





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CLASSICAL GREEK LITERATURE

VOL. II.



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A HISTORY

OF

CLASSICAL GREEK LITERATURE

BY THE

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HISTORY OF GREEK LITERATURE.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION—EARLY USE OF WRITING—THE INFLUENCES OF
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY AND THE DAWN OF HISTORY
IN THE SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

§ 295. *Introductory.*—The history of Greek prose literature, as we possess it, begins almost at the close of the poetical development of the nation, at least at the close of its original development, for though many poets flourished later than our earliest prose writers, no new species of poetry, except possibly the bucolic, dates its origin from this time, and the later poets were in few cases men of remarkable or enduring originality. Hence it is that, in a logical survey of Greek literature, we may allow ourselves to treat all the poetry before we approach the consideration of prose writing. This, indeed, is now the accepted order among the German writers on the subject.

I have in the former volume stated my belief that the composition of any long or elaborate poem postulates the use of writing, and I therefore proposed this condition as giving us the earliest limit for the date of the *Iliad* as we have it ; but many eminent critics have thought differently, and have argued that poetry can be composed and preserved without any such aid. Fortunately this divergence of opinion does not exist in

the case of prose literature. Everyone admits that prose is impossible without writing—nay, even without the well-established habit of fluent and sustained writing. A few words on the history of the alphabet in Greece may therefore suitably introduce our present subject.

§ 296. The materials for the investigation of early Greek writing are to be found in many various and scattered inscriptions, of which all those discovered up to a certain date are to be found in Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptionum Græcarum*, but the later are scattered through various archæological journals. The stricter study of these documents must be prosecuted by means of photographs or facsimiles, as the shape and character of the letters are generally our only means of determining the age of the inscription. Investigations of this kind, when reduced to method, are called the science of *Epigraphik*, and, with the constantly increasing excavations and discoveries through the Hellenic East, have become the most important and fruitful branch of recent Greek studies. But in England the Universities have completely neglected this study, and the best English Hellenists, with a very few brilliant exceptions, are as helpless in the face of an old Greek inscription as if it were in a Semitic tongue. I can only refer the reader to a German summary of the main results—Kirchhoff's *Studien zur Geschichte des griechischen Alphabets* (3rd ed. 1877). In this very able book he will find it shown that our earliest inscription of determinable date—that of the Greek mercenaries on the leg of a colossal figure at Abu-Simbel—is by no means written in the most primitive form of the Greek alphabet. And yet this inscription cannot have been made later than 600 B.C., more probably about 640 B.C.¹ The sepulchral inscriptions found at Melos

¹ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΟΣΞΕΛΘΟΝΤΟΣΞΕΞΕΛΕΦΑΝΤΙΝΑΝΨΑΜΑΤΙΧΟ

ΤΑΥΤΑΕΓΡΑΨΑΝΤΟΙΣΤΗΝΨΑΜΑΤΙΧΟΙΤΟΙΘΕΟΚΛΕΟΣ (sc. τοῦ Θεοκλέος)

ΕΠΛΕΟΝΗΛΘΟΝΔΕΚΕΡΚΙΟΣΚΑΤΥΠΕΡΘΕΝΙΣ (sc. ἕως) ΟΠΟΤΑΜΟΣ

ΑΝΙΗΛΛΟΓΛΟΣΟΣ (sc. ἀλλόγλωσσος) ΔΗΧΕΠΟΤΑΣΙΜΤΟΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΟΣΔΕ
ΑΜΑΣΙΣ

ΕΓΡΑΦΕΔΑΜΕΑΡΧΟΝΑΜΟΙΒΙΧΟΚΑΙΠΕΛΕ, ΟΣΟΤΔΑΜΟ (sc. son of nobody).

Cf. Lepsius, *Denk.* xii. plate 99, No. 531 for a facsimile; also Boeckh, vol. iii. p. 507 (No. 5126).

and Thera, though perhaps not older in date, are far more archaic, and point to a condition of writing at least half a century older among the Ionians, who had modified their writing into the character found at Abu-Simbel. These and other facts collected by Kirchhoff with great care show that the Phœnician alphabet of twenty-two letters must have been adopted by the Greeks, and quickly modified to suit the different character of their language before 700 B.C., and perhaps considerably earlier. But for our purposes we need not claim an earlier origin than 700, though perhaps the constant discoveries of old inscriptions at Olympia will soon afford us clearer and fuller evidence. I predict that if such evidence be forthcoming it will tend to increase rather than to diminish the age of the use of writing in Greece.

§ 297. These considerations are confirmed by another phenomenon which we find in Greece about the same period. The rise of lawgivers and of codes of law points distinctly to writing, for we can hardly conceive the ordinances of a statesman entrusted to vague tradition. The date and character of Zaleukos, Charondas, and Lycurgus are indeed subject to dispute, and the extant Spartan rhetra may be suspected to be later in form,¹ but no one can doubt that the Locrian and Spartan constitutions were early fixed in writing, certainly a considerable number of years earlier than those of Drako and Solon, which are fairly determined as shortly before and after the year 600 B.C. Quite in concert with this development of law we hear of the sayings of the Seven Wise Men, whose varying catalogue includes rather the politicians than the early philosophers, and whose wisdom was not only laid down in verse but in those short proverbs which easily fasten on the popular imagination. When Herodotus speaks of Æsop as a

¹ It is cited and explained by Plutarch (*Lycurgus*, c. 6) : *Διὸς Σουλτανίου καὶ Ἀθανᾶς Σουλτανίας ἱερὸν ἰδρυσάμενον, φυλὰς φυλάξαντα καὶ ὥσας ὠβάξαντα, τριάκοντα γερουσίαν σὺν ἀρχαγέταις καταστήσαντα, ὥρας ἐξ ὥρας ἀπελλάζειν μεταξὺ Βαβύκας τε καὶ Κνακιδῶνος, οὕτως εἰσφέρειν τε καὶ ἀφίστασθαι· δάμω δὲ τὰν κυρίαν ἦμεν καὶ κράτος· αἱ δὲ σκολιὰν ὁ δᾶμος ἔλοιτο, τοὺς πρεσβυγενέας καὶ ἀρχαγέτας ἀποστατήρας ἦμεν.* Cf. on this Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, iii. p. 346; or Grote's *Greece*, vol. ii. p. 465, sq., and notes.

λογοποιός of early date, he seems to point to some form of prose fable far older than his own time. It is remarkable that savage races in our own day have made beast-fables their first literary effort on the discovery of the use of writing.¹ But all these things have left us but faint and doubtful traces ; for the wisdom of the Seven Wise Men, and the fables of Æsop, have come down to us in a rehandled and modern form, and we know nothing of any early prose form in which these things were originally composed. But on the whole, we have ample evidence for the common use of writing throughout the seventh century, evidence which is, in my opinion, necessary to account for the development of Greek lyric poetry, the construction of codes of law, and the general literary culture of the age.

In fact, the wonder is, not that prose writing came so early, but so late in the history of Greek literature. But the national taste was so well satisfied by poetry that it required special influences, other than the mere familiarity with writing, to induce men to set down their thoughts in unmetrical form. To these we may now turn.

§ 298. We cannot embrace in this volume either the history of Greek religion or of Greek philosophy, both large and interesting subjects, and demanding special investigation. We are here concerned with them only so far as they produced a direct effect in moulding either the form or the tendencies of general literature. But as religion underwent great changes in the sixth century, and philosophy then originated, our sketch of Greek literature must embrace the remoter effects of both on the writers of that and succeeding generations.

We have already noted² in Pindar the allusions to a future world, and to its rewards and punishments, and that this doctrine was due to the Orphic mysteries, which were common through Greece in this century. The origin of these mysteries is uniformly referred to Pieria in Thrace, from which they are said to have been brought to Lesbos, and then spread over Greece. They are closely identified, on the one hand, with the worship of Dionysus, which also originated in Thrace,

¹ Cf. my *Proleg. to Anc. Hist.*, pp. 118, 391.

² Vol. I. p. 213.

but had assumed, by contact with Phrygia, an enthusiastic and orgiastic nature, so that the dithyrambs to the god, of old sung to the cithara, were adapted to flute and cymbal accompaniments; on the other hand, the Orphic rites were bound up with the widely spread mysteries of Demeter and Persephone, celebrated at Eleusis. But still more remarkable, and more important than either of these indications, is the identification of Orpheus, as the priest of Apollo, with Dionysus, and the evidences that he and Apollo, with whom he is identified, once in hostility with Dionysus, became reconciled with that god, who, under the title of Zagreus, was made a sort of night-side to the sungod, and ultimately confused with him. This secret doctrine, the identification of Apollo and Dionysus, is said to have been that disclosed in *Æschylus*' trilogy about *Lycurgus* of Thrace, for which he was indicted as guilty of impiety. It is accordingly evident that the Delphic priests had recognised and adopted the Orphic rites as in harmony with their own creed, so that they must have been of real importance in Greece, and widely spread through the hearts of men.

§ 299. We may infer, however, from the scanty evidence of later writers that this religion of mysteries and rites, whether Orphic or Eleusinian or Dionysiac, was fundamentally distinct from the popular creed. It preached the identification of the most diverse gods, perhaps even the unity of all the gods. It approached the dogma of a world-soul, and of the divinity of the soul of man, if not of all the world, as a manifestation of God. It portrayed the wonder of a suffering deity, and of good overborne by the powers of darkness for a season. It held out the hope of immortality to those who embraced the faith, and made them a chosen people. It replaced, in fact, the old Homeric society of obvious human gods, with their vulgar amours and passions, by mystic principles and half-understood devotions. There seems little doubt that the established Delphic priesthood who adopted it borrowed from Egypt not only many elements of the new creed, such as the murder of the god and his resurrection from the dead, but more distinctly the policy of the Egyptian priests, who are known to have been monotheists or rather pantheists, yet who not only tolerated but taught a most

complicated polytheism to the people. Thus the established religion went on : temples were built and statues consecrated, sacrifices offered and feasts celebrated to all the gods ; but the select, the initiated, the higher classes in religion found their comfort in far different beliefs, which could not be made public.

Yet they could not but make themselves felt. Inasmuch as perhaps all the literary men of the age knew these mysteries, we find among them, at least, two leading ideas engendered by their faith : the conception of law and order in both nature and the life of man, an order resulting from the control of one supreme principle, untouched by caprice or passion ; and the conception of mystery, of something unexplained in the world, of something revealed to privileged classes and hidden from the vulgar.

§ 300. While the belief in a future state takes but transient hold of the Greek mind, and even disappears in its vulgar form, these other larger notions seem to me to dominate most writers from Pindar onward, but above all to have affected the early philosophers, concerning whose views we must also say a few words. Most of them have unfortunately left us no fragments whatever ; but if they had, we should treat them as literature, not as philosophy.

The very same tendencies which suggested in religion the identification of various gods, and an increased appreciation of unity in worship, seem to have acted on the secular thinkers of Miletus, and set them to seeking unity in the substance or matter of the world. The doctrine of Thales that moisture was the common element of which all things were variously compounded, is directly analogous to the cult of Dionysus, the god of moisture, to whom all growth and fruitfulness are due, and who, in combination with Apollo, the god of light and heat, generates all the conditions of change in nature. The theories of the sixth century started in Ionia, and have this common point, the search after unity, as their leading feature. The followers of Thales found moisture too coarse a primeval substance, and substituted the more subtle air (Anaximenes) or imperceptible fire (Heraclitus). Others, such as Xenophanes and Pythagoras, advanced beyond the conception of mere

matter, and sought their single principle either in number, with its eternal and certain laws, or in some higher abstract Unity, which embraced all apparent contradictions.

§ 301. The effect of these theories on literature was twofold: first, that the matter of thought became worth recording apart from its literary form, and knowledge as such was to be pursued apart from elegance in diction; secondly, they corroborated the religious teaching of the mysteries, that 'all things are not as they seem,' that public opinion and ordinary sense miss the truer and deeper meaning of experience, that there are secrets and difficulties in human knowledge, and many things hard to understand and still harder to explain. The first resulted in the origin of prose literature,¹ which according to consistent tradition was due to the wonder-working *Pherecydes* of Syros, son of Babys, who lived about the middle of the sixth century, and is called the teacher of Pythagoras. His semi-theological semi-philosophical book called *Ἐπτάμυχος*, on theogony and the revelation of the gods to the world, was the first attempt at a prose treatise.²

Neither Thales nor Pythagoras left anything written, and it is remarkable that Xenophanes, though he was a great adversary of the poets and of public opinion in general, and led the conflict between philosophy and poetry, nevertheless employed, not only the poetic form, but even the poetic habit of public recitation to disseminate his views. Perhaps there was as yet no reading public in the newer colonies of Italy and Sicily when he lived; but the fact remains certain, and also the similar practice of his follower Parmenides.

If, indeed, *Theagenes* of Rhegium, the first literary critic,

¹ The Greeks said prose *writing*, as they were fond of ascribing every step in culture to a definite inventor. But, as we have shown, and as the inscriptions above cited have since proved, mere prose writing must have long been in use for simple inscriptions, and for laws. But the use of prose for *literary* purposes was a distinct step, and much later than might have been expected.

² We have the opening sentence of it quoted by Diogenes: Ζεὺς μὲν καὶ Χρόνος ἔσσεαι καὶ Χθὼν ἦν. Χθονὶ δὲ οὖνομα ἐγένετο Γῆ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζεὺς γέρας διδοῖ. And again (Clem. Strom.): Ζὰς ποιεῖ φᾶρος μέγα τε καὶ καλόν· καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ποικίλλει γῆν καὶ ὡγηνὸν καὶ τὰ ὡγηνοῦ δῶματα.

who wrote on Homer and introduced the principle of allegorical interpretation, really flourished about 525 B.C., the reason just assigned would not hold good ; but the date rests on the single authority of Tatian, and I hesitate to reckon a literary critic among the earliest pioneers of prose literature.

§ 302. On the contrary, HERACLEITUS of Ephesus¹ was perhaps the first great prose writer among the Greeks, and the source of a new current in the literature of his country. His treatise on Nature,² though not published by himself, was copied from the MS. he had deposited in the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, and was early known and read in Sicily, as appears from the fragments of his Sicilian contemporary Epicharmus, and from Attic references down to the days of Socrates. The whole philosophy of the man who had discovered that all organism grows, and that all growth implies motion, turned (like the Eleatic theory of Xenophanes) upon a contempt of ordinary opinions—nay, even a contempt of our ordinary senses, which are witnesses only to what is dead, as they perceive not the inner motion of every substance in the world. He therefore appealed to a *select public*, and made a severance among the members of society which had, perhaps, been unknown in Greek cities heretofore.

But what is more important as regards literature, he was the first Greek who ventured to write obscurely, and to profess to do so without apology. This is, to my mind, the important and novel side of Heracleitus in Greek literature ; for from his day onward we find obscurity not uncommon even in the next generation, whereas in older literature it is unknown. In the following age we find it affected by his followers, and even in Thucydides and in Sophocles, but banished again by the good sense of the Athenian public. It does not reappear till the Alexandrian epoch, with which we are not concerned. When

¹ He was apparently of noble family, and certainly an exclusive aristocrat in sentiment. He flourished about 500-480 B.C., and seems to have been a morose and unsocial man. Diog. Laert. ix. 1, gives various stories about him and some quotations, with spurious letters.

² Also said to have been called *Μοῦσαι*, being in three books, which was the old number of these goddesses.

I speak of obscurity the word may, of course, be taken in different senses. First, there is the obscurity of allusions not clear to the reader ; and Pindar is full of this, but of this only, as he was one of the ordinary crowd in philosophy, and was not capable of any thoughts in themselves profound. Secondly, there is the obscurity of a crabbed or affected style. In Æschylus, on the contrary, we have not only the first kind of obscurity—the allusions to mysteries—but we have obscure thoughts, difficult to express and unintelligible to the most advanced Greeks ; for we have the evidence of Aristophanes, which I here believe, that Æschylus thought even the Athenians no judges of poetry, and would not accommodate his writing to their comprehension.

It has not, perhaps, been sufficiently remarked how important was the example of Heracleitus, and how easy it is to lead the fashion in obscure writing. We must remember that Heracleitus was really a quaint and original thinker, and a remarkable innovator, not only in thought, but in style ; for he wrote a rythmical, picturesque prose, at a time when prose was in its infancy. His fragments are far more poetical in the higher sense than the verses of Xenophanes, and for this very reason he may have scorned the shackles of metre, and set down unchanged the utterances of his teeming mind. This accounts for the remark of the rhetor Demetrius,¹ who says that the frequent asyndeta were the greatest cause of his obscurity. Each thought was thrown out by itself, and the reader must find its logical connection with the rest for himself.²

In addition to Zeller's exhaustive chapter on Heracleitus,³ I may recommend the various brilliant essays of J. Bernays, reaching from 1848 to 1869 ; some separately published, others

¹ § 192.

² Specimens of Heracleitus' style are the following : ἔμπεδον οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ κως ἐς κυκεῶνα πάντα συνειλέονται. ἐστὶ τωτὸ τέρψις ἀτερψή, γνωστὸς ἀγνωσίῃ, μέγα μικρόν, ἄνω κάτω περιχωρόντα καὶ ἀμειβόμενα ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἰῶνος παιδιῇ. αἰών, παῖς ἐστὶ παίζων, πεττεύων συνδιαφερόμενος. τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός. οὐ ξυνίασι ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογεί· παλίντροπος ἁρμονίῃ ὥσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης.

³ *Phil. d. Griech.* i. 566-677.

in the seventh and ninth vols. of the *Rhein. Mus.* We have also, from Mr. I. Bywater of Oxford, a new critical and more complete edition (1877) of the fragments, 130 in number, with Diogenes' *Life*, and the spurious *Letters*, done with that conscientious care which distinguishes all his work.

§ 303. The example of the theologians and philosophers was, however, active in another direction ; for it stimulated writers on the genealogies of gods and of men to set them down in prose. The earliest of these are enveloped in mist ; it is even doubtful whether *Cadmus* of Miletus, the reputed father of history, ever existed, or whether his account of the settlement of Ionia was not a late forgery. *Acusilaus*, of the Bœotian Argos, near Aulis, the son of Cabas, who devoted himself to mythical genealogies chiefly adapted from Hesiod, is a real personage, of whose work some thirty notices are preserved in the scholiasts ; but we know nothing more about him. Equally obscure is *Dionysius* of Miletus, the reputed author of a Persian history ; and the prose works attributed to Eumelus of Corinth were certainly later paraphrases from poetical treatises. *Pherecydes* of Ieros (the second of the name) certainly did some service in genealogies, which even at his time (B.C. 460) were the only phase of history esteemed and understood. A society consisting of clans always lays the greatest stress on genealogies ; as, for example, the ancient Irish, whose histories are little more than enumerations of names.¹ Xanthus, Charon, and Scylax are only of interest in connection with Herodotus (below, p. 26).

§ 304. But the second or critical element of history was added presently by a greater man, HECATÆUS of Miletus, who seems to me to have the best right to be called the Father of History among the Greeks. For he was the forerunner of Herodotus in his mode of life and his conception of setting down his experience. He attained such eminence as to be consulted pub-

¹ Those who ridicule these Irish genealogies are ignorant that they were practically title-deeds, for any man proving himself an O'Neill or a Maguire had a right to graze cattle in the O'Neill and Maguire country, and to till it. Hence these genealogies were early kept, and no doubt early disputed, and this gives them an exceptional value. I perceive the same anxiety to show hereditary rights in all the usurpers of power throughout early Greek history.

licly by the Ionians at the time of their revolt (incited by Aristagoras) from the Persians. He knew the Persian empire from personal examination, and advised strongly against any revolt. When he could not persuade them, he advised them to secure the supremacy of the sea, a common capital, and a centralisation of forces ; which could only be done, he considered, by applying the treasures given by Cræsus to Apollo's temple at Branchidæ to supply the sinews of war. These views show him to have been a man of large political insight. He also advised Aristagoras, at the end of the revolt, to fortify the island of Leros,¹ and there await the tide of events ; but for the third time, his advice was unheeded. These facts all rest upon the authority of Herodotus, who mentions him elsewhere, and systematically, as *λογοποιὸς ἄνηρ*, or *ὁ λογοποιός*. In one place he tells us that Hecatæus boasted to the priests of Egyptian Thebes that he could trace his origin through fifteen generations back to a god, which they denied, saying that at least 345 generations could be proved by them to have lived on the earth since the reign of the gods. Herodotus also mentions without criticism his theory of the unjust expulsion of the Pelasgi from Attica, and he often alludes to his predecessor slightly, without expressly mentioning his name.

From these facts, along with the notices of Suidas, it appears that the historian was born about Ol. 57-8, and died after the conclusion of the Persian war, about Ol. 76. His high position in society is proved not only by the story just mentioned, but by his wide and careful travels, which imply good means and connections. Whether he learned from Pythagoras we cannot tell. His travels apparently embraced Egypt, Persia, Pontus, Thrace, as well as the Greek world, and were probably made before the Ionian revolt in 500 B.C., when his wide experience was publicly recognised, and after 516 B.C., when the town of Boryza in Thrace became Persian, which he states it to be in a geographical fragment. Thus the settled and orderly

¹ There is an inscription published in Ross's collection (ii. p. 28), in which some Hecatæus is honoured as a founder and benefactor by the Lerians. Whether this person be the historian, or a relative, I am unable to tell. The fact is mentioned by Mure (iv. 143).

condition of the Persian empire, when Darius was established on the throne, seems to have enabled Hecataeus to acquire his geographical materials. It has been inferred from a story preserved in a fragment of Diodorus that he was sent as an ambassador to Artaphernes after the conquest of Ionia, and that he obtained good terms for his countrymen. He is mentioned as a man of exceptional learning (along with Hesiod, Pythagoras, and Xenophanes) by his younger contemporary Heracleitus, and classed by Hermogenes with the great historians of Greece.

§ 305. Of his works we can recognise two : a geographical description of the known world, and an historical work, sometimes called *Genealogies*. He seems to have had one predecessor in each—Scylax of Caryanda, who explored the Indus for Darius Hystaspes, and wrote a *Periplus* which was soon lost, and Acusilaus of Argos. He completed and improved the map first constructed by Anaximander, and it was, doubtless, this copy which Aristagoras brought with him to exhibit at Sparta. He narrated curious natural phenomena, just as Herodotus, but naturally believed more than Herodotus did, and is accordingly criticised by him for credulity. But he was, nevertheless, the first Greek historian who did apply rational criticism¹ to test

¹ The following are the chief specimens :—

Müller, frag. 346 : 'Εποίησαν δὲ Ἑλλήνων τινὲς ὡς Ἡρακλῆς ἀναγάγοι ταύτην τοῦ "Αἰδοῦ τὸν κύνα, οὔτε ὑπὸ γῆν ὁδοῦ διὰ τοῦ σπηλαίου φεροῦσης, οὔτε ἔτοιμον ὃν πεισθῆναι θεῶν ὑπόγειον εἶναι τινα οἴκησιν, ἐς ἣν ἀθροίζεσθαι τὰς ψυχάς· ἀλλὰ Ἐκαταῖος μὲν ὁ Μιλήσιος λόγον εὑρεν εἰκότα, 'ὕφιν φήσας ἐπὶ Ταινάρῳ τραφῆναι δεινόν, κληθῆναι δὲ "Αἰδοῦ κύνα, ὅτι ἔδει τὸν δηχθέντα τεθνάναι παραντίκα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰοῦ· καὶ τοῦτον ἔφη τὸν ὕφιν ὑπὸ Ἡρακλέους ἀχθῆναι παρ' Εὐρυσθέα.'

Frag. 349 : 'Γηρυνόην δέ, ἐφ' ὅντινα ὁ Ἀργεῖος Ἡρακλῆς ἐστάλη πρὸς Εὐρυσθέως, τὰς βοῦς ἀπελάσαι τὰς Γηρυνόου καὶ ἀγαγεῖν ἐς Μυκήνας, οὐδὲν τι προσήκειν τῇ γῇ τῶν Ἰβήρων,' Ἐκαταῖος ὁ λογοποιὸς λέγει, 'οὐδὲ ἐπὶ νησὶν τινα Ἐρύθειαν ἔξω τῆς μεγάλης θαλάσσης σταλῆναι Ἡρακλέα· ἀλλὰ τῆς ἡπείρου τῆς περὶ Ἀμβρακίαν τε καὶ Ἀμφιλόχους βασιλεία γενέσθαι Γηρυνόην καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἡπείρου ταύτης ἀπελάσαι Ἡρακλέα τὰς βοῦς, οὐδὲ τοῦτον φαῦλον ἄθλον τιθέμενον.'

Frag. 357 : 'Ἡ πολλὴ δόξα κατέχει μὴ ἐλθεῖν τὸν Αἴγυπτον εἰς Ἀργος, καθάπερ ἄλλοι τε φασὶ καὶ Ἐκαταῖος γράφων οὕτως· 'ὁ δὲ Αἴγυπτος αὐτὸς μὲν οὐκ ἦλθεν εἰς Ἀργος· λέγεται δὲ τις ἐν Ἀργεὶ πρῶν, ὅπου δικάζουσιν Ἀργεῖοι.'

popular beliefs ; and his originality in this point, the result, no doubt, of the contemporary philosophy at Miletus, must not be overlooked. From his geographical work some 330 citations have been collected by Carl Müller, most of them names of towns in Stephanus of Byzantium, and a few in Strabo.¹ From his *Genealogies* (of which the genuineness was disputed by Callimachus, but defended by Eratosthenes and Strabo) a smaller number of more interesting passages still survive, bringing up the total number (together with the *fragmenta incerta*) to almost 400. The very opening sentence of the *Genealogies* is characteristic.² On his style we have three very interesting notices : Strabo says³ that the school of Cadmus, Pherecydes, and Hecataeus, though abandoning metre, were in other respects poetical writers. Hermogenes⁴ has a general description of his style, which is somewhat as follows : 'Hecataeus of Miletus, from whom Herodotus profited most, is a pure and clear writer, and in some respects possesses no ordinary charm. Using

Mure says (iv. 71) that while his foreign geography was full of good observations of an historical kind, his genealogies and his Greek notices were confined to the mythical period. The passages just cited show that he applied criticism here also, and that Mure's distinction is probably unfounded.

¹ C. Müller thinks it unlikely that the genuine work survived till Stephanus' time, and holds that he used an interpolated and modified copy. Thus Capua was called Vulturum in Hecataeus' day, and yet is cited from his work (fr. 30) with its new name. A map of his views is published in most good ancient atlases, and also in the appendix to Mure's fourth volume. The gap in his description of the coast from Naples to Genoa is well noted by the latter, and points to some distinct prohibition on the part of the Romans and Tyrrhenians, which kept Greek vessels from landing on their coasts. Probably Greek ships were compelled to sail from Naples by way of Sardinia to Mentone, the first town mentioned on the coast above Naples, at least in the fragments we have in Stephanus. But the like omission of Athens, Argos, and other renowned Greek towns, shows that there was some other cause of gaps either in Hecataeus' book, or in Stephanus' quotations from it.

² Frag. 332 : Βούλεται μέντοι διάνοιαν, οἷον ὡς Ἐκαταῖος φησιν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆς ἱστορίας· 'Ἐκαταῖος Μιλήσιος ᾧδε μυθεῖται.' Cf. also § 12 : 'Ἐκαταῖος Μιλήσιος ᾧδε μυθεῖται· τάδε γράφω, ὥς μοι ἀληθέα δοκέει εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοί τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὥς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν.

³ i. p. 34.

⁴ *De gen. dic.* ii. 12.

the Ionic dialect pure, and not mixed with epic and other elements, as Herodotus did, he is in diction less poetical.¹ Neither is he so finished a writer. His charm is, therefore, not comparable to that of Herodotus in treating similar subjects; for the matter of a book is not its only element as regards delighting the reader, but the diction, in all its details, is of great importance. Thus Hecataeus, not having given equal thought and care to his diction, was completely surpassed by his successor.' The modern reader will of course observe that the last remark is wrongly put. No doubt, Hecataeus, with ten times the labour, could not have attained the elegance in style of Herodotus, who did not write till Greek prose had been studied and practised for nearly a century longer; but the facts on which Hermogenes based his remark are doubtless strictly true. Lastly, in *Longinus de Sublim.*, chap. xxvii., the author says: 'Sometimes when a historian is speaking of a person, he suddenly leaves his own attitude and passes into that of the person he is describing. This figure should be used when a sudden crisis brooks no delay in the writer, and, as it were, compels him to pass at once from person to person. So it is in Hecataeus. 'Ceyx being grieved at this, immediately requested the Heracleidae, his descendants, to leave the country. For I am not able to help you; in order then that ye may not be yourselves destroyed, and, moreover, injure me, go² to some other community.'

§ 306. I have dwelt at considerable length on Hecataeus, who represents most distinctly the positive tendencies of the sixth century as opposed to its speculative and mystical aspirations. With him all was matter of fact, observation, and plain

¹ This is quite in a different sense from Strabo's remark.

² Frag. 353: 'Ἐτι γε μὴν ἔσθ' ὅτε περὶ προσώπου διηγοίμενος ὁ συγγραφεὺς, ἐξαίφνης παρενεχθεὶς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πρόσωπον ἀντιμεθίσταται.—Διὸ καὶ ἡ πρόχρησις τοῦ σχήματος τότε ἡνίκα ὁξὺς ὁ καιρὸς ἂν διαμέλλειν τῷ γράζοντι μὴ διδᾶν, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐπαναγκάξῃ μεταβαίνειν ἐκ προσώπων εἰς πρόσωπα· ὡς καὶ παρὰ τῷ Ἑκαταίῳ· 'Κλυξ δὲ ταῦτα δεινὰ ποιούμενος, αὐτίκα ἐκέλευε τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας ἐπιγόνους ἐκχωρεῖν· Οὐ γὰρ ἐμὴν δυνατὸς εἶμι ἀρήγειν· ὡς μὴ ἂν αὐτοὶ τε ἀπόλυσθε καὶ ἐμὲ τρώσῃτε, ἐς ἄλλον τινὰ δῆμον ἀποίχεσθαι.'

Note the infin. ἀποίχεσθαι. Did he return here to the narrative form?

recording of observations. Thus the positive tendencies, which culminated in the splendid histories and geographies of later days, owed their origin to this early school of practical enquirers. But I will not prosecute this side of Greek literature further here, and shall consider the successors of Hecataeus in relation with their most illustrious and perfect type, Herodotus. I feel justified in doing so, not merely because the Persian wars form so great a crisis in Greek history that no sort of literature, save the choral lyric poetry, passed through it unchanged, but also because Miletus—the great intellectual hothouse of Greece, the centre of her art, her philosophy, and her history—was completely destroyed by the Persians at the opening of the fifth century, and so the splendid continuity of Greek thought received a disastrous check. Up to this date, the title Milesian meets us in every field of thought; from henceforth it disappears for centuries from our studies. Simple stories of rude shepherd life, and the loves of rustic swains, were known long after as Milesian tales—a faint and wretched afterglow of the most lurid and stormy sunset in the history of Greek intellect. Prose literature received a blow from which it never recovered; for while the tendency of Ionic prose had been (as it ought to be) to assume the narrative, or the philosophical form, the destruction of its proper home threw the balance into Attica, where the rhetorical element became so predominant as to control all descriptions of prose writing. Hence, as Mure observes,¹ Greek prose has permanently suffered, and we have only one great specimen of what narrative prose might have been but for the injurious influences of Athens. Herodotus, with all his genius, was unable to stem the tide of Attic influence; yet his great work shows us clearly what might have been expected but for the subjugation of Ionia and, above all, the destruction of Miletus.

I have here left untouched another hidden but powerful tendency in the religious mysteries of the sixth century, especially in the worship of Dionysus—I mean their *dramatic* elements. But this has been treated in a separate chapter,² when I discussed another phase in the history of the subject.

¹ iv. 127.

² Vol. I. chap. xiv.

CHAPTER II.

HERODOTUS AND THE CONTEMPORARY IONIC PROSE WRITERS.

§ 307. THOUGH Miletus, the great centre and mainspring of Ionic culture, was untimely destroyed, the influence it had already exerted over eastern Hellas could not disappear in an instant. A series of men attempted to utilise prose for historical purposes, and communicated the old Milesian spirit to Herodotus, who, although he lived to see the Peloponnesian war and to witness the teaching of the sophists and the rise of rhetoric at Athens, was, nevertheless, so strictly a writer of Ionic genius, so completely a coequal in spirit and in culture of Epicharmus, and Pindar, and Æschylus, that in a rational survey of Greek literature he must be placed among his predecessors as one born out of due season. But the culture of Athens had, perhaps, not yet swallowed up all the rest of Greek literary genius, and the style of Hellanicus, a younger contemporary, or, at least, not older than Herodotus, makes us suspect that Herodotus was not so unique as he is generally considered.

We have the late, but respectable, authority of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, that he was born 'a little before the Persian wars,' which would make him older than the account of Pamphila, who gives B.C. 484 as his birth year. As it seems likely, from the absence of later allusions, that he died before 420 B.C., he may have been born before the battle of Marathon. It is generally agreed that Halicarnassus was his native town, though from his long residence at Thurii he is called the Thurian by Aristotle, when quoting the opening words of his history in the *Rhetoric*.¹ He is also called the Thurian

logopoios in a passage cited from an epistle of Julian by Suidas. But Strabo mentions both titles, and explains them in the obvious way just mentioned. Suidas says his parents' names were Lyxes and Dryo, or Rhœo, through one of whom Panyasis was his uncle. An extant epitaph or epigram confirms his father's name, and the obscurity of both, though Suidas calls them illustrious, seems some warrant for the trustworthiness of the tradition.

I see no reason for doubting the relationship with Panyasis, which is rendered internally probable by the peculiar and exceptional education which Herodotus must have received. His intimacy with Homer's poems has been shown from a comparative table of phrases ¹ to be such as we should not expect from ordinary circumstances, but can easily explain by his intercourse with Panyasis, the learned reviver of epic poetry. In the same way he quotes the cyclic poets, Hesiod, the gnomic and lyric poets, and the earlier tragedians, Æschylus and Phrynichus. It seems by accident, rather than from ignorance, that he omits Callinus, Tyrtaeus, the elder Simonides, Stesichorus, Epimenides, and Epicharmus, from references which otherwise embrace all the older literature. The two Sicilian poets may possibly not have been known to him till he went to Thurii, but he writes like a man with all the greater authors at hand, as they may have been in the house of Panyasis and, of course, at Athens, which he visited in mature age. Suidas, indeed, says that he was exiled to Samos by Lygdamis, grandson of the Artemisia whom he delights to honour in his history; that he returned and obtained his country's liberty by expelling Lygdamis, but finding himself disliked, left for Thurii, where he settled and died. But all these facts, if true, could hardly have escaped corroboration by his own allusions, or, at least, by early witnesses.² We hear nothing of Herodotus having married or left any descendants.

§ 308. We can therefore assert nothing, save that a good deal

¹ Mure (vol. ii., Appendix Q) gives an imperfect list.

² All these legends are rejected by A. Bauer, in his researches, as invented when Herodotus began to revive in popularity after long oblivion. But this ground for scepticism is refuted by H. Weil in the *Revue Critique* for Jan. 1, 1880.

of his earlier life was spent in travelling, and apparently travelling for the purpose of his history.¹ This he must have brought with him to Athens in sufficient completion to make him famous, if Sophocles, as Plutarch and Suidas tell us, composed an ode to him in the year 440 B.C. It is probable, therefore, that before this time he had visited Upper Egypt, Susiana, Babylonia (as far as Ardericca and Aghatana), Colchis and Scythia, Thrace, Dodona, Zakynthos, and Cyrene, with most of the countries within this great circuit. The spread of mercantile enterprise from Miletus and Phocæa, and the security afforded by the Persian conquests and good administration of Asia and Egypt, made such voyages not only possible, but perhaps not unusual. Even in the days of Solon it was part of a perfect education to visit, at least, the Lydian court and the wonders of Lower Egypt.

Herodotus' eastern travels seem to have been made before his retirement to Thurii, but we cannot fix the years and order of them, except that he saw the battle-field of Papremis after the year 460 B.C.,² probably while the Athenian armies were in possession of part of the country. He is said by the pseudo-Plutarch to have recited his history when he came to Athens, and (by Suidas) afterwards at Olympia; but the latter tale is plainly an invention suggested by the later fashion of exhibiting there, and the earlier is not much more probable, unless a mere reading among distinguished friends were intended. But if this were so, the alleged public vote of ten talents would of course be inconceivable.³ Yet I see that most recent German critics accept both the public recitation and the state reward.⁴

It is probable that he resided at Athens for some years until he joined, with many other celebrated men, the colony

¹ Travelling for literary purposes was so rare in those early times, that I do not share the confidence of K. O. Müller and others, who assert positively that Herodotus had no other object. Commercial reasons may have existed, though it is not easy to imagine such various voyages conducive to any systematic business. As Stein observes, his personal wanderings seem to have extended precisely to the limits of the Persian dominion; beyond them he only speaks from hearsay.

² iii. 12.

³ Cf. *Euseb. Chron. ad Ol.*, 83-4.

⁴ Stein, *Introd.* to his Edition, i. p. xxii, note.

which founded Thurii, near the old site of Sybaris, in 443 B.C.¹ There can be little doubt that at Athens he learned to know many of the splendid intellects then collected there, besides Sophocles, who seems indebted to him for at least three passages : that in the *Antigone*, brought out in 440, where the greater loss of a brother than a husband is curiously discussed ; the attack on the habits of Egyptians in the *Œdipus Col.* 337, sq., as well as the rehearsal of human misery in the chorus (1211, sq.).² 9^{mar}
the

It also appears from the strongly democratic temper of the later part of his history, in spite of his aristocratical antecedents and parentage, that he came under the influence of Pericles and his policy. Yet if we assume this, and even that he revisited Athens after the Propylæa was built (430 B.C.), we are astonished at the small effect which Attic thought and Attic style made upon his history. The compressed logical speaking of Antiphon, the stately emphasis of Pericles, the subtlety of Euripides, and the whole sophistical school, seem the offspring of another age and another atmosphere. In this society we may conceive him, intellectually at least, a sort of Oliver Goldsmith, often ridiculed by his friends for simplicity, and no doubt underrated, but, withal, far exceeding his clever critics in directness, in grace, and in pathos, and so gaining a place in the literature of his country which his contemporaries never anticipated. But perhaps this is too fanciful, and I would rather

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¹ As K. O. Müller observes, there is no evidence that he left Athens in 443 ; it is even possible, according to the same authority, that he did not leave till after the opening of the Peloponnesian war. But this would throw the composition of his history far too late, if we suppose with Müller that it was not written till his retirement to Italy.

² Cf. further, frag. 380, on the discovery of games to stave off the pangs of hunger ; and frag. 967, on the melting snow causing the inundation of the Nile. The passage above mentioned in the *Antigone* is considered spurious by some critics, but is defended on very reasonable grounds by Kirchhoff, *Ent. des herodot. Gesch.*, pp. 8-9. Though, as he says, we can conceive no later time at which such an interpolation would be popular, it is more likely that Sophocles obtained the story privately from Herodotus than that he copied it from a just published history. Cf. Stein's *Introd.*, p. xxv.

infer from this curious want of influence that the main body of his work was finished when he came there, and that he spent his leisure in completing and perfecting it. There are, it is true, a good many references to current events after 431 B.C.,¹ and these notices are woven into the tenor of the narrative; but, nevertheless, these later allusions which touch the opening of the Peloponnesian war, and some events which may not have occurred till 425 B.C., are easily severed from the main narrative, and are probably additions made to a corrected copy, in which he even refers to the incredulity with which one of his statements had been received. He alludes² to a separate work on Assyria, of which hardly any trace seems to have survived, so that many have thought he only referred to a longer episode which he intended to introduce in his book.

§ 309. His life, which some critics have prolonged beyond all probability into the next century, was ended either at Thurii, where he was even said to have been buried in the market-place, or at Athens. The restless and troubled state of Thurii, together with the late allusions to Athens, make the latter alternative probable enough. A third account transfers his tomb to Pella in Macedonia, which is incredible. The complete absence of allusions to the Sicilian expedition, coupled with his habit of 'writing up' his book to recent times in its allusions, is strong evidence for his death before that event. It has been debated whether the work was finished, and, as usual, critics have held opposite views on the subject: some alleging that the capture of Sestos is a natural and proper end; others that he must have intended to proceed to other events in connection with it. I can only state my opinion that though the author meant to add some details, as is proved by an unfulfilled promise,³ the main subject was completed with the

¹ v. 77; vi. 91, 98; vii. 137, 233; ix. 73 and elsewhere.

² i. 106 and 184. Prof. Rawlinson cites a passage in Aristotle's *Natural History*, and some notices of Parthian manners in John of Malala, which may possibly be taken from it; but according to the best MSS., which Kirchhoff supported by the expression *πεποίηκε*, used by Aristotle, the passage comes from the poet Hesiod.

³ iii. 213.

repulse of the Persians from Europe, and the work substantially and properly concluded.

Similarly it has been debated whether he wrote his work in middle or in advanced life ; and, as Mure has observed, its tone and style, in the absence of outward evidence, are certain to produce the impression of an aged man telling his long experiences to a younger generation. This feeling is enhanced by the strong contrast to his Attic contemporaries which has already been mentioned. Most of the debates about his life are of this vague and uncertain character, and are after all but waste of time. I will only observe that his most elaborate biographer, Dahlmann, seems to me more unfortunate and illogical than the rest in his conjectures, none of which I have accepted.

§ 310. But of late years A. Kirchhoff has taken up the question with his usual acuteness, and has discussed in a special pamphlet¹ the evidences in the work itself, which are, as he rightly says, our only real evidence. He thinks the earlier part of the work shows traces of familiarity with Athens, from the comparison of the circuit of Ecbatana with that of Athens,² from the comparing of a distance with that from the agora at Athens to Olympia,³ from his knowledge of Æschylus' poetry, and from his reducing Persian measures to Attic.⁴ Hence he infers that the historian arrived at Athens from his travels about 446 B.C., and finished up to iii. 119 (the story of Intaphernes' wife) at Athens early in 442 B.C., so that Sophocles came to know it. He thinks that the criticism of his dialogue among the Persian conspirators,⁵ to which he afterwards pointedly refers,⁶ may have been one of the causes for his suspending his work and going, in the interests of Pericles, whom he admired greatly, to Thurii. From there he visited Sicily and Magna Græcia, and thus resumes his history with special knowledge of Crotoniate legends. From v. 77, in which the Propylæa at Athens, which were not finished till

¹ *Die Entstehungszeit des herodotischen Geschichtswerkes*, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1878.

² i. 98.

³ iii. 80.

⁴ ii. 7.

⁵ vi. 43.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

431 B.C. are mentioned, and from other hints in the later books, the historian seems to have returned to Athens about that time, and proceeded with his work up to 428 B.C., which contains the latest references to contemporary events. Kirchhoff holds that the work was then interrupted by the death of Herodotus, as it should have included the victory at the Eurymedon.¹

But the whole of this acute argument is based on the hypothesis that our text stands exactly as it was originally composed, and that allusions were not afterwards inserted. The argument from silence used to limit the last year of Herodotus' writing to 428 B.C. is also very precarious. It is also certain that a successful recitation, followed by public rewards at Athens, which Kirchhoff accepts, cannot possibly have been a reading of the first three books, but rather of the last three, in which Athens is really glorified. This consideration upsets either the tradition or Kirchhoff's theory.

There are two busts of Herodotus in the Naples Museum, neither of which is of good workmanship, and which are, moreover, not very like or referable to the same original. One is a double Herme, with Thucydides at its back; the other is a smaller and plainer bust, but with a peculiar ugly and friendly face, not unlike the bust of Socrates, and with much of the gentle and gossiping expression which we might expect in the historian. I should be disposed to consider this as our best authority, but for the recent confirmation of the 'Thucydides on the double Herme.

§ 311. Turning from the historian to his work, it must be at once premised that no abstract of each book will here be attempted, because such an account gives a false idea of the work, which, while following a general plan, abounds in so many digressions, small and great, in so many stray remarks of interest in literature and archaeology, in so many anecdotes of national or individual peculiarities, that any reader can take it up anywhere, and find it both instructive and amusing. Even a careful and lengthy digest of the general argument, such as is given by Mure,² conveys no idea of the general effect, which

¹ *Op. cit.*; cf. his summary, p. 26.

² iv. 276-94.

can be far better appreciated by a perusal of any twenty chapters.

The plan is distinctly stated at the opening. It is to narrate the great conflict of Greeks and barbarians; so that the glorious deeds of both may not perish, and that their true causes may be known. Herodotus thus chooses no petty quarrel between neighbouring Greek cities, no dispute of transitory moment, but the great shock of East and West, of liberty and despotism, which has lasted in many Protean phases up to the present day. The first result of this large conception, which rises above the narrow nationalism of his successors, is that his history gives us more information about the state of ancient nations and their culture than all the other Greek historians put together.

§ 312. His preface is on the mythical conflicts between the Greeks and the Asiatics; but after a very brief sketch in five chapters he boldly lays aside the mythical point of view, without caring to decide upon the question of aggression there disputed, and states his intention of starting from the first Eastern aggressor upon the Greeks for whom he can vouch from his own knowledge, not forgetting to tell of cities, both great and small, as he proceeds, seeing that the fortunes of men change, and their glory waxes and wanes with the lapse of time. He enters at once upon Croesus of Lydia, and proceeds to give an account of the kingdom since its foundation by Gyges to its destruction by Cyrus, turning aside constantly to explain its gradual encroachment upon and conquest of the Ionian cities. The antiquities of Ionia, and its connection with Attica and Achaia, are probably drawn from his uncle Panyasis' poem, and are highly interesting as regards the federal constitution, the dialects, and the culture of the early Ionians.¹ But there are also interwoven digressions of dramatic interest—the legends of the visit of Solon to Croesus, and the affecting story of Atys; others of historical importance, such as the reign of Peisistratus, the rise of Sparta through Lycurgus, and her early struggles with

¹ i. cc. 142–51. Niebuhr thought the grand catalogue of the Persian forces was borrowed from Choerilus (cf. § 109). But this poet was younger than Herodotus.

Tegea. The conquest of Lydia by Cyrus leads him to go back to the rise of the Median empire, and its merging into that of the Persians by the revolt of Cyrus. The customs and religion of the Persians are described, and then their conquest of Ionia, Caria, and Lycia, with constant notes on these latter nations and their customs. The next war of Cyrus leads the historian to Babylon, which is carefully described and its later history sketched.¹ The first book ends with the death of Cyrus in battle with the northern barbarians.

§ 313. Herodotus passes through these and a vast number of other subjects with the most perfect ease and mastery. The reader is never disappointed at the delay of a result, or annoyed at the irrelevance of a digression. When Croesus comes in contact with Cyrus, he reverts to the older history of Cyrus' empire; when Cyrus attacks Babylon, he reverts in the same way to the older history of Babylon and of Assyria; but finding this episode too cumbrous, he relegates it to a separate 'Assyrian history.' The second, third, and fourth books are a detailed account of the progress of the Persian empire under Cambyzes, the false Smerdis, and Darius; but the campaigns against Egypt, Arabia, Scythia, and Lybia afford a proper place for a full and interesting discussion of the geographical features, natural peculiarities, or society of these countries. These digressions, which occupy the whole of the second book (on Egypt) and almost all the fourth (Scythia and Lybia), are so complete in themselves as to suggest the theory that Herodotus, when he first travelled, intended to put his careful and systematic observations together into a geographical work—on the model of Scylax, but something far greater, which would describe the less known countries of the East and South, not only in their natural, but in their political history. This plan must have been abandoned before he went to Thurii, or he would certainly have composed a similar digression on the less known parts of Italy, and probably on the Carthaginians. But as the work proceeds, and the interest in the coming catastrophe grows warmer, the episodes and halting places are sparingly admitted, and the great struggle advances with epic grandeur

¹ cc. 178-88.

to its close. The narrative finds its natural conclusion in the capture of Sestos, the last point which the Persians held in Europe, and their repulse into that Asia which they always claimed as their own. There is, therefore, no reason to doubt whether the author lived to finish his task. The very last chapter is, indeed, a sort of appendix, like several in the work, which a modern author would have thrown into the form of a footnote; but as this device was then unknown, all these collateral points find their place in the text.¹ Yet even in these parts of the work we should deeply regret the omission of the short notes on the character and privileges of Spartan royalty, on the Athenian acquisition of Lemnos, and on older Attic history; nay, even the scandalous anecdotes about the courts of Periander and of Xerxes are agreeable diversions, though by most critics censured as beneath the dignity of history. On the affairs of Samos² he is so explicit in several places that he was supposed to have retired there when in exile from Halicarnassus, and learnt the Ionic dialect; but the affairs of Samos, especially under Polycrates, the greatest of Greek despots, if we except those of Sicily, are sufficiently important in themselves to warrant the share assigned to them, and the inscriptions found on the site of Halicarnassus by Mr. Newton are in the Ionic dialect.

A fuller inventory of this great and complex work is accessible in many good editions and translations mentioned below; nor is it the duty of a historian of literature to discuss the many historical problems raised by a comparison of the statements of Herodotus with those of other ancient authorities, or with the evidence of inscriptions newly discovered in our own times. We must here confine ourselves to the literary character of his book, and his qualities as an author and an artist.

¹ It is, moreover, noticeable that very few of the historical works left us by the Greeks have formal conclusions—a fashion which seems somehow contrary to literary taste in those days, and of which the absence is perhaps connected with the practice which many authors followed of tacking on their narratives to that of a predecessor by taking up the thread where he had dropped it.

² iii. 120, sq., &c.

§ 314. The extant fragments of Xanthus show that Herodotus used his *History of Lydia* less than might have been expected, there being no extant coincidence between them, although Ephorus states that Xanthus afforded a starting point to our author. The case is only different in degree with Charon of Lampsacus, whose fragments (on the annals (ᾠροί) of Lampsacus) show a good many points of identity in subject with Herodotus, though there are equally points of difference; and it has been argued from Herodotus' missing the point of a joke on the old name of Lampsacus (Pityusa), made by Cræsus,¹ that he cannot have read Charon's annals of the town, in which this older name is prominently mentioned. Charon's annals of the Spartan kings seem, however, to be referred to in vi. 37. The works of Hippys of Rhegium, and of Antiochus of Syracuse, were chiefly devoted to the affairs of Magna Græcia, which Herodotus does not touch at length; and this is, I think, a strong argument against the composition of his work at Thurii in his later years. Had the whole scheme and plan of it not been matured before he settled in Italy, it is more than probable that he would have gathered materials for more interesting episodes, and told us something of the early fortunes of the Hellenes in the West. The memoirs of Ion and Stesimbrotus, and the history of Hellanicus, must have been later than the date to which his history is here assigned, and do not therefore require notice in this place. As to geographical literature, Herodotus cites² the *Arimaspea*, a geographical poem of Aristeas, as an authority on Scythia; and Scylax of Caryanda's *Periplus* on Arabia and India. He also criticises the maps then current, and I have already noted (p. 11) his references to the work of Hecataeus. It is, indeed, notable, at the dawn of an epoch of research, how often men despise their immediate and ablest predecessors, while they treat with respect the earlier and weaker attempts of the same kind. Herodotus appears to feel in Hecataeus a rival, while the rest were hardly in the same plane of literature.

§ 315. The books now enumerated, together with the poetical library above described, were all the literary sources accessible

¹ vi. 37. (Müller, *FHG.* i. p. 33, frag. 6.)

² v. 13. 5.

to Herodotus, if we except the personal intercourse with all the high culture and knowledge to be found at Periclean Athens. Commanding these materials, Herodotus had set to work from an early period of his life to enlarge and complete them by a long series of travels and careful observations ; endeavouring, where it was possible, to see both geographical curiosities and monumental records with his own eyes, or else giving us the evidence of those who had seen them, often with careful scrutiny and cautious reserve, when they were beyond his personal ken. Thus, in the Greek world he consulted those ancient registers or lists of kings, priests, or victors, which were preserved in various temples. Charon had already published the list of Spartan kings ; Hellanicus added the priestesses of Juno at Argos and the Carnean victors, probably after Herodotus' researches were concluded. These lists were of the last importance to early chronology, and were collateral with the system afterwards adopted in Greece—that of reckoning by Olympiads. There were also a vast number of inscribed pillars in important cities, and of rich offerings dedicated to ancient shrines, on which the donors had told their circumstances, and so left records of their life and acts. The treasury at Delphi, for instance, was full of such offerings, one of which, the tripod dedicated by Pausanias to the Greeks after the battle of Plataea, was lately found in the hippodrome at Constantinople.¹ By means of these documents, as well as by sifting the traditions of the nearer times orally, the historian attained considerable accuracy and clearness about the earlier portions of Greek history, properly so called. The trivial points at which Thucydides sneers show how free of serious errors Herodotus must have been in this part of his work, and we may safely say that, with all his love of the marvellous and his taste for gossip, he has told us more, and told it better, than his critical followers contrive to tell us with far greater compression and the omission of endless points of interest.

§ 316. When he goes beyond the Hellenic world, his want of linguistic knowledge causes a great difference in his power of attaining truth. He takes care, indeed, to express doubt con-

¹ Cf. Rawlinson's *Herod.*, vol. iv., Note A (p. 483).

cerning the many wonders told him of the ends of the earth—northern Scythia and southern Arabia—which he repeatedly tells us he could not learn from an eye-witness ; but concerning these nothing trustworthy was perhaps then attainable. But in the case of the old cultures of Asia, and in Egypt, where ample records positively teemed on rocks, and pillars, and public buildings, his ignorance of the languages threw him into the hands of cicerones—inferior priests, mercenary soldiers, and other incompetent and untrustworthy persons—who often did not know the truth, and, perhaps, sought deliberately to mislead the curious Greek enquirer. Hence, while his pictures of the life and manners of these nations are of inestimable value, his attempts to sketch their past history have often been corrected, or even reversed, by the recent deciphering of inscriptions which he could have seen and transcribed. Even here he is *generally* right ; it is hard for an honest enquirer not to discover a great deal of truth ; but he is not reliable, and it is one of the great boasts of modern research to have been able to extract the truth where the venerable Greek enquirer was fain to be content with a cross-examination of doubtful witnesses and a comparison of their negligences and ignorances.

It has often been urged in addition, that even under his untoward circumstances, Herodotus might have done better had he been endowed with the critical faculty of Thucydides, and had he not started with a theory of Divine interference, and an innate love of the marvellous and the quaint. This so-called childishness of Herodotus has been unduly magnified by the fact that we do not possess his forerunners, but only his most sceptical successor, wherewith to compare him. This is evidently unjust ; for while he appears credulous from this point of view, he was probably far in advance of the Greeks of his day, if we except the Periclean circle. He is constantly sceptical, and even disposed to censure others as too easy of belief ; but as is natural with all nascent scepticism, this feeling breaks out only here and there, and is illogically coordinated with credulity on kindred points, which the author has not thought of disputing. A most interesting catalogue

might be made of such survivals of credulity in the works of the sceptics of all ages.

§ 317. But no German editor has approached the question of Herodotus' credibility with such boldness and originality as Mr. Blakesley in the very remarkable introduction to his edition. Of course others have pointed, as he does, to the influence of *Sophistic* on the historian, to his wandering life, like Protagoras or Gorgias, to his alleged reading out of his performances, to the conventional turns of his moral advices, and the repetition of the same ethical commonplaces in the mouths of divers and dissimilar characters. He is the first to lay proper stress on the close identification of Herodotus, by Thucydides and other ancient critics, with the *λογόποιος* who composed not to instruct but *to please*.¹ He believes that this class of men, as soon as they attained any facility in prose composition, selected such events, and attributed such motives, as they thought would be striking and popular without any misgivings as to the accuracy of their statements; for the historic sense is a late and gradual acquisition which Thucydides acquired only by his extraordinary genius and circumstances in those early days. If this be so, the credibility of Herodotus as to particular facts will stand on a very different basis from that of modern historians. It has been hitherto assumed that wherever he speaks as an eye-witness his faithfulness is beyond dispute; but if he be a mere story-teller, which is our nearest English to a *λογόποιός*, nothing is so universal an attribute of such people in all times as to narrate secondhand facts as if they were personal experiences. It is done without the least bad faith, for the teller may firmly believe his authority, and merely wish to complete his picture without critical statements as to his authorities. Mr. Blakesley is clearly of opinion that Herodotus did this, and that he copied personal narratives from other people and set them down as his own. He gives as an example the alleged copying² from Hecataeus of facts about the crocodile, the

¹ He compares the speeches of Solon and Croesus (i. 23 and iii. 36) with the notions ascribed to Hippias in Plato's *Hipp. Maj.*, p. 236.

² ii. 68-73.

hippopotamus, and an account of the phoenix. This Herodotus does without acknowledgment, and with such deviations from the truth as seem to preclude a personal investigation. If these considerations be well founded, a vast deal of learned talk about the travels of Herodotus and his valuable evidence as an eye-witness will be blown to the winds. But of course it would not place him in the rank of a modern novelist, or even in that of De Foe, which Mr. Blakesley suggests. The real parallel he gives is that of Marco Polo, whose work at first circulated in MS., like that of Herodotus, and underwent curious alterations, not only at the hands of interpolators, but at the author's own, before it was printed. There is the same mixture in both of credulity and scepticism, of veracity in spirit, and yet ready acceptance of the doubtful or the false, of effort to be historical in an age when strict history was hardly yet defined.

§ 318. This speculation belongs to the estimate of his genius, which it may properly introduce, and is naturally suggested by the contrast of the Father of History with his greatest and most immediate successor, Thucydides; nor is it reasonable to waive the question by merely insisting upon the contrast of their natural characters, and the different social and political atmosphere in which they were educated. Had Herodotus been a cold and sceptical critic, a despiser of all the domestic and personal features in great men or in dominant nationalities, a Periclean Athenian whose exclusiveness raised the pettiest Greek quarrel above the largest revolutions among barbarians, he might, no doubt, have sifted such materials with greater acumen, but he certainly would have had neither the desire to possess them nor the temper and the patience to collect them. The genial simplicity and wide sympathy of Herodotus not only supplied him with the stimulus to seek, but his informants with the inclination to impart, what they knew, and thus vastly counterbalanced any inferiority of judgment by the larger field of knowledge which he embraced.¹ His just estimate of the

¹ The only authority I can quote for this view, which I have implied long ago in my *Prolegomena to Ancient History*, is that of the Comte de

older civilisations of the Lydians, the Medes, the Persians, and the Egyptians, has made his great work a picture, not of Greece, but of the old world at one of its most interesting periods. To the student of ancient history in any large and comprehensive sense, it must be pronounced a work of infinitely greater value and more permanent interest than the struggle for ascendancy between the two leading states of Greece, which had no general effects upon the changes of the world. While, therefore, the conceptions of history in Herodotus and Thucydides were mainly the consequence of the temper of the men and of their surroundings, it must be declared that, *for an historian*, the atmosphere in which the latter lived, while giving him critical acumen and freeing him from theological prejudices, narrowed his view and distorted his estimate of the relative importance of events. We may indeed feel very grateful that Herodotus was not attracted in early life by this brilliant exclusiveness, and that he remained an Ionic instead of becoming an Attic historian.

§ 319. There is a like contrast between the style of the earlier and the later historians. Herodotus was thought the master of the λέξις εἰρομένη, or style of simple co-ordination of clauses, while Attic rhetoric brought them into complex connections, so as form ingeniously constructed periods.¹ There are, indeed, speeches introduced by Herodotus, such as the discussion on the best form of government by the fellow-conspirators of Darius,² where he shows ample acquaintance with the rhetoric of the day, and where the periods are formed with some skill

Gobineau, in his exquisitely written but fantastic *Histoire des Perses* (i. 247, sq.). He goes further than I do, and makes a curious *apologia* for the Oriental chroniclers in connection with the receptive and uncritical temper of Herodotus.

¹ Dionysius Hal. gives, as an example, Herodotus' words : Κροῖσος ἦν Ἀνδρὸς μὲν γένος, παῖς δὲ Ἀλυάττεω, τύραννος δὲ ἐθνέων τῶν ἐντὸς Ἀλυος ποταμοῦ ; which, if periodically constructed, would be : Κ. ἦν υἱὸς μὲν Ἀ., γένος δὲ Λ., τύραννος δὲ τῶν ἐντὸς Ἀλυος ποταμοῦ ἐθνῶν. He even adds a forced and unnatural construction. This loose and easy style was sometimes affected by Attic rhetors, as, for example, by the tyrant Critias, and may be seen in fragment 25 of his *Lacedæmonian Polity*.

² iii. 80, sq.

and intricacy. This intermediate sort of writing was the *historic period* as opposed to the stricter *rhetorical* or *logical period*. These speeches, which are a common feature of all the classical historians, are by no means so signal a blemish to his work as are the rhetorical harangues in later literature ; for his speeches are well contrasted with those in Thucydides as *dramatic*, and coming in so naturally as to produce a lifelike picture of scenes and characters.¹ I add a passage from one which I regard as very peculiar, from its Thucydidean tone, and which proves

¹ The most elaborate instance just referred to is most severely censured by all the critics, who think it absurd that the great Persian nobles should discuss aristocracy and democracy after the manner of Greek sophists. Nevertheless Herodotus insists, in spite of the disbelief of his contemporaries, that this discussion really took place. It seems to me a very bold thing to deny flatly the truth of an assertion which Herodotus—a man of undoubted honesty and intelligence—makes in the face of hostile criticism ; and, even had I no stronger reason, I should hesitate to disbelieve him. But Gobineau has clearly shown the elements of truth in the story, and how the historian puts in a Greek form the really vital problem of the Persian empire. It is usual to regard it as an Oriental despotism, which was occasionally the case, when the central power came into strong hands ; but this is really a false view. The Iranian nobles were a feudal aristocracy, divided into classes, within which each member was really free, though bound by immemorial customs to render certain dues of respect and service to the chief. The independence of all these clans and families really constituted a democracy, not of course a city democracy, with an agora and public debates, but a country democracy, with liberty and equality of rights, and this was somewhat the form of constitution into which Persia relapsed under the Arsacidae, when the tyranny of the central king of kings was found too oppressive. Cambyse, succeeding to the wealth of Cyrus, and to the possession of his conquests, which of course did not belong to the hereditary nobles of Iran, began to make them feel this tyranny. Hence the discussion of the conspirators : were they to continue this imposing but dangerous monarchy ? Could the seven lords in council control the other feudatories, and maintain the empire ? or should they revert to the natural condition of old Iranian society, and let all the clans live under their immemorial customs ? It is also to be noted that they do not resolve on a monarchy, without limiting it beforehand by reserving to themselves certain hereditary privileges, thus showing their appreciation of the danger. I must again refer for an excellent statement of this matter to Gobineau, *Histoire des Perses*, i. 583, sq.

how fully Herodotus sympathised with the enterprise of imperial Athens, as expounded in Thucydides' speeches.¹

But the general character of his writing, with its gossiping resumptions (*ἐπαναλήψεις*) and its natural anacolutha (which old grammarians noted and admired), is that of a peculiarly easy and artless flow, more like a charming conversation than a set composition ; and this is characterised by a constant passage from narrative to dialogue, which comes in so naturally as to be often unperceived. There is reason to believe (above, p. 14) that Hecatæus followed the same practice, which may have been a typical feature of Ionic historical prose. But it is not likely that many writers could have attained this art to such perfection as Herodotus. He employs it constantly to paint characters, which he never describes in a formal paragraph, but brings, as it were, living and speaking upon his stage. It has, nevertheless, been justly remarked that he is more successful in portraying types than individuals, national characteristics than personal features. His Persians, and Lydians, and Spartans are very distinct ; but his Cræsus becomes a Solon in captivity, and his Eastern grandees all use the same formulæ of contempt for unknown Hellenes of the West. This monotony was doubtless fostered by the gentle fatalism which prevails throughout early Greek literature, and which finds its perfect expression in the dialogues of Artabanus and Xerxes.² But this same feeling

¹ vii. 50 : 'Αμείβεται Ξέρξης τοῖσιδε· 'Ἀρτάβανε, οἰκότως μὲν σύ γε τούτων ἕκαστα διαιρέει· ἀτὰρ μήτε πάντα φοβέο, μήτε πᾶν ὁμοίως ἐπιλέγεο. Εἰ γὰρ δὴ βούλοιο ἐπὶ τῷ αἰεὶ ἐπεσφερομένῳ πρήγματι τὸ πᾶν ὁμοίως ἐπιλέγεσθαι, ποιήσεις ἂν οὐδαμᾶ οὐδέν· κρέσσον δὲ πάντα θαρσέοντα ἤμισυ τῶν δεινῶν πάσχειν μᾶλλον, ἢ πᾶν χρῆμα προδειμαίνοντα μηδαμᾶ μηδὲν παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ ἐρίζων πρὸς πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ τὸ βέβαιον ἀποδέξεις, σφάλλεσθαι ὀφείλεις ἐν αὐτοῖσι ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ ὑπεναντία τούτοις λέξας. τοῦτο μὲν νυν ἐπ' ἴσης ἔχει· εἰδέναι δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἔοντα κῶς χρῆ τὸ βέβαιον ; δοκέω μὲν οὐδαμῶς. τοῖσι τοίνυν βουλομένοισι ποιεῖν ὥς τὸ ἐπίπαν φιλέει γίνεσθαι τὰ κέρδεα, τοῖσι δὲ ἐπιλεγόμενοις τε πάντα καὶ ὀκνεῖσι οὐ μᾶλα ἐθέλει. 'Ορᾷς τὰ Περσέων πρήγματα ἐς τὸ δυνάμιος προκεχώρηκε· εἰ τοίνυν ἐκείνοι οἱ πρὸ ἐμεῦ γενόμενοι βασιλείες γνώμῃσι ἐχρέοντο ὁμοίῃσι καὶ σύ, ἢ μὴ χρεόμενοι γνώμῃσι τοιαύτησι ἄλλους συμβούλους εἶχον τοιούτους, οὐκ ἂν κοτε εἶδες αὐτὰ ἐς τοῦτο προελθόντα· νῦν δὲ κινδύνους ἀναρριπτόντες ἐς τοῦτ' σφεα προηγάγοντο. μεγάλα γὰρ πρήγματα μεγάλοισι κινδύνουσι ἐθέλει καταρέεσθαι.

² vii. 10, sq. ; and thus in 46, sq. : Μαθὼν δὲ μιν Ἀρτάβανος ὁ πατήρως,

of the transitory nothingness of life—Euripides' τὸ μηδὲν εἰς οὐδὲν ῥέπει—may have aided his candid nature in the very just and impartial view he takes of the virtues and vices of men. He has often been accused, but never convicted, of bias or unfairness. He is most explicit in telling the good points of those who suffer his severest censure. Perhaps the most disagreeable personage in his history is the deity 'who permits no one to feel proud but himself' ¹—a sort of singular, but impersonal Providence, in whom a leading attribute is jealousy, a curious and early reflection of the most ingrained national vice of the Greeks from Homer to the present day. The enigmatical warnings of this Providence, through dreams and oracles, occupy, no doubt, too prominent a place among his causes for great events, but, nevertheless, convey to us the feeling of the Greek public, even of later days, far more faithfully than the uncompromising positivism of Thucydides. If, also, he assigns trivial origins to great consequences, such as the selfishness of Demokedes involving his whole race in misfortune, we must remember in palliation that the caprices of

ὅς τὸ πρῶτον γνάμην ἀπεδέξατο ἐλευθέρως οὐ συμβουλεύων Ξέρξῃ στρατεῦσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, οὗτος ὡνὴρ φρασθεὶς Ξέρξεα δακρύσαντα εἶρετο τάδε· ὦ βασιλεῦ, ὡς πολλὸν ἀλλήλων κεχωρισμένα ἐργάσαιο νῦν τε καὶ ὀλίγῳ πρότερον; μακαρίσας γὰρ σεωντὸν δακρύεις. Ὁ δὲ εἶπε· Ἐσῆλθε γὰρ με λογισάμενον κατοικτεῖραι ὡς βραχὺς εἴη ὁ πῦς ἀνθρώπινος βίος, εἰ τουτέων γε ἐόντων τοσούτων οὐδεὶς ἐς ἑκατοστὸν ἔτος περιέσται. Ὁ δὲ ὁμείβετο λέγων· Ἔτερα τούτου παρὰ τὴν ζῆν πεπόνθαμεν οἰκρότερα. ἐν γὰρ οὕτω βραχεὶ βίῳ οὐδεὶς οὕτω ἄνθρωπος ἐὼν εὐδαίμων πέφυκε, οὔτε τουτέων, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ οὐ παραστήσεται πολλάκις, καὶ οὐκ ἅπαξ, τεθνάναι βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶειν. αἴτε γὰρ συμφοραὶ προσπίπτουσιν, καὶ αἱ νοῦσοι συνταράσσουσιν καὶ βραχὺν ἐόντα μακρὸν δοκέειν εἶναι ποιεῖσιν τὸν βίον. οὕτω δὲ μὲν θάνατος μοχθηρῆς ἐούσης τῆς ζῆς καταφυγὴ αἰρετωτάτῃ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ γέγονε· ὁ δὲ θεὸς γλυκὺν γεύσας τὸν αἰῶνα φθονερὸς ἐν αὐτῷ εὕρίσκεται ἐών. The author of the *Ephialtes*, ascribed to Lysias, has used this passage with great effect, and without any servile imitation, in his admirable peroration, §§ 77-78.

¹ vii. 10. It is, however, but just to add that he thinks the gods (θεοὶ) have their name from setting in order (κόσμος θέντες), and that he recognises in many places a wise and benevolent Providence. Thus, iii. 108, καὶ ὥς τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ προνοία, ὥσπερ καὶ οἰκός ἐστι, ἐόσα σοφή, makes harmless and edible animals prolific, whereas the reverse is the case with birds of prey.

despots, however contemptible in themselves, may be as vast in results as the rational policy of deliberative assemblies.

The same tendency makes him attentive to female character, and to the indirect influence of women on public affairs. His sketches of Queen Artemisia and the Spartan Gorgo, of Amestris and of Labda, are very spirited, and full of feeling; but here again, like a tragic poet, he rather paints types than peculiar individuals. If he is anywhere peculiarly felicitous in individual features, it is in such scenes as Kypselus' feast for the suitors of Agariste, or the attempt on this very tyrant in his infancy. Here it is that a certain humour, which almost passes for mere simplicity, makes him paint small and comic detail, and so fill in with definite and peculiar colour the outline of the fixed types which generally occupy his pages. We naturally associate this humour with its opposite, the pathetic, as both are the offspring of a quick and delicate sympathy. Nor are we disappointed in Herodotus, whose profound pathos is not surpassed by any tragic poet. The legend of Atys, the story of the Periander's family troubles, and the dramatic forebodings of the great catastrophe in the dreams and confessions of Xerxes and Artabanus, are prominent among many instances of this rare and splendid quality in Herodotus' narrative.

§ 320. Turning to the dialect of Herodotus, we find ourselves in presence of a problem which has been raised by the minute criticism of the present day, and which seems not likely to receive a satisfactory solution. We can perceive from the author's careful observations¹ on the four subdivisions of the Ionic dialect of Asia Minor that he had studied the question, and that his language was not unconsciously determined by the circumstances of his education, but was the carefully chosen and purified instrument in which he determined, for æsthetic reasons, to clothe his thoughts. This agrees with the repeated observations of Greek grammarians, that his dialect was mixed or various, as opposed to the pure Ionic of Hecataeus and Hippocrates; it is therefore idle to assert that his history represents the Samian or any other local speech. But beyond this the observations of such critics as Hermogenes and Dionysius are un-

¹ i. 142.

fortunately confined to general statements that he is the chief master of Ionic—as Thucydides of old Attic—prose. They do not determine in any detail what combinations or variations were admitted by Herodotus. This silence was probably owing to the absence of any special studies among the Alexandrian critics,¹ who left so much material on Homer and on the Attic writers. As a natural consequence the readings of our texts seem regulated by no fixed principles, and not only are various dialects admitted, but the same word appears, even in our best MSS., in divers forms. While there are thus difficulties about the original form of individual words which will probably never be solved, we can indicate two certain sources of variety.

The first is the rise of epic language, with which Herodotus was always acknowledged to have been thoroughly imbued. This strong tincture, not only of epic phrases, but of thoughts, seems to result from his early intercourse with Panyasis, a learned student of epic diction, who may possibly have educated his nephew, and endeavoured to induce him to follow in his own footsteps. If this be so, seeing that Panyasis must have studied epic diction critically, we should have ample reasons for this complexion in the dialect of Herodotus. It is, however, carefully to be remembered that all the later researches into Homeric language tend to the theory of an old Attic recension, and to the consequently old Attic character of the diction as we have it. There can be little doubt that this old Attic and the Ionic dialects of Asia Minor were closely allied, so that many apparently epic forms may be mere archaic words in the language of Herodotus' parents. The theory that our Homer was recast in the days of Herodotus, and so brought into accord with his language, is part of Mr. Paley's doctrine of the late composition of our *Iliad* and *Odyssey* which has been above rejected (§ 48).

The second source of variety in Herodotus seems to be the adoption of Attic forms, and of some Doric forms, almost all of which are, however, in use with Attic writers. It is even

¹ Abicht, i. p. 9, says the Alexandrians were much occupied with him, and that to them we owe the division into nine books. If so, why have we no body of scholia extant?

doubtful whether the dialect of Halicarnassus was Doric in Herodotus' day ; its exclusion from the Hexapolis, which he mentions, and the discovery of an early Ionic inscription by Mr. Newton during his researches, make the matter very doubtful. And as regards the Attic forms, we are uncertain both how far old Attic and Ionic forms may have coincided, and how far our present MSS. may have been tampered with by Atticising transcribers. The difficult problem of determining the dialect of the book has, nevertheless, been attempted by a series of scholars, beginning with Struve in 1828, who worked out the evidence of the MSS. on a few very frequent forms, such as the declension of *Βασιλεύς* ; Dindorf followed in his preface to the Didot edition (1844), and even gave an alphabetical catalogue of proper Ionic forms ; then comes Bredow (1846), and the later German editors of the text. They start, in my opinion justly, from the principle that Herodotus did not vary in his writing of the *same* word, and that therefore the balance of MS. evidence in favour of one form should make us correct the less authenticated variants of the same word. There are cases where the evidence is so evenly balanced that no decision seems possible, and there are still editors, such as Mr. Wood, who will not accept the principle, and think that Herodotus carried his epic imitations so far as to use various forms for euphony's sake. This question is therefore likely to remain open, and it is a matter of great satisfaction that it interferes hardly at all with the understanding of the text. The age immediately succeeding Herodotus drifted away so rapidly from his tone of thought and style that he soon lost his popularity. Thucydides and Ktesias still think him worth criticism, but the rest set him as a mere story-teller, and in the days of Theopompus (a century later) he was so forgotten that that rhetorical historian published an abstract of his work in two books.¹

§ 321. As already observed, there is no evidence that the text of Herodotus occupied the Alexandrian critics like those of Homer or Aristophanes. But the Roman rhetoricians, especially Dionysius of Halicarnassus, fully appreciated his perfection in style, though they, of course, set it down to a conscious theory,

¹ But Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric*, speaks of him as a typical historian.

and not to the natural conditions of early prose. It was rather in the age of Hadrian, when the popular taste turned from over-refinement and polish to naïve simplicity, that the father of History again revived in general estimation, and became the object of much comment and admiration. Thus we may thank the taste of a degraded and artificial age for having saved us this splendid monument of early genius. Porphyry mentions *Miscellanies on the Emendation of Herodotus*, by the grammarian Philemon, who notices even in his day the many corruptions of the existing texts. I suppose all Greek literature affords nothing else so like a smart and adverse modern review as the tract on the *Spitefulness of Herodotus*, which has reached us under Plutarch's name. The author takes all the history to pieces, especially the Hellenic history, and endeavours to show at every turn a spirit of malevolence and injustice, which is so strong as to result in self-contradictions and inconsistencies of various kinds. Some of the points made, especially as regards the Corinthians, seem very good, and perhaps the attack has not been sufficiently considered; but the smartness of the writing is singular for a Greek criticism.¹ At the same time the writer insists upon the extraordinary charm exercised by Herodotus' style, and thus bears witness to his popularity in that day. Accordingly, he was constantly imitated in late Roman and Byzantine days.² But no body of scholia seems to have reached us in any of the extant MSS. Of these some thirty are known, the oldest and best of which is the Codex Medicus of the tenth century. There are also good texts of the eleventh and twelfth centuries at Rome. But ever since Gaisford's edition the peculiar codex S (Sancroftianus), which he first made known, was considered of higher authority, and was made the basis of all the recensions down to Stein's earlier text; while Abicht has in our day argued successfully

¹ Here is a specimen (c. 33): *Θηβαίους δὲ καὶ μηδίζοντας λέγων ἐν Θερμοπύλαις στιχθῆναι, καὶ στιχθέντας αὐτοῖς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς μηδίξιν προθύμως, δοκεῖ μοι, καθάπερ Ἰπποκλείδης ὁ τοῖς σκέλεσι χειρονομῶν ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης, εἰπεῖν ἄν, ἐξορχούμενος τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐ φροντὶς Ἡροδότῳ.* He refers to the story of the marriage of Agariste (vi. 129).

² Cf. the curious references in Nicolai, *LG.* i. p. 271.

against this course, and has again asserted the Mediceus as the proper groundwork for a critical text. This is admitted in Stein's larger critical edition, and the third edition of his commentary.

Herodotus was first printed in the Latin version of Laur. Valla at Venice, in 1474. The princeps of the Greek text is that of Aldus (1502), but it is based on a Paris MS. not of the highest authority. Gronovius (1715) first collated the Laurentian codex, but Wesseling (1763) commenced the really critical labours on the text by a larger collation of many MSS. Early in the present century there are two laborious and learned editions by Schweighäuser and by Gaisford, followed by that of Bähr (second ed. 1856). Blakesley's (*Bib. Class.* 1854) does not give any of the newer lights, but shows great acuteness in the appendices on various historical questions. The best critical books of the newer school are the annotated editions of Abicht and Stein, with German notes. The former has also written important monographs on the text; ¹ the latter has published a large critical edition (Berlin, 1869), in which he has discussed and classified the MSS., and given the fragments of lexicography and the few scholia attached to our extant copies. He promises (in a third volume) a full *lexicon Herodoteum*. Both have given at the close of the preface to their editions an excellent conspectus of the peculiar forms used by Herodotus. Schweighäuser's *Lexicon Herodoteum* is a painstaking book, but was published before the later labours in the text. Moreover, all the exegesis before 1850 is rendered obsolete by the reading of the cuneiform inscriptions, which have thrown immense light on the Persian and Assyrian histories. The same may be said as regards the results of Egyptology, which are brought to bear on the second book in Stein's edition by the learning of Brugsch. Besides the early version of Valla, there is an excellent French translation by Zaccher, and a fine English edition by Prof. George Rawlinson, which is illustrated with the learning and research of Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir G. Wilkinson: this edition is the only English one up to modern requirements in

¹ Especially in the *Philologus*, xxi. pp. 79, sq.

exegesis. Mr. Wood's preface to his school edition of book i. gives a good summary of the recent controversies on the critical side in Germany.

§ 322. The most important rival of Herodotus as a writer of Ionic prose history was HELLANICUS of Mitylene, who was older in years, according to Pamphila, and prior, according to Dionysius ; but who mentioned circumstances concerning the battle of Arginusæ (408 B.C.),¹ and must therefore be regarded as a later writer than Herodotus. Nevertheless, he seems not to have been so perfect an artist, and to have fallen short as regards the conception of welding all his various researches into one great whole. Some thirty titles of his works are mentioned in various citations, and though some of these may be amalgamated, there can be no doubt that he was author of many distinct books, of which some were even in poetical form. Carl. Müller discovers in their subjects something of a plan like that of Herodotus, first handling Persian and other barbaric nations, and then approaching Greece. The Greek legendary history of Argolis, Thessalia, Arcadia, and Attica, would come under the titles Phoroneus, Deucalion, Atlas, and Cecrops, whose genealogies were handled after the manner, we may suppose, in which the 'Annals of the Four Masters' treated early Irish history ; but the Attic history was carried down to the historian's own days. The later events of other Greek states may have been noted in connection with the lists of the priestesses of Argos and the Carnean victors. This scheme is ingenious, and in itself probable, though it can hardly be proved from the scanty and indirect citations which remain. But this much seems plain, that Hellanicus, like Herodotus,

¹ This appears from schol. Aristoph. *Ran.* 706. τοὺς συνναυμαχῆσαντας δούλους Ἑλλανικός φησιν ἐλευθερωθῆναι, καὶ ἐγγραφέντας ὡς Πλαταιεῖς συμπολιτεύεσθαι αὐτοῖς (fr. 80, Müller). The schol. on Soph. *Philoct.* 201, makes him use the work of Herodotus, and therefore distinctly younger as a writer. He is also cited by Plutarch, and in the *Life* of Andocides as having shown that orator's descent from Hermes. This again points to the latest decade of the century, before which time Andocides could hardly have been prominent. Nevertheless, in the tract on the *Spitefulness of Herodotus* (c. 36) he is apparently referred to as older than that writer.

pursued at the same time historical and geographical researches. His history did not however escape, like that of Herodotus, the vice of dwelling upon the mythical period, from which little but genealogies could be related. But these mythical accounts of the old poets were not merely transcribed into prose; they were apparently compared with and corrected by the local traditions. It may have been originally to extend and improve this local knowledge that geography was studied, and no doubt commercial reasons added their force. Thus geography and mythical history became combined in the same hands, and in the case of Herodotus the avoidance of myths, and descent to real history, made the combination natural and artistic. Though we know that Hellanicus wrote in the Ionic dialect, the 179 allusions collected by Müller do not contain any materials for a criticism of his style or for any judgment of his literary merits.

Hermogenes and Dionysius both rank him below Herodotus, and no doubt justly. Whether he wrote a few years before Herodotus or after him, the fact that a distinguished literary rival in the same field made so widely different a figure tends to increase our respect for our father of history, and our conviction that his work was not the natural outcome of a general progress in prose literature, but the discovery of an original and unique genius. As to mere research, Hellanicus may possibly, as Mure asserts,¹ have been superior, seeing that he had some notion of the Latin language, and mentions Spina, Cortona, and Rome, which belonged to a part of Italy almost unknown to the Greeks of his day. But these, and his other notices of Italy and Sicily, may have been borrowed from Hippys of Rhegium, or Antiochus of Syracuse, who is cited (fr. 7) by Dionysius of Halicarnassus as mentioning Rome. All these lost authors do not properly belong to a history of extant classical literature; their statements, quoted at second hand, and in altered phrase, are important to the historian who is sifting the age and character of the authorities for some alleged fact, but they have no claim whatever to be called literature. I refer all those who desire a full list of these

¹ iv. 237.

writers, and the conjectures of the learned about them, to Mure's fourth volume, or to Carl Müller's first volume of his inestimable *Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum*.

§ 323. But I will not pass on without saying a few words about two other contemporaries who were among the Ionic prose writers (though also otherwise celebrated), because they seem to have struck out a new vein in literature, and one which did not find favour for a long time after they made their essays. I refer to the personal memoirs of STESIMBROTUS of Thasos, and ION of Chios. The latter has already occurred (§ 228) in the list of the lesser known tragic poets, and he might have achieved in this direction an undying fame but for the excessive splendour of his rivals. He may have been a good poet; 'nevertheless he did not attain unto the first three.' As an historian we find him cited as the author of two works—the *Settlement of Chios*, in which he gave the antiquities and early history of his native island, and a book variously called his *ὑπομνήματα* or *ἐπιδημῖαι*, his memoirs or foreign travels, that is to say, his travels to Athens and other famous towns. He seems to have made notes of the eminent men he met, and their social qualities, and these he put together into piquant chapters, which are occasionally cited by Athenæus and Plutarch. The long fragment on Sophocles (fr. 1) is very curious, and so are the notes on Kimon and Pericles; but the utter silence of all early writers concerning this work, and some chronological difficulties about the campaign of Sophocles, have made Ritter suspect that the whole treatise is a later forgery. If we consider the undeveloped state of Greek prose before the year 421 B.C., when Ion is alluded to as already dead, it is indeed somewhat strange that familiar memoirs should have been written, and still more strange that such a branch of prose should have found no school of cultivators; for Stesimbrotus of Thasos, who was a contemporary sophist, and wrote about Homer and about the mysteries, is quoted by Plutarch in a very similar way for gossiping anecdotes, but seems unknown in the better days of Greek literature. He wrote a book about Themistocles, and Thucydides (son of Melesias), and Pericles, from which a good deal is

quoted about Kimon, and nothing about Thucydides. But these memoirs seem, even from our scanty fragments, of a very different complexion from the pleasant social sketches of Ion. Plutarch ranks Stesimbrotus with the comic poets in his savage attacks on Pericles, nor did he give even of Kimon so agreeable a picture as Ion. He writes like a strong advocate of the aristocratic party, who endeavours to malign the policy and blacken the lives of the heads of the opposite party. We cannot say whether Stesimbrotus, who doubtless spoke Ionic at Thasos, but who lived most of his life at Athens, wrote in that dialect; however, the distinctly Ionic character of Ion's fragments leads us to suppose that this familiar sort of prose was not composed in severe Attic purity, but in the easy dress of Herodotus' co-ordinate constructions and semi-poetical dialect. But the days of Ionic prose were numbered: not even the splendour and variety of Herodotus' great history could stay the influence of Attic taste, of Attic rhetoric, of Attic precision, which invaded Greek literature at this time and overcame all other tendencies. Thus it may possibly be the form in which they wrote which condemned these two anecdotists to oblivion for centuries. Rhetorical prose became the only prose tolerated; even narratives were regarded as species of *eloquence*, and so the familiar homeliness and artless charms of the chroniclers gave way to political oratory and political history. It is indeed not unlikely that Stesimbrotus formed a sort of connecting link, and that under the pretence of writing memoirs he composed a bitter political pamphlet against the liberal policy of the day. His trade as a sophist, and the strong protests of Plutarch against his unfairness, make us suspect that we are drifting away fast from the candid spirit and the large views of Herodotus.

§ 324. For even Herodotus had his early and formidable detractor, who set himself deliberately to contradict the historian's accounts of Persia and Assyria, and to show their general untrustworthiness. As this man, KTESIAS, the private physician of Artaxerxes at the battle of Cunaxa, wrote in Ionic prose, and in the style of earlier historians, it will be well to include him in the present chapter, though his work cannot have

appeared till after the year 400 B.C. But both his opposition to Herodotus and his general attitude, which owing to many years' residence in Persia was not affected by the revolution of taste at Athens, bring him together logically with the earlier prose of Asia Minor.

We know that he was the son of Ktesiochus of Knidos, and Galen describes him as a relative of Hippocrates the physician ; so that he may have been an eminent practitioner attracted by high pay to the court of Ochus, where he remained fourteen years (415-1 B.C.), as well as the first three of Artaxerxes' reign. He described himself as a person of great importance at that court, and as an envoy, not only to the Greeks after the battle of Cunaxa, but to Evagoras, prince of Cyprus, and afterwards to Sparta. His two principal works, the *Persia*, which included Assyrian and Median histories leading on to the Persian, and his *India*, or description of the wonders of India, were composed after his return home. A *Periplus* and a tract on *Mountains and Rivers* are also quoted. We do not possess a single direct quotation from these works, our knowledge of him being derived from copious paraphrases in Photius, who gives the facts in his own language. Hence we can only take on trust the statement of ancient grammarians that he wrote in good Ionic, and with elegance, but without the simplicity of Herodotus, for he was always seeking for sudden and striking effects and pathetic contrasts. These features sometimes appear even in the cold paraphrase of Photius. But he set himself deliberately to overthrow the authority of Herodotus on Eastern history by asserting that he himself had access to the royal records, the βασιλικαὶ ἐφθέραι, of the archives of Artaxerxes ; and he remodels all the Median history, changes the names of the personages allied with and opposed to Darius, and in every point makes it his duty to show Herodotus a liar. Though successful for a time, and perhaps to some extent causing Herodotus to be neglected, he did not satisfy critics like Aristotle, or even Plutarch, who in the *Life of Artaxerxes* throws doubts on his authority. But the pseudo-Plutarch follows him in his tract *On the Spitefulness of Hero-*

dotus,¹ so does Diodorus, and in later classical times his audacity rather turned the balance of critical opinion in his favour.

His fragments were first edited and his credibility upheld by Stephanus in 1566, and this is the attitude of the two learned editions of Dindorf (Didot's *Herodotus*) and Bähr, both of which were published just before the newly deciphered cuneiform inscriptions were brought to bear upon the question. The learned arguments and the judicial attitude of these critics, who insist upon the better sources of information of Ktesias, and the impossibility of his being quite incredible where he insists upon a distinct version, have been rendered amusing by the reading of the inscriptions, which prove that Herodotus was nearly always right, and that the colossal errors of Ktesias must have arisen from a deliberate attempt to deceive.² From this point of view the work is a literary curiosity, and it is to be hoped that some learned German will think it worth his while to re-edit the fragments, with all the monumental evidence appended, in order that we may know what residuum of truth is left in them, and whether it is worth while discussing their authority where they contradict Herodotus only, and are not themselves contradicted by monumental evidence. For my own part, I do not believe it is possible to lie consistently, and think there must be some elements of real history in every such fabrication.

§ 325. It is, however, very remarkable that while the Ionic dialect found little favour in history or in any kind of poetry during this epoch, and the resuscitation of its old epic form was not more successful than its very perfect narrative style in the hands of Herodotus, still in the department of pure science this dialect was dominant, and maintained itself far into the next century. The earlier Ionic philosophers and their

The latter tells us (xiv. 16) that Ktesias brought down his Persian history to the year of the Sicilian Dionysius' declaration of war against the Carthaginians (398 B.C.). Ælian, Arrian, and Lucian, however, all suspect him of falsehood. Cf. the references in Clinton's *Fasti*, *sub an.* 398 B.C.

² Cf. the trenchant decision of the venerable dispute between the historians in Rawlinson's *Herodotus* (i. 77), where the evidence of the inscriptions is brought to bear for the first time.

Eleatic offshoot had used epic hexameters to convey their speculations. From the time of the profound Heracleitus, Ionic prose, and probably the dialect of Miletus, came into use; and we find in the latter half of the fifth century, not only the Samian Melissus,¹ and the Clazomenian Anaxagoras, but the Thracian Democritus, the Cretan Apollonius, and the cosinopolitan Protagoras² writing in this accepted philosophic organ. It is remarkable, too, how the many actual quotations from these men show that terseness and vigour were perfectly attained in the language which strikes us as so diffuse and easy in Herodotus. Perhaps the most splendid specimen of this incisive and almost more than Thucydidean force and brevity is found in the genuine works of Hippocrates, who, though he may have taken that historian for his model, writes in pure Ionic, and approaches the style of Heracleitus far more than he does that of the Attic politician. The many treatises by later hands, which are transmitted to us under the name of Hippocrates, are composed in the same dialect, which had evidently become the established language of the school or medical guild of Kos. Such guilds are very tenacious of language, and Latin is not more universal in the medical prescriptions of the present day than Doric became at Athens in the next century, where Doric schools of medicine were highly esteemed.

The scientific development of the Greek mind at this epoch does not belong to our subject, but I have called attention to the prevalence of Ionic prose among the most serious

¹ Though it seems that the Elean Zeno, the comrade of Melissus in philosophy, agreed with him in adopting prose, instead of the epic verse of his master Parmenides, as his method of conveying his subtle dialectic, there is still no evidence that he wrote in Ionic prose. The citations from his book are in Attic, but may possibly have been all paraphrased by Aristotle, Simplicius, and Diogenes. The silence concerning his dialect is, however, good negative evidence that he wrote in old Attic. Blass (*Att. Ber.* i. 52) speaks of Gorgias as the first Attic orator, on somewhat similar evidence. But if the Sicilian rhetor, who only visited Athens in old age, was able to compose in Attic, Zeno, who came there in middle age, may have also done so, though he was not a professional orator.

² Zeller, *Phil. der Griechen*, 1020, note.

thinkers, as well as among the most frivolous anecdotists, to show how easily we may make rash judgments about Greek dialects, and talk of the softness and weakness of the Ionic speech as an evidence of luxury and mental relaxation, whereas all the really earnest science of the day—I here waive the claims of the sophists—was expressed in this very dialect, and with a strength and compression which savours rather of harshness and obscurity than of simple and artless transparency.

§ 326. The life of HIPPOCRATES is shrouded in a strange mist, considering the extraordinary celebrity of the man. In the late biographies which remain to us the following facts seem worthy of record. A certain Soranus of Kos, otherwise unknown, is said to have made special researches among the records of the Asclepiad guild, in which Hippocrates was set down as the seventeenth in descent from the god Asclepios, and born on the 26th of the month Agrianus, in the year 460 B.C. The inhabitants were still offering him the honours of a hero. He seems to have travelled about a good deal, particularly in the countries around the northern Ægean, and to have died at an advanced age at Larissa in Thessaly, leaving two sons, Thesalus and Drakon. Many of his descendants and followers in the school of Kos were called after him—Suidas enumerates seven in all—so that this additional uncertainty of authorship attaches to his alleged writings. The many statues of him agreed in representing him with his head covered, a peculiarity which excited many baseless and some absurd conjectures. Abstracting carefully from the numerous Hippocrates mentioned in contemporary Attic literature, there are two undoubted references to the great physician of Kos in Plato,¹ and one in Aristophanes,² which establish the epoch assigned to him in the biographies. He is said to have been instructed by Herodicus of Selymbria, and Gorgias of Leontini, a legend arising merely from the confusing of this Herodicus with another physician who happened to be the brother of Gorgias. There is no vestige of either Herodicus' practice or Gorgias' rhetoric in the extant treatises ; but Hippocrates assuredly, like Pericles,

¹ *Protagoras*, 311, A ; *Phædrus*, 270, C.

² *Thesmoph.* 274.

trained himself for a large knowledge of his special pursuit by a familiarity with the metaphysic of the day. His alleged study of the great plague at Athens is not corroborated by a comparison with Thucydides' account. The works pronounced genuine by Littré in the large collection of Hippocratic writings which still survive are these: the treatises on *Ancient Medicine*, on *Prognosis* (which includes our diagnosis in the largest sense), the *Aphorisms*, the tract on *Climate* (air, water, and situation), the *Epidemics* (i. and iii.), the *Treatment of Acute Diseases*, the tracts on joints, fractures, and surgical instruments applied to them, on head wounds, and the *Oath* and *Law* of the guild.

It need hardly be added that several of these are disputed by more sceptical critics; but some of them, for example, the tracts on *Climate* and the *Epidemics*, are certainly genuine, and show that Hippocrates was not only a great physician and philosopher, but a literary genius of the highest order. It is, of course, quite mistaken to say that he originated Greek medicine; a large body of recorded facts, and of contesting theories, were before him; a great deal of practical knowledge had been accumulated, and had guided the treatment of disease among his predecessors. In the Asclepeia or temple hospitals established at Athens, Epidauros, Knidos, Kos, Cyrene, and elsewhere, a great many cases were recorded in an empirical way. On the other hand, the physical philosophers, such as Empedocles, Democritus, and Anaxagoras, were constantly putting forth theories on the nature of man and the composition of the body. What was perhaps more important than either was the close study of physical conditions by the trainers in the palæstras. These men made hygiene and diet a matter of first-rate importance, and both they and the philosophers banished superstition from the study of health, and introduced that purely human and rational method of discussion which is so prominent in Hippocrates, and which gives his reasoning so strong a likeness to that of his contemporary Thucydides.¹ From all these sources we can see materials

¹ Here is a specimen:

(*De aëre, aquis, locis*. cap. 29.) Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπιχώριοι τὴν αἰτίην προστιθεσσι θεῶν, καὶ σέβονται τούτους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ προσκυνέουσι, δεδουκότες

drawn together to form a large and comprehensive system of medicine. Discarding all assumptions of abstract elements, or of various phenomena being deduced from one substance, Hippocrates seems to have insisted upon taking man as he appears in experience, and from an accurate induction of particular cases to establish the laws of health and disease. The gymnasts had taught him to lay stress on hygiene, and he insists that an accurate analysis of health is vital for teaching us the true symptoms of disease. But while thus starting from particulars, and building his inferences on them, he learned from the philosophers that large view which, as it were, neglects local symptoms, and seeks to classify each case under general conditions of disease, bringing out the common features in each, and comparing them with the general conditions of normal health. Hence he paid special attention to climate and situation, and his most interesting tract is that on the effects of air, water, and situation, in which he compares Asiatic and European races, and suggests to Plato and Aristotle the celebrated political division of mankind so often quoted from the *Politics*. The minute noting of cases in his *Epidemics* shows

περί γε ἑωυτῶν ἕκαστοι. Ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ταῦτα τὰ πάθεα θεῖα εἶναι καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου θεϊότερον, οὐδὲ ἀνθρωπινώτερον, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὁμοῖα καὶ πάντα θεῖα· ἕκαστον δὲ ἔχει φύσιν τῶν τοιούτων καὶ οὐδὲν ἄνευ φύσιος γίγνεται. Καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ὥς μοι δοκεῖ γίγνεσθαι φράσω. Ὑπὸ τῆς ἱππασίης αὐτοὺς κέδματα λαμβάνει, ἅτε αἱ κρεμαμέναν ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων τοῖς ποσὶ· ἔπειτα ἀποχωλοῦνται καὶ ἐλκοῦνται τὰ ἰσχία οἱ ἂν σφόδρα νοσήσωσι. Τοῦτο δὲ πάσχουσι Σκυθέων οἱ πλούσιοι, οὐχ οἱ κάκιστοι, ἀλλ' οἱ εὐγενέστατοι καὶ ἰσχυρὸν πλείστην κεκτημένοι, διὰ τὴν ἱππασίην· οἱ δὲ πένητες ἦσσαν, οὐ γὰρ ἱππάζονται. Καίτοι ἔχρην, ἐπεὶ θεϊότερον τοῦτο τὸ νόσευμα τῶν λοιπῶν ἐστί, οὐ τοῖς γενναιοτάτοις τῶν Σκυθέων καὶ τοῖς πλουσιωτάτοις προσπίπτειν μόνοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἁπασιν ὁμοίως καὶ μᾶλλον τοῖσι ὀλίγα κεκτημένοισι· εἰ δὴ τιμῶμενοι χαίρουσι οἱ θεοὶ καὶ θαυμαζόμενοι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀντὶ τούτων χάριτας ἀποδιδούσι. Εἰκὸς γὰρ τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους θύειν πολλὰ τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ ἀνατιθέναι ἀναθήματα, ὄντων χρημάτων, καὶ τιμῶν· τοὺς δὲ πένητας ἦσσαν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν, ἔπειτα καὶ ἐπιμεμφομένους, ὅτι οὐ διδῶσαι χρήματα αὐτοῖσι· ὥστε τῶν τοιούτων ἁμαρτιῶν τὰς ζημίας τοὺς ὀλίγα κεκτημένους φέρειν μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον ἔλεξα, θεῖα μὲν καὶ ταῦτά ἐστι· ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις· γίγνεται δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστα· καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη νοῦσος ἀπὸ τοιαύτης προφάσιος τοῖς Σκύθαις γίγνεται οἷον εἴρηκα. Ἔχει δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους ὁμοίως.

the other side of his mind ; and there are points of diagnosis ('prognosis,' as he called it) on which modern physicians have nothing to add to his observation.

Turning from details to the general features of the man, so far as we can discern them in the acknowledged treatises, we are struck with the honest, earnest, scientific spirit of all his researches. He is in direct antagonism with the spirit of charlatanism, and of seeking after sudden effects and surprises, which must have been a very general feature among medical men when they had but lately separated themselves from priests and soothsayers—in fact, from the 'medicine men' who impose upon early and superstitious societies. The celebrated opening sentence of the *Aphorisms* is a memorable manifesto against this spirit,¹ and in a hundred places he warns against ostentation, recommends simplicity and patience, and confesses with true and deep modesty his errors and his failures. Here, again, we are reminded of Thucydides' description of his own work, no ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα, but a κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί. In fact, as Littré has observed, the polemic of Hippocrates against the charlatans is as serious and sustained as that of Socrates against the sophists.

§ 327. The style of Hippocrates is nervous, exceedingly compressed, and, at times, obscure from its brevity ; but, on the other hand, profoundly suggestive, picturesque, and full of power and pathos. He uses poetical words and images freely, but always to increase the fulness of his meaning, never for mere ornament. He is far terser in thought than Thucydides, though he resembles him in shortness of expression ; indeed, as I have before said, he more resembles Heracleitus than any other Greek prose writer.

The questions about his dialect are quite similar to those which beset the text of Herodotus. Though dwelling in the Doric settlement of Kos, he used the Ionic dialect. It appears, however, not only from our texts, but from the remarks of ancient critics, that his language was closer to old Attic than that of Herodotus, and we do not know whether it

¹ ὁ βίος βραχύς, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρή, ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὀξύς, ἡ δὲ πείρα σφαιλερὴ, ἡ δὲ κρίσις χαλεπή.

was merely another of the four dialects distinguished by him, or whether it was an artificial language with Atticisms introduced. Our MSS. are hopelessly vacillating in their various transcriptions of the same words; and here, as with Herodotus, the ignorance of scribes, who substituted a familiar for a provincial form, has destroyed the evidence which we might have had concerning the literary dialects of Asia Minor.

The whole history of the text of this author is, indeed, full of doubt and difficulty. The researches of Littré have disentangled the following facts. Ktesias of Knidos, though said to be a relation of Hippocrates, belonged to a rival school, and is reported by Galen to have criticised some points of practice recommended by Hippocrates. As these physicians were contemporary, Ktesias cannot have referred to any later or spurious writings. But such soon came into existence. The sons and the son-in-law of Hippocrates, as well as other members of the school, edited, enlarged, and circulated his writings. Some of the tracts are evidently mere rough notes thrown into shape; and thus a body of Hippocratic writings, not unlike the collection of Aristotelian writings, began to be formed, in which the genuine and spurious were almost inextricably combined. Aristotle, who shows many traces of intimacy with Hippocrates, quotes one of the existing tracts (*On the Nature of Man*) under the name of Polybus, his son-in-law. We hear in the succeeding generations of Diokles of Karystus, Apollonius and Dexippus of Kos, as commentators upon his doctrine. With Herophilus, who founded a celebrated school at Alexandria, the real criticism of the text seems to have begun; for the lists of Hippocratic writings varied, and the learned men, called 'sifters' (*χωρίζοντες*), drew up a short list of what they held genuine. No author was more commented on, both as to style and as to matter, than Hippocrates. While the school of Herophilus carried on fierce polemics on his principles, and on the genuineness of certain tracts, the verbal critics, like Aristarchus, discussed his dialect and style. I must refer the reader to Littré's fifth chapter for a full list of all these critics down to Galen, who is our best authority upon Hippocrates, but whose medical criticisms only have survived; a trea-

tise on the genuineness of the several tracts, and another on the historical allusions in them, are unfortunately lost. We may pass in silence the few later names which follow upon Galen, the last of the great ancient physicians. Three *Lives* are to be found : in Suidas (very full), in Tzetzes, and one ascribed to Soranus (not Soranus of Kos).

§ 328. *Bibliographical.* A great number of MSS. of Hippocratic writings remain, but we are still in want of any complete catalogue of them. Those in Paris have been collated with exemplary care and diligence by M. Littré, who discovered that one of them (No. 2253), of the tenth century, contains a text far superior to all the others, and is derived from a purer archetype. He also shows that none of our MSS. represents the texts of Artemidorus, Rufus, and Sabinus, prepared in Hadrian's time, and criticised for their innovations by Galen, who comments, even in his day, on the variations in the MSS. Concerning the Viennese, Marcian, or Vatican copies I can find out nothing certain. The text first appeared in a Latin translation of Fabius Calvus, the friend of Raphael, in 1525 (Aldus); the Greek text in 1526 (*ibid.*). Then come the great Basle and Dutch editions of Cornarius and Foës. The only modern editions of note are Littré's (4 vols. Paris, 1839), based on the Paris MSS., and Ermerins' Dutch edition (1859-64), which only adds a collation of two trivial Leiden MSS., and many notes of Cobet on a Marcian codex. The *Histories of Medicine*, such as Sprengel's and Daremberg's, must be consulted for closer information.

CHAPTER III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE RISE OF TECHNICAL EDUCATION IN THE FIFTH CENTURY—THE SOPHISTS AND SOCRATES.

§ 329. WE now proceed to consider the speculations and the teaching of Greek philosophy—a large and special study—so far as they had a direct influence upon letters. There was a time when Greek philosophy assumed the garb of epic poetry, and though very novel in subject, did not modify the form which it adopted, or create a new kind or species in literature. I have mentioned Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedocles as the most remarkable representatives of this epoch in Greek thought. There came also a time when prose had long been the received organ for earnest thinking, when philosophy, with equal indifference about the form, used that received organ without adding any other feature to literature than seriousness of tone and the introduction of some technical terms. Such, for example, was the prose of Chrysippus and of Aristotle. But at the crisis in the Greek mind which we have reached with the middle of the fifth century—a period of seething restlessness in politics and in speculation, of scepticism in religion, of vagueness in the yet untorned theory of morals—philosophy must necessarily become an important thread in the variegated tissue which the historian seeks to unravel. The rise of a new character in Greek literature produced by these causes must of course have been gradual, and marked off by no gap of time from what preceded, and we might expect to find even contemporaries variously affected by it—some adhering to the old, and some to the new ideas. But by

a peculiar good fortune we still have two remarkable pairs of writers, contemporaneous in most of their life, who illustrate the wide gap in style and in sentiment which may be produced by a very small difference in age. Sophocles and Euripides were not twenty years apart in age, Herodotus and Thucydides not more, and yet the mellowness of the old, and the crudeness of the new ; the acquiescence of the old, and the scepticism of the new ; the clearness of the old, the depth of the new, are shown in them as if there were a century intervening. It is for this reason that, having concluded our survey of Herodotus and Sophocles, the last and most perfect bloom of Ionic and of old Attic culture, we ought not logically to pass to their rivals and younger contemporaries, Thucydides and Euripides, without pausing to survey the remarkable intellectual forces which had come into play throughout Greece, and which found in them their earliest and greatest exponents. But for the severance of prose and poetry in this work I should accordingly have assigned to the Sophists a place which might seem peculiar in literary history.¹

There are periods in the life of men when a few years make little difference in intellectual matters. If a new theory or a new way of thinking is broached to men of forty and men of sixty, the former are nearly as unlikely to embrace it as the latter. The case is widely different if we compare men of twenty with men of mature and settled convictions. For the time of opening manhood and growing intellect is the time when the mind is for a very few years peculiarly open as well as retentive, when passion intensifies study and inflames enthusiasm, and thus the prominent teachers of our earliest manhood, whether preachers, or poets, or politicians, have an influence upon us which seems absurd to our elders, who keep quoting the leaders of their own youth as the ideals for *our* imagination. Thus a very few years make a wide gap in our intellectual sympathies, and this is probably the most natural account of the gap between Sophocles and Euripides. Sophocles heard the same philosophers or sophists whom Euripides heard, but

¹ Viz. between Caps. XVI. and XVII. of Vol. I.

they were not fashionable at Athens till his education was completed, and his career and artistic style determined.¹ Thus they would have but little effect upon him in comparison with their effect on the rising Euripides, who may have met Zeno and Anaxagoras before his genius had found its expression, or at least before he had adopted his philosophic creed.

§ 330. If we enquire what influences were at work when the dominion of Athens in literature, as well as in politics, was secured, and every leading thinker, whatever might be his home, came to Athens as the natural field for preaching his system, we shall find several distinct schools—Grote enumerates twelve—whose main object was physical speculation carried on to some extent by observation, but mostly by deduction from certain metaphysical hypotheses. Among the latest of these was the teaching of Empedocles of the four heterogeneous elements, and their mixture by Love and Hate; there was the atomic theory of Leucippus and Democritus, of the homogeneity and indivisibility of all the particles of matter which are mechanically combined in the void. But there were also two theories which probably had far deeper influence on such men as Euripides—the one on account of its striking and fruitful dogma; the other on account of the new method whereby its tenets were maintained.

Anaxagoras, while agreeing with the Eleatics on the impossibility of creation or annihilation, and with various of his other predecessors on the qualities of the elements of matter, could not explain the composition and harmony of the world without assuming as the prime cause of motion *Noûc*, or spirit. This postulate of a heterogeneous, non-material cause to account for the harmony and order, as well as the composition

¹ The dates of all the leading earlier Sophists are not accurately determinable, but I think the weight of evidence is in favour of the assertion in the text, which has, moreover, general reasons in its favour. This is the general result of the careful and elaborate discussions of the dates in the notes to the last edition of Zeller on the Sophists (*Phil. der Griechen*, vol. i. sect. iii.). Of course I do not put Diagoras of Melos in Ol. 78, as Suidas does, but about Ol. 98. On this point cf. Meier's article *Diagoras* in *Ersch und Gruber's Encyclop.*

of material nature, though only assumed in the most timid way, and for the purpose of introducing physical explanations, was nevertheless an innovation of capital importance, and opened the way to a philosophic adoption of the unity¹ of God, and the general idea of a divine Providence which we have already met in its popular form in the history of Herodotus. It moreover caused the gradual abandonment of that habit of personifying natural objects which was the universal feature of the untutored Greek mind; and though the contemporaries of Anaxagoras held it gross impiety to call the sun a mass of white-hot metal, these views must infallibly prevail as soon as the unity of God was seriously adopted, and his action required to explain the course of the world.

We have secondly, among the metaphysicians of the day, the Eleatic theory in the hands of *Zeno*, who did not add to the theory of the unity of Being, and the unreality of variety and change, but merely strengthened it by a polemical method of reasoning which had a vast effect on the style as well as the thought of his day. He sustained his somewhat unintelligible and abstract dogma by attacking the opinions of his opponents, and showing that what they assumed as obvious—such notions as variety and change—involved greater absurdities and contradictions than the doctrine which he professed. This *negative dialectic*, this habit of pulling to pieces the doctrine of the adversary by question and answer, was carried out to its full completeness by Socrates, who made it the most powerful instrument of philosophic teaching ever known in the history of human intellect. It must be carefully kept in mind that Zeno did not use this dialectical method for the purpose of teaching scepticism; he was no sophist or technical rhetorician, but nevertheless his method was naturally adopted by them, and they used it as a model.

§ 331. This leads us to consider the influence upon literature of the SOPHISTS, the practical teachers of education in the fifth century, who sprang up to meet a sudden and pressing want, and who professed each in his own way, and without any

¹ The reader will remember that this does not necessarily imply His Personality.

concerted plan or system, to instruct for money, and to train the youth of any city in the political and literary acquirements necessary for attaining and holding a prominent place in society. Only one of these celebrated men, Gorgias of Leontini, takes an actual place in the history of Greek literature, and that from his rhetorical side, in which he was the direct forerunner of Attic eloquence. This rhetorical side of the Sophists, and their grammatical and linguistic studies, will properly be treated when we come to another department of Greek prose literature. I am here only concerned with their indirect effect on literature, and especially upon history and tragic poetry, by means of their metaphysical and ethical speculations. These are, indeed, not easy to sever from their rhetoric; for as with them form seemed always more important than matter, and an immediate result than a permanent gain, they were perpetually turning philosophy into rhetoric, and proclaiming rhetoric as philosophy.¹

Grote was the first to dispel the cloud of misconception which had been diffused about the Sophists by ancient calumny and modern dulness, nor is there any part of his monumental history of Greece more enduring in value than the famous sixty-seventh and sixty-eighth chapters on this subject. While all the works of the Sophists have perished, there have remained to us the ablest and the most systematic attacks ever made upon them, and from opposite sides. Aristophanes, representing the old Conservative party, which hated all enlightenment and progress, attacks them in his *Clouds*, where he makes Socrates, as the most familiar at Athens, their representative, though attributing to him many tenets which he is well known to have opposed. Still Socrates, though he did oppose the Sophists and ridiculed them, and did not travel about or take pay, was, broadly speaking, one of them. He was a professional educator, he kept shaking old prejudices and received opinions, he practised dialectic, he trained men to think and speak accurately, and so he might fairly be made by the comic

¹ Thus Philostratus, at the opening of his *Lives of the Sophists*, says τὴν ἀρχαίαν σοφιστικὴν ῥητορικὴν ἡγεῖσθαι χρὴ φιλοσοφοῦσαν, and this theory was carried out strictly down to the time of Isocrates and proclaimed by him.

poet a vehicle for his furious onslaught on all the weaker and immoral features in the Sophistic education, though it was Socrates who had really reformed and rendered it the noblest outcome of the age. On the other hand, Plato, representing the ultra-Radical party, which advocated not the reform but the reconstruction of society, attacked them for the opposite fault—for not being thorough enough, for preaching mere hand-to-mouth expedients, and having no systematic principles at the basis of their slipshod philosophy. For this purpose he represents in his Dialogues such men as Callicles and Polus and Euthydemus as impudent assertors of a selfish morality or as mere intellectual mountebanks, who are overthrown and humbled by the *clenchus* of Socrates. But even Plato, the professed enemy of the Sophists, does not venture to traduce the great leaders who had inaugurated the movement, and made it popular and lucrative. Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus are even in Plato's Dialogues treated as important and respectable thinkers, who though not a match in argument for Socrates, yet advocate reasonable and moral theories, and advocate them with ability. But all these circumstances, which Grote has brought out into clear daylight, were jumbled together by the former editors of Plato, and by most of the historians of philosophy, into a stupid tirade against all the Sophists whom Plato chose to oppose. Critics ascribed to them the lowest and most impossible motives, and attributed to their influence a complete degradation of Greek society, which, as a fact, is historically false, and even if true could never have been produced by a few wandering teachers of open immorality. The dramatic lampoons of the old comedy, and the hardly less dramatic pictures in Plato's Dialogues, are used indiscriminately as absolute proofs against the Sophists, and yet as quite untrustworthy or merely ironical when they record anything in their favour. There is no more prominent proof of the prejudiced estimating of evidence common among distinguished classical scholars than the German literature on this subject, and it is an equally curious evidence of either preoccupation, or perhaps of the slow effect which an argument in a foreign tongue produces, that though most of them cite Grote's arguments, they fail to see

their force, and set down his logic to his democratic party spirit.¹

§ 332. These Sophists, who sprang up to meet the want of their age, and were morally neither better nor worse than the public they addressed, attempted to give practical instruction to such as desired it in philosophy, in morality, and in politics. They did not form a sect or school, but nevertheless resembled one another in certain important features, which they had indeed—be it noted—in common with the older and more profound philosophers, such as Xenophanes, and more particularly Empedocles. They travelled about from city to city, because in those days of city states it was not convenient to send youths to a special university town, where they must have lived as aliens, and therefore, as they could not go to their university teaching, it must come to them. For the sophistic teaching corresponds very closely to what we should call university teaching, and in later days a ‘pupil of Isocrates’ is spoken of as we should say ‘an Oxford man.’ In the next place they were said to make very great fortunes by their profession, which Isocrates opposes by the bad argument that Gorgias, the richest of them, left but a small property. For though they were men of good morals and temperate habits, we perceive in them all a certain ostentation and expensive style of dress and living, which they evidently thought necessary to their importance, and which doubtless absorbed their profits.

These external points, along with their encyclopædic pretensions and practical system of teaching, make it just to call them by a definite class-name. Honoured and fêted by the richer youth, suspected and mostly despised by the older and more staid people, a brilliant and yet a second-rate profession, they afford an exact parallel to the artists of the present day—I mean especially singers and actors, who travel about the world in great luxury, and are received with much ambition and pride by younger people of the highest class, but who, nevertheless, spend great fortunes and acquire brilliant reputations without rising to that position in society which the

¹ To this Oncken, and Zeller in the latest edition of his *History of Greek Philosophy*, are honourable exceptions.

better classes assert for themselves ¹ An Athenian gentleman whose son turned sophist, however celebrated, would have felt as an English squire whose son turned operatic singer. The worship of these merely material artists—actors and dancers—appeared in Greece also, at a later and degenerate time; in the classical epoch even such a social position could only be attained by artists in intellectual perfections.

§ 333. But, as might be expected from their somewhat superficial character, which resulted naturally from the number of subjects which they professed, the Sophists found scepticism very convenient when positive theories were abstruse and disputed, or when moral objections were brought against purely intellectual education. *Protagoras* of Abdera, the earliest and perhaps the greatest of them, asserted in the opening of his book: ‘Respecting the gods, I neither know whether they exist nor what are their attributes; the uncertainty of the subject, the shortness of human life, and many other causes, debar me from this knowledge.’ This statement, which is not verified by any allusion in Plato’s portrait of the man, is said to have so offended the orthodox public of Athens that they exiled Protagoras, and had his book publicly burnt. More certain is his theory that ‘man was the measure of all things;’ in other words, that all knowledge was relative, and depending upon the faculty of knowing—a statement of vast importance, and the basis of all idealism and of most scepticism from that day to our own. Profound as these dogmas appear in themselves, they were peculiarly convenient for a teacher who desired to draw his pupils from theological and moral speculation into the more positive and practical pursuit of rhetoric and of politics. If individual man is the measure of all he can know, and of all he ought to do, the moral consequences are doubtless very serious, and they became obtrusive enough in the sequel; but the earlier Sophists did not teach these developments.

¹ I should be stating an absurdity were I to say, or imply, that there are not thorough gentlemen, in every sense, pursuing these artistic callings; but it is notorious that this is not the rule, and that it is possible to be a renowned artist without other than a special cultivation of a particular dexterity.

Similarly, *Gorgias*, as a philosopher, wrote a book denying any possibility of a scientific knowledge of nature, apparently in the absolute sense. It was called *On the non-existent or on Nature* (περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ περὶ φύσεως),¹ and argued, (1) that nothing exists, (2) that if it does it cannot be known, (3) or even if known cannot be communicated. These propositions were sustained by a negative dialectic similar to that of Zeno, offering the adversary an alternative and then disproving both members. In morals these two sophists seem to have taught nothing peculiar, though the logical result of their psychological scepticism could not be doubtful. *Prodicus* of Keos, on the contrary, to whom the apologue of the *Choice of Heracles between Virtue and Vice* is ascribed, was apparently a teacher of the orthodox sort, and merely graced with the ornament of rhetorical diction the principles of popular morality. I will not here follow the history or the catalogue of the Sophists further. But in the absence of any philosophical treatises written by the Sophists, or of any closer information than mere titles on their method, we may say a word here upon the fragments of one of the more obscure of their number, which are nevertheless preserved in no inconsiderable number.

§ 334. *Antiphon*, the sophist, also called τερατοσκόπος and δνειροκρίτης, often confused with the contemporary rhetor, is introduced by Xenophon disputing with Socrates ;² but he is not there represented as preaching any opinions save a contempt for asceticism and a vindication of human pleasure, as well as being the advocate of paid teaching. Hermogenes criticises his style only, and thus we are reduced to his fragments to tell us the nature of his teaching. He wrote a work in two books about *Truth*, which, as in Protagoras' treatise, meant Being or Reality, and in this work seems to have embraced most of the physical enquiries of the day. Its tendency was sceptical, for he denied Providence, and there were scientific

¹ Perhaps this title was intentionally parodied from the title of Protagoras' work, which seems to have been inscribed περὶ ἀληθείας ἢ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος. I do not think this remarkable resemblance is noted by the historians.

² *Mem.* i. 6.

(as opposed to theological) explanations of astronomical phenomena. To this physical treatise he added a moral or ethical discourse, as is plain from the elegant extracts quoted from him, without special reference, by Stobæus, which illustrate worldly wisdom and human fortunes in graceful and poetical diction, and with anecdotes possibly in the style of Prodicus. But the tone is not so much that of a preacher as of a mere painter of human life. I would call special attention to frag. 131,¹ which is closely analogous to the speech of Medea in Euripides,² with additional points of considerable merit, on the balance of happiness and misery in marriage.³ There was a third book, called *Politicus*, which was probably a handbook for a young citizen who desired to prepare himself for public life. These fragments are sufficiently full to show us both the encyclopædic turn of the man and his superficiality, so that his aim was rather to clothe knowledge in an attractive form than to stimulate to deep enquiry. Hence we can still see the justice of his nickname *λογομάγερος*, which Suidas has preserved. If he recommended pleasure, and to snatch the happy moment as it came, his pictures of human sorrow and labour may have been meant to enforce this view, as well as the denial of Providence with which he is credited. But still the moral fragments are elegant in expression, and refined in the feeling which they show, so that we may be sure this forerunner of Aristippus did not choose to pass for anything else than a moral and respectable teacher. His fragments can best be studied in Blass's edition of the orator Antiphon, and in the discussion⁴ in which he has considered their contrasts with his namesake's speeches.

§ 335. It seems established that the successors of these men gradually degenerated into polymaths and then into mountebanks in education, and that they soon sank in importance.

¹ Ed. Blass.

² *Medea*, vv. 200, sq.

³ It ends with the words *φέρει δὲ καὶ παῖδες γενέσθωσαν φροντίδων ἥδη πάντα πλέα καὶ ἐξολίχεται τὸ νεοτήσιον σκίρτημα ἐκ τῆς γνώμης καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον οὐκέτι τὸ αὐτό*. Blass thinks these extracts belong to his book *περὶ ὁμοιοίας*, from which the express quotations only prove that it was an exhortation to harmony among citizens.

⁴ *Alt. Ber.* i. 99.

Before Plato composed his later Dialogues they had become too insignificant to merit refutation, and in the following generation¹ they completely disappear as a class. This is of course to be attributed not only to the opposition of Socrates at Athens, but to the subdivision of the profession of education. Its most popular and prominent branch—that of Rhetoric—was taken up by special men like the orator Antiphon, and developed into a strictly defined science. The Philosophy which they had touched without sounding its depths was taken up by the Socratic schools, and made the rule and practice of a life. The Politics which they had taught were probably found too general, nor were these wandering men, without fixed home, or familiarity with the intricacies of special constitutions, likely to give practical lessons to Greek citizens in the art of state craft. Thus they disappear almost as rapidly as they rose—a sudden phase of spiritual awakening in Greece, like the Encyclopædists of the French.²

These were the intellectual disturbers of society, who began to tell on poetry when Euripides approached the problems of the drama. It is indeed absurd to say that moral and metaphysical difficulties had not been agitated by earlier poets. The conflict between the duties of avenging a murdered father and of filial affection to the murderess, is one which might make the most thoughtful doubt and hesitate. The conflict between obedience to the law and obedience to the holiest affection, in the *Antigone*, is an *antinomy* far deeper and more interesting than those of Zeno. But the tragic poets did not press for a general solution, they did not insist upon a full statement and argument on both sides; they taught, after their manner, philosophy, but not dialectic. Euripides could no

¹ Isocrates indeed in his speech *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως* (especially §§ 198, sq.), not delivered till 353 B.C., says a great deal about popular objections to himself, and to the Sophists, as a class to which he was supposed to belong. But I think he was merely repeating the arguments of his youth, which were important enough when he opened his school, about 408 B.C., but were quite obsolete in his later years. Isocrates shows the peculiar tenacity of a narrow intellect in repeating a once acquired idea.

² Cf. Zeller, *Phil. der Griechen*, i. pp. 1027, sq.

longer avoid these explicit controversies. The physical theories of Anaxagoras, and his theological difficulties, were current among thinkers at Athens, and demanded a more popular exponent than a dry prose treatise. If man be indeed the measure of all things, the passions and the miseries of man take their place in philosophy, and require exposition and analysis as well as his higher principles. Above all, the weak and the ignorant, the woman and the slave, have their rights in the democracy where all men have been already equalised, and their wisdom, their fortitude, and their temperance are not less suitable to excite our terror and our pity than the sufferings of heroic men. Such were the altered conditions of tragedy in the hands of Euripides.

§ 336. But I must add a word, lest it should be imagined that the great poets and prose writers, whom I have described as rising just before the movement, had remained absolutely untouched by it. Both Sophocles and Herodotus were too clear-sighted and too sympathetic to permit of their standing altogether aloof from the current of thought in their maturer years. Hence we find in Sophocles *Eristic*, as in the dispute of Teucer and the Atridae (*Ajax*), we find in Herodotus *scepticism*, we find in both a rhetorical skill which, though concealed in the garb of poetry or of conversation, shows that neither was insensible to the charms of the new artistic study of diction. The appearance of a break with the old beliefs in Herodotus, and the insistence upon personal evidence, have caused him to be named, though unjustly, the sophist of Greek history. There is in Sophocles an approximation even to the compression and obscurity of Thucydides, which indicates (I suppose) the reaction of Antiphon and his school against the flowing and diluted periods of Gorgias. But nevertheless, when all due allowances have been made, the main fact remains, that Sophocles and Herodotus belong to a different generation and a different school of thought from Euripides and Thucydides. Hence it is not only justifiable, but even necessary, to separate them in treatment, though they stand almost side by side in chronology.

§ 337. If this history were a history of Greek philosophy, we

should class SOCRATES not with the Sophists, but as the head of a new movement, and the father of Ethical philosophy, and of critical method in the succeeding century. But from a literary point of view, it must not be forgotten that he was a man of the Periclean age, and the contemporary of those who made the fifth century the most splendid in Greek literature. Nevertheless we cannot trace his effect upon the books of his own day, except in the attacks of the Old Comedy, and the many traditions which make him a friend and admirer of Euripides. It is only after his death that all Hellas begins to ring with his name. We may therefore connect him either with the influence which brought him forth, or with those which were derived from him. I prefer the former, though less usual course, as being best suited to show his position in Greek literature.

It must be remembered that Socrates never wrote anything, and that his literary prominence is solely due to the extraordinary stimulus he gave to others. For he not only suggested all the philosophy of the succeeding centuries, but he really created a new form of Attic prose—the philosophical dialogue, which in the hands of Plato outshines every other form of Greek writing in the fourth century except perhaps the speeches of Demosthenes. Let us first consider what he owed to his predecessors, and then what were his special points of originality as compared with them.

§ 338. It is hardly true to say that he was the first to bring down philosophy from heaven—from abstruse physical speculations—to earth—to ethical questions concerning the rules of human life. More than one of the greater sophists, such as Prodicus, had concerned themselves with morality, and professed the teaching of virtue. It is not less inaccurate to say that he invented negative dialectic, or the method of arguing with an adversary by raising difficulties, and proving absurd consequences, for this had been the special field in which Zeno had already attained remarkable results. But Zeno had only applied his dialectic to purely speculative metaphysic, and the Sophists had only regarded moral lessons as a small part of the cycle of practical education. The novelty in Socrates was the

application of the scientific method of dialectic to practical questions, and his severance of these, of ethical enquiries, from the physical and theological speculations of older philosophers. This was accordingly another step in the severance of the branches of education, which was perhaps commenced by Antiphon's exclusive adherence to rhetoric. Now this latter was the very branch which Socrates wholly avoided, and which he protested against in the pursuit of clear ethical notions. He insisted upon perpetual question and answer, upon keeping up the pupil's attention by making him join as an equal or fellow enquirer in the research, and he sought, from an induction of the particular uses of any term, to arrive at some general definition which should comprise them, and thus convey a clear and consistent idea to those who used that term. Thus he not only laid the foundations of the science of ethics, but he stimulated his followers to an accurate use of abstract terms, and to set down their enquiries in the form of question and answer ; in other words, philosophical accuracy, and the conversational form, were his positive contributions to literature.

His negative importance was his wholesome antagonism to the taste for rhetoric, for flowing periods, and plausible statements, which infected and had almost completely leavened Attic literature at the close of this period. His whole life was a protest against rhetoric as an engine of education or of self-culture. Talking well about a subject was a mere disguising of ignorance to oneself and others. The real thing was to sift each point, and discuss each statement. So deeply did Socrates feel this necessity of clearing up one's own mental condition, that he held all virtue to be knowledge, and that vice arose not from passion, but from ignorance, or perhaps rather from confusion of thought. This part of his teaching was indeed as it were an inheritance from the Sophists whom he combated all his life, for they too professed to make good citizens by teaching, and if virtue can be taught, it must be a kind of knowledge. But the whole spirit of Socrates' teaching was nevertheless directly opposed to the rival educators, with whom he was often classed. They were brilliant and superficial ; he was homely and thorough ; they

rested in scepticism, he advanced through it to deeper and sounder faith; they were wandering and irresponsible, he was fixed at Athens, and showed forth by his life the doctrines he preached.

§ 339. But I will not digress into Socrates' philosophy or into his life. These things are fully discussed not only in the philosophical, but in the political history of Greece. It may be sufficient here to state that he was the son of the sculptor Sophroniscus and Phænarete (a midwife), and that having followed his father's trade for a short while—a specimen of his work was said to be preserved in the Acropolis, where Pausanias saw it—he turned to ethical speculation. But he started with self-examination, and rejected all superficial solutions, and he soon came to test his researches by examining those around him, and seeking from them answers to the moral questions which puzzled him. He performed the public duties which fell to his lot with constancy and bravery, and bore with great equanimity the extreme poverty—*μυρία πένια*—which was the result of his devotion to the training of others. But as all the foremost young men of Athens—Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides—attended him, he was attacked by the orthodox and democratic party after the Restoration, on the charge of corrupting the youth and teaching the worship of strange gods. His defence, which we must not identify with the famous *Apology of Socrates* by his pupil Plato, justified his conduct, and assumed so bold and patronising a tone to the jury, that he was condemned by a small majority, and executed 399 B.C. The real causes and the significance of this sentence have much occupied modern critics, but do not belong to our present subject. Thus Athens lost a striking and familiar figure, which had for half a century frequented the market-place; but his spirit lived on in the schools which sprang from his teaching.

§ 340. The many extant busts agree with the indications in Plato's *Symposium* concerning the very ugly type of his face—round eyes, snub nose, and thick protruding lips. But if the type was that of a Silenus, there was much kindness and geniality about him, along with great bodily vigour and endurance. We have two detailed portraits of his life and conversation in the

Dialogues of Plato, and in the Dialogues of Xenophon, who also wrote *memoirs* of his master. These latter are by modern scholars thought the less idealised portrait of the man, but in many traits they agree with the more elaborate and grander picture suggested in the Dialogues of Plato. There is a peculiar group of these Dialogues specially devoted to drawing a true picture of Socrates in his last days—the *Euthyphron*, a discussion on his views concerning piety at the moment when he was charged with impiety by Meletus; the *Apology*, which professes to give his defence in court; and the *Crito*, in which he refuses the chance of escaping, and lays down the strict duty of obedience to the law as the great civic virtue. This last dialogue shows us clearly enough the Xenophontic side of the man, who together with intellectual scepticism inculcated plain orthodox morality in practice. The *Phædo*, which completes the dramatic picture, and paints the last hours of his prison life, seems a later composition, and attributes to him metaphysical theories, which were rather Platonic than Socratic. But the scenery is no doubt fairly accurate. This group then gives us Socrates in his death. The best Platonic picture of him in his life is to be found in the introductions to the *Lysis* and *Charmides*, and in the latter portion of the *Symposium*, where the drunken Alcibiades draws that wonderful, audacious, and unparalleled portrait of him in his most secret moments.

It is suspected that Plato has introduced many of his own theories under the ægis of Socrates' name. This very probable conclusion is, however, curiously opposed to the testimony of Aristotle, who constantly in his extant writings quotes the opinions of Socrates, and quotes them from his words in the Dialogues of Plato, without once (so far as I know) hinting that the Platonic Socrates is an idealised portrait. Nor does he ever quote the Socrates drawn by Xenophon or any other of the numerous authors of Socratic dialogues.¹ There is a third sketch of the man in the fragments of Aristoxenus, who states on the authority of his own father that he was a man of strong passions and irascible temper, taking money for teaching, and altogether of a lower type than

¹ In the chapters on Plato and Xenophon I will return to this question.

the fuller accounts compel us to believe. This shows us at least that he had many opponents and detractors, who looked upon him as anything but a great moral and social reformer.

§ 341. It is indeed not difficult to see injurious tendencies suggested by his teaching, which might alarm more earnest thinkers than the old conservatives, who feared that he was shaking all the foundations of traditional morality and religion. There is no doubt that by his discouraging the pursuit of practical politics, of oratory, and of physical science, until men had cleared up all their first principles by ample discussion, he encouraged a strong and very mischievous tendency among all social people—that of wasting their time in conversation, the *λέσχης τέπνον κακόν* of Euripides. It is no doubt very well to say that these dialectical talks were all-important. Even in the Dialogues of Plato, which are of course vastly better than the real discussions, there is much prolixity, and much waste of time and ingenuity. Accordingly the charge that Socrates taught young men to idle in talking over what they ought to do—*ἀδολεσχῆν* as the Greeks called it—is not unfounded. Again, the doctrine that each man's first and most absolute duty was to purify his own soul from moral ignorance, and attain to that knowledge which was virtue—this doctrine asserted the infinite value of each man's own good as contrasted with the good of others and of the State. Hence Socrates preached what the Germans call that *absolute subjectivity* which was ultimately the destruction of the whole ancient idea of the State. Though himself an exemplary citizen, it may be asserted that none of his pupils ever turned out even a moderately good one. Young aristocrats like Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides set up their 'absolute subjectivity' as above the laws, and endeavoured to use other men as slaves or playthings. Men of pleasure like Aristippus used the virtuous and vicious alike for their own convenience, and escaped by voluntary exile from the intolerable duties of promoting the welfare and good government of their fellows. Last of all the Cynics, such as Antisthenes and Diogenes, broke with society altogether, lived as strangers under the protection of laws which they despised, and offended and shocked their fellow-citizens by the

grossest rudeness and the most shameless indecencies. No doubt these men were parodies of Socrates. They omitted all the refinement, all the grace, all the wonderful attractiveness, which his threadbare cloak and naked feet could not impair. They exaggerated his somewhat prosy homeliness about cobblers and tinkers and tailors as the proper illustrations in moral enquiry. They travestied his noble contempt of a false and unjust public opinion into an insolent disregard of all the traditional decencies of social life. Still they *were* parodies. They followed up his rejection of the ordinary culture of sophistic education with a rejection of all culture, and thus for the first time that closest of all alliances in Greek social life was dissolved. Unfortunately, perhaps indeed fortunately, the books of all the Socratic philosophers, except those of Xenophon and Plato, have perished. The vast catalogue enumerated by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of Euclid of Megara, of Stilpo, of Antisthenes, of Diogenes, of Aristippus, and of the other *viri Socratici* are gone, and have hardly left a trace behind. But though we thus have escaped commenting upon their style and method, it was necessary to say a word in passing on the extraordinary revolution produced by Socrates in Greek thought. Had these men lived a century earlier, they would assuredly have been Sophists. In the fourth century they were all developed in antagonism to the general features of the Sophists.

§ 342. But we must now take up another thread in the complex woof, and show how great men of a totally different stamp stood out at Athens, together with the poets, the historians, and the Sophists. We have seen in the last chapters how, from the writing of treaties and drawing up of registers, the first attempts had been suggested of setting down first mythical histories, and then annals in unfettered or prose diction—a very important and late step in a society whose poetry had long reached a splendid literary form, and had been employed for politics and for philosophy as well as for more emotional and romantic subjects. These bald and dry attempts were gradually refined into the narrative form by Hecateus, and perfected by the introduction of dramatic

elements—of humour and pathos in the matter, and mixture of dialogue with narrative in the form, by the great and consummate genius of Herodotus. But with him this branch of Greek literature reached its highest point. The later attempts to write Ionic historical prose, such as that of Ktesias, strove merely to enhance the effects attained by Herodotus, and made no lasting impression upon their age. Indeed, it is very remarkable how little even his splendid work is cited among contemporaries, and how intent the men of his day were upon a different style and a different ideal in prose writing. Not even the great body of Greek speculation which was written in Ionic prose, and which contained the deepest thoughts of their deepest thinkers—Heracleitus, Democritus, Anaxagoras—could stay the current which set in a new direction.

CHAPTER IV.

THE BEGINNINGS OF ORATORY AND THE RISE OF ATTIC PROSE COMPOSITION—GORGIAS, ANTIPHON.

§ 343. THE new direction was itself determined by two great causes—the spread of education among the masses, and the increase of democratic constitutions throughout the Greek world. For the consequent importance of conversation and discussion raised eloquence above all other branches of literature, and no sooner was critical attention directed to its power and charm, than they were found to be reducible to a theory which could be taught to a degree impossible in the case of poetry. This was the teachable or artificial element in oratory, by which the speaker, in addition to the natural gifts of genius and of outward grace, adds the technical skill derived from the science of rhetoric, the *τέχνη*, as the first inventors called it.

In the simpler sense eloquence had always been at home among the Greeks. The Homeric poems assume it as a great gift in their heroes, and one not generally possessed by them. Odysseus, and Nestor, and Phoenix are the orators of the heroic age, and the specimens of their persuasive speaking in the poems show how keenly the rhapsodists and their audiences appreciated this high quality. In Hesiod it is an inspiration of kings by the muse. The deficiency of the Spartan Menelaus almost seems suggested by Doric, not by Achaean Sparta. But in early historical days, it is remarkable how little we hear of eloquence. None of the early tyrants is reported to have owed his power to this quality, not even Peisistratus, who was a literary and perhaps an eloquent man. In the pages of Herodotus we can only find the Athenian Hippocleides, who outshines the other suitors of Agariste in social eloquence at the

feast, and Themistocles—the first notable historic instance, which the evidence of Thucydides corroborates. Though Herodotus does not remark upon it, his dramatic narrative leaves us in no doubt as to the secret of Themistocles' influence. It is, however, certain that his speaking was not more based on technical knowledge than that of the orators in the *Iliad*, and that, like the many other speakers in Herodotus, he trusted to a persuasive manner, and to weighty facts to produce the effect he desired. The period after the Persian wars was that which we have already discussed in connection with tragedy, and the development of philosophy and sophistic. The democratic right of free speech, and the love of talking and disputing, so dear to Greeks of all ages, transpires everywhere. Tragedy is the poetry of argument and of eloquence, rival systems of philosophy are the arena of polemic and exposition; sophistic is little more than the setting up of this formal readiness as the highest and most perfect accomplishment of life. But far more important than all these luxuries of education were the practical uses of eloquence, not only in public deliberation, but in pleading before democratic assemblies or courts of justice. Hence the necessities of the age must produce teachers of eloquence in all these branches.

§ 344. The earliest practical development was due to the Sicilians, who seem to have been always remarkable among the Greeks for their *Attic* qualities, their quickness of intellect, and love of clever speaking. There are signs of this talent even in the scanty fragments of Epicharmus and Sophron; nor did it become extinct down to the days of Cicero, who specially notes it in many places through his Verrine speeches and his rhetorical writings. But the introduction of democracy at Syracuse in 466 B.C., and at Agrigentum a few years later, gave a great impetus to the study of oratory; and so it comes that while Aristotle, speaking loosely, mentions Empedocles of Agrigentum as the master of Gorgias and the father of rhetoric, Syracuse certainly produced in Korax the first founder of the art of preparing court speeches, with a view to persuading the judges by artful attack and defence. It is said that the expulsion of the tyrants produced so many

claims for property wrongfully seized and transferred by them, that Korax wrote his *techné*, and probably prepared speeches for pay, to meet this public outburst of litigation. But the special point about him and his successor Tisias, was their avoidance of the trade of sophist, and their strict adherence to the practical profession of *rhetor*. We are told in the *Lives of the Orators*, ascribed to Plutarch, that Tisias gave lessons to Lysias at Thurii, and to Isocrates at Athens. Pausanias even says that he came with Gorgias on his celebrated embassy (427 B.C.) to Athens. All these anecdotes are of little authority. There is no good evidence that Korax, who taught early, and Tisias, who taught late, in the fifth century, wandered about like Gorgias. It is also certain that they composed their speeches for Syracusans in Doric dialect, and were therefore inconvenient models for Attic orators. A *techné*, or rhetorical treatise, by Tisias was extant in antiquity, in which he developed the importance of the *εἰσὸς*, or guessing probable points, which Plato adopts and develops in his *Phædrus*.

It is evident that these Rhetors, just like the Sophists, cared nothing for truth and falsehood, but altogether for persuasion. This was generally called 'making the worse argument appear the better,' and is attacked by both Plato and Aristophanes, as if the whole profession of advocates was not necessarily founded upon the principle of leaving the truth to be ascertained by the judge, and of confining themselves to the strengthening of the side on which they have been retained. This charge against the Sophists, which all the German scholars repeat with great devoutness, might be brought with equal justice, and equal irrelevancy, against the great profession of the law in the present day. It is Machiavelli's adherence to this scientific neglect of moral considerations in a general policy, instead of a particular cause, which has excited against him the same kind of charge with greater force.

As has been just observed, we have no evidence of the influence of Korax and Tisias on Attic judicial oratory, and yet it is almost certain that Antiphon must have studied them. For he was essentially their successor, and not the successor of the Sophists, strictly so called, who taught at Athens during the fifth

century. Protagoras was indeed supposed by some to have made advances in rhetoric, but it was not in forensic, but in dialectical speaking. He discussed the accurate sense and use of words, and noted grammatical anomalies ; he expounded poets, and discussed politics—in fact, he did everything but lay down strict rules for judicial argument. Nevertheless, his general studies must have greatly influenced style ; and if Pericles thought it worth while spending a day in discussing with him the real *cause* of an accident, he can have been no mean or unsuggestive thinker. But neither he, nor Prodicus, nor Hippias of Elis, though the one set forth the praise of virtue with elegant diction, and the other brought together an encyclopædia of knowledge in his lectures, can be called special masters in the art of Attic prose. It is indeed possible that they all, like Protagoras, continued to use the Ionic dialect.

§ 345. But while these men were promoting in a formal way accuracy of diction and elegance of form, *political* oratory of a more solid kind, such as had been employed by Themistocles, was receiving a great impulse at the hands of Pericles. There can be no doubt as to the extraordinary effect of his public speaking. Even the comic poets who upbraid his policy, and assail his motives, cannot deny it. They speak of him as the Olympian, whose eloquence was very thunder and lightning ; they speak of him as charming the audience with magic power, and alone of the speakers of that day leaving a sting behind.¹ Yet we know that he left nothing written save a few decrees, that he never thought of publishing his speeches, and that the wonderful effects produced were not by a violent or impassioned manner, but by the weight of his character, the dignity and calmness of his demeanour, and the solid and convincing nature of his arguments. The few sayings remembered of him are remarkable for pithiness, and for a deep poetic feeling, and we know that, in addition to his political speeches, he made some of those semi-political harangues at public funerals, which were of the nature of an epideictic display, and which excited an ungovernable enthusiasm in the Athenian women then present, whose

¹ Cf. Vol. I. p. 431, note.

seclusion debarred them from hearing elsewhere the great orator. But we may be certain that, though we have no remains of the speeches which he delivered, the compositions put into his mouth by Thucydides have no resemblance to them except in the policy they advocate. The rhetorical antitheses and verbal subtleties of Thucydides were quite foreign to the genius of Pericles, who clearly owed his power to his profound thoughts, which were doubtless clothed in poetical and figurative, but clear diction. This purely political oratory, which despised the trammels of rhetorical form, was probably the oratory aimed at by such democratic speakers as Cleon and Lysicles and Hyperbolus, though we know that the first of them added vulgar and extravagant action—a thing quite contrary to Greek taste. In after days there may have been a few proud and careless aristocrats who trusted to natural gifts in public speaking, and this would seem also to have been the case with Phocion ; but on the whole, even political oratory could not save itself from the inroads of rhetoric, and thus we have in Demosthenes the highest combination of both, but probably a political eloquence inferior to the more pregnant and more poetical, though less elaborated, eloquence of Pericles.

During the period of Pericles' greatness as a political orator, judicial eloquence was shaping itself, as we shall presently see, into an exact science in the hands of Antiphon. But at the same time, the third prominent branch among the Greeks, *epideictical* oratory, or the eloquence of display, was rapidly developing in the hands of Gorgias. It was of course impossible that these three branches of oratory should keep perfectly distinct, for great distinction in any one of them must naturally lead to the others, as Pericles was called upon to deliver panegyrics, and Antiphon to defend himself by a political speech. Still the parentage of the 'Attic orators' from Antiphon, and of Antiphon from Korax, is direct and certain ; so is the descent of Isocrates from the school of Gorgias. Equally certain is it, that in Themistocles, Pericles, Alcibiades and Phocion we have a practical kind of public speaking, which did not condescend to rhetorical artifices, and was probably more like the best speaking in the English House

of Commons than anything else which I can suggest. But of course, from the very nature of this eloquence, which was not written out by the speakers, and never reported (a device unknown to the Greeks), we can trace in it no development or necessary progress.

§ 346. We therefore turn at once to GORGIAS, whom we merely mentioned (p. 60) in speaking of the philosophic side of the Sophists, as his real importance belongs to the history of oratory. Aristotle speaks of Empedocles as his forerunner ; but does not imply that Empedocles actually prepared a *τέχνη*, or devoted himself to rhetoric, but that his reputation in this direction arose both from the splendid diction with which he recommended his physical theories, and from his democratic action at Agrigentum. If Empedocles was the teacher of Gorgias in philosophy,¹ this may have been an additional reason for the remark. But the slight difference of age, as Blass remarks, between the two men, as well as between Protagoras and Tisias, makes the relation of master and pupil between any of them unlikely. For Empedocles seems to have become prominent about 470 B.C., and the birth of Gorgias, who lived all through the fifth century, cannot have been much after 490. All our authorities agree that he lived over 100 years, and that he came to Athens as a celebrated man in 427, apparently for the first time, as his speaking then made so wonderful an impression. He was born at Leontini, the son of Charamantides, and had a brother Herodicus, a physician whom Plato mentions, and a sister, whose descendants set up a memorial statue, which Pausanias describes, to the rhetor at Olympia. His other remarks in connection with it² are curious, but not very trustworthy. Though Gorgias was justly counted a sophist, and published a celebrated sceptical treatise, he seems to have preferred to call himself a rhetor. He travelled much about Greece, and was reputed to have amassed great wealth—yet he only left a very small fortune, though he was unmarried,

¹ The testimony of Plato (*Menon*, 76 c) is decisive that Gorgias and Empedocles were advocates of the same doctrines, and must therefore have been in some way connected.

² vi. 17, 8.

and had frugal habits. But frugal habits, as I explained (p. 59), are consistent with luxury and even extravagance in other directions. He seems to have died in Thessaly, whither so many celebrated men of letters resorted.

A great number of eminent men are named among his pupils : Menon and Aristippus in Thessaly, who are mentioned in Xenophon's *Anabasis* ; Likymnius, Polus, Alkidamas and Isocrates, the rhetors, with good reason ; Thucydides, Critias and Alcibiades, on doubtful authority. Though he shared with all the other Sophists the boast that he could make the weak appear the strong, and that no professional man could argue even concerning his profession against a trained dialectician, he seems to have been a man of good moral character and high aspirations, and is said to have designated as a lampoon, and the work of a young Archilochus, the celebrated dialogue (*Gorgias*) in which Plato attacks his theory of rhetoric. He left several technical essays, but they are supposed to have been ready-made commonplaces rather than scientific expositions of principles. He is besides reported to have composed political speeches and harangues ; probably the former were merely accidentally political, and belonged properly to the *epideictical* species, the *harangue*, of which he was the real founder, and in which his great merit lies.

§ 347. The subjects of these oratorical displays are preserved to us. Two of these, called the *Olympicus* and *Pythicus*, were, like Isocrates' *Panegyricus*, intended as a sort of political pamphlet, except that Isocrates was unable to deliver them with effect, while Gorgias evidently trusted to the power and grace of his voice and presence. The subject of the once famous *Olympicus* was an exhortation to the assembled Greeks to give up internal feuds, and combine in attacking and appropriating the territory of the barbarians. This subject was a favourite one with the Rhetors, and gave them opportunity to flatter the Greeks on their national advantages as compared with the surrounding barbarians ; but it is a great mistake to confound this Panhellenism, either in Gorgias or in Isocrates, with the Hellenism of a later age, which sought to infuse Greek culture into the surrounding

empires. Similarly there was an *Epitaphios* of Gorgias, which probably served as a model to succeeding orators, for, in addition to the lost *epitaphios* delivered by Pericles and other leading Athenian citizens, we have five extant—that in Thucydides, that in the *Menexenus* of Plato, that of Hyperides, and those ascribed to Lysias and to Demosthenes, which are late and poor.¹ We know from these how stereotyped was the form of such harangues, and it is more than probable that it is to Gorgias that we owe its first establishment. There was also a panegyric on Elis, beginning, we are told, without preface (proem) with the words Ἥλις πόλις εὐδαίμων. The further allusions in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* to his use of digressions in these harangues make us imagine them not unlike Pindar's odes in a prose dress, wherein the mythical ancestors and former greatness of the victor's family formed the chief ornament of the encomium.

§ 348. Gorgias' style was far more flowery and poetical than the chaster taste of succeeding generations could tolerate even as a display, for of course the judicial orators, who spoke in court and for a fixed purpose of persuading a jury, must have been from the beginning more ordinary in their language, and tamer in their reasoning. But in addition to the license of his subject, and the occasions of his display, there seems in our extant fragments a striving after alliteration and ryming in sound, and antitheses in sense, which show how prose in his hands still felt afraid to abandon the aids by which poetry seeks to charm the ear. The composition seems far too attentive to form, and the display of ingenuity in this respect is so conscious and excessive as to be considered childish by the Greeks, who laid him aside, till the Roman rhetors took him up, and studied him afresh. The grammarians who write about style censure him gravely for this excess of *πάρισα* and *ὁμοιοτέλευτα*, just as Plutarch censures Aristophanes for using them, as compared with Menander.

¹ Isocrates also mentions that the subject of the *Panegyricus*, so far as it consisted in the praise of Athens, brought him into direct competition with these *encomia*. His *Eclogas* was often called, though wrongly, an *Epitaphios* because it dealt with the virtues of the deceased monarch.

His metaphors also were so frequent as to be tedious. Most of these very superficial devices were called Gorgian figures. I here quote the principal fragment given by Dionysius, as it is not easily accessible, except in Mullach's *Fragmenta* or Clinton's *Fasti*, though a curious and early specimen of Attic prose.¹ For Gorgias appears to have adopted this dialect, and thus in another important respect to have marked an epoch in Greek eloquence.

There are two speeches preserved among the orators under his name, the *Encomium of Helen*, and the *Defence of Palamides*, which have much exercised critics as to their genuineness. Blass, after a careful examination of them in his first volume, cannot make up his mind to accept them, though they have many likenesses to his certain fragments, and there is no decisive anachronism in style or matter to expose them; but when he comes to discuss the *Helen* of Isocrates² he is so impressed by the arguments in favour of its being a reply to the *Encomium*, and to a speech of Gorgias, that he decides in favour of its genuineness. Nothing can better prove to us the difficulty of deciding the

¹ Schol. *ad Harmoz.* 412 : Τί γὰρ ἀπὴν τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις, ὧν δεῖ ἀνδράσι προσεῖναι ; τί δὲ καὶ προσῆν, ὧν οὐ δεῖ προσεῖναι ; εἰπεῖν δὲ καὶ μὴ εἰπεῖν, βούλωμαι, βουλοίμην δὲ ἅ δει, λαθὼν μὲν τὴν θεῖαν νέμεσιν, φυγὼν δὲ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον φθόνον. Οὗτοι γὰρ ἐκέκτηντο ἔνθεον μὲν τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀνθρώπινοι δὲ τὸ θνητόν· πολλὰ μὲν δὴ τὸ παρὲν ἐπικεκίς τοῦ αἰθάδους δικαίου προκρίνοντες, πολλὰ δὲ νόμου ἀκριβείας λόγων ἀμύνητα· τοῦτο νομίζοντες θεϊκότατον καὶ κοινότατον νόμον, τὸ δέον ἐν τῷ δέοντι καὶ λέγειν καὶ σιγᾶν καὶ ποιεῖν· καὶ δισσὰ ἀσκήσαντες μάλιστα ὧν δεῖ, γνῶμην καὶ βῶμην, τὴν μὲν βουλευόντες, τὴν δὲ ἀποτελοῦντες· θεράποντες μὲν τῶν ἀδίκως δυστυχούντων, κολασταὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκως εὐτυχούντων, αἰθάδεις πρὸς τὸ συμφερον, ἀόρητοι πρὸς τὸ πρέπον, τῷ φρονίμῳ τῆς γνῶμης παύοντες τὸ ἄφρον, ὑβρισταὶ εἰς τοὺς ὑβριστάς, κῆσμοι εἰς τοὺς κοπιούους, ἄφοβοι εἰς τοὺς ἀφόβους, δεινοὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς. Μαρτύρια δὲ τούτων τροπαῖα ἐτήσαντο τῶν πολέμων, Διὸς μὲν ἀγῶνα, τούτων δὲ ἀναθήματα· οὐκ ἄπειροι οὔτε ἐμφύτου Ἄρεος, οὔτε νομίμων Ἑρῶων, οὔτε ἐνοπλίου Ἑριδός, οὔτε φιλοκάλου Εἰρήνης· σεμνοὶ μὲν εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς τῷ δικαίῳ, οἷσι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τοκέας τῇ θεραπείᾳ, δίκαιοι πρὸς τοὺς ἀστούς τῷ ἴσῳ, εὐσεβεῖς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τῇ πίστει. Τοιγαροῦν αὐτῶν ἀποθανόντων ὁ πόθος οὐ συνάπεθανεν, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος οὐκ ἀπαμῶντος σώμασι (ἢ οὐ ζώντων.

Σεμῆς γὰρ (says Dionysius) ἐνταῦθα συμφορήσας λέγεις ὁ Γοργίας, ἐννοίας ἐπιπολαιωτέρας ἔπεξαγγέλλει, τοῖς τε παρίσσις καὶ ἀποπετελεύτοις καὶ ἀσποκατάρκτοις καλλωπίζων δι' ὅλοι πρὸς κόρον τὸν λόγον.

² *A. B.* ii. p. 222.

question than these doubts and changes of opinion in such a critic as Blass, who is not, like most German-, over-sceptical, or disposed to make light of all evidence against his own subjective opinions. Still, as all early critics seem to ignore them, they are probably clever forgeries, at least on me they produce that impression, as on most of the German critics.¹ These speeches are now printed in the Teubner *Antiphon* (ed. Blass), but he has unfortunately not added the fragments, which must be sought in Mullach's *Fragmenta Philosophorum*, vol. ii. The MSS. are very numerous for the *Helen*, and in general found with the speeches of Antiphon. Their value is discussed by Blass in his Preface to *Antiphon*, p. xi, sq.

§ 349. It is unnecessary in this place to make more than a passing mention of *Polus* of Agrigentum, and of *Likymnius*, whom we know on Plato's authority to have been pupils and followers of Gorgias. For of neither have we any remains, nor do the ancients quote any works of Polus save a rhetorical treatise. The picture of the man in Plato's *Gorgias* is disagreeable, forward, and insolent; but perhaps here too Plato is playing the Archilochus. Likymnius is even more obscure, and only survives in stray allusions of Aristotle and Dionysius as the inventor of 'Likymnian words' of more sound than meaning. The greater pupils of Gorgias, Alkidamas and Isocrates, belong to a later generation, and a newer epoch of literature than that with which we are now occupied.

§ 350. We turn to the clearer and far more important figure of ANTIPHON the orator, the real father of Attic judicial oratory, who may indeed have heard Gorgias, and learnt from him, as some of the 'Lives' assert, but who was nevertheless the founder of a very different and far more solid branch of Attic prose composition. Plato in his *Phædrus* (257 D) says, that distinguished statesmen in Greek cities were ashamed to

¹ In the preface to his *Antiphon* (Teubner, 1870), Blass, in recording his change of opinion on both orations (after Reiske), regards the *Pala-medes* as a valuable specimen of early Attic judicial oratory, which is quite true, so far as accurate dissection of the subject goes. He adds, that even if forgeries, these speeches give us as good an idea of the genuine Gorgias, as the Roman copies give us of old Greek sculpture.

commit to writing and leave behind them speeches, lest they might hereafter be called sophists. Though his evidence as regards the Sophists is always suspicious, it is not unlikely that this sort of teaching was at first classed with other teaching, and the office of schoolmaster or pedagogue (in our sense) has never ranked high among the 'upper ten' of any society. It is probable from 'Thucydides' expression (though not certain, as Blass implies) that, at first Attic counsel, who were not allowed to speak for their clients, aided them with verbal instructions. But it was inevitable that they should come to write down the speeches in full, and practise their clients in delivering them, so that this species of eloquence soon outran the political speeches on the bema, which remained for a long time the composition of mere practical politicians. Hence it was that when a professional rhetor like Antiphon did happen to make a political speech in the course of a judicial debate, the effect of it was so extraordinary. The Germans think that this practice of retaining a professional advocate by litigants was the result of what they call the ochlocracy, which invaded Attic politics about 420 B.C., and which is supposed by them to have rapidly corrupted all morals and principle in the state. But this, as Mr. Grote has long since shown, is a mere servile submitting to the evidence of the comic aristocrats, who traduce and malign the completed democracy. It required no special revolution or degradation of public opinion to produce written court speeches, when the habit of retaining counsel was once sanctioned.

§ 351. Antiphon the son of Sophilus, of the deme Rhamnus¹ in the north of Attica, was born early in the fifth century, about 480. His grandfather was said to have been an adherent of the tyrants, so that his origin was probably aristocratic, as is to be also inferred from his politics. The authors of the 'Lives' are at variance as regards his education, concerning which they evidently knew nothing; his style shows, as might be expected, evident traces of the study of Tisias and Gorgias—the *reasonable presumptions* (εἰκότα) of Tisias, and the

¹ Cf. the picturesque description of the district in M. G. Perrot's *Éloquence politique et judiciaire à Athènes*, i. p. 106.

antitheses of Gorgias being prominent in his speeches. He was evidently a celebrated teacher of rhetoric, as appears from an allusion in Plato's *Menexenus*, and from Thucydides' statement we know that he was the leading advocate at Athens. But it appears from the hint of his being self-taught, from his appellation Nestor, and from other allusions in the *Lives*, that he did not become celebrated as a practical orator or politician till he was advanced in years. We possess none of his speeches which seem to date before 420 B.C., excepting possibly the *indictment of the stepmother*, which in my opinion is not genuine. He appears, from his traditions, and perhaps from constant associating with young nobles as their teacher, to have acquired a profound hatred of the Athenian demos; he wrote speeches for the allied cities in disputes about the tribute, and wrote a violent attack on Alcibiades, who, as being a renegade, was of course exceptionally hated by the aristocratic party. But it is probable that this speech was spoken by some client, for all through his life this wily and able man kept in the background, and pulled the strings of public affairs through weaker men whom he put forward. He was in fact a sort of Athenian Baron Stockmar, who made excursions from education, or perhaps still more a Richard Wagner, who made excursions from art, into politics. This is the picture drawn of him in a famous passage by Thucydides, who was, according to common tradition, his pupil and friend, and who evidently regarded him with no common admiration.

The circumstances in which he became a moving force are a prominent part of Greek history. After the Sicilian disaster, when he was now an old man, he undertook the organising of the oligarchical revolution, which resulted in establishing the Four Hundred at Athens. We know from Thucydides' graphic picture that this was done by a huge conspiracy, which worked by means of the aristocratic clubs in Athens. These clubs, called *ἐταῖρίαι*, were purely political, and may perhaps be compared to the Orange societies in the north of Ireland, which while they profess loyalty to the constitution in their own sense, and to their own order, hardly conceal their hatred of their political opponents in the very formulæ of their party,

creed. We know that these clubs carried out their object by political assassination, and that they intimidated the populace by their prompt and daring crimes. For this policy Thucydides makes Antiphon responsible, and if indeed he proceeded to call him 'second to no man of his day in *virtue*,' we might well doubt the historian's morality as well as his veracity. But of course Thucydides meant intellectual ability, as being in his view the main perfection of a man. Horses or dogs which performed their allotted functions properly possessed an *ἀρετή* of their own quite analogous. After describing the plots and murders perpetrated by the oligarchical conspirators, he adds,¹ that Peisander was apparently the chief actor and public head of the movement; 'but the man who devised the whole thing so as to bring it to this point, and had watched it longest, was Antiphon, a man second to none of the Athenians of his day in ability (*ἀρετή*) and abler than any to devise a plan, and to express his thoughts; who never came before the (assembled) people, nor so far as he could help it into any debate, but (yet) was an object of suspicion to the masses on account of his reputation for cleverness; for, indeed, he was the one man able to give most help as an adviser to those who were contending in debate both in court, and in the assembly.'

It is not our province to detail the fortunes of the leaders of the Four Hundred; how they despatched a deputation, in which Antiphon took part, to Sparta, to put Athens completely in the hands of the Lacedæmonians; how when they returned after the failure of this embassy, the moderate party with Theramenes obtained the ascendancy, and how most of the conspirators fled to Deceleia. Antiphon and Archeptolemus remained, for reasons which have not been preserved. They were forthwith tried for their treasonable negotiation with the enemies of the city, and we are fortunate in still possessing the text of the indictment, as well as of the sentence, which in Plutarch's *Life* is copied from the rhetor Cæcilius, who found it in Craterus' collection of state documents.² It appears that

¹ viii. 68. - According to the parallel passages quoted by Classen in his *Introduction* (p. lxxvii), *ἀρετή* also implies *unselfishness*.

² Both these statements are quoted by Blass, *AB.* i. pp. 88-9, *noted*.

Antiphon put forth all his strength in his own defence. The veteran rhetor, who had for years been the acknowledged master of judicial eloquence, at last found himself obliged to apply in his own case the arts and arguments with which he had supplied his clients. His speech, which was famous in antiquity, is an irreparable loss to us, as he did not adopt a technical or narrow ground of defence, but reviewed the whole revolution of the Four Hundred, and probably his own political life, in his harangue on the *coup d'état* (περὶ τῆς μεταστάσεως). Thucydides goes on to say, when describing his character as above quoted, that the defence was the finest oration of the kind known up to his day. Agathon is said to have specially praised it to the orator, who replied that the approval of one competent judge atoned for its ill-success with the many. But of course the case was too clear, and the general distrust of the dangerous rhetor must have felt itself thoroughly justified by the evidence of his antidemocratic policy.¹ He and Archeptolemus were condemned to death, their descendants to loss of civic rights; their bodies were refused burial in Attic soil, and their houses razed to the ground.

§ 352. These events happened in 411 or 410 B.C. (Ol. 92, 2). We have no other evidence whatever of the personal character of this remarkable man. The Greek lives have sought to afford it by confusing him with several other men of the same name, first with Antiphon the democrat, whose services in war and politics brought him death at the hands of the Thirty, who were the successors of the Four Hundred in policy at Athens. There was also Antiphon the tragic poet, murdered by Dionysius of Syracuse for an anti-tyrannic joke, and (omitting obscure persons) the sophist Antiphon, already mentioned (p. 61). Didymus ascribed none but the speeches on homicide to the rhetor, to the sophist not only essays on truth and concord, but even what he calls the *δημηγορικοί* and the *πολιτικός*—political harangues. This judgment, which Hermogenes quotes from Didymus, is shown to be correct from the careful examination of the fragments by Blass,² and they are accordingly

¹ See the elegant sketch of the temper and feelings of the Athenian people at this moment in M. G. Perrot's *Éloquence*, i. p. 117, sq.

² *AB.* i. 97, sq.

printed as an appendix, under the sophist's name, i. his edition of Antiphon. I have spoken of these fragments in connection with the Sophists. If the rhetor left no political speeches, we must understand Thucydides to mean that on these subjects his advice was given orally, and not by writing—a probable supposition, as the litigants might be obscure people, but the politicians already speakers of some experience.

§ 353. We pass to the consideration of the still extant speeches which are ascribed to him. These are obviously divisible into two classes, the theoretical exercises, and the practical or actual court speeches. The former are peculiarly interesting as affording a specimen from early times of the training given by the rhetors—training of a strictly real and practical tendency, and very different from the idle declamation upon impossible cases which was fashionable in the later schools. On the other hand, they show plainly the professional spirit then disseminated by the Sophists, who advocated the theory, so naturally acceptable to the over-subtle and not over-conscientious Greek, that rhetoric was a sort of magic art, and that by unlocking its secrets a man could ply at will the assent and obedience of his hearers. Now-a-days, when a great part of eloquence consists merely in feeling intensely upon a subject, and letting the heart find its most simple and natural utterance, we cannot easily put ourselves into this curiously artificial attitude, which allows the conviction of the speaker in his cause to go for little, and makes his eloquence a mere play of intellectual dexterity. But such was indeed the case in the days of Antiphon. His exercises, called *tetralogies*, because they contain a double attack and reply on each case, are all upon murder cases, as indeed are all his extant speeches; but though this branch of them was particularly famous, the unity of subject in his remains is rather to be ascribed to the accidental preservation of that portion of his collected speeches in which this class of cases had been brought together. They are meant to show how a master of the art could frame arguments with equal persuasiveness on either side of a given case.

One pair of the first tetralogy will here be sufficient as an

example. A distinguished man has been found in the way murdered by night, but his person not plundered. His attendant slave is found lying beside him, mortally wounded. Before dying, he attests that he recognised one of the murderers, the man who is now charged with the crime. Moreover, the latter was known to be at enmity with the deceased, and just engaged with him in personal litigation. As the accused denies the charge absolutely, the case would come for trial before the Areopagus. It should be remembered that as it is an imaginary one, there is no stress laid on the narrative of the facts, which are assumed as undisputed on both sides ; the problem is simply to argue from them in the best possible manner.

The accuser, who is a relative of the deceased, opens with reminding the court how an offender of known talent and mature experience will be sure to commit a crime in such a manner as to avoid easy conviction, and that for this reason, as direct evidence is almost sure to be wanting, the greatest importance must attach to *εἰκότα*, or probable inferences. He adds a reminder of the public pollution resting upon the state until the murderer has been prosecuted and punished. This is the exordium. The argument opens by rejecting successively all causes for the outrage except that of premeditated murder, and shows that, such being the case, the accused had the strongest motives to prompt him to the act, both from old antipathy, and from the fear of condemnation in the pending suit. Added to this, there is the only possible evidence, that of the dying slave. On these grounds the speaker presses for a verdict of condemnation, repeating in conclusion the religious aspects of the question, and picturing the defilement of all the temples and altars frequented by a blood-stained criminal.

To this very strong case the accused replies by opening with a bitter complaint of his singular misfortune. While others are relieved by a cessation or change from a pressing danger, the defendant, whose property has been ruined by the persecution of the deceased, has not escaped him even now, but has his life still threatened and annoyed, so much so, that it is actually no longer sufficient to establish his own good character, but he is in danger of condemnation if he cannot

discover and convict another man's murderers. He proceeds at once to show that, granting his hostility to the deceased, the certainty of being suspected was to him on prudential grounds the strongest dissuasive from attempting it. But he will undertake to retort the probable arguments set up against him. In the first place, the deceased may have been slain by robbers, who did not strip him because some one approached, or by some criminal whom he had surprised in the commission of another crime, or by some other personal enemy. Nor is the evidence of the slave trustworthy; for his excitement must have made it hard to recognise the murderers, and he would naturally name any person suggested by his master's relations. Moreover, the evidence of slaves is at all times doubtful, being never accepted without the test of torture. But as regards the probabilities of the case, they are clearly against the accuser, for how could a man in danger of being condemned to a mere fine risk his life and liberty to avoid it? and if he did, he would do it through another, and not expose himself to direct detection. His having strong reasons to commit the deed rather show that he was suffering injustice at the hands of the deceased, and it were indeed hard if this injustice were to entail the still greater injustice of a capital condemnation. The defendant concludes with retorting the charge of impiety upon those who leave the real culprit unpunished, and endeavour to convict an innocent man, who is also a man of high public character and of blameless life.

Such are the two speeches which open the debate, carried on through another attack and defence. They are all very short, in fact mere skeletons to be filled out, as occasion might suggest, but are so able and subtle as to show us how natural was the distrust of such an art on the part of the Athenian public, and how invaluable must have been the help of such a counsel, if the opposite side was not furnished with similar weapons.

§ 354. The second tetralogy is on a case of homicide by an accident in the palestra, when a lad, throwing a dart in accordance with all the rules of the school, hit another who ran across him at the instant. The case is interesting as

showing the Greek sentiment concerning the pollution or blood-guiltiness of any man or thing which was the *cause* of death, whether intentionally or not. Hence the constant subtleties as to the real *cause* of the event which we find here, and in the speech *on the chorister*, and which are reported to have occupied the attention of Pericles and Protagoras for hours together. The third tetralogy is a dispute about a homicide during a quarrel. The question argued is that the accused merely defended himself against the attack of the deceased, who thus succeeded in causing his own death; and moreover, that his wounds not being mortal, he deliberately, and against professional advice, had himself treated by an incompetent physician, who caused the fatal result. All these curious rhetorical exercises are evidently from the same hand, and there have not been wanting attempts to prove them of later date and inferior authorship than that of Antiphon. But there is no reasonable ground for such scepticism. The faults of over-subtlety and of crudeness attributed to them are exactly those which we should expect from his age and character, and their similarity in style, in spite of a few peculiarities, to Antiphon's certain speeches and to Thucydides' history are satisfactory evidence of their genuineness.

§ 355. I feel much more doubt about the *Charge of Poisoning against a Stepmother*, which comes first in our MSS. This speech has no doubt many features very similar to the acknowledged pieces, such as the *προκατασκευή*, or short summary *before* the narrative of facts, which was usual with Antiphon, and the artificial antitheses and assonances. But it is certain that other rhetors of the same age used these devices. On the other hand, the narrative of the facts obtains a prominence and a picturesqueness in this speech which are foreign to what we know of Antiphon, while the argument is neither forcible nor ingenious, as his arguments are wont to be. There is, moreover, a predominance of pathos in the speech which seems to me strange to him. But the best modern critic, Blass, is not convinced by these objections to reject the speech, and the reader may therefore regard my opinion as having the weight of authority against it.

§ 356. As the speech about the chorister is on the subject handled in the second tetralogy, so the speech *On the Murder of Herodes* is in character very similar to that of the first. Herodes was an Athenian, and a relation of the accuser, who became a cleruch at Mitylene after its capture in 427 B.C. While on a journey to Ænos, he left his ship at Methymna by night, apparently in a state of intoxication, and never returned, nor could his body be anywhere discovered. His relatives charged with the murder the only companion of his voyage, a Mitylenæan, who was supposed to be incited by an enemy of Herodes called Lykinos, who also lived at Mitylene. As additional evidence there was adduced a letter supposed to be written by the accused to Lykinos, and the declarations of a slave on board, who was tortured by the relatives, and confessed against the Mitylenæan, but was forthwith put to death, having revoked his evidence when he saw that he gained nothing by it. It is in this interesting case, and for a citizen of a subject town, accused with murdering an Athenian citizen, that Antiphon composed his admirable speech. We perceive that the accused had been harshly and unjustly treated. Upon coming to Athens, he had been at once cast into prison, and been refused the alternative of offering bail for his appearance, or of standing a second trial on appeal, though such refusal was illegal. The orator must therefore not only disprove the charge, but overcome a strong bias in the jury, arising from his inferior condition, and the feeling against Mitylene, which had not died away since the memorable crisis described by Thucydides. I will not here pursue the intricacies of the argument, in which there is, as usual, little narrative, but rather a subtle discussing of the probabilities of the case. The trial is interesting in showing the constant and stupid application of torture, and the little faith which was put in slaves' evidence even with this precaution. Moreover, a free man who was on board was also tortured, which seems very strange, and one of the speaker's points is the fact that while the slave confessed and criminated him, the free man would confess nothing.

§ 357. Particularly interesting is the argument which shows that mere probability is an unsafe guide, especially in capital

cases, and this is illustrated by several cases of false condemnation, where the truth came out afterwards.¹ The conclusion is also very characteristic, as showing the religious character of the Athenian public, to which Antiphon perpetually appeals. The speaker urges that had he been guilty, the gods must have shown their displeasure by unfavourable weather when he was sailing, or unpropitious signs when he was sacrificing with others; whereas the contrary was the case.² This and other like appeals in Antiphon's speeches have been used with great simplicity by Blass³ to prove that the orator was a man of antique sanctity, and an advocate of the national and established religion. We may be sure that the follower of the great sophists, and the master of Thucydides, held no such views. His political career, and the practice of substituting clever arguments for a just cause, especially when it first arose, are anything but the marks of an old-fashioned and conservative piety. But of course Antiphon, as a skilled rhetor, knew the audience he was addressing, and especially in cases of homicide the religious superstitions of the people were very strong, and sustained by a wholesome instinct. Hence he takes the utmost care that his case shall not be ruined by disclosing the least irreverence or scepticism on such matters—the least hint of which would have been to an elderly and sedate jury the strongest *εἰκός* that the speaker was a lawless and guilty person.

¹ § 69, sq. Ἡδὴ δ' ἔγωγε καὶ πρότερον ἀκοῇ ἐπίσταμαι γεγονός, τοῦτο μὲν τοὺς ἀποθανόντας τοῦτο δὲ τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας οὐχ εὕρηθέντας αὐτίκα Ἐφιάλτην τὸν ὑμέτερον πολίτην οὐδέπω νῦν εὕρηνται οἱ ἀποκτείναντες τοῦτο δ' ἐντὸς οὐ πολλοῦ χρόνου παῖς ἐζήτησεν οὐδὲ δώδεκα ἔτη γεγονώς τὸν δεσπότην ἀποκτείνειν· καὶ εἰ μὴ φοβηθείς, ὥς ἀνεβόησεν, ἐγκαταλιπὼν τὴν μάχαιραν ἐν τῇ σφαγῇ ὥχετο φεύγων ἀλλ' ἐτόλμησε μέιναι, ἀπώλοντ' ἂν οἱ ἔνδον ὄντες ἅπαντες· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ᾤετο τὸν παῖδα τολμῆσαι ποτε τοῦτο. He adds a curious condemnation of all the Hellenotamiae on a false charge, when only one escaped through the delay of his sentence.

² From the fact of Andocides (*De Myst.* §§ 137-9) urging similar points in favour of his own innocence, I infer that it was a commonplace at Athens to argue that fair weather was a proof of favour from the gods, and that a sea voyage was supposed to afford them a peculiarly convenient opportunity for punishing the guilty.

³ *AB.* i. 135. Cf. also Professor Jebb's *Attic Orators*, i, p. 40.

§ 358. Though the subject-matter of Antiphon's speeches is not without interest, there can be little doubt that the most important feature about him, especially in a history of Greek literature, is his form. For he is the earliest master of that artificial and technical prose, which reached its climax in Demosthenes, and which is one of the most remarkable developments of the genius of the race. Nor is there any department of Greek Literature so foreign to modern taste or to modern ideas. We would willingly attribute all the minute analysis of sentences in Greek orations to the barren subtlety of the rhetors of Roman times, and believe that the old orators scorned to compose in gyves and fetters, and study the syllables of their periods, and the prosody of them, as if they were writing poetry. But all these details seem to have been handed down in the *τέχναι* which each of them published, and Antiphon's was not the least-known among them. It seems that every sentence was to be weighed and measured in these orations, which were indeed not long but yet very intricate, and which were constructed with so close an adherence to rules, both in matter and in form, that we cannot imagine any parallel now-a-days. Not even French prose, the most polished and artificial organ of thought in modern Europe, can compare with Greek rhetoric in this respect. The Greek orator composed in *periods*, each of which was divided into one or more *κῶλα*, or members, four being the major limit. These *cola* implied one another in construction, and were summed up or completed by the last member, which was longer and weightier in sound than the rest. This is the *καταστραμμένη λέξις*, of which Antiphon is the earliest official representative, though Gorgias was probably its originator, and there are not wanting examples of it in Herodotus. The relative length of the *cola*, their cadence, their ending syllables—all these matters were made subject to rules. Antiphon, standing at the opening of this peculiar study, has by no means attained all its refinements; he oftens offends against the canons of the Roman critics by allowing the natural course of expression to carry him away. But this is only in comparison with later Attic eloquence, In comparison with our eloquence, we per-

ceive at once a stiff and artificial tone about him, enhanced by the antique flavour of his language, wherein he and Thucydides affected the old and unusual, in contrast to the beautiful spoken Attic of their day.¹ I will not trouble the reader by going into more minute details on these technical points, which rather injure than help our enjoyment of Attic prose, but recommend the full discussion in Blass' chapter on Antiphon, with the special tracts to which he refers. In an official history of Greek oratory these are essential details, however dry and uninteresting they may be to the general student.

To us moderns much of the force of Antiphon consists perhaps in his having not refined his style into complete accordance with these technical laws. The *austere harmony* which we find in him and in Thucydides is far more impressive than the *smooth harmony* of Isocrates.² This character is sustained by his choice of words, which are dignified and often poetical without the excess of metaphors censured in Gorgias. He uses the older $\sigma\sigma$, though it had been already replaced by $\tau\tau$, and the expression $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ μέν— $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ δέ, so common in Herodotus but abandoned in later Attic prose. As to the method of his orations, we notice that the arrangement is simple and natural. After a proem, he throws in a sort of *προκατασκευή*, to prepare the mind for the narrative of facts which follows. But here is his weak point, particularly as compared with Lysias, while his strength lies in argument, especially in the urging and retorting of *à priori* probable proofs. He reiterates, however, a good deal, and comes back on points already argued. Besides

¹ Thus, while such writers as Dionysius and Demetrius are constantly showing anacolutha in the use of particles (μέν repeated, or without δέ, or *vice versa*, &c.), we are rather struck with such sentences as this: ἐγὼ δ' ἡγοῦμαι πολὺν ἀνιοσιώτερον εἶναι ἀφείται τοῦ τεθνεώτος τὴν τιμωρίαν, ἅλλως τε καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐκ προβουλῆς ἀκουσίως ἀποθάνοντος, τῆς δὲ ἐκουσίως ἐκ προνοίας ἀποκτεινάσης (i. 5)—or this: οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον οὔτ' ἔργῳ ἁμαρτόντα διὰ ῥήματα σωθῆναι, οὔτ' ἔργῳ ὁρθῶς πράξαντα διὰ ῥήματα ἀπολέσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ῥῆμα τῆς γλώσσης ἁμάρτημά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἔργον τῆς γνώμης. And yet this latter is found fault with by the critics for having the last clause too short, and nothing corresponding to ἁμάρτημά ἐστι!

² We have no better word than *harmony* to use here for the Greek ἁρμονία, which is not at all the same in meaning.

the *figures of language*, as the rhetors called them, that is to say, balanced antitheses, alliterations at the end of clauses, and such like, he made but sparing use of *figures of thought*, such as indignant questions, invocations of the gods, and such indications of emotion as we should certainly leave to nature, but which these strict theorists had discussed as mere rhetorical devices. It was remarked that five of these, the *aposiopesis*, the assumed hesitation (*διαπόρρησις*), the emphatic repetition of a word (*ἀναεὶπλωσις*), the *climax*, and the use of irony, were unknown to him. But this is not true of irony, which is prominent enough in the Herodes speech, when the speaker is refuting the point that, as no murderer had yet been discovered, he is bound to clear himself by making the discovery.

The sum of these remarks leads us to the conclusion, that while the early condition and incomplete development of oratory made Antiphon adhere more closely than his more subtle and variously trained successors to a fixed and symmetrical plan, he did not equal them in the smoothness and grace of their structure, or in the artful simplicity of their narratives. Nevertheless he makes an august and haughty impression, even when pleading in the person of others. His tone is severe and dignified, his language strong and clear, without being fervent or passionate; and he stands before us not only as the fit organiser of an anti-democratic revolution, but as the master and model of the historian Thucydides.

§ 359. Turning to the external history of Antiphon's work, we note that, though greatly esteemed by his actual contemporaries, he was soon eclipsed by succeeding orators, whose developed graces were more agreeable than the harsh harmonies of the antique rhetor. His commonplaces are mentioned by Aristotle as of the same kind as those of Gorgias, and it is probable that Aristotle refers to the extant tetralogies, which may have been part of the well-known *τέχνη*. But the other earlier writers on rhetoric do not seem to have paid any attention to him. He was not a model for either late Attic or Roman eloquence. Dionysius often refers to him as being, like Thucydides, a writer of the old rough style, and as being with Lysias and Isocrates a leading orator

of Thucydides' day—as being a fine writer, but not pleasant. Cæcilius of Calacte appears first to have made a special study of him, and we have many good things cited from his criticisms in a special treatise on Antiphon and in his *Lives* of the orators. Hermogenes speaks of him with equal care and appreciation. The Life in *Plutarch's Lives of the Ten Orators*, the Greek arguments, and many citations of phrases in the Lexica show that he was studied if not generally read in late Greek times. There was even a special book on Antiphon's *figures* by Caius Harpocration, and we have extracts given by Photius from the orations.

§ 360. *Bibliographical.* As to MSS., Aldus tells us, in the preface to his *Ed. Princeps*, that Lascaris was sent to the East to look for Greek books, and brought back one containing the orators from Mount Athos. This MS. was evidently different from any of those now extant, but not, I think, superior to the best we possess, though in some passages it alone preserves the true reading. Foremost is the Crippsianus (A), used by Bekker as the basis of his text, which is in the British Museum, and of the thirteenth century. But since Mætzner collated the Oxford (N), of about the same age, it has been found, after much controversy, to be a better copy of the same archetype as A.¹ Others are the Laurentian and Marcian, (B and L), and a Breslau copy (Z). After the *Ed. Princeps* (1513), which contains all the orators save Demosthenes, as well as the speeches attributed to Gorgias and Alkidamas, and is the first edition of them all save Isocrates, there are texts by Stephanus and others; but of highest authority, in our own time, are those of Bekker, Baier and Sauppe (the Zurich *Ed.*), Mætzner, and Blass (Teubner, 1871). If these are not professed commentaries on the author, there is a host of critical monographs by Sauppe, Franke, Brieglebe, Spengel, and others, with occasional flashes of light from Cobet in the *Mnemosyne*. An exhaustive account of both the man and his writings is given by Blass² and in Mr. Jebb's *Attic Orators*.

¹ Cf. the discussion in Blass' Preface to his text of Antiphon, which differs from his earlier history of Attic oratory in some points.

² *AB.* i. ch. iii.

§ 361. In connection with the technical development of rhetoric by Antiphon, it may be well to add a word on some contemporary or immediately succeeding men, whose main activity is to be placed before the archonship of Eucleides, and who are specially noted in Plato's dialogues, in Cicero's rhetorical works, and by Dionysius, as marking epochs in the history of Attic eloquence. The fact that their writings are almost wholly lost prevents their claiming any considerable space in this short history. Foremost stands *Thrasymachos* of Chalkedon, who can be inferred from the extant notices to have flourished during the later years of the Peloponnesian war. He figures as a leading personage in Plato's *Republic*, where he appears in the character not of a rhetor, but of a bold and vulgar sophist, of blustering manner, and of low moral tone. But whether this portrait is indeed a fair one may well be doubted. In the *Phædrus* he is mentioned with Theodorus as a cunning rhetor, and this is more in consonance with our other notices of him. His technical treatises are referred to as ἀφορμαὶ ῥητορικαί (which probably do not differ from his *great techné*), as ἐπιδεικτικοί, and as παίγνια. Perhaps the deliberative speeches, of which a fragment remains, were also technical models. From his ἀφορμαὶ were cited various set proems, ὑπερβάλλοντες, or climaxes, and ἔλαιοι, or appeals to pity; Plato¹ speaks of him as able to excite to rage, and to soothe again the minds of his hearers, and this praise seems not ironical. But more generally, Blass has shown from a comparison of the ancient authorities² that he was regarded as the real founder of the newer Attic eloquence, inasmuch as he adopted in *style* the just mean between poetically artificial diction, on the one hand, and vulgar colloquialism, on the other. Secondly, he determined more accurately the rhetorical period, a proper rounding of sentences for proper effect, where everything is subordinate, and related to the main thought, no loose or disconnected clauses being admitted. Thirdly, according to Aristotle, he first used the pæonic rhythm, beginning his period with a first pæon, and ending with a first or fourth—a subtlety which is now of little interest,

¹ *Phædrus*, 266-7.

² *AB.* i. 246.

and, as Blass shows, not verified by the extant fragments, but which shows how profoundly artificial was Greek oratory in comparison with ours. Cicero, however, also observes in Thrasy-machus this strict attention to rythm. He seems accordingly to have been a valuable guide to Lysias, and other practical orators of the next generation. Only two short fragments remain.

We have the same sort of praise in Plato's *Phædrus*¹ of *Theodoros* of Byzantium, and of *Euenos* of Paros, who seem to have been fertile in separating each part of an oration into subdivisions, such as προδήγησις, δήγησις, and ἐπιδήγησις, πίστῳσις, and ἐπιπίστῳσις; Euenus also suggested indirect and, as it were, accidental effects, which he called παρέπαιροι, παράψογοι, and the like. But all these subtleties belong strictly to the history of Greek rhetoric, and require no special treatment in a general history of literature.

¹ 266 E.

CHAPTER V.

THUCYDIDES—ANDOCIDES, CRITIAS.

§ 362. THUCYDIDES is said, upon late and doubtful authority, to have been born in 471 B.C., and to have been therefore forty years old at the opening of the Peloponnesian war. This agrees, however, fairly well with the two passages in his work ¹ in which he states that he began his study of the war from its commencement, being then of mature age, and having perceived its importance; that he wrote down the events as they occurred, and lived all through it to the close. As to the historian's early life, we can only affirm that, while he is not known to have taken any active part in politics, and yet had sufficient means to permit perfect leisure, he must have studied with care in the rhetorical schools of Gorgias, and still more of Antiphon, as well as in the sophistical schools of philosophical scepticism. He further tells us that he was the son of Oloros, that he himself suffered from the plague at Athens, which he so graphically describes; ² also that he was appointed general for the protection of Athenian interests in Thrace, and that he was sent for from Thasos, where he was occupied, by his colleague Eukles to save Amphipolis, but that having failed in this object, owing to Brasidas' promptness, he secured Eion. ³ He tells us that, owing to his possession of gold mines in Thasos and on the opposite coast of Thrace, he was of great influence in that country, ⁴ but that he was banished *after* the affair at Amphipolis (B.C. 424) for twenty years, and thus had the opportunity of studying the other side of the conflict, especially the Peloponnesian affairs.

¹ i. 1, and v. 26.

² ii. 48.

³ iv. 104-6.

⁴ This circumstance may have caused his appointment as strategus, without any expeditionary force, in that region.

These are then the indisputable facts which we possess on his own authority—moreover, we may infer that he outlived the capture of Athens by Lysander in 405 B.C., perhaps for some time, as these confessions occur early in the fifth book, and we must allow him time to complete the remainder. On the other hand, his assertion that he witnessed and recorded the *whole* war is not borne out by the close, which ends abruptly, and shows evidence of being broken off by the death of the author, or some other untoward circumstance. Indeed his observation¹ that the eruption of Ætna in the year 426 was the third recorded, and the last known up to the date of the remark, seems to fix his death, or the limits of his revision of his work, before 396 B.C., when another eruption took place. However, his long absence from Athens, as well as his severe and perhaps surly character, kept him from being affected by the rapid changes of style and taste which mark the later years of the fifth century. Hence, though his work was, in part at least, written after new Attic prose had been developed, and when Lysias was delighting the juries with translucent simplicity, Thucydides kept up the old austerities of style, which make him and Antiphon peculiar among all the extant prose writers.

According to the most current tradition, he was assassinated in Thrace, where he lived in retirement on his property, and his unfinished work, which passed into the hands of his daughter, was edited either by her or by Xenophon, to whom she entrusted it. As we shall presently see, there are some points of style in the last and unfinished book which make Xenophon a possible editor. There is a great controversy among the Germans, some arguing that he considered the war concluded with the peace of Nicias, and had actually composed the first four and half books when he found that he must continue his task, and so he began again² with a new proem. Others, among whom is the latest editor, Classen, consider that the so-called inconsistencies in his work, on which Ullrich based this theory, can be explained away, and that there is a clear proof of the whole work being the outcome of one deliberate

¹ iii. 116.

² v. 26.

plan, not carried out till the end of the war, though evidence was taken, and notes made, all through its course. The controversy is, however, neither interesting nor profitable, and by modifying our purely subjective opinion as to the degree of completion which the earlier books may have attained before the later were written, we may indefinitely approximate the one hypothesis to the other.¹

Two other more fanciful inferences are drawn from his work. When he contrasts it with those which are intended for immediate display, and speaks² of them as composed by the logographers rather to afford pleasure than profit to the hearer, he is supposed to refer to the recitation of Herodotus at Athens. The earliest possible date for any such performance, and that of only parts of his work, is 446 B.C., which may serve to mark the time when the two historians came in contact, not when Thucydides was a child (according to a current anecdote), but a grown man, and able to criticise. But all this is doubtful, and still more so is the notion of Ullrich, that his remark on Antiphon's defence of himself, being the finest known τῶν μέχρι ἐμοῦ points at the defence of Socrates. This conjecture assumes that Socrates' defence was esteemed an oratorical performance, which it certainly was not.

There is a note of Plutarch's, in his life of Kimon, which is of more value, and apparently trustworthy. After detailing the descent of Kimon through his mother from a Thracian king

¹ The legends about Thucydides' life have been lately examined (apart from Classen's Introd.) by Petersen, *De Vita Thucyd.*, Dorpat, 1873; by Wilamowitz-Möllendorff in *Hermes* (xii. p. 326, sq.); by O. Gilbert (*Philol.* 38, 2), and by Firmani, *Revista di Filologia*, for 1877, p. 149, sq. But no new facts have been established. The newer tracts on the composition of his history, and the relation of the earlier to the later part, are enumerated by L. Herbst, in the first part of his elaborate *Jahresbericht* (*Philologus*, 38, p. 504). The result of his very dry and intricate discussion is to show that while Thucydides regards and speaks of the first ten years of the war as a separate war, he did not compose its history, nor even his general introduction, without a knowledge of the whole twenty-seven years of its course. Whether the allusions which prove this were originally in the narrative, or inserted on revision, no man can tell.

² i. 21: ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν . . . ὡς λογογράφοι ξυνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον.

Oloros, he adds: 'Therefore the historian Thucydides, being related to Kimon's family, was the son of an Oloros, called after his ancestor, and owned gold mines in Thrace. He is said to have been murdered at Scaptesytle (in Thrace), but the monument over his remains, which were brought to Attica, *is shown* among the tombs of Kimon's family, next the tomb of his sister Elpinike. But Thucydides was a Halimousian as to his deme, whereas Miltiades' people were Lakiadæ.' There is also a very explicit and credible statement in Pausanias¹ that his return from exile was due to CEnobius, son of Eukles (apparently his old colleague in Thrace), who carried through a decree that he should be restored to Athens, but that having been assassinated as he was returning, a statue was erected to him in the Acropolis, and a monument set up to him not far from the Melitean gate.

§ 363. On a double Herme in the museum of Naples we have representations of Thucydides and Herodotus, which represent the former as a somewhat mean, surly-looking person; yet the type is so unlike an ideal Greek head, and so thoroughly individual, that it was always believed to have some authority. The printing of photographs of the splendid bust at Holkham, by the Earl of Leicester (in May 1878), along with a translation of Prof. Michaelis' essay upon these portraits,² proves that the Naples portrait is a poor and shabby copy of the same (probably bronze) original from which the Holkham bust is taken. The latter is in splendid condition, and expresses all the sternness and strength, together with the peculiar modernness, which marks the character of Thucydides. I am of course far from thinking that a bust which did not express these qualities could not be genuine; some men are very disappointing in their appearance. But it is very satisfying to have the portrait corresponding to our ideal, and in no conventional way. It is the opinion of Otto Gilbert³ that this is a copy of the portrait statue set up by CEnobius.

¹ i. 23, 9.

² I must here record my thanks to the Earl of Leicester for sending me a copy of this valuable contribution to archæology.

³ *Philologus*, 38, 2, p. 259.

§ 364. Turning to a survey of his work as we have it before us, we must adhere to the now received division into eight books, though it is nowhere countenanced by the author, and though we hear of divisions into nine and into thirteen books as known in old days. But the existing arrangement is convenient and well devised. Thucydides intends his work to be a military history of the Peloponnesian war, compiled from original documents, and from a careful record of personal observations, as well as a comparison of the fresh reports of eye-witnesses. That he has carried out this plan perfectly, and that his book is the most complete and careful record of the details of a long war, cannot be for a moment questioned. It is a work infinitely more complex, and more difficult than Xenophon's account of his Retreat from Cunaxa, but is like it in being a contemporary history. The chronological method which he prefers, and specially vindicates,¹ as superior to the ordinary plan of quoting archontates and priesthoods, is that of successive summers and winters. Nevertheless, his starting-point² must be determined on the old method, and his strict adherence to summers and winters leads him at times to break off a connected account of military operations to notice some distant and unimportant, but synchronous transaction. This defect of arrangement has been commented on by Mure and others. Unfortunately it has led the author to record a vast number of petty raids and resultless movements in outlying parts of Greece, while he has omitted the whole of the literary and artistic, as well as almost the whole of the social and political, history of the great epoch on which he wrote. This is the more to be regretted as the few digressions he does make into archæological or political subjects are, in proportion to their extent, the most valuable and interesting parts of his work.

§ 365. But the author himself is by no means of that opinion. His preface opens with the assertion that the Peloponnesian war, as he had from the very commencement expected, turned out by far the most important crisis in Hellenic, and therefore in human, history. It is almost impossible that in making this statement Thucydides should not have had the great work of

¹ v. 20.² ii. 1.

Herodotus in his mind's eye, especially if he did not begin to write, as many critics maintain, till the close of the war. But whether this be so or not, his proof of the bold assertion as to the importance of his subject is singularly sophistical. He turns first to the very ancient times, and in what is called his *Archæologia* reviews the condition of early Greece, and especially the resources displayed in the Trojan war, which he holds to have been but small, for want of the real sinews of empire—*χρήματα καὶ ναυτικόν*, money and a navy. The same was in a lesser degree the case with the states which became prominent under tyrants from this time to that of the Persian wars, as he shows by a series of most interesting observations.

But when he comes to this crisis¹ he shirks a fair estimate of its comparative importance with his own subject; he gives a very meagre extract to show its effects upon Sparta and Athens, and concludes² by saying that the ancient affairs were difficult to ascertain on proper evidence, because of the uncritical way in which people hand down tradition. He illustrates this by three examples: first, that of the Athenian misconception about Harmodius and Aristogiton, to which he again reverts more fully,³ and then to the popular Greek errors about two trivial matters, which had not past into oblivion, the *λόχος Πισαράτης*, and the double vote of the Spartan kings, in one at least contradicting an opinion of Herodotus. 'So little pains do the many take in seeking after truth, and rather turn to what is ready at hand!'⁴ In c. 23 he returns to the

¹ c. 18.² c. 20.³ vi. 54.

⁴ Herbst, in a very minute examination of this preface (*Philologus*, 38, pp. 534-45), gives a new exposition of the whole argument, and defends Thucydides against the charge of having endeavoured to slight the importance of the Persian war in the history of Herodotus. He considers that Thucydides divided his retrospect into two portions, that of the *παλαιά*, reaching from mythical times down to the battle of Marathon, and that of the *Μηδικά*. The *παλαιά*, which he reviews in cc. 2-17, embrace the *Troica*, which have been exaggerated by fables, and the period of the tyrants, in which a careful examination of facts shows want of the resources of war. He then sketches the *Μηδικά* in cc. 18, 19. The criticism which follows (cc. 20-2), and which contains the disrespectful remarks on the logographers, and the general untrustworthiness of old traditions, is

comparison of the *Medic* affairs, and observes that they were settled by four battles, whereas the later war was more protracted, severe, and full of horrors. He speaks of cities being now destroyed by barbarians, of which we know only a single small instance (*Mycalessus*). He also asserts that this war greatly affected barbarians as well as Greeks. Historically this is not provable, but I fancy *Thucydides'* opinion was rather that any war, however petty, among Greeks was vastly more important than the most momentous struggle with barbarians. This is the real cause of his exaggerated estimate of the Peloponnesian war—a war which was perhaps of less importance in the world's history than any other struggle of similar length, for it was not a struggle of either opposed races, or religions, or great ideas; and had its issue been reversed, it would not have materially affected the general course of human history. But an exaggerated notion of his subject is a good fault in an author, and only to be blamed when it leads him to invidious comparisons with his rivals. With the twenty-fourth chapter the real history of the war begins, and in an excellent narrative he tells us of the quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra about *Epidamnus*, followed by other preliminary movements and the discussion at Sparta.¹ But before entering upon the actual war, he again reverts to the past, and resumes the sketch of Greek history—this time Athenian—from the capture of *Lesbos* to the outbreak of the war.² There follow directed, according to *Herbst*, wholly against the historians of the *παλαιά*—poets and poetical logographers—and has nothing to say to *Herodotus*. *Thucydides* then turns (c. 23) to a parallel criticism of the really important *Μηδικά*, and though allowing their greatness, nevertheless maintains the greater importance of his own period, because of the brief crisis of the Persian war, and because of the lesser number of Greeks engaged. But this presupposes that he is comparing the *Μηδικά* with the whole twenty-seven years war, and not with the *Archidamic* alone. I think this general sense may be read into the passage, but it is certainly not the obvious one, and I much doubt whether *Thucydides* intended to avoid censuring *Herodotus'* method of writing history, as distinguished from the early logographers.

¹ cc. 24–55, 56–88.

² cc. 89–118. This was known among old critics as the *Πεντηκοντετηρία* of *Thucydides*.

additional preliminaries to the war, again interrupted by the episodes of Pausanias and Themistocles ;¹ and the book ends with the completion of the preliminary matter.

§ 366. It is remarkable that in the latter chapters Thucydides not only implies a knowledge of Herodotus, but also some respect for him. He starts his second retrospect from the capture of Sestos, where Herodotus had paused ; he says that while the *Medic* affairs had been fully treated, the succeeding period was neglected, even by Hellanicus, who was inaccurate in his chronology ;² he, moreover, in his digressions about Pausanias and Themistocles, expressly fills up the points omitted by Herodotus. This seems to me to denote a difference of date in the composition of the early preface and these later portions of the first book. We see, however, that this book is full of digressions and of prefatory matter, all in the author's opinion strictly necessary to the understanding of the Peloponnesian war. I have also omitted all mention of the speeches—a peculiar and somewhat foreign feature in the history, to which we will revert presently with more detail.

Passing on to the succeeding books, we find in every one of them some brilliant piece of narrative ; indeed, wherever the subject is worthy of the writer, his talent for nervous and spirited description responds fully to the occasion. Thus we have in the second book the night attack upon Plataea (at the opening), then the graphic and affecting account of the plague,³ which has been the model for so many subsequent writers ; and the naval operations of Phormion off Naupactus.⁴ We have in the third book⁵ the night escape of the Plataeans from their city, which has been reproduced in our own day by Sir E. Creasy in his Greek novel, *The Old Love and the New* ; the terrible tumults at Corcyra, with the historian's reflections,⁶ and a very interesting chapter⁷ on Delos. The fourth book opens with the brilliant Athenian success at Sphacteria, and contains not only the equally disastrous failure at Delium,⁸ but the active operations of Brasidas

¹ cc. 128-38.

² c. 97.

³ cc. 47, sq.

⁴ cc. 83, sq.

⁵ cc. 20, sq.

⁶ cc. 75, sq.

⁷ c. 104.

⁸ cc. 77, sq.

in Thrace, including the historian's own failure to save Amphipolis.¹

This passage, which is curt and stingy in detail, has given rise to much discussion among critics. Most of the Germans, whose enthusiastic reverence for Thucydides will allow no flaw in his character, maintain that he did all that could be done to save Amphipolis, and that his exile, to which he alludes casually in another place, was an unjust sentence, caused by the disappointment of the Athenians at Brasidas' success. The most prominent supporters of this view are Classen (in his *Commentary*) and Ernst Curtius (in his *History*). On the other hand, the reticence of the historian on the date and nature of his appointment to the command, and the un concealed dislike and contempt he shows for Cleon, who probably caused his exile, have led critical English scholars, such as Mure in his chapter on Thucydides' life, and Grote in his *History*, followed (as usual) by Oncken, to declare that the historian was remiss and dilatory up to the last moment, and probably deserving of his punishment. We have not sufficient evidence to settle the question with any certainty. It seems to me that the historian honestly thought he was not to blame, but that the Athenians, perhaps just as honestly, differed with him in opinion. His silence as to the sentence passed upon him is quite in keeping with his usual reticence on the disappearance of leading men from the scene. Thus he merely tells us that Pericles lived two years into the war; he only lets out accidentally that Phormion was dead, by stating that the Acarnanians applied for his son to be sent to command them.

§ 367. Returning to our catalogue of remarkable passages, we have the celebrated reflections on the close of the Archidamian war, and the new proem to the rest of the work in the fifth book; ² and later on, after the long and complicated intrigues of Alcibiades in the Peloponnesus, the description of the battle of Mantinea, apparently from personal observation.³ The sixth and seventh books, by far the finest portion of the work, are mainly concerned with the preparation and

¹ cc. 104-6.

² c. 26.

³ cc. 64-75.

outfit of the Sicilian expedition, its interruption by the outrage on the Hermæ, its gradual progress, and disastrous close. Indeed, the sustained splendour of the narrative in the seventh book makes it impossible to specify passages. The eighth book, in which we miss the finishing hand of the author, is mainly interesting for its accurate account of the oligarchical revolution at Athens in 411 B.C., a political crisis so closely connected with the war as to form part of it, and thus fortunately to find its way into the narrative.

But it must be remembered that these remarkable narratives are interrupted both by barren chronicles of petty raids and ineffectual campaigns, which are given in most conscientious detail, and by political speeches inserted at intervals, in order to expound the feelings and passions which formed the atmosphere in which the facts occurred. While the former details arise from a too minute and careful registering of the facts, which Thucydides no doubt overrated in importance, the second are of a very different kind, and are rather violations of, than servile submissions to, historical accuracy. I need only say one word about the former. The various raids about Ætolia and Acarnania, among the Sicilian cities before the arrival of the great Athenian armament, or in the Poloponnesus after the peace of Nicias, though they are of little moment, and are now passed over by most readers, nevertheless serve to give us a very living picture of Greek warfare and of Greek politics, with their perpetually shifting intrigues and varying aspects; and although we should gladly have taken instead a few more of his invaluable digressions on antiquities or on changes of constitution, we must acknowledge that they give his narrative of the war great completeness. There is indeed only a single passage in which he betrays weariness of these trivial movements, and says he will not chronicle them concerning Sicily, except when the Athenians were directly concerned.

§ 368. But wherever the facts become important, his narrative is not content with a mere chronicle, it adds the motives of the actors, and describes their most secret thoughts, as if the historian had been present and had heard them declared. This drawing of human character in accordance with the suggestions

of the facts, is particularly remarkable in the 8th book, where there are no set speeches, and is a striking example of the dramatic way in which Greek historians identified themselves with their subject. We moderns make our reflections consciously, and separate them from the narrative. Thucydides seldom does so, but lets his subjective opinions come out in the drawing of character, and the attribution of motives as historical facts. As his basis is strictly the *human*, as opposed to the *divine* so often admitted by Herodotus, these motives are generally verified by the results, and are never improbable, but yet they are not history in our sense.¹ This is far more distinctly the case with the speeches, where he absolutely leaves the domain of history, in our sense, and assumes that of a rhetorician, from which point of view he is justly criticised by all competent and complete historians of Attic eloquence. It is indeed most probably his great example which has led subsequent classical historians to interlard their narrative with imaginary harangues, and which gave to Greek and Roman history that rhetorical flavour noted by Mure as the main defect of Attic prose literature. It is generally admitted that these speeches have no claim to any accuracy; and though most historians long to find at least Pericles' Funeral Speech in the second book authentic, Mure has shown in this particular case how the mannerisms of the historian are specially prominent, and how he uses arguments which could not possibly have been spoken by a Greek political leader who possessed the secret of fascinating his audience.

There is even very little apparent effort made to preserve character in these speeches. Thus the Lacedæmonian speakers are as voluble and as lengthy as the rest, and their Doric dialect is exchanged for the old Attic diction of the work. Thucydides himself² notes the difficulties of preserving accuracy in these speeches, and says he endeavoured to reproduce the general sense of *what was really spoken*, that is to say, really spoken *in his opinion*; but we may be quite sure that no such speeches could ever have had any effect upon a large audience. Ac-

¹ Cf. the excellent remarks of Herbst, *Philol.* 38, p. 556-9.

² i. 22.

cordingly he toned them all to the uniform dress required by his history as a work of art, and only suggests peculiar features by the short and rude speech of the ephor Sthenelaidas,¹ or by the lively style of Athenagoras,² or by the egotism of Alcibiades. But more frequently they are so general and impersonal as to be ascribed to 'the envoys' or 'the speakers' of a certain city or policy. The best analysis of them has been given by Blass, in the first volume of his work on Attic eloquence, in which he follows closely the well-known criticism by Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

§ 369. Excluding the dialogues, which we shall consider presently, there are forty-one speeches, of various length, inserted in the first seven books, the eighth being peculiar in possessing none. They may be classed as panegyrical, of which the famous speech of Pericles³ is the only specimen, juridical, of which the demurrer of the Plataeans and reply of the Thebans⁴ are specimens, and thirty-eight deliberative harangues. About fourteen of these are exhortations to soldiers by their general, and are mostly short and to the point. There remain twenty-four strictly deliberative speeches, inserted generally in pairs or threes, and sometimes even so constructed that the answer follows a long time after the first speech, and not professedly in reply to it. A careful reading of these speeches will show a gradual improvement in clearness as the work advances; those of the sixth book being much more to the point and freer from obscurity than the earlier ones, the speeches of Hermocrates especially being very good specimens of the deliberative style. It seems indeed not unlikely that Thucydides in his exile made the acquaintance of the great Syracusan, to whom he is everywhere very favourable, and from whom he may have obtained the outlines of his policy. Colonel Mure thinks that the same sort of relations with Alcibiades, when in exile, are to be inferred from the minuteness with which his secret policy is described. O. Müller has the same idea about Athenagoras, and most critics about Pericles and Nicias. These conjectures only prove how much character Thucydides has succeeded in in-

¹ i. 86.

³ ii. 35-46.

² vi. 36.

⁴ iii. 53-9; 61-7.

fusing throughout speeches conceived in his own form and diction.

§ 370. Dionysius, whose judgment as a rhetorician is of value, however modern scholars may despise his notions of composing history, gives us a very complete criticism of many of them, with a full appreciation of the glaring defects which require the genius of the author to palliate them. The chief of these is *obscurity*, which most critics think a natural and unavoidable result of the early and undeveloped condition of Attic prose, combined with the perpetual striving of the author to pack his sentences as full as possible with meaning. Hence even his censors have perpetually admired his marvellous power of conveying substance in the smallest amount of words, and of pressing on the reader a new thought before the former one is fully expressed. Next to this compression and consequent obscurity, the historian has been justly censured for many sophistical *mannerisms*, such as the perpetual antithesis of *nominally* and *really* (λόγῳ and ἔργῳ), which in the Funeral oration occurs sixteen times, and nearly one hundred times in the course of the work. There are also needless definitions of obvious words, and subtle distinctions, not to speak of the affected use of neuter adjectives for nouns—a practice for which his latest German commentator finds reasons which will appear, to such as are not pedants, invented to sustain a bad case.¹ Colonel Mure and Dr. Blass have also noted curiously inappropriate arguments in some places, where an orator of common sense could not possibly have followed the course assigned to him. Such are the opening words of Pericles' *Epitaphios*, in which he ascribes a spirit of niggardly detraction to his audience, and the speech of the Corinthians,² where the changes and chances of war are insisted upon by those whose object was to urge it, and not to dissuade from it.

To these criticisms, which seem to me well founded, I have two remarks to add. In the first place, when Classen and others speak of the undeveloped condition of Attic prose, and the difficulties of wrestling with an unformed idiom to express

¹ Cf. Classen, i. p. lxxiii, quoting the authority of Hermogenes.

² i. 120.

adequately great and pregnant thoughts, they altogether overstate the matter in their efforts to defend Thucydides. Euripides and Cratinus had already perfected the use of Attic Greek in dramatic dialogue. Again, not only was it quite feasible to transcribe into Attic the excellent models in Ionic prose already subsisting, but in Attic prose Antiphon had already attained clearness, as we can see in his extant speeches. Possibly his example may have aided in making the speech of the Plateans and the Theban answer, which are essentially court speeches, the best in the work. But apart from dramatic poetry and oratory, it seems perpetually forgotten that the tract *on the Athenian polity*, which we have among Xenophon's works, must have been published before 415, and more probably about 428 B.C., and therefore years before Thucydides' history, and that whatever faults the tract may disclose, it shows an easy and complete mastery of the Attic prose idiom.¹

Secondly, when critics, both ancient and modern, reiterate their praise and wonder at the extraordinary compression of thoughts in these speeches and in the descriptions of the historian, and speak of his hurrying on from new thought to new thought without waiting to express himself clearly, they seem to me to misstate altogether the true nature of his eloquence. I cannot find that there is this crowding of ideas in his orations, but rather a crowding of curious and distorted aphorisms about some leading idea, which is reiterated in all sorts of forms. The real keynote to his style is to be found in the characteristic description of his Athenian audience which he puts into the mouth of Cleon.² There appears, in fact, as before observed in

¹ Dionysius notes the same thing in comparison with the prose of Critias, whom he calls one of the new Attic school, but who wrote before Thucydides.

² iii. 38 : αἵτιοι δ' ὑμεῖς κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντες, οὔτινες εἰώθατε θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων γίγνεσθαι, ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων, τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἔργα ἀπὸ τῶν εὖ εἰπόντων σκοποῦντες, ὥς δυνατὰ γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πεπραγμένα ἤδη, οὐ τὸ δρασθὲν πιστότερον ὕψει λαβόντες ἢ τὸ ἀκουσθὲν, ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων καλῶς ἐπιτιμησάντων· καὶ μετὰ καινότητος μὲν λόγου ἀπατᾶσθαι ἄριστοι, μετὰ δεδοκιμασμένου δὲ μὴ ξυνέπεσθαι ἐθέλειν, δοῦλοι ὄντες τῶν αἰεὶ ἀτόπων, ὑπερόπται δὲ τῶν εἰωθότων, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν ἕκαστος βουλούμενος δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγουσι, μὴ ὕστεροι ἀκολουθήσαι

the case of Sophocles (Vol. I. p. 316, § 194), a sort of tendency to play hide-and-seek with the reader, and, while expounding an obvious or familiar idea, to astonish him by the new and strange way in which clause after clause is brought out.

§ 371. In support of this opinion, that Thucydides is only condensed in expression but not in thought, a great number of passages could be cited, but I must content myself with a few. The famous picture of the excitement of the land forces during the last great battle in the harbour of Syracuse¹ may serve as the first. It has elicited the profound admiration of Grote, and the ridicule of Mure for the same reasons. And though we cannot but agree with much of Grote's praise—'the modern historian strives in vain to convey the impression of it which appears in the condensed and burning phrases of Thucydides'—there is real truth in the words of Mure: 'The specification of the modes in which the assembled crowd displayed its emotions; of the exact position of the groups of which it consisted; of the precise amount that each saw and heard, with the vicissitudes of their feelings and gestures, even to the nervous "bobbing" and "ducking" of their heads or bodies in sympathetic response to the critical turns of the combat, are overstated to superfluity or triviality.' He shows too in a note the greater tendency to antithetical jingle of structure and sound in this part of the narrative.

I will next refer to an equally well-known passage, both as a good specimen of the style, and as an illustration of my position. It is the account of the Athenian character as contrasted with the Spartan by the Corinthian envoys.² Now in this passage,

δοκεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ, ὁξέως δέ τι λέγοντος προεπαινέσαι, καὶ προαισθῆσαι τε πρόθυμοι εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ προνοῆσαι βραδεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποβησόμενα· ζητοῦντές τε ἄλλο τι, ὥς εἰπεῖν, ἢ ἐν οἷς ζῶμεν, φρονοῦντες δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἱκανῶς. ἀπλῶς τε, ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσσωμένοι, καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον, ἢ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις.

¹ vii. 71.

² i. 70: οἱ μὲν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὁξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ὃ ἂν γνῶσιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδέν, καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τὰναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. αἰθῖς δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταί, καὶ παρὰ γνῶμην κινδυνευταί, καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες· τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον τῆς τε δυνάμειος ἐνδεὲς πράξει, τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι, τῶν

not only is the contrast very much over-strained (instead of being qualified by such cases as those of Nicias and Brasidas), but the whole description plays round the single idea that the Athenians are a very enterprising, and the Spartans a very conservative, society. Again, in the fine speech of the Plateæans in defence of their lives, the appeals to the generosity of Sparta are repeated all through the argument till they become wearisome. An endless number of similar instances, and of the repetitions of the same ideas and the same phrases, even in different speeches, indicate, if anything, rather a poverty than a richness of ideas.¹

The fullest and most suggestive is, perhaps, Pericles' *Epitaphios*, though it too has its reiterated antitheses of *in word* and *in deed*; but even here we may perceive one great reason both of the obscurity and of the constant playing with a few ideas which characterise almost all the harangues. It is the fixed purpose of the historian to make them quite general in application, and hence the careful avoidance of all details and all particulars which give point and flavour to every great speech of every real orator. Thus the allusions of Pericles to the art education and æsthetic pleasures afforded at Athens lose much point by the avoidance of every detail concerning the great artists or the great works which were within the sight and in the mind

τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε οἶεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητάς, καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους. οἶονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἂν τι κτᾶσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἐτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι. κρατοῦντές τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξέρχονται, καὶ νικώμενοι ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ἀναπίπτουσιν. ἔτι δέ, τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρῶνται, τῇ γνῶμῃ δὲ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς. καὶ ἂ μὲν ἂν ἐπινοήσαντες οὐκ ἐξέλθωσιν, οἰκεία στέρεσθαι ἡγούνται, ἃ δ' ἂν ἐπελθόντες κτήσωνται, ἱλίγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες, ἣν δ' ἄρα που καὶ πείρα σφαλῶσιν, ἀντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρεῖαν. μόνοι γὰρ ἔχουσιν τε καὶ ὁμοίως ἐλπίζουσιν ἃ ἂν ἐπινοήσωσι, διὰ τὸ ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖσθαι ὧν ἂν γνῶσι. καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι' ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι, καὶ μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι, ξυμφορὰν τε οἷα ἦσσαν ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα, ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον. ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μῆτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μῆτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἔαν, ὁρθῶς ἂν εἴποι.

¹ Cf., for example, the latter half of iii. 37, iii. 44, and the appendices to Mure's fifth volume, on the rhetorical mannerisms of Thucydides.

of all his supposed hearers. Indeed, throughout the whole work not a single contemporary artist, or poet, or literary man is mentioned, except Hellanicus, and that for his inaccuracy ; not a single public work or monument, save the Propylæa, and that perhaps because it was a needless expense in the way of mere ornament, without the excuse of religion. But if this adherence to generalities has damaged the rhetorical effect of the speeches, it has made them a better and more enduring monument of the philosophy of history as the author conceived it.

Finally as to the form of the speeches, the rhetorical critics have observed that while there is a general attention paid to the rules prescribed in the early handbooks, while there is generally a fixed exordium, a *prothesis*, a narrative of facts, and a formal conclusion, there is no such slavish adherence to them we should expect rather in professional court-speeches than in the deliberative addresses of political leaders. While figures of *diction*, such as rhymed endings, artificial antitheses, and the like, are frequent, figures of *thought*, such as indignant questions, irony, aposiopesis, and the like, are rare, as if beneath the dignity of the historian, and chiefly admitted in the harangue of the demagogue Athenagoras ;¹ whereas even in the speeches of Cleon, whom the author hated and despised, no attempt has been made to portray his vulgarity in his language.

§ 372. Passing to the dialogues, the first to be mentioned, on account of its length and prominence, is the so-called Melian dialogue at the close of the fifth book. The form of this passage is that of a court-speech interrupted by replies to each point, and is an ingeniously constructed method of expounding the brutal policy of the Athenians as expressed in a private conference. Grote has raised special objections to its historical value, and thinks it rather a sort of tragic climax of insolence, intentionally dramatised before the disastrous *peripetia* of the Sicilian expedition. While agreeing fully with his objections, I think he need not have contrasted it, as less genuine, with the speeches, many of which rest on just as little evidence, and

¹ They are, however, much more frequent than is to be inferred from Blass's account, who speaks of Athenagoras' speech as affording the only examples.

have just as little internal probability. But in any case the obscurities and outlandish contortions of expression in the discussion have struck all commentators, and elicited from Dionysius special censure. It is properly ranked with the speeches on account of its rhetorical and sophistical tone, and may be regarded as one of the weakest points in the great history. The other two examples, the dialogue of Archidamus with the Plataeans,¹ and that of the Ambraciot herald and the Acarnanian soldiers of Demosthenes,² are both admirable, the former being formal and stately, the latter very brief and dramatic; and it is to be regretted that there are not more such passages in the work.³ For on the whole this dramatic quality is a feature which we miss in Thucydides, after perusing the more picturesque Herodotus; the genius of the Father of history has not been here equalled by his great Attic rival.

§ 373. The absence of both speeches and dialogues from the eighth book has caused much discussion in ancient and modern times, and is generally considered to be due to the accident of the work being unfinished at the author's death. There are several summaries of opinion throughout the book which would, it is thought, have been expanded and transformed into speeches had he lived to revise and complete it. Cratippus, his contemporary, is reported to have said that Thucydides deliberately omitted them, finding that they did not suit the prevailing taste. But this seems to imply that the earlier books were published by the author himself, except we interpret Cratippus to mean that Thucydides observed such a change in Attic eloquence with the rise of Lysias that he felt what he had already composed was becoming antiquated. On the other hand, Xenophon, in the first two books of the *Hellenica*, which are a professed continuation of Thucydides, inserts several speeches—a proof that he at least did not consider the eighth book a matured change of style in its author. The later books of the *Hellenica*, written years subsequently, have no speeches in them, so that there seems really to have been a change of fashion, but not

¹ ii. 71-4.

² iii. 113.

³ Perhaps i. 53 should be added as another case, but there is here only a single protest and reply.

in Thucydides' time. There are, moreover, a good many peculiarities in this book, a good many words not elsewhere occurring in the history, but common in Xenophon, and a prominence of personal expressions of opinion, which have been sufficient to suggest its spuriousness to many ancient critics, and which have led some moderns to believe that the editor, probably Xenophon, had some share in reducing it to its present form. The reader will see most of the peculiar phrases in an appendix to Mure's fifth volume. I would especially add the violent sentence about Hyperbolus,¹ which is so different from what the historian says even about Cleon, and so historically false and misleading when we consider the real circumstances (preserved by Plutarch) of Hyperbolus' ostracism, that I wonder how Grote can quote it in a foot-note² without perceiving that it either overthrows his own theory of ostracism or the trustworthiness of his infallible guide. So also the emphatic commendation of the Athenian Five Thousand³ seems to me too personal and explicit for the usual manner of the historian.

The last discussion of this question is in Classen's introduction to the eighth book, in which he of course adopts the theory most honourable to Thucydides, and most favourable to the dignity of the text on which he has spent so many years of his life. He has pointed to the peculiar recension of the text of this book in the Vatican B, as showing an early feeling that it had not received the author's final revision, but this recension he attributes (at earliest) to some Alexandrian grammarian, though he joins Bekker in accepting it, as approaching what Thucydides would have produced had his labours not been cut short by death. This may be reasonable enough, but when he goes on to argue (p. x. sq.) that the historian deliberately omitted speeches here, as in a large part of the fifth book (which, by the way, also shows want of a final revision), he will not carry conviction to any unprejudiced mind. It is all very well to say that the political movements were too fleeting and intricate

¹ c. 73: καὶ Ὑπέρβολόν τε τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον· ὥστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως, ἀποκτείνουσι μετὰ Χαρμίνου (a strategus).

² vii. 145.

³ c. 97.

for set declarations, but surely nowhere in the work can we see better scope for a great harangue than in the stirring events at Samos (c. 76) where the fleet became in fact the Athenian democracy. Classen thinks that Thucydides only inserted speeches where they had really been made. I do not agree with him that Thucydides was restrained by any such considerations, but even taking up his own ground, does he imagine that the events both at Samos and at Athens were carried out without both vigorous and plausible speeches at every meeting? But there is endless room for this not very profitable subjective criticism.¹

§ 374. It remains for us to gather up the details, and to form some general estimate of the genius and character of the great historian. Whatever faults of style, whatever transient fashion of involving his thoughts, may be due to a sophistic education, and to the desire of exhibiting depth and acuteness, there cannot be the smallest doubt that in the hands of Thucydides the art of writing history made an extraordinary stride, and attained a perfection which no subsequent Hellenic, and few modern writers, have attained. If the subject which he selected was really a narrow one, and many of the details trivial, it was nevertheless compassed with extreme difficulty, for it is at all times a hard task to write contemporary history, and more especially so in an age when published documents were scarce, and the art of printing unknown. Moreover, however trivial may be the details of petty military raids, of which an account was yet necessary to the completeness of his record, we cannot but wonder at the lofty dignity with which he has handled every part of the subject. There is not a touch of comedy, not a point of satire, not a word of familiarity throughout the whole book, and we stand face to face with a man who strikes us as strangely un-Attic in his solemn and severe temper.

This dignity was, perhaps, even more strongly shown by his reticence on topics which excited the interest, and filled the thoughts, of ordinary men. We can hardly think that he despised the great artistic and literary life at Athens, which was so

¹ Cf. another ingenious attempt by Cwiklinski in *Hermes*, xii. pp. 23-87.

dear to his ideal hero, Pericles ; yet, as already remarked, he never turns aside, except in a passing clause, to mention it, or to notice any of the great rival intellects which were fascinating the Athenian public of the day. It would have been strictly to the point, when he insists upon the elastic and impressible hopefulness and energy of Athens, which astonished all her enemies, to have noticed that even during the invasions of the land, and the long dolours of siege and of sickness, not only did Sophocles, Euripides, and their many tragic rivals continue to hold the attention and the interest of the Attic public, but even the buffoonery and broad farce of the Old Comedy found in war and distress a subject for fun and banter, and a people ready to enjoy and delight in it. All this would have enhanced his argument, but he merely mentions this side of Athens in passing, and by the mouth of Pericles, who probably made a far different use of so great and fruitful a topic.

§ 375. Far more distinct and unmistakeable is his contempt for the social gossip and scandal of the day, which encompassed the two prominent Athenians of the period—Pericles and Alcibiades—with a perfect cloud of anecdote. The older comedians—we hear the echo of it in Plutarch and Athenæus—were aristocratic and conservative, and never ceased attacking in Pericles his policy, and his private life. The attacks on Alcibiades, who seems to have either bullied or cajoled the comic writers, still remain to us in the form of orations which are very libellous accounts of his private life, but are corroborated by the allusions of Thucydides and other good authority. The later aristocratic thinkers also were adverse to Pericles' policy, and it seems to me as if Thucydides, in composing his history, had among other objects this in view, that he should vindicate from these objections the statesman whom he regards as the ideal leader of Athens. But concerning the private scandals told about the life of Pericles, concerning the very existence of Aspasia, concerning the heresies of Damon and Anaxagoras, and their persecution as Pericleans, on all these topics he is contemptuously, perhaps indignantly, silent. Indeed, as regards women, he seems to have summed up his views in a single sentence at the close of Pericles' speech, when he said that 'she was best

who is least spoken of among men, whether for good or for evil.' It is not unlikely, indeed, that a conscious antagonism to Herodotus led him to a faulty reserve in this respect, and we cannot but regard it as a defect of over-dignity, when he leaves us to discover from a late epigram of Agathias, that a jury of the same Athenian assembly which condemned the whole population of Mitylene to death, forced Paches to suicide for violating the honour of two of the women who had been condemned to slavery by the same decree. It is not, indeed, his habit to allude to the death of any leading men unless it took place in battle, but it was here the duty of an impartial observer, who disliked the democracy, and often records things against it, to mention the example of a just and upright feeling.¹ It has been very common to praise Thucydides for the wonderful impartiality of his statements; it is not at all so certain that he was strictly impartial in his reticence. This question has been discussed with great ingenuity by M. Müller-Strübing in his work on Aristophanes, and it seems to me that he has made out a case against the historian.²

§ 376. Parallel to this dignity of reticence on social matters and on political scandal, is the historian's neglect of religious matters, and his somewhat contemptuous allusions to oracles and other manifestations of Providence. This may be referred to the strictly modern character of his history, in which it differs strongly not only from that of Herodotus, but from the subsequent histories of Xenophon and others who relapsed into a religious attitude. The age and society in which Thucydides grew up were probably the most sceptical in all Greek history; it was a period like the close of the eighteenth century in France, from

¹ I am bound to add that Mr. Bury has since led me to doubt the whole story in Agathias as a late invention.

² The arrogance of this author, who professes to have learned political insight by long residence in England, but who is certainly in every other respect un-English enough, has elicited from Classen a vigorous reply, as regards Thucydides, in the Introduction to his Commentary on the fifth book. But to attack Thucydides is such high treason with Classen, that even the strongest arguments of this kind could have no effect upon him. Nevertheless his rejoinder, though short, is valuable, and he of course overthrows or shakes some of Mr. Strübing's most advanced positions.

which society afterwards recoiled, and returned to the more natural condition of either belief or acquiescence in the national faith. But Thucydides will only admit religion where the fears or the hopes it raises become moving springs of human action ; there is no trace in his work of any positive faith, no hint of ruling power in the world beyond that of human intellect. Appeals to Divine aid are only the appeals of the weaker side, who have no solid argument at their back, and are contemptuously set aside as idle by those who insist on the motives of self-preservation and of self-interest as the real guiding principles of society. He uses indeed frequently the term ἀρετή apparently for a moral quality in men, or at least for that generosity and unselfishness¹ which obtain a good report in society, sometimes (I think) for that reputation itself. But when he applies it to a deliberate political assassin—Antiphon—we feel that he must have meant it in some widely different sense from its later use, and that even this word must be applied in an intellectual way, and mean generally ability or reputation. Of course no man has ever been able to banish the notions of right and wrong from his language or his thoughts, and perhaps it fared with ἀρετή² as with the terms ἀγαθός and κακός, which Mr. Grote asserts to have had at first a political meaning only, whereas the moral meaning is really the ground of their application in politics. However this may be, it is more than likely that with the belief in the religion of his day, and the belief in rewards and punishments from on high, Thucydides abandoned the belief in the intrinsic worth of moral excellence, and that he especially points to the fate of Nicias to show that these qualities availed nothing when combined with want of vigour and ability. Hence the clearness with which he analyses motives and explains policy from the single ground of selfishness and a regard to material interests. It was left indeed for Classen, his latest commentator, to discover in Thucydides a hidden wealth of piety and virtue, which leads

¹ Cf. the list of passages given in Classen, i. p. lxxvii.

² It is specially noted by Suidas that Thucydides and Andocides used ἀρετή in the sense of εὐδοκία, and this seems to me true in several places throughout both authors.

him to set forth the evil results of passion and selfishness, and to show the fatal consequences of impiety and neglect of the gods. There is no use in arguing the point with a man who after long and laborious study, perhaps owing to this study, adopts such views. But it is one more instance of the inferiority of tact and want of appreciation of evidence for which the Germans are no less remarkable than for their industry and their enthusiasm. I trust that in refuting this silly glorifying of a favourite author, I have not detracted aught from the great and enduring merits of the historian who has taught us to know more of Greek interpolitical life than all other Greek authors put together. In acuteness of observation, in intellectual force and breadth, in calmness of judgment, in dignity of language, there has never been a historian greater than Thucydides.

§ 377. As regards the historian's trustworthiness, it has been so universally lauded that it is high time to declare how far his statements are to be accepted as absolute truth. We may be confident, I think, that on contemporary facts his authority is very good, and so far there has been no proof of any inaccuracy brought home to him. The discovery three years ago of the original text of the treaty, which he reproduces in v. 47, has indeed shown that our MSS. differ considerably from the actual wording of the original. I agree with Classen that these variations were probably due to an originally inaccurate transcription, and not with Kirchhoff, that they prove a great corruption of our texts. But what is more important for us to note is this, that the variations, though many (thirty-one in all), are very trifling, and do not in a single case alter the sense. This is the outcome of Kirchhoff's careful discussion in the twelfth volume of *Hermes*.¹ So far then the authority of

¹ This is not Kirchhoff's opinion. He cannot believe for one moment that such a man as Thucydides would make or insert in his work a 'slovenly copy' of a document. I think that is exactly the difference between the most accurate of ancient historians and the moderns. Thucydides, whose speeches were no doubt very wide of the mark, and represented very vaguely what the various orators really said, was not in my mind the least disposed to quarrel about trifling details in the transcription of any document, and I think we are very fortunate to find that he or his informant did it as accurately as it has been done.

Thucydides is unassailed. But when he goes into archæology, the case is very different. His admirers have not indeed ventured to establish the reality of the Trojan war on his authority, but they all assume that his Sicilian history is as accurate as his history of the war in his own day, though it reaches back 300 years, nay even to 300 years 'before the advent of the Greeks.' It is only lately that his sources for this early history have been examined, and it appears that he copied from Dionysius of Syracuse, a *λογοποιός* of the stamp of the fore-runners of Herodotus. Hence in this portion of his work he has really no more authority than Dionysius, and the whole tradition requires careful reconsideration. But this would lead us too far from our subject, and I will refer the reader to the second appendix of my first volume, where I have discussed it in relation to the knowledge of western geography shown in the *Odyssey* of Homer.

§ 378. Turning to the external history of the text, we find that though it is not mentioned by any of the writers of the succeeding generation, it must have at once attained a high reputation, for several historians—Xenophon, Cratippus and Theopompus—set themselves to continue or complete it, without venturing to handle over again the epoch treated by the master hand. The later encyclopædists of Greek history refer to him as the best authority. In Roman times we know from the manifest imitations of Sallust, from the praise of Cicero and of Quintilian, that they admired the man, and were offended at his obscurities, just as we are.¹ But the Alexandrine critics had declared him the highest model of the older Attic dialect, and commented copiously on his text. So also the schools of rhetoric established at Rome turned their attention to him; and we have already frequently made mention of the judgments of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whose remarks upon our author are full of acuteness, and often very just, though he judges altogether from a rhetorical point of view, and therefore fails to comprehend the higher merits of Thucydides as the first philosopher in historiography.

§ 379. *Bibliographical.* The body of scholia which we pos-

¹ Plutarch, *De Gloria Ath.*, is full and appreciative on his merits.

sess, and which, in contrast to those on Herodotus, are often very full, seem to be derived from a variety of commentaries (*ἐξηγήσεις*) by Asclepius, Antillus, Evagoras, Phæbammon, Sabinus and Didymus, most of them of unknown date, but some very old and of value. From these we have excerpts of various value, and often contradictory, so that the study of them is one of difficulty. They are to be found in most of the MSS., which are many, and by no means of ascertained value, Poppo, Bekker, and Arnold differing broadly as to their relative importance. Nor do the MSS. seem all as yet collated, and we may expect new results from a critical appendix to Classen's edition, which would form the proper conclusion to the work. Thus Haase (in the Didot ed. 1842) says that a twelfth century copy with good scholia had just been acquired at Paris, but too late for his edition. I myself have seen at Monte Cassino a fine and early MS., which I cannot find mentioned in any of our editions. So far as I can make out, a Laurentian codex (69, 2) is the earliest, but the Vaticanus (B) is the best. A lost 'Italus' (Bekker's A), a Cassel MS., an Augsburg (Augustanus), now in Munich, and a Clarendonius at Cambridge, are all about the twelfth century in age, and all of value for the recension of the text. The Vatican (B) is peculiarly valuable for its recension of the eighth book, in which it constantly differs from the other copies, but whether these variations are early and clever emendations, or due to an originally purer text, is difficult to determine. The former is the opinion of Classen, and the German critics generally. Hence Schöne still proposes to make the Laurentian (C) the basis of the text, but Classen prefers the Vatican recension.

The editions are very numerous. The *princeps* is that of Aldus (1502), then there is a Juntine with scholia (1526), but they had already been printed with Xenophon by Aldus in 1503. The edition of Stephanus (1564, and often reprinted) gives the scholia round the text, and Vaila's early translation. Hudson's folio of 1696 (Oxford) is a splendid book. Then we have Duker, Poppo, Göller, Haack, and in our own time Bekker, Arnold, Haase (Didot), and Stahl (Tauchnitz, 1874). The most recent commentary is that of Classen, a careful and

scholarly work, but sadly in want of an index and of a critical preface on the MSS. and older editions. The notes are mainly grammatical. Messrs. Bigg and Simcox have given us four books in the *Catena Classicorum*. The scholia are most conveniently studied in the Didot edition.

The translations of Thucydides are in themselves a curious study. The earliest Latin version was that of Valla (1485), corrected by Portus (1594), then Casa (Florence, 1564), and Baron Hoheneck (1614). There are two very early English renderings, that of Nicholls, 'citizen and goldsmith of London,' in the fourth year of Edward VI. (1550, who mentions the older French edition of Claude de Seysell, Archbishop of Turin), and that of Thomas Hobbes, about 1670. We have since Smith (1753), Bloomfield (1829), Dale (ed. Bohn, 1848, good book), Crawley (1874), and also the speeches done separately by Wilkins. There are Italian versions by Cellario (Verona, 1735), and Strozzi (Venice, 1735), who calls the book, as might be expected at Venice in those days, 'the war of the peoples of the Morca with the Athenians.' Many other partial and total versions I omit. The *Lexicon of Thucydides* (London, 1824) seems to me of little value,¹ but that of Bétant is fairly complete (Geneva, 1843-57).

§ 380. It seems fitting to close the splendid epoch of Attic literature which has so long occupied us with two very distinct and characteristic names—one of whom sums up in his single person almost all the literary tendencies of his age, but was too strong and ambitious in character to rest content with such glory, and who accordingly lived and died in the violent conflicts of party politics—the notorious Critias. The second, Andocides, was involved in public affairs from apparently the very opposite cause, a certain weakness and instability of character which would not let him rest content with an ancient name and an ample fortune, but which involved him in troubles and wanderings, and in the bad repute of being an uncer-

¹ The review of Thucydidean literature up to 1877 in Bursian's *Jahresbericht* (by A. Schöne) has been long delayed, and has not yet reached me.

tain friend and, under pressure, a betrayer of his party. But in another way he shows the results of Attic culture in that he attained, under these circumstances, a place in the Attic Ten who were models for subsequent eloquence, and that although, like Critias, he was thought an amateur by professionals, he was quite a first-rate professional among amateurs. The life of Critias ends with the second restoration of the democracy, as that of Antiphon with the first, but, as be seemed his more violent character, on the field of battle, and not by the verdict of the court. Andocides, whose activity and whose eloquence are concerned with the same period, prolonged an inglorious life after the Restoration. But he is in no sense a connecting link between the old and the new. He was not, like Thrasy machus, a stepping-stone beyond Antiphon leading to Lysias. He was rather a weak echo of the school of Antiphon, modified by the subjects which he treated, or perhaps owing to these subjects, different from Antiphon, and interesting as the earliest specimen we have, along with Thucydides, of the deliberative as contrasted with judicial style of Attic eloquence.

But we must first gather the facts known to us concerning the life of Andocides. In this case we are not in want of full information, at least on the important moments of his career, but unfortunately our information is untrustworthy from the fact of its being conveyed either in the bitter attack preserved among the speeches of Lysias, or the impassioned defence of his character by the orator himself. On both sides we can even now detect exaggerations and inaccuracies, so that it is not easy to say how far the rest may not be equally vague or misleading. Thucydides, for example, will not assert many things which Andocides claims to have been clearly proved. The following sketch has accordingly been compiled by modern historians from the somewhat conflicting evidence of lying or at least prejudiced witnesses.

§ 381. ANDOCIDES was an aristocrat of ancient family, deduced by the genealogist Hellanicus from the god Hermes through Odysseus, which belonged to the Kydathenæan deme, and the tribe Pandionis. The orator asserts that his great-grandfather Leogoras commanded an attack upon the Peisistratids,

which we find it hard to verify. This man's son (the elder) Andocides was employed as strategus with Pericles and Sophocles against Samos, also at Korkyra, and in the negotiations for the thirty years' peace previous to this time. These facts are corroborated by Thucydides.¹ The elder Andocides' son was Leogoras (the younger), a man of luxurious and hospitable habits, who begat the orator, and a daughter, married to Callias, the son of Telekles. Thus the boast of the orator that his family had been celebrated both in war and peace, and was well known and respected at Athens, is fairly justified.

The pseudo-Lysian attack upon him, which seems a genuine speech delivered in 399 B.C., states that, though some forty years old, he had never done any public state-service. This assertion, while attributing to him a character inherited from his father rather than his remoter ancestors, contradicts the date of his birth (467 B.C.) given in the *Greek Life*, which is a most untrustworthy compilation, and probably confounds the elder and younger Andocides. The orator seems rather to have been born about 440 B.C. We know nothing of his training, but can hardly conceive him not to have profited by the teaching of Antiphon, then the foremost sophist of the day, and, moreover, of known aristocratic sentiments. Having joined the political club of Euphiletus, he became involved in the affair of the Hermæ, and hence in various troubles, which lasted most of his life. The details of the affair belong rather to Greek history than to literature. It is certain that after several inferior persons—slaves and metics—had informed, a certain Diokleides informed against the family and friends of Andocides, who were all thrown into prison, and were in the utmost danger of immediate execution. Under these circumstances, Andocides, pressed by his relatives, and under promise of a free pardon gave such informations as satisfied the public and restored public confidence.² Our authorities vary widely as to how many they embraced, and what credit they deserved. His opponents said he accused his own father and himself. The orator asserts that this is false, and that he only added four names to those already implicated, and these he specifies.

¹ i. 51.

² Cf. the quotation below.

He confessed to have known of the plot, but to have opposed it, and so accounted for the escape of the *Hermes* before his own door, which *Euphiletus* had given the conspirators to understand would be mutilated by *Andocides*, while he was in bed with a broken collar-bone, both unable to stir and opposed to the conspiracy when he first heard it broached. *Thucydides* says¹ that the real truth was never ascertained, but, as many commentators observe, he wrote before the speeches of *Andocides* could have been known to him, and may thus have been less well informed than we are. Of course this informing made the orator an object of hatred to his companions, and presently, by a decree of *Isotimides*, entry into the agora and temples was forbidden to those who had committed sacrilege, even though freed from penalties in consequence of the *Hermæ* affair.

It is plain that as soon as the high premium for informing about this matter was offered, a perfectly distinct set of informations was given concerning the violation of the *Eleusinian* mysteries, and in these *Alcibiades* was involved, when his enemies failed to connect him by any evidence whatever with the mutilation of the *Hermæ*. The two charges were accordingly intentionally confused, and the man who had escaped the one was implicated in the other. Thus *Andocides*, who merely confessed some knowledge of the latter, was assumed by his adversaries to have admitted guilt concerning the former. This he steadily denies; but the decree of *Isotimides* compelled him to leave Athens and wander abroad, where he made his living by mercantile speculations. His adversaries told ugly stories of his dangers and adventures in Cyprus. Then he brought various supplies to the Athenian army at *Samos* in 412 B.C., in the hope of working out his return by conferring solid benefits upon his countrymen, but upon venturing to Athens he was seized by the Government of the Four Hundred, and only escaped death by their fall. So he returned to Cyprus, where he is said to have been again imprisoned by *Euagoras*, and having managed the despatch of a corn fleet for Athens, returned about 409 B.C., when he delivered the extant speech

concerning his return. But failing in his object, he again went into exile, and is said by his accuser to have visited almost all Hellenic lands ; he himself confesses that he made friendships with various kings and strangers, and probably acquired by trade a considerable fortune. After the capture of Athens by Lysander, he returned with the other exiles about 402 B.C., and found his paternal property gone, and his house, after his father's death, occupied by the demagogue Cleophon, though now probably empty. He then began his career as a rich citizen, performing public duties, of which a tripod commemorating a victory with a cyclic chorus was long extant. But after three years he was attacked by the demagogue Kephisius for his old complicity with the profanation of the Mysteries. The pseudo-Lysian speech against him seems to have been delivered by one of Kephisius' fellow accusers, Miletus or Epichares. Being supported by the respected democrats Anytus and Kephalus, Andocides gained the cause.

Once more he appears on the political scene. The speech *concerning the peace*, if genuine, asserts that during the Corinthian war, he was sent with full powers to treat for peace with Sparta. He brought back terms, and an embassy of Spartans, and pressed on the people the arrangement he had negotiated, but in vain. The *Life* says he was again banished in consequence of his failure (about 391 B.C.) ; but the whole story of these negotiations, on which Xenophon and Diodorus are silent, is very doubtful. Blass believes it because Philochorus is cited in the argument of the speech as asserting the fruitless visit of a Spartan embassy at this time. Of Andocides' death or of his posterity we hear nothing. Thus this lengthy summary of the facts of the orator's life shows him to have been an aristocrat who moved in political circles, and spoke either on public or on personal matters, but did not compose speeches for others or teach the art of rhetoric as a professional.

§ 382. The extant speeches and fragments of Andocides can be classified chronologically with tolerable certainty, and fall into the following order : (1) the fragment *πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους*, before 415 B.C., and with it, perhaps identical, is the *συμβουλευτικός*, from which we have two fragments ; (2) the speech *on his*

Return, sometimes called *περὶ τῆς ἀδείας*, 409 B.C. ; (3) *on the Mysteries*, also called *περὶ τῆς ἐνδείξεως*, 399 B.C. ; (4) *concerning the peace with the Lacedæmonians*, 390 B.C. The attack on Alcibiades, though handed down as Andocidean, and spoken in the person of Phæax, is now generally believed to be the composition of a later sophist, as shown both by his ignorance of history and his polished style. It is hardly necessary to analyse these speeches individually, as they are not very important specimens of Greek oratory, and their loose and disconnected structure makes a brief abstract impossible.

If we take up the speech *on the Mysteries*, which is far the longest and the most characteristic, we can frame from it a perfectly adequate idea of his style, which in the other orations is less marked and striking, though of the same complexion. He opens with a proem, which reappears in the nineteenth oration of Lysias, and which both orators seem to have adopted from some collection of commonplaces by an earlier sophist. But when we compare both versions, we find that Andocides inserts matter of his own, and reverts again to his model, whereas Lysias seems to have used it with hardly any modification. In Blass' text (Teubner, 1871) the quotations from the proem are printed in special type, so that the reader can easily see the use made of it by our orator. He then proceeds, after expressing a doubt what line he will follow, to a long narrative of his share in the affair of the Hermæ, and the various informations tendered concerning it. He shows that his informing only touched the Hermokopidæ, and had nothing to say to the profanation of the Mysteries, with which he was now charged. The whole narrative is very lively and picturesque, and full of a natural charm rarely to be found amid the artifices of Greek orators. The scene in the prison (§ 48) is very pathetic, and worthy of special note.¹ He is at

¹ ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐδεδέμεθα πάντες ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ νύξ τε ἦν καὶ τὸ δεσμωτήριον συνεκέκλειστο, ἤκον δὲ τῷ μὲν μήτηρ τῷ δὲ ἀδελφῇ τῷ δὲ γυνὴ καὶ παῖδες, ἦν δὲ βοή καὶ οἶκτος κλαίωντων καὶ ὀδυρομένων τὰ παρόντα κακά, λέγει πρὸς με Χαρμίδης, ὦν μὲν ἀνεψίός, ἡλικιώτης δὲ καὶ συνεκτραφεὶς τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐκ παιδός, ὅτι Ἀνδοκίδη, τῶν μὲν παρόντων κακῶν ὄρᾳς τὸ μέγεθος, ἐγὼ δ' ἐν μὲν παρελθόντι χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐδεόμην λέγειν εὐδὲ σε λυπεῖν,

great pains to contradict the charge that he confessed any personal guilt, or brought any charges whatever against his father and relations, whom he claims, on the contrary, to have saved from an unjust sentence. The legal portions of the speech, in which he discusses the various kinds of ἀτιμία, and the subsequent restoration not merely of ἄτιμοι, but of exiles, are not so clear, and evidently not so much to the taste of the speaker. But when he reverts again to personal matters, and attacks the motives and private character of his accusers, especially Callias, son of Hipponicus, he becomes very lively and striking. A very full and accurate analysis of this and the other orations is given by Blass.¹

§ 383. The criticisms upon his style are, however, all based on the formal and technical ideas of the rhetoricians, and seem to me to do little justice to the orator. They call him simple, unadorned, irregular, and wanting in method and vigour. They notice that his periods run frequently into abnormal constructions, and end in anacolutha. They mark his frequent digressions, and the want of due proportion in the parts of his speeches. They complain that, although he generally uses the language of common life, and is even vulgar and comic in his pictures, he nevertheless often employs poetical idioms, which violate the strict notions of Attic prose. But if we remember that his speeches must have been published, not as models of style, but as pamphlets vindicating the character and policy of the author, who was no rhetor or sophist, but merely a cultivated aristocrat, most of these charges fall to the ground. In fact Andocides stands nearest of all the Attic orators to our modern conception of a public speaker. We do not admire too

νῦν δὲ ἀναγκάζομαι διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφορὰν. οἷς γὰρ ἐχρῶ καὶ οἷς συν-
 ἦσθα ἄμεν ἡμῶν τῶν συγγενῶν, οὗτοι ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰτίαις δι' ἃς ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύμεθα
 οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τεθνήσκουσιν οἱ δὲ οἴχονται φεύγοντες, σφῶν αὐτῶν καταγιγνώσκοντες
 ἀδικεῖν εἰ ἤκουσας τι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἰπέ, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν
 σεαυτὸν σῶσον, εὖτε δὲ τὸν πατέρα, ὃν εἰκός ἐστὶ σε μάλιστα φιλεῖν, κ. τ. λ.
 λέγοντος δὲ ᾧ ἄνδρες τοῦ Χαριμίδου ταῦτα, ἀντιβολούντων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ
 ἰκετεύοντος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, ἐνεθυμίσθη πρὸς ἑαυτὸν· ᾧ πάντων ἐγὼ δεινотάτη
 συμφορᾷ περιπεσών, πότῃ περὶ τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ συγγενεῖς ἀπολλυμένους
 ἀδίκως, κ. τ. λ.

¹ AB. i. 300, sq.

strict or logical a frame, we like the language of common life, adorned occasionally with flowers of poetic ornament ; we enjoy digressions and personal attacks as giving life and point to political debate. It is moreover confessed that by his dramatic habit of introducing the very words of other speakers, he has attained a very striking amount of *ethos*, in the sense of character-painting, which lends a great additional charm to his narrative. But we can understand how this orator was always despised by the formal and technical writers, to whom we owe all our information on this side of Greek literature. Yet it is hardly creditable to modern critics that they should blindly follow this judgment, and ignore the very interesting and modern features in this remarkable man, who alone represents to us the amateur and non-professional eloquence of the higher classes at Athens.¹

§ 384. The external history of the text is bound up with that of Antiphon, both authors being handed down to us together, except that the good Oxford MS. (N) omits Andocides. Otherwise what has been said above of the MSS. and the Aldine *prints* on Antiphon may be consulted. A. G. Bekker has published a translation and commentary on the orator (Quedlinb. 1832). Without producing special editions, Sluiter, Meier, Vater, Kirchhoff, Hirschig and others have elucidated many points in the text.² Baiter and Sauppe's, and Blass' are the best texts.

§ 385. Widely different in character from Andocides was his contemporary and relation, CRITIAS, born also of a noble family, which had been known and celebrated as far back as Solon's

¹ Perhaps I should add that in the *Phædrus* of Plato, an amateur speech on Eros is composed by way of contrast with the formal *epideixis* which he professes to quote from Lysias. There is, moreover, a long attack on formal rhetoric, and an exposition of the conditions which moderns would think proper for an orator, though the standard of Plato is too high. Possibly the speeches of Phocion, if we had them, were similar protests against artificial rhetoric from the practical side. But the dissent of Socrates and his school, and of such men as Phocion, were ineffectual in stopping the tide of public opinion in favour of professional and technical eloquence.

² Cf. Blass's Preface to his Ed. (Teubner), p. vi.

time. Indeed, both Solon and Anacreon celebrated the beauty of the ancestors of Critias.¹ We hear through Xenophon and Plato that Critias applied himself much to mental culture, and attended the teaching of Socrates, but would not be dissuaded by him from pursuing immoral objects, and hence quarrelled with the philosopher.¹ Nevertheless it is very remarkable that a man who made literature only a stepping-stone to political influence should have attained so high a point in various kinds of writing.

He may have been born about 450 B.C., but showed little prominence up to the time of the Four Hundred, of whom his father Callæschrus was a prominent member. Of course he was always an oligarch, but he probably spent his earlier life in study, and did not see a proper scope for his energies. It is remarkable that he took no strong side with the Four Hundred, so that he not only remained at Athens, but proposed decrees about the recall of Alcibiades, and the enquiry into Phrynichus' death, which show a desire to agree with the democracy. Yet he roused the suspicions of Cleophon, who had him banished. It was during his exile, in the dissolute society of Thessalian nobles, that he developed that strong hatred of the democracy, and that general lawlessness and violence, which make his name a byword among later Athenians. His career as one of the Thirty, and his death in battle against Thrasybulus, are matters of notoriety. He was evidently a man of strong clear head and logical consistency, but probably a sceptic in morals, and an advocate of the worst theories of the sophists whom Plato brings up as opponents to Socrates.

Though highly cultivated in music and literature, though a good artist in various kinds of poetry and prose, he was a ruthless and cruel man, upon whose nature the refinement of aristocratic birth and good society had no effect. His political misdeeds have, however, probably obscured his literary merits; for he sums up in himself all the forms and kinds of Attic literature, and in all of them he attained a certain eminence. We have spoken above (§ 137) of his poetry, of his elegiacs and hexameters, which were political and aristocratic in tone, and of

¹ Xen. *Memor.* i. 2, §§ 12, sq.

his tragedies (§ 232), which seem to have quite outdone Euripides in preaching scepticism and a contempt for received dogmas. Nevertheless, the frequent attribution of his plays to Euripides shows how high was their poetical merit. In prose he wrote descriptions of the politics of Sparta, Thessaly, and other states; lives of celebrated men, such as Homer and Archilochus; and philosophical discussions, of which Galen quotes one on the nature of love. Hermogenes quotes as to oratory his *προοίμια δημηγορικά*. His prose works are said to have been the best, but, being long neglected on account of the deep hatred which his life inspired, were first revived and praised by Herodes Atticus, and then criticised next to the Ten by Hermogenes, by Philostratus and others. It excites some surprise that he did not supplant Andocides in the Canon of the Ten orators. Unfortunately we only possess a few trifling fragments of his prose, and need not therefore discuss the judgments of the critics. They praise his taste and purity, and remark that he rather belonged to the new Attic writers, having none of the harshness of Thucydides, who nevertheless survived him. He was subtle and persuasive, but not, say they, fiery or vehement. His political violence was, we may fear, rather the result of deliberate selfishness and cruelty than of wild passion, for even in his poetry this latter quality seems absent, or under strict control. But from his manysidedness, and from his strictly aristocratic tone, he would have been a very good representative of Periclean culture, and of the older bloom of letters at Athens, which passed away or changed with the Restoration.

CHAPTER VI.

ATTIC LITERATURE OF THE RESTORATION—

LYSIAS AND ISÆUS.

§ 386. FROM this time onwards the aristocrats, as a party, seem to have been absorbed or destroyed, and though Plato shows plainly enough his tendencies, he lives apart from the people, and abandons all hope of acting upon the politics of his day. Charges of hostility to the demos are indeed still common in the quarrels of the day ; there is hardly a speech on public matters in the collection of Lysias in which it is not urged by the speaker against his adversary, and likewise pressed as a counter-charge. Even Thrasybulus does not escape it. But parties had been so broken up and confused by the disorders of fifteen years ; the adherents of the Four Hundred were so often enemies of those of the Thirty ; so many aristocrats had been exiled as too moderate ; so many time-servers had changed sides, that we cannot show any definite aristocratic party after this date. But it was a time of sad memories and of poignant regrets ; in spite of the amnesty voted, and honestly enough observed by the demos, every private accusation, every charge of peculation or violence, gave occasion for hints of former treason, and for suggestions that the over-indulgence of the state might now be rectified by condign punishment on another score.

§ 387. It is of course not easy to draw lines of distinction in an epoch where a great number of literary men of various kinds were working collaterally, and where no year or decad could be wanting in intellectual work. But yet it seems, by some curious coincidence, that the lives of most of the great older lights of Attic literature closed during the dark troubles towards the end of the Peloponnesian war. Beginning with

Antiphon, we can enumerate Sophocles, Euripides, and Agathon in poetry ; Critias, Socrates, and Thucydides—all of whom died within a few years of the archonship of Eucleides. It does not appear indeed that among so many authors more than two—Aristophanes and Andocides—of those whom we know, wrote before this crisis, and also after it. Andocides, as I have explained, is not of much importance. The later work of Aristophanes is perhaps the strongest evidence we have of the altered tone of literature after the year 399 B.C. Attic life was no longer the stormy existence of a tyrant democracy, ruling a great dominion, and occupied with imperial interests—a society keen and intellectual, but rude withal, and in some respects coarse and cruel. The Athens of Isocrates and Plato is a tamer and more cultured city, in which for a generation political interests sink into a secondary place, and in which intellectual and moral culture come into the foreground. This is really the time in which the change took place from the Periclean to the Demosthenic citizen.¹ The Athenians of the Restoration, excluded from empire by the predominance of Sparta, sought material wealth and social refinement ; they paid mercenaries to perform the military duties which had no vital importance in their eyes. And for awhile all enterprise, even in art, paused. The glories of Pheidias found no rival till the schools of Scopas and Praxiteles, a generation later, re-kindled the torch. Attic poetry decayed, and never recovered. The New Comedy gained its greatness at the expense of all the higher flights of fancy, and cannot rank higher than the genteel comedy of Sheridan.

It cannot, however, be held that the years immediately following Eucleides were merely days of rest and weariness, for, as if to mark the epoch of the Restoration, several eminent men, who attained maturity some years before, now enter the field of literature, and perfect the development of Attic prose. Of these four stand pre-eminent above the rest—Lysias, Isocrates, Plato, and Xenophon. These men, historians, pamphleteers, philosophers, court advocates, occupy the field till circumstances again brought Athens into the

¹ Grote's *Hist.*, vol. xi. p. 390, and my *Social Life in Greece*, p. 269.

position of asserting Hellenic interests against foreign domination; then political oratory revives with Demosthenes and his compeers. The lighter literature of the epoch—the many anecdotists whom later compilers quote, the Middle Comedy, which gave a picture of the society of the day, are unfortunately lost, and though fragments of comedies survive in hundreds, we can form no adequate notion of the merits of even Antiphanes and Alexis. The dramatic side of Plato and of Xenophon only gives us a glimpse into aristocratic life, a few realistic pictures in Lysias' speeches show an ugly counterpart in the poorer ranks. But if the social aspects of Athens are in this period but partially preserved, her intellectual development stands before us in a very clear and instructive way, for we have ample specimens of the style—the way of thinking—of all the great prose writers of the age.

§ 388. We will commence with *LYSIAS*, the oldest of them, whose technical education must have been completed in the earlier epoch, but whose literary activity, though late in development, starts with peculiar freshness and vigour at the very opening of the Restoration. With him, moreover, we enter upon a new phase of oratory, and that which is the most characteristic of old Greek thought and culture. I have sketched in the last page the general condition of Attic society after the return of Thrasybulus, how external peace and an enforced amnesty left many private feuds, and embittered many new disputes. I may add that the Athenians, who had no longer a great empire to control, turned to a closer scrutiny of domestic affairs and of home finance. The state was now poor, and the citizens unable to bear heavy taxation; it is not unlikely that many men of doubtful character, who had made money abroad, came to Athens, and were allowed to obtain or regain civic rights (like Andocides), because they would undertake liturgies and other expensive state burdens. On the other hand, there were constant complaints of peculation and waste among public servants—one man is charged with embezzling the revenues in the administration of foreign affairs, another is capitally accused for squandering the public chest in adding to the public sacrifices

by false statutes, and thrusting upon the state religious burdens too great for it to bear. Thus this period of external quiet at Athens was prominently an age of litigation. It was not unlike the crisis at Syracuse which was said to have produced the earliest masters of rhetoric, Corax and Tisias.

But at Athens Antiphon had already domesticated the art. We can therefore expect only a new development with the rise of more favourable conditions. This new development is distinctly and prominently set before us in the oratory of Lysias. Let it be remembered that the Athenian theory of public life and of citizen duties required every man to appear personally and transact his own business; as the assembly must not be made up of elected representatives, but of the free citizens in person, so in the law courts it was abhorrent to Athenian notions of the personal dignity and importance of citizenship that any man should hand over his affairs to a professional advocate, and sit by as a mute. Far less would any Athenian judge have ventured to insult or perplex the litigant who endeavoured to plead his own cause, and escape from the heavy expense of employing a professional pleader. All this trade-union feeling which marks the judges and the bar of modern days was unknown at Athens. There was rather an opposite feeling in the Attic courts. The jury suspected and feared the devices of an art which professed openly to confuse the right and the wrong, and to give the victory to the worse over the better cause. As it was nevertheless inevitable that feeble or inexperienced litigants should seek the assistance of those who made the law their study, we find that the profession of paid advocate, or professional speech-writer, assumed this curious phase at Athens, that the orator must conceal himself, that he must assume not only the case but the person of his litigant, and, while pleading his cause, avoid all display of power or of art which the jury might suspect as too perfect for an average citizen.

Thus the *logographer* of the Restoration was strictly a dramatic author, differing from the poet in this, that while his plot was given him by the case in hand, the arguments, the diction, nay even the particular emotions to be expressed were

devised by the advocate, and put into the mouth of an actor, who, however poor in forensic gifts, had at least a deep interest in the performance, and a personal knowledge of the circumstances of the case. It had been said by older rhetors that what was probable (*εἰκός*) was more valuable in argument than what was true, as such; this principle was carried to a far finer point by the so-called *ἡθοποιία* (conveying of character) and the *πρέπον*—two hardly distinguishable qualities¹—of the school of Lysias. Thus when critics, old and new, note how like to comedy are many of the details in Lysias' speeches, they have caught only particular cases of these 'comic graces' which are really of the very essence of this artistic logography. It is a matter of common remark how dramatic genius seems to have faded out at Athens after the days of the three great tragedians and the old comic poets. Perhaps it would be truer to say that this talent became diffused through a wider area, and through branches of literature apparently foreign to it. Dramatic speech-writing and dramatic dialogue (as with Plato) occupied the attention of great artists who might in an earlier generation have held a foremost place among writers for the stage. There was a reality about the courts, and a freedom about the schools, which suited various complexions of mind. But the talent, though disguised, is there still; we are still in the presence of Attic thought and Attic culture of the highest type. With this preface we turn to the details.

§ 389. Lysias, an Athenian by birth, was the son of the Syracusan Kephala, a man of respectability and fortune, who was persuaded by the influence of Pericles to settle in Athens as a *metic*, where he carried on a thriving manufacture, chiefly as an armourer. He is introduced as a very old man, living in refined and elegant society, at the opening of Plato's *Republic*. It appears from the house property owned at Athens and the Peiræus by both Kephala and by his sons, that they must

¹ Dionysius speaks of the *πρέπον* (appropriateness) in three respects; as regards the character of the *speaker*, as regards the character of the *audience*, and as regards the character of the *speech itself*, which should change according as narrative, argument, or appeal become necessary. The first of these is *ἡθος*.

have all been of the privileged class of aliens called *isotélais*, who were assessed the same state-burdens as citizens, though they enjoyed no full political rights. The date of Lysias' birth seems to be wrongly stated in the *Lives* of him as 458 B.C., in which case he would have been nearly sixty years old before he made his first essay as an orator. For other critical reasons the date of his birth has been brought down by recent scholars to about 435 B.C., but this is merely a matter of inference, and depends on our denying the accuracy of Plato's picture of the family in his dialogues. We are told that as a boy of fifteen he, and at least one of his brothers, went to Thurii, and the assumption that they went among the original settlers was the main cause of the orator's birth being fixed at the now rejected earlier date. But there is no reason to sustain this view. It seems that at Thurii he came in contact with Tisias or his pupils, and studied under them the art of rhetoric, in which he became known as a theorist, probably at an early age.

We hear from Aristotle that he kept a school of rhetoric, but that finding himself outdone as a theorist by Theodorus, he took to practical oratory, in which he was without any dangerous rival. This story, repeated for us by Cicero, is I think suspicious, because, as Lysias seems to have adopted speech-writing for a profession owing to his loss of fortune, we need not conceive his adopting rhetoric from any other motive, and we find him coming out as a great practical orator immediately after the catastrophe which deprived him of his fortune. Moreover, Plato in his *Phædrus*, which is supposed to be a discourse between Socrates and Phædrus, when Lysias is a young and rising man, speaks of him already as a celebrated orator.¹ However this may be, it seems certain that he sojourned at Thurii from the age of fifteen till the Sicilian disaster brought troubles on the democratic party through most cities of Magna Græcia, and he was among the 300 citizens banished

¹ Grote (*Plato*, i. p. 200, note) makes this allusion in the *Phædrus* an argument for his view that it was not written till after 399 B.C. He thinks that Lysias, according to his own statement of his want of experience in the opening of the speech against Eratosthenes, was not famous before that date.

by a revolution which sent him back to Athens in the archonship of Callias (412, B.C.). Here he and his brother Polemarchus carried on their business, and apparently without incurring the general impoverishment which affected Athens at the close of the Peloponnesian War. For when the Thirty were in power, and were looking out for convenient persons to plunder, these brothers, with other resident aliens, were chosen as affording the best booty. In the striking narrative of his speech *against Eratosthenes*, an adherent of the Thirty, Lysias has told us the story of this cruel and violent proceeding, in which his elder brother, Polemarchus, was put to death without cause or trial, the property of both seized by the Thirty, and Lysias only saved by presence of mind and accident from their hands. When in exile at Megara he seems to have worked actively in aid of the democratic party. Plutarch's Life, apparently quoting from his lost speech *about the benefits he had conferred* (on Athens), states that he presented Thrasybulus' soldiers with all the rest of his property, 2,000 drachmæ and 200 shields, which must have been invested in business far from Athens. He, moreover, collected mercenaries, and persuaded the Elean Thrasydemus, his own great friend, and a strong democrat in politics, to give two talents in aid of the undertaking. It was in consequence proposed by Thrasybulus, as soon as they succeeded, that civic rights should be accorded to Lysias; but the proposal, though carried, was indicted by Archinus, a companion, perhaps a rival of Thrasybulus, as illegal, because proposed before the council who should have prepared it were properly elected, and in consequence Lysias remained for the rest of his life an *isoteles*. Several somewhat hostile allusions to Thrasybulus in the extant speeches have puzzled the critics, who think that the orator ought to have been a staunch adherent of his democratic friend—as if it were not part of Lysias' art to assume the person of his client, and perhaps by such very allusions to lull the suspicions of the jury that he and not a simple citizen was pleading the cause. But we do not know how far this disguise was possible, or whether it was not as transparent as that of the assumed authorships which we noticed in the Old Comedy of the previous generation. For we hear that Lysias

having lost his fortune, and having revealed to both himself and others his practical power in prosecuting the murderers of his brother, became so popular a professional speech-writer, that at least 200 of his speeches (not to mention spurious attributions) were preserved. Among the many rivals who may have written some of the speeches assigned to him, none approached him in celebrity. We hear nothing further concerning his private life, save that he stood in intimate relations to a certain Metaneira, though married to his niece, the daughter of his youngest brother, Brachyllus, according to a common fashion at Athens. He does not seem to have lived to an advanced age, his latest extant speeches not reaching, I think, below 480 B.C. The epigram or poem of Philiscus upon him cited in Plutarch's *Life* is so corrupt as not to be worth quoting;¹ but there is a fine bust of him in the Naples Museum, which seems to be genuine, and shows a strong, clear, somewhat hard face.

§ 390. The speeches of Lysias are upon so great a variety of subjects, that it is extremely difficult to classify them. The great majority are very short pleadings in private disputes, some on trifling subjects, but even here constantly touching on public affairs, and discussing the general character both of the litigants, and of the public men of the day. But before entering on this side of the orator's work, we may dispose briefly of his rhetorical and political speeches—I mean political as opposed to mere court arguments. Of his earlier works, his technical treatise, which is alluded to, and his erotic and panegyrical efforts, which were extant both in the form of speeches and of letters, we know almost nothing. But a curious sketch or specimen of his rhetorical essays on erotic subjects is preserved in the *Phædrus* of Plato, where Socrates insists on Phædrus reading out to him a composition of the kind which he has just heard Lysias, the famous orator, deliver. There is considerable controversy as to the genuineness of this document, most English and French critics, such as Mr. Jowett and M. Perrot,² holding it to be a

¹ Cf. Bergk, *Lyr. Fragg.* p. 640.

² Mr. Grote, in his admirable chapter on the *Phædrus* (Grote's *Plato*, ii. cap. xxiv.), seems never to have suspected the genuineness of this docu-

mere satirical imitation of the orator by Plato, many Germans, and among them Blass, asserting it to be a real transcript. Blass, indeed, goes so far as to say that even such a stylist as Plato could not have produced so characteristic an imitation of the graces and turns of Lysias, whose speech is here, as he well observes, *formally* far superior to Socrates' answer. But surely the imitation of Agathon's style in the *Symposium* shows how clever a counterfeiter Plato could be. I confess myself not convinced by these arguments, nor by others such as this, that the direct assertion of its being read from a written copy precludes its being the invention of Plato. The historical impossibilities in the Dialogues show plainly how far Plato considered his dramatic license to extend, and it seems more likely that he closely parodied some kindred speech of the orator, than that he introduced real quotation of such length into his compositions—a practice which would have inestimably increased their value for the history of literature. From Lysias' *panegyricus* we have, on the contrary (in Dionysius), a genuine fragment, that of a speech delivered at the ninety-eighth Olympiad, when the elder Dionysius of Syracuse sent a pompous embassy to contend at the games. The subject is the increasing danger to Greece from the great king on the one side, and the Sicilian tyrant on the other, with strong exhortations to harmony among Hellenes, and a firm resistance to the encroachments of both. The mob at Olympia, as we are told, in consequence of this address, hooted the poems of Dionysius, plundered his gilded and embroidered tents, and insulted his deputation, but this was the only effect produced. The critic Dionysius says it was inferior in weight and dignity to similar compositions of Isocrates and Demosthenes. The fragment, however, as far as it goes, seems quite equal to the more diffuse rhetoric of the former, and must have been fully as exciting to the hearers, though Dionysius says it is not so.

§ 391. The *Epitaphios*¹ appears to be spurious, and I will

ment. But he was a man strangely easy of faith concerning the alleged authorship of Greek documents, and in the same chapter (p. 256) implies his belief in the authenticity of the *Epitaphios* of Lysias.

¹ Or. 2.

therefore postpone the consideration of it to another place, where we can bring it into comparison with other displays of the kind. Of the imaginary speech for Nikias before the Syracusans, we have only a sentence or two, and though it was accepted by Theophrastus, it is likewise of doubtful authenticity. But a genuine and interesting fragment of a *δημηγορία*,¹ or deliberative speech, has been preserved by Dionysius, in which the speaker urges a complete restoration of the democracy after the expulsion of the Thirty, against the proposal of Phormisius to limit civic rights to landholders. In this, as in many other speeches, Lysias spoke his own strong sentiment against every form of government except that of the whole people. This sentiment is practically illustrated by the longest and best known of his court speeches, that *against Eratosthenes*, delivered in his own person, and generally stated (after his own exordium) to be the first essay that he made in court. It falls after the fragment just mentioned, which must have been delivered in 403 B.C. The only other document in the collection of earlier date is the speech *for Polystratus*, which may be as early as 406, but which all good critics refuse to consider genuine.

I may remark that spurious speeches like this, if really delivered at the time they profess, and not the work of later sophists, are a most valuable index of the general condition of Attic oratory apart from the great masters who towered above the average crowd.

§ 392. The speech against Eratosthenes is in every respect a very fine oration, full of point and of vigour, but only exhibiting a certain number of Lysias' perfections. The narrative of his brother's murder and his own escape is admirable, and the pressing of his proof by questioning of the accused irresistible. But far more interesting to us is the sketch of the political acts of Theramenes, who at the moment was somewhat rehabilitated in character by his enmity to Critias and his tragical death. The whole speech seems intended to have a larger scope than the condemnation of Eratosthenes, who is too contemptible an adversary to have his motives dissected, or his character painted

¹ Or. 34.

at full length. Neither does Lysias seek to convey his own character to the jury, a device chiefly useful to a defendant, but not to a plaintiff who merely sought to fasten his charge upon the adversary.

The speech *against Agoratus* is very similar in character, except that both plaintiff and defendant are lower in the social scale, so that while there is less of general political argument, there are more copious details, especially of the wretched conduct of Agoratus, who after becoming a tool to the Thirty and doing to death a large number of honest citizens, escaped to Phylæ, and attempted to join the democrats.¹ Though saved from instant death by Anytus, who nobly reminded his soldiers that this was not the time or place to take vengeance on their enemies, he was shunned as an accursed outcast, and when attempting to join the solemn procession on the return of the exiles from Peiræus, was disarmed and driven off with scorn by Æsimus, the chief of the ceremony. Thus if this oration is remarkable for Lysias' dramatic power or character-drawing, it is in the drawing of the adversary. This feature recurs in several of the lesser orations spoken by plaintiffs, of which I may refer the reader to that *against Alcibiades* (the younger), a dissolute young debauchee, who is depicted as having inherited only his father's vices ;² that against Philon,³ in which a mean and selfish creature, who profited by his neighbour's misery, is brought before us in strong colours ; that against Diogeiton,⁴ who was a false guardian, and an oppressor of helpless orphans, according to his accuser ; and that against Nikomachus.⁵

§ 393. Far more striking, however, and more artistic than these portraits of adversaries, are the portraits conveyed by Lysias of the characters of defendants in their own speeches. Here character was of great importance, for in answer to the allegations of the prosecutor, the defendant, without boasting

¹ §§ 77, sq.

² The authorship of this oration, which is evidently a genuine speech, is doubted by Blass and others, chiefly because they think the character-painting not delicate enough for Lysias (Blass, i. 406).

³ Or. 21.

⁴ Or. 32.

⁵ Or. 30.

or insolence, was bound to let the jury know his past history, his services to the state, and his general blamelessness of life. This is more strictly the *ethopœia* for which the orator was so celebrated. His defendants are all personages distinct enough for a drama or a modern novel. The most remarkable examples are those found in the speech for Mantis theos,¹ that of the accused, a political character, in or. 25, that of the speaker in or. 21 (very similar, with delicate distinctions, to that of Mantis theos), and that of the defendant charged with cutting away a sacred olive on his estate.

I will pause for a moment at this group; it consists of people of consideration, who come forward to speak with confidence and dignity in their own behalf. The speech of Mantis theos, whose name is preserved in the superscription, is the most remarkable. He is a young aristocrat, whose ancient family and good traditions have prompted him not to only to seek danger in the van of battle, and retire from action more slowly than the mighty Thrasybulus, but to ascend the bema without waiting for the sanction of mature age, and to advise the people on public affairs. He chooses, moreover, to adopt a style of dress and of life suited to his aristocratic station, though no one has ever seen him joining in the revelries and the misconduct of other young men of the same class. He thanks his present adversary, who has questioned his fitness for the council, for having given him a fitting opportunity in the scrutiny (*δοκιμασία*) of exhibiting his life. Though somewhat self-assertive for our notions of good taste, the speech is admirably suited to a young Greek aristocrat. The other discourses of the same class, being delivered by older men, are calmer and less confident, but each of them conveys a strong and clear impression of the speaker's respectability, dignity, and superiority to any vulgar crime.

§ 394. Passing to a lower condition of society, we may cite the oration *on the property of Aristophanes*, in which the speaker's father, who was already dead, was charged with having made away with the money of Aristophanes, confiscated after his execution by public decree. Here the speaker, touching lightly

¹ Or. 16.

on the dreadful fate of Aristophanes (who was executed without trial, and even his body refused to his relatives), endeavours to show that his own father and he himself were quiet, unassuming people, his father having maintained a good character to the age of seventy, when he died, and he himself having been too young to share in such a crime. Still more characteristic is the first oration, *on the killing of Eratosthenes*, whom the speaker found in his wife's chamber, having discovered her infidelity by a slave, and having summoned various friends to be witnesses of the outrage. The picture of the innocent and unsuspecting husband—a man of the poorer class; of all the suggestive circumstances which he overlooked from thorough confidence in his wife; of his sudden awakening to a knowledge of her guilt—all this is drawn in homely detail, and with masterly power.

Similar in some respects, though contrasted in not asserting complete innocence and justification, are the speeches *in reply to Simon*, and *in answer to the charge of malicious wounding*.¹ The speakers, who had quarrelled with rivals in somewhat disreputable love affairs, while admitting their folly, and the reality of the brawl, assert their own efforts to keep things quiet, and the fury and unreasonableness of their opponents. All three orations are very interesting in opening to us views into the inner life of the lower classes at Athens. To take them as specimens of public morality, as is done by most Germans and the English critics who follow them, is to make the Newgate Calendar an index of average morals. As this has been done for Ireland in the last century by a distinguished historian, we must protest against its being done for Athens.

§ 395. Last in this class of speeches I will mention the very interesting speech *on behalf of the Invalid Pauper*, whose allowance of an obol *per diem*, according to the Athenian poor-law, was challenged, and who shows that his case is a fair one for public charity. The old grammarians, who could not understand how the great Lysias should plead in such a case, where the issue was trifling and any remuneration impossible, rejected it as spurious. Most moderns are of the opposite

¹ Or. 3 and 4.

opinion, justly. But they seem hardly to have appreciated the circumstances of the case, which are easily to be deduced from the speech. The alleged pauper was evidently what we call 'a character,' with a small shop close to the agora, the common resort of many people far above him in means and station, who were doubtless attracted by his wit or his drollery. These people, moreover, seem to have lent him horses to ride, and this fact, together with the distinguished company which thronged his shop, led the accuser to believe that he was not ἀκούρατος, without means of helping himself. It is indeed more than probable that his influential friends got him put on the relief list in preference to more deserving applicants. This created envy against him, and he found himself in danger of losing his pension. We can imagine him appealing with comic pathos to Lysias, who probably frequented his shop with other strollers in the agora, and we can imagine how the company would join in entreating the great advocate to help so useful and popular a character. Thus half in charity, half in fun, Lysias writes him a defence, which could only have had effect when spoken by a well-known and original character, and which gains or loses almost all its point by the delivery.

There is all manner of fun in the speech, comic pathos, parody of serious arguments, unexpected turns; but it must be *acted* to produce any effect. Most of the arguments are not serious, and the impression produced is that the speaker was by no means so badly off as he pretends; yet the defence would be very telling, when a trifling sum was at issue, and would be sure to carry the Council by its cleverness and its racy humour. This tendency to the humorous is very apparent in two other speeches, that *against Theomnestus*,¹ who endeavoured to evade a charge by adhering to the letter of the law in contempt of its spirit, and the fragment against the Socratic Æschines, which draws a picture of the defendant worthy of Aristophanes. Allied, as usual, to this talent, is the power of pathos, which, though kept in restraint by the taste of the day, and sparingly admitted in early Greek oratory, is very prominent in the prison-scene drawn in the speech against Agoratus,²

¹ Or. 10.² § 39, sq.

which strongly resembles that already noted in Andocides (above, p. 129). Still finer and unique in our remains of Lysias is the narrative in the speech *against Diogenes*, which indeed Dionysius cites as a model, where the appeal of the mother of the orphans to her father, who was their guardian, is not inferior to the finest speeches in Euripides. I will quote it here, as being little known to ordinary students.¹

§ 396. I have endeavoured to bring together these general features because the particular analysis of so many short speeches, on so many various subjects, would detain the reader far too long, and occupy a disproportionate space in this history. The argument, the authenticity, and the literary features of each speech have been fully discussed in Blass' *Attische Beredsamkeit* and in Mr. Jebb's *Attic Orators*, to either of which the special student of Lysias may turn for fuller information. I am likewise bound to pass by in silence the many political and social lights on the history of Athens afforded by the allusions of his speakers—many of them not creditable to the public morality of the Restored democracy, and showing how vague suspicions, political changes, and even the poverty of the public purse, were made the handles of private accusations.

¹ § 22: 'ἔπειτα σὺ ἐτόλμησας,' ἔφη, 'εἰπεῖν, ἔχων τοσαῦτα χρήματα, ὡς δισχιλίαις δραχμαῖς ὁ τούτων πατήρ κατέλιπε καὶ τριάκοντα στατήρας, ἃ παρ' ἐμοὶ καταλειφθέντα ἐκείνου τελευτήσαντος ἐγὼ σοι ἔδωκα; καὶ ἐκβαλεῖν τούτους ἡξιώκας θυγατριδοῦς ὄντας ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας τῆς αὐτῶν ἐν τριβωνίοις, ἀνυποδῆτους, οὐ μετὰ ἀκολουθοῦ, οὐ μετὰ στρωμάτων, οὐ μετὰ ἱματίων, οὐ μετὰ τῶν ἐπίπλων ἃ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῖς κατέλιπε, οὐδὲ μετὰ τῶν παρακαταθηκῶν ἃς ἐκείνος παρὰ σοὶ κατέθετο. Καὶ νῦν τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς μητριᾶς τῆς ἐμῆς παιδεύεις ἐν πολλοῖς χρήμασι εὐδαίμονας ὄντας· καὶ ταῦτα μὲν καλῶς ποιεῖς· τοὺς δ' ἐμοὺς ἀδικεῖς, οὓς ἀτίμως ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας ἐκβαλὼν ἀντὶ πλουσίων πτωχοὺς ἀποδείξαι προθυμῇ. καὶ ἐπὶ τοιούτοις ἔργοις οὔτε τοὺς θεοὺς φοβῇ, οὔτ' ἐμὲ τὴν σὴν θυγατέρα τὴν συνειδυῖαν αἰσχύνῃ, οὔτε τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ μέμνησαι, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἡμᾶς περὶ ἐλάττονος ποιῇ, χρημάτων.' τότε μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, πολλῶν καὶ δεινῶν ὑπὸ τῆς γυναικὸς βρθέντων οὕτω διετέθημεν πάντες οἱ παρόντες ὑπὸ τῶν τούτῃ πεπραγμένων καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἐκείνης, ὁρῶντες μὲν τοὺς παῖδας, οἷα ἦσαν πεπονθότες, ἀναμνησκόμενοι δὲ τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, ὡς ἀνάξιον τῆς οὐσίας τὸν ἐπίτροπον κατέλιπε. ἐνθυμούμενοι δὲ ὡς χαλεπὸν ἐξευρεῖν ὅτῃ χρὴ περὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πιστεῦσαι τινά, ὥστε, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, μηδένα τῶν παρόντων δύνασθαι φθέγγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δακρύοντας μηδὲν ἥττον τῶν πεπονθόντων ἀπιόντας οἴχεσθαι σιωπῇ.

Associated with these disagreeable features is the want of confidence in testimony shown through all his orations. After a preamble, and the prothesis, or first short statement of the case, the orator proceeds (where it is possible) to a narrative of the facts, in which he seeks in the clearest order and the simplest language to convey his client's view of the case. Then follows the citing of witnesses, who swear to the truth of the narrative. But, instead of being content with this, the speaker generally goes on to general *à priori* arguments, based on the character or the interests of the litigants. Indeed, general character seems to have weighed far too much in the Athenian law-courts, as it will ever do where a trained judge is not present to guide and control the feelings of the jury.

The *attack on Alcibiades* (or. 14, 15) is generally regarded as spurious, but by an early if not contemporary author, and bears curiously close relations to the speech of Isocrates *de Bigis*, to which it seems to be a reply. But the speech attributed to Lysias is not from so masterly a hand as the defence by Isocrates. Another speech in the Lysian collection, that *against Poliochus*, has likewise distinct references to the same defence, which, though in form a court speech, is really an encomium on Alcibiades, and may have been a good deal modified after its delivery for the purpose of publication.

§ 397. The general merits of Lysias have been implied in the above review of his extant speeches. It is perhaps important to add that the pettiness of many of the causes pleaded, and the consequent shortness and dryness of the argument, especially when delivered in support of the main speech (*δευτερολογία*), have much injured his reputation among modern students of Greek. Did we possess a few more of his great efforts, like those against Eratosthenes, Agoratus, and Diogeiton, we should better appreciate the praises of the ancient critics.

But with this pettiness of particular causes seems connected the criticism of Plato, that Lysias, in contrast to Isocrates, or to Pericles, among his forerunners, did not seek to deduce his special arguments from general philosophical principles. This was no doubt true; we also find, as Plato says, his arguments strung together without logical nexus, and often repeated need-

lessly. On the other hand, this close adherence to the individual case gave him that wonderful variety which the ancients admired, observing that among 200 genuine speeches no fixed use of any commonplaces, even in the proem, could be found. But his occasional repetitions of arguments are probably intentional, and meant to bring important points before the court in an artless way, and as a simple man might do who could not give weight or importance to a single statement by lofty diction or sounding periods. For, above all things, Lysias aimed at *unaffected simplicity*, the *tenue dicendi genus*, the ἀφελὲς λόγος of the critics, in which he was always considered the unapproached master. This character he attained by the use of plain words, having been the first to perceive that elegant and even dignified prose did not require poetical diction to exalt it—and here he broke loose completely from the traditions of Gorgias. Secondly, he attained it by clear statement, there being seldom the least obscurity when we know the whole of the case, and where the text is not corrupt. Thirdly, by brevity—a feature which strikes us very much in most of his speeches, and which can only be fully understood by regarding many of the shortest as mere auxiliary statements to the main argument.

§ 398. Of course a great writer like Lysias does not bind himself slavishly by such rules. There are passages of deep emotion where unusual words and phrases occur, and where they are more natural than common diction. There are cases where, for the sake of pathos, he repeats an idea, and holds it before the audience with great effect; again, for the sake of point, he introduces those parallelisms and balancings of clauses, which were then so common in Attic eloquence that to avoid them was perhaps more affected than to use them. These ornaments are what give Lysias' speeches the archaic complexion which has been compared to the stiff curls and conventional smile of the older Attic sculpture, even in its high development under the hands of Calamis.¹ But all these

¹ Dionysius uses the parallel illustration of the old simple paintings with few colours and little perspective, as compared to the more ambitious modern works. But to us, unfortunately, his illustration is of no avail.

things are distinctly exceptions to his rule of extreme simplicity, which would often degenerate into dryness or meagreness but for the exquisite *grace* (χάρις) which is the most brilliant feature of his genius. This quality, which cannot be analysed, has been extolled by all critics, and is equalled, especially in his narratives, by Herodotus alone of Greek prose writers. Indeed, as Antiphon stands close to Thucydides, and is strong on the argumentative or dialectical side, so Lysias approaches Herodotus, being far superior in the historical or narrative part of his oratory. His style seems at first sight, as Dionysius observes, so simple and natural that anyone might hope to imitate it, whereas it is really the most exquisite and unattainable art to copy nature artistically and yet with perfect accuracy. For this purpose he often deserts the rounded period, and uses, like Herodotus, an easy and lucid λεία εἰρομένη, which makes his story wonderfully plausible and persuasive. Thus he steals upon his hearers, as the ancients observed, instead of coercing them by power and grandeur. He also abandons his periods for an opposite purpose, when in passages of great excitement he adopts short unconnected clauses, as in the famous conclusion of his speech against Eratosthenes, and in the mother's description of her orphans before Diogeiton. All these peculiarities make it easy for us to understand how his critics thought him inferior in those panegyrical or deliberative harangues, where a periodic style was peculiarly effective. Thus a plain and forcible speaker in our own day might find great difficulty in composing a congratulatory address, which is expected to run in long and rounded sentences. Of course rhetors and grammarians have always preferred Isocrates, but if it were only as an antidote to that over-artificial and watery eloquence, the remains of Lysias are of inestimable value.

§ 399. Turning to the external history of his works, I have nothing to add to what has already been said about Plato's criticism, except that he may have been biassed by Lysias' democratic views, which led him constantly to attack and expose with great severity men with whom the philosopher had great sympathy. Aristotle very seldom mentions Lysias in compa-

ri son with Isocrates, and Theophrastus, though regarding him as the type of the 'genus tenue,' seems to have thought Thrasymachus more important in the history of rhetoric. Deinarchus, Charisius, and Hegesias are spoken of as imitating his style in contrast to that of Demosthenes. There were treatises composed upon him, as upon the other orators, by the Alexandrian critics, but these are unfortunately lost, nor do we possess any scholia upon this author. But in Roman days, when there was a reaction against the florid Asianism, Lysias found many admirers and students who aimed at old Attic simplicity and purity : of these C. Lic. Calvus is the most important. Cicero, who was attacked by this school, holds the balance very fairly between Lysias and his supposed opponents. He grants Lysias all the merits due to him, but prefers Demosthenes as a model on account of his power.

In the Augustan period, when Atticism triumphed, there were very full appreciations and discussions of Lysias by Dionysius and Cæcilius, both of whom wrote special works on him, besides the extant tract of Dionysius, and many judgments of both these and of Hermogenes in relation to other orators. Various later commentators, such as Zosimus of Gaza, Zeno, Paulus Germinus, are cited in the *Lexica*. In fact, throughout all Greek criticism, his place seems fixed as next in importance to Demosthenes and Isocrates. Of the 233 speeches declared genuine by Dionysius and Cæcilius, of all these comments and explanations, we have only the critiques already cited, a good many special points in Suidas and Harporation, the titles of about 170 speeches, and a single collection of 34 speeches, some of them imperfectly preserved, with about 100 lesser fragments.

§ 400. *Bibliographical.* The speeches (with the exception of the spurious *Epitaphios*, which was copied separately also) are handed down to us through one codex,¹ the Palatinus X, preserved at Heidelberg, which is the parent of all other copies, particularly of the Florentine, once esteemed of higher authority. Not only was X copied from an archetype already

¹ Written in the twelfth century, and brought from Nicæa to Europe. Cf. a special article upon it by Schöll in *Hermes*, vol. xi. pp. 202, sq.

mutilated, but it has itself lost several pages, and is, moreover, the work of a careless and inaccurate scribe, so that our text has afforded critics ample scope for emendation and correction. Eight of the extant speeches (whole or partial) are attested by Dionysius, the ablest and most careful of the authorities on this question. Five he rejects; others are doubtful. The selection seems made from two collections of Lysias' speeches, or else there are two selections from his whole works brought together. This is inferred from speeches on murder appearing in the first and twelfth places, the latter of them (*against Eratosthenes*) being evidently the first in order both of time and merit. But all closer classifications are complicated and unsatisfactory, owing to the great variety of the cases treated, as the reader will see from Blass' discussion of the point.¹

The first edition (Aldus, 1513, with other orators) is taken not from the Palatinus, but from the Athos MS., which Lascaris brought over, and which is now lost, but it was evidently an inferior copy of the same archetype. In our own day, besides the Zurich editors, and the Teubner edition of Scheibe—both excellent—this author has received inestimable aid from the critical labours of Cobet, both in his *Novæ Lectiones*, and in a special school edition (Amsterdam, 1863), which is of course the best text. There are many good essays, and many selections with notes by the Germans, of whom I may mention Hoelscher, Francken, Frohberger, Rauchenstein. There are German translations by Falk (Breslau, 1842) and F. Baur (2nd ed. Stuttgart, 1869). Excellent general estimates will be found (besides those of Blass and Mr. Jebb) in Perrot's and Girard's—the latter specially on Lysias—writings on Greek literature.²

§ 401. It is usual to pass from the consideration of Lysias and his court speeches to that of Isocrates and his epideictic displays, and then to return to Isæus as the special forerunner and master of Demosthenes. But as the evidence of this latter relation is not very clear, and in any case only applies to a special class of Demosthenes' speeches—those against his

¹ i. 348, 368.

² G. Perrot, *Éloquence politique, &c., à Athènes*, vol. i., and J. Girard, *de l'Atticisme dans Lysias, passim*.

guardians—it seems preferable to take up the works of Isæus in close connection with Lysias, to whom he affords many points of resemblance and of contrast. This will enable us to form a better estimate of the legal eloquence of Athens before we turn to her philosophers and pamphleteers, who were also, according to the fashion of the day, orators and special students of rhetoric.

§ 402. The darkness which shrouds the life of ISÆUS is hardly an accident ; it is rather the mark—I had almost said the distinguishing mark—of the developed profession to which he belonged. While Antiphon's apparent privacy of life only concealed an active and constant interference in public affairs, as was clearly shown when he came to lay aside the mask ; while Lysias' speeches contain several discourses of public interest and on public affairs in which he was personally concerned, the works of Isæus, not only as we have them, but as they were known to the ancients, were λόγοι ἰδιωτικοί, not merely for private individuals,¹ but on private suits, and in these they approach more nearly to what we should call Chancery practice than any other Attic eloquence preserved. Accordingly as our Chancery lawyers do not even attain the notoriety of those engaged in criminal or nisi-prius actions, far less that of political speakers, so Isæus remains personally unknown, and even his speeches, remarkable though they be, have seldom been studied except by special enquirers into the principles of Attic jurisprudence. Hence the dates of his birth and death are not known. His origin is said doubtfully to have been of Chalcis, and his father's name Diagoras. He may have been an Eubœan cleruch, driven back to Athens by the loss of the island to Athens, or a *metoikos*, a resident alien,

¹ The Greek argument of the fourth oration (concerning Nicostratus, &c.) says that Isæus was related to Hagnon, nephew of the testator, and spoke this speech in aid of them personally. As there is no hint of these facts in the course of the speech itself, they must have been derived from some old authority, and are not improbable, though Blass thinks (ii. p. 506) that this is alleged *wohl lediglich aus thörichte Vermuthung*. But, unfortunately, the people in question are obscure, and the speech gives us no light concerning Isæus' life or connections. Cf. for a careful review of the facts, Blass, *AB.* ii. p. 454.

who settled and practised at Athens without the social position of Kephalus and his son Lysias. The dates of the extant speeches, so far as they can be determined, range from 389 to 352 B.C. This, and his alleged instruction of Demosthenes, show his activity to have extended through the first half of the fourth century B.C. Of his education equally little is ascertained. He is called a follower of Lysias, a pupil of Isocrates. But his speeches only show the general influence which these great contemporaries must have exercised upon a man of his ability. The absence of closer likenesses even suggests that their education of him was not more direct.

§ 403. The subjects of the eleven speeches, and of the considerable fragments quoted as specimens by Dionysius, have no special literary interest, nor is there any one of them which is worth analysing in this place.¹ The most elaborate and Demosthenic in tone is the eleventh, that *on the bequests of Hagnias*. Concerning this lawsuit, which lasted many years and underwent many trials, we have among the speeches of Demosthenes that *against Macartatus*—a performance not only below the usual level of the great orator, but inferior to the speech of Isæus, which is far more logical and better constructed. The eighth, *on the succession to Kiron's property*, is similarly interesting in having been considerably used by Demosthenes in his speeches against his guardians, but the free and independent way in which he modifies the commonplaces or quotations from it, shows that he was even then no mere ordinary pupil, but an original and powerful rhetor. All the speeches of Isæus are about questions of succession, about the validity of wills, or of the evidence on which they are established and impugned, and upon the rights of relationship. They show us very clearly, like the speeches of Lysias, the grave defects of the Athenian jury system. These juries were not a small group of men, sworn to enquire into questions of fact, guided on points of law by a professional judge, and intended to protect private individuals from an abuse of power on the part of the government. They were rather the sovereign people broken up

¹ From a collection of sixty-four speeches, of which fifteen were rejected by old critics, we only have a scanty remnant of about one-sixth.

into divisions of 500, and bringing into court all the powers of the sovereign, without responsibility or control of any sort. Accordingly, while the great numbers of the jury made Attic court speeches to be practically harangues to a large assembly—a point seldom adequately insisted upon—its absolute and despotic power turned advocates to aim at persuasion rather than sound argument, to appeal to passion and not to reason, to flatter and not to convince by fair means.

All the court eloquence of Athens is vitiated by this fundamental unsoundness of the tribunal which it addressed, and nowhere is the result more apparent than in the speeches of Isæus, which were on subjects settled by strict law, by established custom and precedent, by traditions as old as any in Aryan civilisation. As regards the right and limits of testamentary bequest, the strict line of succession among collateral branches, the consequences of intestacy, the disturbing elements of mental incapacity and undue influence—in all these matters the system of Attic jurisprudence was very complete and carefully constructed. But, however desirous an advocate of Isæus' legal turn of mind might be to confine himself to the strict law of the case, the jury were averse to such dry discussions. Moreover, they seem to have laid far less stress on positive evidence than we do, probably on account of the mendacity of the nation; we also find the preparation of documents, and preservation of them in proper archives, strangely neglected. Hence in no case is the advocate content with proving a point by positive evidence, or producing a document establishing it; he always goes on to the *εἰκός*, the probabilities of the case; and indeed most of Isæus' speeches are arguments *against* the evidence on the ground of these probabilities. The produced will is argued to be a forgery, because the testator was on bad terms with the legatee; the alleged adoption of a son is denied on similar grounds. Is it likely a man in his senses would do such a thing? is the perpetual plea of the litigants. It is easy to see how such a state of things stimulated court eloquence, and how the ingenuity of a trained rhetor was required to put a fair face even upon a case which should have stood upon its own merits. The dicasts thought nothing of breaking a will,

or even of deciding in the teeth of sworn evidence. Indeed, from the number of cases of conviction for perjury known to us, we may infer that the swearing in Attic courts was not more conscientious than it is in the Irish county courts of the present day.

§ 404. Hence we see the point of the remark upon Isæus in the Greek *Life*, that he was thoroughly unfair to his opponent and out-generalied his jury.¹ But this very reputation injured his efficiency, for while Lysias seemed artless when charging the guilty, Isæus was suspected even when vindicating the innocent. Indeed a comparison with Lysias is the best means of showing the peculiar characteristics of Isæus. In the first place, his speeches are as a rule much longer and more elaborate, and this especially by reason of the many summaries and recapitulations which Lysias would have considered tedious, and which are in any case violations of *ethos*, if the speaker be an inexperienced debater. But in Isæus the mask seems falling away; the position of the logographer was too notorious and well established to be denied, and he either disdains, or he fails, to assume the personality of his client. Hence he abandons the simple structure upon which all Lysias' speeches are based, and affects variety and power of treatment. He breaks up his narrative into parts, and introduces argumentation between them, he omits the exordium or the peroration, or rather weaves in these preambles and appeals into the body of his speech. He even begins or ends with the reading of laws—in fact, a study of variety is one of his chief objects. This is as obvious in the diction as in the arrangement of his speeches. In some of them, and in some parts of them, his periods are almost as grand as those of Isocrates or Demosthenes; in others he affects, perhaps with less success, simplicity of narrative; in others he presses the adversary with close questioning, and with a rapid urging of short points. But while his eloquence is more sustained and logical, and while he forces home his arguments by dint of clever restatement and recapitulation, he does not attain to the grace of Lysias nor to the sustained power of Demosthenes. Nay, even in spite of the studied

¹ καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀντίδικον διαπονηρεῖται, τοὺς δὲ δικαστὰς καταστρατηγεῖ.

attempts at variety, there is a certain sameness of character about his speeches which makes them tedious in comparison with those of Lysias. This may be in some measure due to the uniformity of subjects in Isæus. Yet even apart from this, the want of ethos and the assumption of rhetorical power naturally produce an unpleasant effect.

§ 405. The influence of Isocrates' rhetoric is to be seen in the avoidance of the hiatus in some speeches, as well as in the general finish and smoothness of many of his periods, but we cannot trace any gradual adoption of these features, or their predominance in the later speeches, so that it is more likely he used this, like other devices, merely to produce variety and novelty. He certainly never adopted the avoidance of hiatus as a fixed principle. His *figures of thought*, such as indignant questions and the like, are more frequent than those of Lysias, whose natural gifts he endeavoured to rival by better training. Thus the old parallel clauses of the Gorgian rhetoric, which give Lysias his antique flavour, are hardly ever to be found in Isæus; but his composition is not the less careful and artificial, though he seeks to avoid these obvious ornaments. And thus with all his archaic mannerism Lysias is far the more easy and natural. It is not necessary to pursue this comparison, which, after the model of Dionysius, has been worked out by Blass and Perrot.

§ 406. *Bibliographical.* We may add a word on the history of the text. Beyond the fact of his being Demosthenes' educator, there is little mention of this orator till Dionysius and Hermogenes, who speak very favourably of him. The notes of Didymus are only once cited (by Harpocration, γαμνηλῆι). The Greek arguments are very complete, but no scholia, so far as I know, have come down to us. As to MSS., we are dependent upon the same which have been already noticed under Antiphon. The *princeps* of Aldus (1513) and the edition of Stephens (1575) were followed by that of Reiske (1773), which were based on no new collation, but all rest on the lost codex of Lascaris. The translation and legal notes of Wm. Jones (Oxford, 1779) are highly commended by Schömann.

The eleventh speech (on Meneclæ's bequests) was first

edited from the Laurentian MS. by Tyrwhitt (London, 1785). The large fragment of the speech on Cleonymus' bequests was added by Mai from an Ambrosian codex in 1815. Of later editors the texts of Bekker and Scheibe and the complete edition and commentary of Schömann (1831), who has also given us a German translation (2nd ed. 1869), are best worthy of mention.

§ 407. We have now followed out Attic court oratory to its completeness under the hands of Isæus; for any superiority which some of Demosthenes' speeches of this kind may possess, seems rather due to the exceptional genius of that orator than to the discovery of any new principles, or new method of rhetoric. And as Demosthenes' 'private orations' can hardly be discussed apart from his life, we may pause here, and turn to collateral fields of literary activity. But, instead of taking up Isocrates, who was at this time the leader of the epideictic rhetoric, or oratory of display, and whose merits were altogether stylistic, I prefer to proceed to that branch of Attic prose which forms the strongest contrast to the practical advocacy in the law courts—I mean the dialogues of Plato and other companions of Socrates. These men despised such a trade, and kept aloof from actual politics; they will therefore afford us a welcome respite from the practical oratory which has occupied us so long. But as thoroughgoing thinkers, and philosophers in the strict sense, their work deserves an earlier and more important place than the idle and empty compromise attempted by Isocrates, of combining a shallow philosophy with equally shallow theoretical politics. Thus this eminent rhetorician, but feeble statesman, will be brought into closer comparison with his proper contrast—Demosthenes.

CHAPTER VII.

PLATO.

§ 408. PLATO, whose proper name was Aristocles, was born either 429 or 427 B.C.,¹ at Aegina, where his father held property. His father, Ariston, son of Aristocles, and his mother, Peristione (sister of Charmides), were both of ancient and noble descent, and though later writers represent him as a poor man, this seems only from the desire of making him a closer copy of Socrates, and of the ascetic type fashionable in Greek philosophy. Several indications may be quoted to show that he was a man of wealth and consideration. He studied gymnastics in his youth, when he was surnamed Plato in the gymnasium from his broad shoulders, and he is reported to have won a prize at the Isthmian games. As his age of military service coincided with the grievous days of the closing Peloponnesian war, he must have been employed in the army; but upon this point, as well as upon his education in music, gymnastic, poetry, and philosophy, we are left to conjecture, and to vague legends, which were no doubt widely circulated about him, but which have no solid foundation. Diogenes says he studied the writing of poetry, and essayed dithyrambs, songs, and tragedies, but that, upon meeting Socrates, he burnt his poems. The epigrams attributed to him in the *Anthologia*, though trifling, are very elegant, and some of them may be genuine. Lastly, Aristotle² says that Cratylus had instructed him in the doctrine of Heracleitus before he came under the influence of Socrates.

¹ Cf. the conflicting authorities cited in Zeller's *Plato*, p. 2, note (Eng. trans.).

² *Metaph.* i. 6.

The whole impression conveyed by these stories is confirmed by his works, and shows him to have been a young Athenian gentleman in contact with all the current science of the day, and influenced by all the social and artistic culture of that matchless city in its matchless period. But his conversion by Socrates marks the great turning point of his life. Plato must have met him at an early age, for Socrates' conversations were very fashionable among his aristocratic friends—probably the age of twenty, which is reported to us, is too late. At all events, he became a constant and favourite pupil, and was with the great master at his trial and condemnation. According to Plato's own statement in the *Apology*, he endeavoured to persuade Socrates to assess the fine which the dicasts might impose at thirty minæ, which he and other friends were ready to pay. This large sum (for those days) implies that they had means. After Socrates' death he left for Megara, and stayed for a time with Eucleides, another pupil of the same school, who became afterwards the head of a distinct sect. From Megara Plato made voyages to Egypt, Cyrene, Magna Græcia, and Sicily; but it is more than probable that he returned at intervals to Athens. The dates of these journeys, even of those to Sicily, which are best known, are involved in obscurity. He is said to have studied mathematics with Theodorus of Cyrene, and to have made closer acquaintance with the Pythagoreans in Magna Græcia. But, in addition to these theoretical matters, he gained his first practical experience of the effects of irresponsible monarchy from the elder Dionysius. Though introduced by Dion, the tyrant was so offended with his views, which were then probably a reflex of those of Socrates, that he delivered him up to the Spartan ambassador Pollis, who had him sold in the market of Ægina. He was, moreover, well-nigh put to death by the Æginetans, who at this time (about 390 B.C.) would permit no Athenian to touch their shore. Being ransomed by one Annikeris, he returned to Athens, and set up a school at the well-known Academy, in the western suburbs of Athens.

§ 409. We unfortunately know nothing of the details of his oral teaching, which he avers in his written dialogues to be far the

most important. We hear that his discourses were very dry, and that in lecturing on the good he by no means adopted the homely style and illustrations of Socrates, but brought in mathematics, astronomy, and finally so abstract an idea of the Good that no one but his special pupils would listen to him. This we have on the report of Aristoxenus, who professes Aristotle's authority, and it agrees with some sneers to be found in the Middle Comedy. At all events, Plato took no part whatever in the politics of Athens, which were thoroughly distasteful to him, and opposed to all his principles. His notions of the proper State and its government are clear enough in the three works he has left us on the subject, the *Politicus*, the *Republic*, and the *Laws*. But when his old friend Dionysius died, he was persuaded by Dion, and also by the younger Dionysius, then under Dion's influence, to revisit Syracuse (367 B.C.) in the hope that, by converting the new tyrant to his views, he might at last have an opportunity of realising his theories of state reform. The experiment turned out exactly as might have been anticipated. After a few days of novelty and of politeness Dionysius grew weary of Plato, and jealous of Dion, so that he banished the latter, and Plato soon departed. But he actually was induced to return to Syracuse about 361 B.C., perhaps chiefly in order to reconcile his friend Dion with the tyrant. After escaping again from the tyrant's displeasure, he returned to Athens, where he spent the remainder of his old age respected by a large society of admirers. He died peacefully at a marriage feast, according to the legend, in 347 B.C., having exceeded the age of fourscore years.

§ 410. Plato is one of the very few Greek authors of whose works nothing has been lost. On the contrary, the catalogue we possess is rather redundant than defective, and one of the main duties of modern criticism as regards him has been the sifting of his writings, and the rejection of what is unworthy or unauthentic. Before approaching the dialogues, we may say a word concerning the lesser and more obscure writings, which were once ascribed to him. There are the epigrams already mentioned, which most critics reject, but one or two of which seem to me probably genuine: there are certain *Distinctions* (διαυρίσεις) to which Aristotle refers more than once; but as

they are never mentioned in any catalogue of his works, they seem to have been some collection of maxims from his oral lectures preserved in the school of the Academy. There are, moreover, a collection of *Epistles*, which are still printed in the editions of the text, and which Grote, in his great work on Plato,¹ accepts as genuine, and bases upon them many statements about the life of the philosopher. One of them (the seventh) is so interesting and circumstantial about his relations with Dion and Dionysius, that all critics have longed to have it regarded as genuine, and even those who reject the Platonic authorship think it an almost contemporaneous composition by a writer thoroughly informed on Plato's life. But I agree with Mr. Jowett and with all the German critics, that none of these epistles are genuine, and I am disposed to think the information derived from the seventh epistle as very suspicious. It may be all true, but no point unsupported by other evidence should be accepted without the greatest caution. We hear, moreover, of about ten dialogues which were of old considered spurious, and most of which are mentioned as such by Diogenes Laertius.² There remain thirty-five dialogues,³ of which four (the second *Alcibiades*, *Anterastæ*, *Hipparchus*, and *Epinomis*) have been

¹ *Plato and the other Companions of Socrates*, i. p. 220, sq.

² iii. 62.

³ Here is the list ;—Dialogues of

(a) SEARCH,

Theætetus

Parmenides

Alcibiades I.

* *Alcibiades II.*

* *Theages*

Laches

Lysis

Charmides

Menon

Ion

Euthyphron

Euthydemus

Gorgias

* *Hippias I.*

Hippias II.

(β) EXPOSITION.

Timæus

Laws

* *Epinomis*

Critias

Republic

Sophistes

Politicus

Phædon

Philebus

Protagoras

Phædrus

Symposium

Cratylus

Criton

—

doubted by the Greek critics,¹ and many more by the school of Ast and Socher, which grew out of the Wolfian controversy in the second decade of this century.

§ 411. The connection of these isolated compositions, and their relation, both logically and chronologically, have ever been, and will remain, a subject of controversy, unless the view of Grote is adopted, that Plato deliberately intended them as perfectly distinct works, and consciously laid aside in each all reference to the rest as regards theory. This Grote distinctly asserts to be the case, at least as regards the two classes of dialogues, into which the Platonic compositions must be divided. We will first discuss the logical order. Plato himself is of course the main authority to be consulted. The same characters who have met in the *Theætetus* meet again expressly in the *Sophistes*, though they do not take up the unfinished thread of the discourse. The *Politicus* proclaims itself a third colloquy of the same party (with a new respondent). The *Republic*, *Timæus*, and *Critias* are similarly connected, and a fourth dialogue, the *Hermocrates*, though apparently announced, was never composed. But I am not sure that Plato did not merely assume the same personages for the sake of dramatic convenience, without meaning to assert intimate relation. I do not know that the author himself gives us any further clue. The earliest attempt at a logical classification of which we know is that quoted by Diogenes,² as laid down by Aristophanes of Byzantium. He arranged five trilogies:—1. *Republic*, *Timæus*, *Critias*; 2. *Laws*, *Minos*, *Epinomis*; 3. *Theætetus*, *Euthyphron*, *Apology*; 4. *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Cratylus*; 5. *Criton*, *Phædon*, and *Letters*. The rest of the dialogues he placed singly and without any fixed order.

(α) SEARCH.

- * *Cleitophon*
- * *Hipparchus*
- * *Erastæ*
- * *Minos*.

(β) EXPOSITION.

- The Apology*
- Menexenus*.

These last two are not properly dialogues, but the one a dicastic, the other an epideictic exercise.

¹ Cf. Zeller's *Plato and the Older Academy* (Eng. tr.), p. 49, note.

² iii. 61.

Several important remarks here suggest themselves. Aristophanes does not utilise the hints just mentioned in the dialogues themselves. He does not follow any scientific order on any conceivable theory of Platonism. He seems also to have recognised as genuine, not only works now rejected, but even those doubted of old, such as the *Epinomis*. Diogenes next mentions the arrangement of Thrasyllus, two centuries later, into nine tetralogies—a dramatic connection often forced and absurd, and of no real value. It was probably suggested, as Grote observes, by the really close bond which unites the *Euthyphron*, *Apology*, *Criton*, and *Phædon*. It is Thrasyllus' full catalogue of thirty-five dialogues (including *Apology* and *Menæxenus*) which Grote thinks based upon the safe traditions of the Academy and the critical work of the *χωρίζοντες*, or critical sifters, of Alexandria, and therefore perfectly trustworthy. But Thrasyllus implies another cross division which is of far more value—that into Dialogues of Search (*ζητητικοί*) and of Exposition (*ὀφηγηματικοί*).¹ It appears also from the statement of Diogenes that essays of classification in old times were almost as numerous and various as among the modern Germans, for nine dialogues which he mentions were each put first in the list by divers critics. I am very far from agreeing with Zeller's inference, that these attempts imply a trustworthy tradition or belief in some fixed and definite order. But to those who are sceptical as to any other logical nexus between the dialogues, or of the possibility of tracing a gradual philosophical progress throughout them, this distinction at least is salient and quite unmistakable, that in some of them a discussion is raised, which results in no conclusion, while in others principles are laid down, and a whole system of law or of philosophy dogmatically expounded.

§ 412. Next after the labours of the Alexandrian and Augustan grammarians, who seem not to have attempted any deep sounding of the mind of Plato, but were content with distinctions of form, we come to the neo-Platonists, who went into

¹ Cf. the list on page 163, note 3. His subdivisions under these heads I need not repeat. The same principle underlies the classification of Albinus (in his *Isagoge* to Plato), though he differs in his subdivisions, as may be seen in Zeller's note (p. 97).

the opposite extreme, and sought to find mystical revelations and divine allegories at every turn in the dialogues. This method of criticism, along with the attempts to show Plato's agreement with the religion of Moses, and his consequent inspiration as an 'Attic Moses,' is now so universally discredited that it may suffice to refer the reader (with Grote) to the prefaces with which Ficinus, the great Renaissance Platonist, introduces the Dialogues in his Latin version (Florence 1494). Serranus, in Stephens' edition of 1578, goes back to the old external way of classifying, and makes out six groups according to the general subjects treated (Ethics, Physics, Politics, &c.). From this time on till the end of the last century speculation on the internal relation of the dialogues seems to have been suspended. With Schleiermacher a new era commences, and since his day Germany has been flooded with theories based on the internal consciousness of the theorist, ascribing a necessary and natural order to the writings of Plato, together with rejections of all those which will not suit the theory, and bold assertions that all opponents and objectors are ignorant of the true spirit of real Platonism. The combatants may be divided into three camps, that of Schleiermacher—now rather waning in influence, though he was the originator of the whole discussion, and still supported by Ritter, Brandis, and Ribbing, which holds that Plato consciously composed his dialogues in a fixed and logical order, which anyone can ascertain who attains to a thorough knowledge of the Platonic system. Next comes that of K. F. Hermann, with a large following, who denies any conscious arrangement in the mind of Plato, but holds that the dialogues show the necessary growth and development of his mind. Various attempts are now being made to reconcile these theories, and to assert this necessary growth, accompanied with a conscious expression of it in certain pieces. Lastly, there is the English school, of which Grote is the leader, and Mr. Jowett the present representative, and to which we may almost add the German Ast, had he not been so illogical as to reject numerous dialogues, though holding the view which most easily admits differences of style and treatment. This school is perfectly sceptical as to the possibility of proving any large

plan or sequence in the dialogues, and not only holds each to be complete in itself and isolated, but even careless of contradicting the rest, and often openly inconsistent with them. It follows logically that all dialogues not discredited by *external* evidence must be accepted, such a thing as internal improbability being seldom admissible.

The great and continuous divergence of opinion among the German Platonists, who have now for 100 years exhausted all possible combinations without establishing any sure results, almost compels us to adopt the third theory in the main. A few general guide-posts are perhaps not denied by anybody. These are, for example, that the purely Socratic and questioning dialogues were written when Plato was fresh from the converse of Socrates; that after his travels in Italy and Sicily he approached Pythagorean metaphysics, and thus brings out principles perfectly foreign to Socrates under his authority. Furthermore, dialogues like the *Euthydemus* show a polemical antagonism to Antisthenes and Isocrates, or some such persons, who were rivals as heads of schools; these are to be referred to the more active period of his life, while such didactic and dogmatic dialogues as the *Laws*, which was certainly written in Plato's old age, seem to indicate the latest form of his teaching, and the temper of his decaying years. With the exception of these, and perhaps a few more such generalities, nothing certain ever has been ascertained as to the logical order of the Platonic writings.

§ 413. For convenience' sake, and in order to afford some frame wherein we may arrange the diverse pieces, the plan of Zeller,¹ put forth without much dogmatism, may be followed as reasonable, and fairly probable; but the great work of Grote has for ever destroyed the hope of any surer results. Following this division, we may regard the first, a purely Socratic group, as consisting of the *Lesser Hippias*, *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, *Euthyphron*, *Apology*, and *Criton*. In these there is no Pythagoreanism, no attempt at a philosophy of nature; they are purely ethical, and concerned with virtue in the Socratic sense, as one and reducible to knowledge.

¹ *Plato*, pp. 115, sq.

Next come the *Gorgias*, *Menon*, *Theætetus*, and *Euthydemus*, in which the doctrine of Ideas, moral theories of the state after death, the theory of Reminiscence, and sundry Pythagorean elements begin to appear. The *Phædrus*, about whose date the widest diversity of opinion exists, may have been an introduction to this group. Next come the dialogues, which, while presupposing both Pythagoreanism and the theory of Ideas, introduce us to Eleatic and Megarian philosophy, abstruse and dry in character: these are the *Cratylus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Parmenides*, and *Philebus*, and to these Zeller appends the two most celebrated of all, the *Symposium* and *Phædon*, which latter is often placed shortly after the death of Socrates, though its doctrines show a large advance on Plato's earlier works. Towards the end of his life come the *Republic*, *Timæus*, *Critias*, and *Laws*. Zeller, in this list, omits the *Ion* and *Menæxenus*, as well as the *Epistles* and first *Alcibiades*. I think the former two are not spurious, or at least proved spurious, and feel the danger of determining such matters without very strong evidence. I venture to assert that no modern German critic would have admitted either the *Lesser Hippias* or *Laws*, and that their spuriousness would now be an accepted fact, had not Aristotle chanced to allude to them in passages of still remaining works. While such mentions of Aristotle are of course conclusive (if precise) as to the authenticity of a dialogue, nothing can be inferred from his silence. Thus the *Protagoras*, one of the most universally accepted, has no early guarantee whatever. The extant allusions of this kind, both direct and indirect, are collected with great care by Bonitz in his valuable *Index Aristotelicus*, and are discussed by Zeller,¹ who will not, however, admit the *Menæxenus*, in spite of a direct reference in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, on account of 'internal improbabilities.' So indelible is the habit of preferring *à priori* speculations to external evidence!

§ 414. I must add a word on the chronological order of the dialogues, which need not be the same as the logical order, for Plato may have composed a prior composition, *dramatically*, as an afterthought or introduction to an already

¹ pp. 54-77.

existing dialogue. Again, such a dialogue as the *Phædo*, which in dramatic propriety should follow immediately on the *Apology*, is supposed with good reason to be a very distant afterthought to an early group.

There is no direct evidence that any dialogue whatever was published during the lifetime of Socrates, except the anecdote in Diogenes,¹ that Socrates, on hearing the *Lysis* read, exclaimed, 'Herakles, what a number of lies this youth has told about me!' This Grote rejects, and argues with great force that Plato published nothing till after the death of Socrates, and when he had at least reached his twenty-eighth year. We have no evidence to decide the question, though Grote's argument is rendered probable by the fact that several of the apparently earliest dialogues are written about the accusation and death of Socrates, and must therefore fall after this date. So also the group called the second in Zeller's list, above given, alludes to events which happened 395-4 B.C., and is later than that date. We have hardly any other chronological data, unless we argue that striking inconsistencies imply a lapse of some years for their growth. Thus the theory of the *Protagoras*, that virtue is the intelligent pursuit of happiness, and the balancing of lesser pains against greater rewards—this theory is contradicted in the *Gorgias*, where the identity of the good and the pleasant is distinctly controverted as an immoral doctrine. Again, Pericles and Isocrates, who are greatly praised by name in the *Phædrus*, are rudely handled and severely censured in the *Gorgias* and *Euthydemus*, if indeed Isocrates is the philosopher-politician alluded to in the latter. If the *Ecclesiastusæ* of Aristophanes were directed against Plato's *Republic*, we should obtain a minor limit (391 B.C.), which is contrary to all probability, as that dialogue has unmistakeable evidences of maturity in views and dogmatism in tone. The absence of all direct mention of Plato in the play permits us to reject it as positive testimony. The author of the seventh Platonic Letter speaks as if the *Republic* were an early work, but probably upon this very evidence, whereas the play itself² shows many reasons for believing that Plato is not in view.

¹ iii. § 35.

² Cf. Zeller, p. 139, note.

§ 415. It seems hardly necessary in this general sketch to give a particular abstract of each of the dialogues, for purely metaphysical discussions are foreign to our plan, and the actual texts are easily accessible, not to speak of the admirable and classical versions of Schleiermacher, the Stuttgart translators (40 vols., 1869), and Mr. Jowett. I shall therefore confine myself to general indications of their contents, while in a few typical cases a fuller treatment will include the broad features which recur in divers discussions. And first let us consider the form adopted by Plato and other followers of Socrates—the philosophical dialogue.¹

§ 416. It is in no sense true that Plato was the originator of this literary form, though most of his commentators attempt to add this to his other merits. But it is certain that he was the greatest artist of this kind which Greece, or perhaps the world, ever saw, and that as he drew into one all the partial truths of earlier philosophy, so he united in his works all the various kinds and attempts of his forerunners in the use of dramatic prose. His early biographers asserted that he studied carefully the *mimes* of Sophron, which were apparently prose and city idylls, portraying character and manners among the lower classes at Syracuse.² In the *Poetic*, indeed, all similarity between these mimes and Plato's dialogues is flatly denied; but the assertions of the *Poetic* are so inaccurate and conflicting, that I attach little weight to them, and think this denial, if true, refers to the subject-matter only. At all events, it is certain that in this school of Sophron and Xenarchus character-drawing was attained by prose dialogue, perhaps the truest forerunner of the Roman *satura* or medley. I turn next to another model, which must have been before Plato's eyes, and in which dialogue must have played an important part—the *Memoirs* of Ion of Chios, and Stesimbrotus of Thasos.

¹ The definition given by Albinus (*Isagoge*, c. i.) is very complete, and each member of it reasoned out: "Ἔστι τοίνυν οὐκ ἄλλο τι, ἢ λόγος ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως συγκείμενος περὶ τινος τῶν πολιτικῶν καὶ φιλοσοφῶν πραγμάτων, μετὰ τῆς προποίσεως ἡθοποιίας τῶν παραλαυβανομένων προσώπων, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν λέξιν παρασκευῆς.

² Cf. Vol. I. § 240.

These works are not known, or not quoted, by writers of this period, and are, as I have above said,¹ liable to suspicion on this account; but if they existed in Plato's day, as is alleged, he must necessarily have known them, and the extracts in Athenæus show us how essential dialogue and character-drawing must have been to them. The use of rapid question and reply is fully understood by Herodotus, who perpetually enlivens his history with dialogue; and even by Thucydides, who in two or three striking passages² exchanges the tameness of his narrative for this more striking form. I am here speaking of the shorter and simpler dialogues in both historians; for the more elaborate discussions, such as that of Xerxes and Artabanus in the one, and the Melian dialogue in the other, are rather upon a tragic model than upon that of any earlier prose dialogue, nor indeed do they aim at any special character-drawing, as Albinus points out. Of course the great influence and popularity of tragedy and comedy must have stimulated all contemporary literature in the same direction. Most young authors of the day—Plato among the number—aspired to be dramatic leaders of thought, like the great poets, who had remodelled all Greek poetry. We even saw how the legal oratory of the day assumed the dramatic tone, and how the orator composed his attack or defence in the character of the client who spoke it. This dramatising of court speeches is perhaps the closest parallel we can find to the philosophical dialogue, as a piece of *ἡθοποιία* or character-painting. Along with all these indirect antecedents, we are distinctly told that the form of dialogue had been already employed for philosophical teaching by Alexamenos of Teos—to us a bare name—and the Eleatic Zeno. We see plainly in the antinomies of the latter how dialogue, with prompt question and answer, was the most natural and almost necessary form for his writings to assume. But this was pure dialectic, dry metaphysical subtlety and counter-subtlety, and was doubtless devoid of all grace and poetry. Perhaps in the *Philebus*, the *Sophistes*, and the *Parmenides*, Plato copied this dry and unattractive, but scientifically invaluable, method of enquiry.

¹ p. 42.² Cf. above, p. 115.

But there is no evidence that Plato, in assuming this form, led the fashion, or turned the minds of men to its advantages. Some of the spurious documents may be as old as the genuine, and it rather seems that the fashion grew up with the age and society of Socrates, and that Plato outran and obscured many rivals and competitors by his genius. We can perceive at least four distinct and important objects attained by adopting it. First, it was the best and most natural way of giving a full and lively history of the life, character, and conversations of his master Socrates, thus producing from another mind, and from a different standpoint, a grander, if not so faithful a memoir of the inimitable master. Secondly, it exhibited most clearly the most Socratic and valuable point in Plato's philosophy—the principle of searching after truth, and of resting in this search as a great intellectual end, whether any conclusion was attainable or not: the raising and discussing of all the objections to, and difficulties in, any theory, could in no other way be brought so vividly before the student. Thirdly, it enabled Plato to put forth opinions tentatively, without assuming any responsibility, and of ventilating a new theory before adopting it as a dogma. In the infancy of philosophy this is no unimportant object, and both in this and the last-named points we may justly compare Plato's dialogues with the disputations of the mediæval schools—a great engine of real culture, and of real education, lost in the hurry and crowding of our modern instruction. Lastly, we must not forget that Plato satisfied a keen dramatic and literary instinct by drawing these personal sketches. He gave rein to a satirical and critical spirit also; and if, in that strangely modern statement of Socrates at the close of the *Symposium*, we are told that the genius for tragedy and for comedy (of old dissociated) is really one and the same, in no Greek author is it so clearly exemplified as in the author of the tragic *Phædon* and of the farcical *Euthydemus*. Gorgias called him an *iambist*, and most critics a *dithyrambist* in prose.

§ 417. While admitting all these advantages in Plato's dialogues—a literary form which has survived to the present day, and of which he was practically, if not strictly, the originator—it

ought not to be overlooked that they have certain faults inherent in themselves, and perhaps some arising from the peculiarities of their author. A conversation which exhibits character on both sides must always command attention, but there are many long passages in which the respondent is a mere answering machine, and in which his perpetually repeated, 'Yes, certainly,' 'It seems so,' 'By all means,' excite great *ennui* in the modern reader. Hence comes the undoubted fact, that this great author is far more talked about, and lauded to the skies, than honestly read, and that even diligent scholars find it a task to read a dialogue of Plato honestly through. Very often the questions and answers are minute and trivial, containing no further interest than the persistent assertion of the importance of the search after truth as such. Often, again, the points made by Socrates are really sophistical and unsound, and we feel annoyed that Plato will not let the respondent give him the true and embarrassing reply.

There is, moreover—there cannot but be in modern minds—a strong feeling that Socrates and his school wasted time in disputation, and induced habits of idleness, cloaked under the garb of philosophic research. It is here that the conditions of old Attic and of modern life are widely in contrast. The Athenian gentleman, with slaves to do his work, with no home occupation, and living about the city as in a huge club, had apparently no notion that he could waste his time, when it was not required in the public service. The modern gentleman thinks very differently. His work lies in reading and writing, in the transaction of professional or public business, his amusement in games and field sports; so that he seldom regards conversation as a serious pastime, or a means of acquiring new truth or deeper culture. This is no doubt much to be regretted, and we should be reminded that a great deal of our best knowledge is learned by conversation. But the Athenians of Socrates' school surely went into the opposite extreme. Even all the literary skill and the nameless charm of Plato's style cannot conceal from us the fact that his dialogues are tedious in the minuteness and elaboration of their conversations. This will be admitted by any candid reader of

Plato who does not belong to the scholastic trade union which thinks that all great Greek authors are to be lauded as perfect, and that even the mildest detraction is to be set down as want of taste, or want of real appreciation or of sympathy for the classics. Verily the merits of such an author as Plato do not need to be supported by a suppression of his weaker points.

§ 418. We might hazard even a further word of criticism as to the form of dialogue he has adopted in some of his greatest works, such as the *Parmenides* and the *Symposium*, in which the main conversation is reported *in indirect narration* by one of the speakers. This prolonged obliqueness of construction, with its crowded infinitives, always appears awkward, not to speak of the dramatic absurdity of making any man repeat from memory a set of speeches or an intricate dialogue. This absurdity is only *artistically* tolerable where the speaker reports a conversation in which he himself took a leading part, as is the case with Socrates in the *Lysis*, *Charmides*, and *Protagoras*. Zeller¹ quotes Weisse and Schöne as making this distinction of direct and indirect dialogues a fundamental one, and ranging them accordingly—another example of perverse ingenuity in forcing the facts to fit into a preconceived theory. There is no reason whatever for classing together the *Charmides* and *Parmenides*, because Plato chanced to make both of them (dramatically) repeated and not direct conversations. The point is as old as the Alexandrian days, for Diogenes Laertius mentions it,² remarking that it is a dramatic rather than a philosophic principle.

The anachronisms in the dialogues, on the contrary, are not disturbing to our enjoyment, though we can imagine sober and critical Athenians sharing in the impatience of Grote, who thinks the historical blunders in the *Menexenus* prove that Plato had never read Thucydides! This judgment is rendered positively comical by the fact that Socrates, in making his speech on the glories of Athens, actually alludes to events as late as the peace of Antalkidas (387 B.C.), whereas he himself died in 399 B.C. The author of such an anachronism would hardly have recoiled from historical

¹ pp. 107-8, note.

² ii. § 50.

inaccuracies in older times ; and yet the dialogue is quoted as genuine in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

§ 419. I will proceed to analyse a very few of the dialogues, each as representative of a class, though it is necessary to add, and to insist, that there are not any two of them strictly upon the same model, nor is there any one of them in which there are not many fruitful and original remarks. Laying aside the *Apology* and *Criton*, which are intended as special pictures of the speculative and of the practical sides of Socrates' life, we will first approach that group which the commentators call purely Socratic. In most of these, after a dramatic introduction, where the passionate relations of young men at Athens are the leading feature, someone makes a remark implying some moral idea, which is not clearly defined, but used by the public with vague and varying associations. Such are the notions of Valour (*Laches*), Friendship (*Lysis*), Chastity (*Charmides*), Religiousness (*Euthyphron*). Socrates, in the dialogues mentioned, immediately fastens upon this vagueness, and proceeds to sift the connotation of the term in the minds of those around him. He refutes the first crude answer easily, by cross-examining the respondent, and showing him inconsistent with himself ; then other answers are suggested, and in their turn refuted. But Socrates himself generally offers no solution of his own, and where (in another class of dialogues) he does attempt to do so, he often proceeds to refute himself, and show that so far only a negative result can be attained, and that it will require a deeper philosophy to establish consistent and scientific definitions of even the most ordinary terms. It is quite plain that this negative dialectic, this sceptical cross-examining, was Socrates' great feature, and that (like Bishop Butler) he was far weaker as a constructive philosopher ; for we may be quite certain that the great system or series of theories put into his mouth in Plato's later dialogues contain not his, but his pupil's notions.

The fragment entitled *Cleitophon*, which most critics assert to be spurious, on account of its cogent criticism on the barrenness of positive results in Socrates' teaching, deals altogether with this point. After a negative discussion on justice, in which various definitions are rejected, Cleitophon turns upon

Socrates, and presses for a positive answer. ‘It is not once or twice,’ he says, ‘that I have endured these perplexities, and have importuned you to clear them up. At last I am wearied out, and come to the conviction, that you are doubtless a consummate proficient in the art of stimulating men to seek virtue ; but as to the ulterior question, how they are to find it, you either do not know, or you will not tell. I am resolved to go to Thrasymachus, or anybody else who will help me, unless you will consent to give me something more than mere stimulating discourses. To one who has not yet received the necessary stimulus, I repeat that your conversation is of inestimable value ; but to one who has already been stimulated, it is rather a hindrance than a help to his fully realising the acquisition of virtue, and with it of happiness.’ Such is the summary of these negative and sceptical dialogues, to which Socrates here makes no reply, but which the ancients considered a sort of introduction to the *Republic*, in which the notion of Justice is formally and positively considered.¹

In selecting a specimen, one is at first strongly inclined to cite the *Lysis* or *Charmides*, in both of which the dramatic introduction—which is laid in a palaestra, among a crowd of fair youths with their passionate elder friends—is peculiarly striking and peculiarly Attic. The excitement at the entrance of Charmides, the reigning beauty, and the intoxication felt at his presence even by Socrates, are among the strangest features in old Greek life, as compared with that of modern Europe. But the questions raised and discussed—What is friendship or affection ? What is chastity or self-control ?—are by no means so important as that in the *Euthyphron*, where a permanent moral difficulty is started.

§ 420. Socrates is going to put in his formal plea of defence against the charge of impiety laid against him by Meletus, when he meets Euthyphron, a man of religious life, and an authority in theological matters—perhaps a Greek pharisee—who is coming to the same archon’s office to indict his own father for homicide. This strange situation arose from the following circumstances. A free dependant of the father had

¹ Grote, ii. p. 18.

killed a fellow-servant in a drunken quarrel at Naxos, whereupon his master threw him bound into a ditch, and sent to the *Exegetes* at Athens to know what should be done with him. Meanwhile, the prisoner died in the ditch of cold and hunger. For this barbarity, Euthyphron indicts his father as guilty of homicide, which in the Attic law implied a pollution upon the house, of the same kind as we should consider murder. But though we should feel so deeply this outrage on common humanity that we might feel disposed to sympathise with Euthyphron, the Greek public, who were well accustomed to barbarous treatment of slaves (and this wretched *θῆς* is regarded as hardly better), and who did not set the absurd value we do on human life as such, were of a different opinion. With them family ties were so sacred and binding, that the feeling of all Euthyphron's relatives was one of horror at his proceeding. 'Your father,' said they, 'did not kill the man (who was in any case a wretched hireling); if he did, was not the man a murderer? and, in any case, to indict one's father is simply monstrous.' Such, then, was the verdict of public opinion. To this Euthyphron opposes his clearer and better knowledge. Either his father's act was just or unjust; if the former, let it be so proved; if not, the murderer is tainted with a curse, and so is his family. It is, therefore, an obligation of the strictest kind, on the ground of piety, to remove this curse; and so far from being impious to indict him, it would really be impious to omit doing so.

Here Socrates joins issue. He professes ignorance on the merits of the dispute; for he is ignorant of the general feature which constitutes piety, and in which all pious acts must participate. What, he asks, is this general feature or quality? Euthyphron answers by giving the particular case in point: it is holy to bring to justice him who commits impiety, whoever he may be. The examples of the gods—Kronos punishing Uranos; Zeus, Kronos—show this. 'Do you really believe these stories,' says Socrates; 'I can hardly bring myself to do so, and this is probably why I am indicted for offending against orthodoxy. But if you insist, of course I must admit them, for I have no evidence against them. But to return. The answer

given is too special; there are other pious acts to be done. What is the general type or standard that a man should know and apply to all actions, and determine them as pious or the reverse?' The second answer of Euthyphron is: 'That which is pleasing to the gods is holy. But the gods, as you just now said, are often at variance, so that the same act may please one and displease the other. Well, then, what all the gods love—and there are such acts—is holy, and what all hate is unholy and impious.' Here Socrates begins to subtilise, and touches dialectically a great theological question—that of immutable morality. 'Do the gods love an act because it is holy? or is it holy because they love it?' Euthyphron declares himself for the former alternative. 'Well, then, the gods loving it is only an accident, by reason of its essential feature, which has not yet been described.' Here Euthyphron confesses himself puzzled, and Socrates suggests that it may be a subdivision of the Just, viz. our duties to the gods, as ordinary justice is our duty to men. But after a short excursion into this field,¹ Euthyphron impatiently returns to the old orthodox answer, that piety is to do in prayer and sacrifice what is agreeable to the gods, which Socrates shows to be identical with one of the already rejected answers. Here Euthyphron breaks off on the plea of other business, and thus no positive solution is attained.²

§ 421. Such are the apparently earlier and simpler *Dialogues of Search*, to which may be added the greater and lesser Alcibiades and Hippias, if we accept them as genuine—which critics are agreed to do in the case of the lesser Hippias, but are doubtful as regards the rest. In all of them Socrates is represented as seeking to purify and deepen a popular notion, by showing vague-

¹ Plato is here on the verge of another great modern question: whether piety consists in gratitude to the gods—an act of right traffic between gods and men, as he calls it—or in the love of God as the ideal of perfection. The Xenophontic Socrates held the former; in Plato's later dialogues the latter is expounded with great loftiness and splendour. But whether this latter doctrine be truly Socratic may well be doubted.

² The reader will not forget that a particular phase of this very moral difficulty—the conflict of the most sacred obligations—had occupied all the great tragic poets from Æschylus onward.

nesses and inconsistencies in its application, and by comparing various special meanings, with a view to fixing its general character or essence. In an age when formal logic was in its infancy, and the now well-understood processes of generalisation and specification had not been analysed, it was not only useful, but all-important, to insist upon the conscious use of them ; hence we may well excuse Plato for making these logical processes metaphysical engines, and setting up the results attained by them as laws or principles of the nature of things. Such a mistake was peculiarly likely to overtake the first speculators in formal Logic, who were at the same time ignorant of all languages save their own, and came naturally to think distinctions of language must correspond to differences in things. No confusion was more permanent in Greek philosophy than this double meaning of λόγος, ratio and oratio, as if the Greek language were a necessary and natural manifestation of the reason, and through it of the nature of things.

§ 422. These reflections lead us naturally to a second group of the dialogues, those which are supposed to have been written under the influence of the dry logic of Euclides of Megara, when Plato went to sojourn there ; nay, by sceptical Germans some of them are even supposed to have been written by thinkers of this school. These are the *Theætetus*, *Sophistes*, and *Politicus*, which are dramatically intended as a trilogy, and the *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, and *Kratylus*. The references, however, of the *Sophistes* and *Politicus* to each other and the *Theætetus* are merely dramatical ; for the difficulties raised and left unsolved are not touched in the sequel, nor is there any logical connection in these extended conversations, in which a new speaker, an Eleatic stranger, is introduced in the *Sophistes* as taking up the leading part. Of all the dialogues of this group, the *Theætetus* is probably the most valuable ; for while it is, like the earlier group, strictly a dialogue of Search, without any positive result, it discusses in a masterly way all the difficulties contained in the problem : What is knowledge ? What is the relation of a varying subject towards varying objects, which can result in universal and necessary truths ? What, again, is opinion ? How is false opinion possible ?

What is the process and what the criterion of knowledge? This dialogue, like the rest of this group, shows an important advance in philosophising, in that it is not so much popular or vulgar beliefs, but the theories of antecedent thinkers, which are subjected to the Socratic *clenchus*. Thus in the present case it is the Protagorean theory that all truth is subjective, that varying man is the measure of all he can know, and hence of the universe, which is canvassed and criticised. And this theory is very properly regarded as the subjective form of the older objective 'flux of all things' maintained by Heraclitus.

It belongs to the history of Greek philosophy to discuss the metaphysical aspects of such enquiries; but it is our duty to call attention to the famous literary passage of the piece, in which the rhetor, who speaks before a tyrannical audience to gain a fixed object, and is accordingly a slave, is contrasted with the philosopher, who spends his leisure in the search after truth, unincumbered by any control or coercion from the outer public. This remarkable passage, which shows a dignity and self-assertion somewhat different from that of the historic Socrates, is worth quoting as a specimen.¹

¹ *Theætetus*, p. 172 c. : καὶ πολλάκις μὲν γε δῆ, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολλὸν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἰόντες γελοῖοι φαίνονται ῥήτορες. ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις; ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι. ΘΕΟ. Πῇ δῆ; ΣΩ. Ἡ τοῖς μὲν, τοῦτο ὃ σὺ εἶπες, αἰὲ πάρεστι σχολὴ καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῇ ποιοῦνται. ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέσῃ, καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἢ μόνον τύχῃσι τοῦ ὄντος. οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε αἰὲ λέγουσι. κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ βέον, καὶ οὐκ ἐγχεῖται περὶ οὗ ἢ ἐπιθυμῆσιν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκην ἔχον ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκε καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγιγνώσκομένην, ὣν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον. οἱ δὲ λόγοι αἰὲ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ τὴν δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ' αἰὲ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος. ὥστ' ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δριμύεις γίνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὴν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεύσαι καὶ ἔργῳ χαρίσασθαι, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς. τὴν γὰρ αὔξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἢ ἐκ νέων δουλείᾳ ἀφίρηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἔτι ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὓς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ

The *Sophistes* is by no means so uniform and consistent. It begins with an exercise in logical division, so as to determine in what exact place of the predicamental lines descending from the genus *acquisitive art*, the position of the *angler* should be placed among those who live by catching their food. As Grote remarks, such exercises were of great value and interest in the infancy of logic, though now of little importance. Plato goes on to speak of the sophist as a man who palms off falsehood for truth, but then passes on to the difficulty: how can you speak falsehood—how can you assert non-being, which has *ex hypothesi* no existence? This question had already occupied him in the *Theætetus*, and is here discussed against the materialists, who assert as real objects of sense only, and against the idealists, who hold that real being is confined to Forms or Ideas. Plato argues that some mediation must take place when we assert unreality. He then, after a long and tedious discussion, returns to the sophist, whom he paints in dark colours; though, as Grote justly says, his picture is more suitable to Socrates than to any of the professed sophists we know.

Of the *Politicus* I will speak in connection with the state theories in the *Republic*. It would lead us too far to speak at length of the other three dialogues I have grouped here: the *Parmenides*, which puts into the mouth of that venerable philosopher an exposition to the youthful Socrates of the famous antinomies of the Eleatic school; the *Philebus*, which discusses the nature of pleasure; and the *Kratylus*, that curious first essay at derivation of words. In this latter Plato shows plainly

δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλῶνται, ὥσθ' ὕγιες οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς ἀνδρας ἐκ μεираκίων τελευτῶσι, δεινοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται.

Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ᾧ Θεόδωρε· τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἢ ἑάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τραπώμεθα, ἵνα μὴ καί, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίαν πολὺ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρώμεθα; ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμῶς, ᾧ Σώκратες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες. πάνυ γὰρ εὖ τοῦτο εἴρηκας, ὅτι οὐχ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται. ἀλλ' οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἡμέτεροι ὥσπερ οἰκείται, καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν περιμένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι, ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ· οὔτε γὰρ δικαστὴς οὔτε θεατὴς, ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς, ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν.

his belief that words express the nature of things, and his tentative analysis of ordinary words is intended to show that the meaning he postulates was in the minds of the first framers. Many modern critics have thought the whole intention was to ridicule some contemporary efforts; but anyone who has heard ignorant people nowadays attempt derivations, and who knows Plato's attitude, will side with Grote in asserting that the attempt was serious, though only provisional, and that Plato would readily have surrendered his results had anyone shown him a more reasonable method of procedure.

§ 423. As we cannot fix any chronological sequence, I may here turn to a small group of very interesting tracts, which are more clearly satirical in tone than the rest of the dialogues. I will not say that there is anywhere in Plato a want of this quality, but the main purpose of two at least—the *Ion* and the *Euthydemus*—is to ridicule two well-known classes of literary men. In the first Socrates cross-examines, in a tone of good-humoured banter, a popular rhapsode who has just come from a contest of epic recitation at Epidaurus, and who gives us many curious details concerning his profession, and the bold claims which the unintelligent reciters of Homer made to universal knowledge, derived from that omniscient bard. For to the Greek public Homer was strictly a *Bible*, in which beyond controversy all theology and morals were contained. The majority also maintained, though here there were doubters, that all kinds of science and practical wisdom were also to be derived from him. But when Ion confesses that he knows no other poets critically, Socrates explains this peculiarity by expounding two theories which are the direct pagan counterparts of the doctrines of Verbal Inspiration, and of Apostolical Succession in the Christian Church. He holds that the Muse inspired Homer to a certain madness, distinct from, if not opposed to, reason, which made him sing divine truths which he himself did not comprehend; that this madness is transmitted by a *magnetic* succession to the rhapsodes, and that thus they teach truths on the ground of inspiration, which are not attained by rational discussion or inference.

It may be well to add here the remark, that the whole school

of Socrates never criticise the great poets of their nation from æsthetic, but from moral grounds ; they never commend a passage as beautiful, but approve or disapprove of it as moral or wise. The same may be said of the criticism in the *Frogs* of Aristophanes, and generally of criticism before the days of Aristotle. Perhaps this is not the smallest reason why the beauties of Greek poetry are so natural and so unconscious. That the Greeks of this age were susceptible to these beauties as such is certain ; it is equally certain that they were quite foreign to that peculiar vice of modern literature, the conscious production and conscious analysis of æsthetic effects in poetry. I need not here turn aside to discuss the many qualifications and exceptions, some of them only apparent, of this law, which the reader should verify and emend for himself. The *Ion* closes with the ridiculous assertion of the rhapsode, that he must at least be a good general, because he knows his Homer, in which that art is taught ; Socrates banteringly presses him to admit the converse, that all good generals must be good rhapsodes.

The *Euthydemus* is similarly a ridiculous picture of the arts and devices of a pair of professional sophists—Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. This again is an indirect dialogue, or reported conversation by Socrates of his discussion with these two men, who profess to teach arms, and judicial rhetoric, and virtue, but have lately, in their toothless old age, mastered the art of Eristic, by which they profess to silence anyone, or in which to instruct anyone who pays the necessary fee. The dialogue wanders into coarse and vulgar buffoonery, showing Plato in the light of a comic artist, though I think he is deficient in wit, even where he abounds in humour. It is, however, remarkable that the sophists carry on the very same sort of elenchus or cross-examination as Socrates, but with a totally different object : they wish to humble the adversary, and display their own force ; Socrates is always intent on stimulating and suggesting, and never seeks to confute for the mere sake of victory. There is a curious epilogue which, as Grote says, seems like an after-thought, which defends the pure philosopher, even such an one as Euthydemus, against a popular half-and-half teacher, who is

neither professional orator, nor real philosopher, but a mongrel worse than either, who gives himself great airs, and knows nothing thoroughly. There seems great probability that this points at Isocrates, of whom Plato expressed high hopes in the *Phædrus*, but who had become the head of a rival school, and was now viewed with a critical eye, and not without jealousy, by the head of the Academy.

§ 424. I pass to the *Menæxenus*, or funeral panegyric, which Socrates professes to have learnt from hints of Aspasia, who had, he says, taught Pericles his great harangue. This points apparently to the speech in Thucydides' second book, in rivalry with which Plato would seem to have composed this dialogue. He represents the art of making funeral harangues as an easy one, and desired, according to Grote, to resist the rhetors on their own ground, by showing he was equal to them in sustained eloquence. If this were indeed his object, we cannot hold that he was very successful. The eulogy of the dead is very inferior to the weighty and splendid performance of Thucydides, though it is smoother in form, and more easy to understand. Yet we hear that it was afterwards very popular at Athens, owing no doubt to the author's general reputation. The review of Athenian affairs comes down to 387 B.C., though put into the mouth of Socrates—an anachronism which causes some to reject the speech. But Aristotle's *Rhetoric* speaks of it, as of other Platonic dialogues, as 'Socrates in the Funeral Speech.' The rhetorical critics from Dionysius to Blass have paid much attention to it, and Dionysius criticises it severely in comparison with the *De Corona* of Demosthenes. Plato was no really finished rhetorician in the Greek sense. Though he laid the foundations for a far deeper and more philosophical theory of rhetoric than any of his contemporaries, he was not in form so strict and irreproachable as they were. He mixes poetical and prose words, he abounds in metaphors, he does not round his periods with accuracy. It is even remarked as regards this speech that he does not adopt the formal improvements of the Isocratic school. The hiatus is not avoided, as it is in later Platonic writings, and the emulation is evidently not with the new, but with the old rhetors, professedly

with Archinus and Dion, leading citizens who were probably of the old school, and would not suit themselves to the new refinements which we shall discuss when we come to Isocrates. The *Epitaphios* ascribed to Lysias is very like Plato's speech in plan and structure, and might be regarded as its model, were we sure of its priority. As a performance in rhetorical prose, it is not equal to the speech of Agathon in the *Symposium*, in which the peculiarly florid and balanced style of that fashionable author seems imitated with wonderful skill.

§ 425. Great as are the merits of the dialogues already mentioned, they are far beneath the writings of the two classes which have yet to be named. The first I will term the perfect dialogues—meaning those of Plato's mature genius, in which both the negative vein and positive philosophical teaching are combined, without any loss in dramatic form or brilliancy. I will call the remaining the constructive dialogues, and discuss in relation with them Plato's political and social theories. But it seems justifiable to apply the term perfect to three pairs of dialogues, which I put in this order, because each pair expounds either the same subject or opposite sides of the same subject. They have no other connection. Thus the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* set forth opposite views on the nature of virtue, Socrates arguing in the former that it is identical with private utility, while in the *Gorgias* he repudiates this view, and holds that virtue is totally distinct from pleasure. Again the *Phædrus* and *Symposium*, though the former touches on other subjects, are mainly dialogues in which the famous Platonic theory of Eros is expounded and defended against objections. Lastly the *Menon*, which is professedly on the teachableness of virtue, maintains this thesis by adopting the theory of the pre-existence of the soul, and may therefore be brought together with *Phædon*, which preaches its permanence after death. Of all these the *Menon* is perhaps the least striking as a literary piece, though it is philosophically very suggestive, and has inspired poets down to our own day with its magnificent conception of the antenatal life, which accounts for so many great riddles—*a priori* knowledge, noble instincts, sudden discoveries—by moving a step backward, and drawing them from

the treasure-house of a former existence.¹ This hypothesis has made the dialogue more famous than its professed subject, the teachableness of virtue, upon which Socrates actually comes to a definite conclusion. Identifying virtue as a kind of *knowledge*, as Socrates consistently did, he holds that the highest kind of virtue, being such, must be communicable; but that the ordinary virtues of men being only right opinions, are not so conveyed, but come by special inspiration of the gods. Hence it is that there are bad sons of good fathers, and that in general virtue is regarded as a moral, and not an intellectual condition.

§ 426. The *Phædon*, or last conversation and death of Socrates, is certainly the most famous of all Plato's writings, and owes this renown not only to the infinite importance of the subject—the immortality of the soul—but to the touching scenery and pathetic situation in which the dialogue is laid. Socrates and his friends in the prison, the calm cheerfulness of the victim, the distress of the friends, the emotion even of the jailor—these pictures are only paralleled in literature by the one sacrifice which was greater and more enduring than that of the noblest and purest pagan teacher. But there is one moment in the Greek prison, which stands in strange contrast to the deep sympathy and gentleness which relieve the gloom on Calvary. The wife and children of the philosopher are removed that he may enjoy his last moments undisturbed in the comfort of philosophic converse, and there is no hint that the heart-broken woman had any claim to the most precious moments of her husband's life. Her lamentations were to him in discord with his dying song, but we feel as if the human string had snapped when the Attic martyr dared to silence it. How much nearer were the mother and the Son at the cross of Golgotha! Yet this scene, one of the greatest in any literature, is not the main interest of the dialogue. It is the clear and cheerful promise of future happiness which has fascinated the thoughtful men of all ages, and especially those who had not obtained a hope of immortality through the adoption of the Christian faith. Before all men the dark grave stands gaping, and ever the question

¹ Cf. Grote, *Op. Cit.* ii. p. 7, and the passage quoted there from the dialogue in a note (p. 81 B).

repeats itself, What is the hereafter? This is the world-grief, the world-fear which Plato seeks to remove, and his answer has comforted patriots and martyrs in many ages and divers lands.

But the reader who imagines that here at least he will find a pure and simple strain, that, like the song of the dying swan, the notes must be clear and the melody simple and pathetic, will be greatly disappointed. The dialogue is full of hard metaphysic concerning the self-motion of the soul, its participation in the eternal ideas of a former existence, its likeness or unlikeness to a harmony, and, moreover, concerning the nature of efficient and final causes. The discussion ends with an elaborate and difficult myth concerning the future state, which tries the intellect, but does not excite the emotions, of the reader. In all these features the *Phædon* bears a singular analogy to its great musical parallel in modern times, the famous *Requiem* in which Mozart declared his hopes and fears through the last hours of his failing life. Here too, at first hearing, the ear misses the simple and sweet melodies which he composed in earlier life, but is surprised with all the intricacies, all the display of wonderful learning, which heap harmony upon harmony, inversion upon inversion, subject upon subject in complicated counterpoint. It requires long familiarity both with Plato and Mozart to feel the great leading ideas, and follow the thread of the divine argument. But even to honest men who are not satisfied with the reasoning, the practical evidence that Socrates showed his own perfect conviction of its truth is perhaps the clearest and the most effective corroboration.

No doubt Plato has here introduced some metaphysic of his own. Indeed the doctrine of Ideas is so developed and prominent in the *Phædon*, that the critics place its composition long after Socrates' death, and late in Plato's mature life. But the main picture must be true, and if Plato had left us no other monument of his genius, it would have sufficed to place him in the highest rank.

§ 427. The most striking contrast to the *Phædon* is the *Symposium*, which is no doubt really greater and more brilliant, but is so intensely Greek, that it sounds strange and even offensive to modern ears. It is an account given by

Aristodemus of a banquet at the house of the tragic poet Agathon after one of his victories, at which, together with other less famous persons, Socrates, the physician Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and by and by Alcibiades, discuss the nature and praise of Eros. The introduction is very graphic, and brings before us vividly the manners of refined society at Athens. Instead of drinking hard, which most of them had been doing the night before, or listening to a flute girl, they 'send her to play to the women within, if they like it,' and propose to speak in turn in praise of Love. The speeches are somewhat strained and mythological, especially that of Aristophanes, which is more grotesque and far-fetched than witty, and again shows that Plato had no real wit at command, in spite of his delicate humour. The speech of Agathon is, on the contrary, a very remarkable rhetorical display, and well deserves the applause which it receives from the company. It is in the old style of Gorgias, full of alliterations and conceits, and is evidently carefully copied from the poet's style. The speech of Socrates, whose passion for cross-examination breaks out several times during the dialogue, is an exposition in which he repeats the lessons he professes to have heard from the prophetic Diotima, and forms (with the *Phædrus*) the *locus classicus* for the proper understanding of the Platonic Theory of Love. But presently Alcibiades breaks in with a riotous party, and the banquet degenerates into a scene of drunkenness and almost of ribaldry. For Alcibiades, instead of praising Eros, undertakes to praise Socrates, and gives such an account of his resistance to erotic temptation, as even in Greek society is only excused by the drunkenness of the narrator. Nevertheless, the most wonderful of all our pictures of Socrates, in all his ugliness, his fascination, his deep sympathy, his iron courage, his unsailable chastity, is this panegyric of the licentious Alcibiades. The end of the banquet shows him in yet another light, as a man of so strong a head, that he can drink most men under the tables, and sit discoursing though his audience is unfit to follow him upon the analogies of the pathetic and the humorous, and how a tragic ought also to be a comic poet. This quality of resisting intoxication was prized by Plato even more than it

is nowadays, as giving proof of a strong and clear intellect, not easily disturbed by outward causes.

§ 428. The *Phædrus* is a discourse in a far simpler setting—there are only two speakers, Socrates and Phædrus—but yet there are few Platonic works more full of poetry, as Socrates, by the shady banks of the Ilissus, and within view of the theatre of Dionysus, soars into a mighty dithyramb on the nature and effects of that divine impulse which leads us to long for immortality, and to seek after perfection. The position of this piece in the development of the author's system has been much disputed, but there seems now to be a sort of general agreement, even among the Germans, that it was an early work. This is most in accordance with the high expectations expressed of Isocrates, who afterwards became a rival, and is probably (above, p. 183) censured in the *Euthydemus*. It accounts also for the favourable judgment here pronounced on Pericles, in contrast to the severe remarks in the *Gorgias*. As to what the critics say about the youthful exuberance of the style, and what in the translation of Zeller is called 'the want of intuitive faculty in the myth,'¹ it seems to me discovered to suit the theory of its early composition. On the other hand, the great doctrines which Plato is supposed to have attained gradually, and long after the death of Socrates, are here almost all distinctly preached. The Reminiscence of previous existence, the Platonic Forms or Ideas, the Eros, and other points, show that if this is indeed an early work, the favourite theory of a gradual evolution in Plato must be abandoned. And this is the sensible view of Grote.

The dialogue opens with the recitation of the erotic speech alleged to be Lysias', which has been discussed above (p. 141), and to which Socrates at first replies with a sarcastic parallel speech, formally inferior to the Lysian harangue. But then craving pardon of the god, he breaks out into that wonderful rhapsody on the nature of philosophic love, which has made its everlasting mark upon human thought, and still survives in the mouth of the modern public which has no

¹ p. 130, note. I suppose *Anschaulichkeit* is the word.

inkling of its real sense. The identifying of all kinds of Eros as mere degrees of the same eternal instinct—the Love of the Ideal Beauty, which is coincident with the Good and the True—is no doubt a very noble theory. Above all it marks in old Attic days a very different kind of pursuit of knowledge from that of modern life, when competition for material rewards is stifling all the poetry and charm of learning. The passion for truth, which Plato held to be a love ‘passing the love of women,’ is now a rare thing to meet, and is regarded as an unpractical anachronism. But while we admit the poetical and æsthetic beauty of the doctrine, it must be confessed a very unfortunate specimen of the perpetual efforts of Socrates to find a common thread or connecting link between all the senses in which the same term was used in ordinary speech. It might puzzle an ignorant person of intelligence to know how Plato identified the sexual instinct with the longing to solve a mathematical problem. The desire of happiness is the desire after *the Good*, which is identical with the True—this leads us to the love of Mathematics or to any other new truth. Again the desire to possess the good must be a desire to possess it *for ever*; hence a desire for immortality, hence, when this is unattainable, the desire to procreate an *alter ego* who may represent us. And the selection of beauty for this purpose is of course the desire of possessing the Beautiful in its phenomenal manifestation, for this alone of the eternal Ideas has its illustration in sense. Such is the logic of the theory of Eros.

The latter part of the dialogue, after the famous myth comparing the soul to a chariot with ill-matched horses, is a criticism on existing Rhetoric, and suggestions of a newer and wider theory. He complains that the existing professional speakers have neither the logical nor the psychological knowledge necessary for the true art. In the first place the subject must be carefully divided, and the heads subordinated—an advice still valuable, and which, if taken to heart by the many persons who deliver *invertebrate* harangues, might raise their performances into a higher order. Secondly, the special peculiarities of the minds to be addressed must be studied, and the arguments specially suited to these circumstances. As Grote observes, these con-

ditions are too exacting, and it is not fair to attack the practical men who were training the Attic public in habits of debate, because they could not satisfy the requirements of the philosopher. But nevertheless Plato, though himself a rhetorician inferior in form to his ablest contemporaries, laid the basis of a better and more permanent philosophy of Rhetoric—developed by Aristotle to some extent, but requiring and admitting of application at all ages and among all kinds of culture. It has indeed been well shown by Spengel that the hints thrown out by Plato in this dialogue on the defects of the popular rhetoric of the day, on the importance of *ψυχαιγωγία*, or psychological study of human character, and on the essentials of proper proofs and method, contain all the really valuable matter of Aristotle's rhetoric, and that they are silently adopted and developed by Plato's great pupil. Aristotle refers indeed to the polemic against rhetoric in the *Gorgias* for the purpose of refuting and qualifying Plato's views as there expressed. But no doubt Spengel is right, that it was not the fashion of the day to quote authorities, and that Aristotle's silence as to the *Phædrus* arises from no vulgar jealousy, but rather from cordial approval of this striking flash of Plato's far-seeing genius.

Another topic in the *Phædrus* is the comparative value of written and oral teaching, on which again we have from Plato a profoundly true, if exaggerated, theory. He despises mere written discourses. He does not believe that a man can be taught to know anything by such means. Until a man has discussed a subject with kindred minds, until he has undergone a careful cross-examining and sifting of his views, he cannot be said to know thoroughly, or have made his own, any subject. Here Plato argues with the mediæval schools, or rather against the modern universities, where the increase of examinations has compelled students to spend their time in reading many books, and remembering what they say. When the test is a *colloquium*, or discussion with the examiner, some of the resulting evils may be obviated; but even this safeguard has been for the most part abolished by the English universities, and many candidates for honours, who can write down apparent knowledge on paper, would be speechless if set down to stand the *τίτλη τὴν ἐλέγχου*

the examiner. However, the tirade against the value of written discourses (which is repeated from the *Phædrus* in the seventh epistle) sounds strange from one of the most prolific authors of written treatises in his day, many of them expository and didactic in style.

§ 429. The criticism of Rhetoric in the *Phædrus* leads us naturally to the *Gorgias*, in which the same subject is handled at greater length, and with greater detail. Rhetoric is treated as the art of practical politics, of persuading the multitude, just like Sophistic, which aims at laying down laws both of morals and politics. Socrates, on the contrary, insists that true politics are the art of making men happier by making them better, and are therefore a consequence or deduction from ethics and from a thorough philosophy of human nature. The sophist Gorgias, like Protagoras in the dialogue which bears his name, is represented as an estimable man and a successful teacher, but not rising above the popular level, and only teaching by knack, not from any scientific principle. In the mouth of Polus and of Kallikles, two inferior followers, are put certain repulsive theories of selfish morality, of the right of the stronger, and of the happiness of power, to which Socrates replies by showing that vice is indeed misery, and that the happiest thing for the evil-doer is to suffer condign punishment, as the sick man must endure painful remedies. He all through compares vice to disease of body—an analogy least of all tenable on his theory that vice is ignorance, and that the wicked man is ignorant of his condition, and requires to be restrained and corrected by wise interference from without. Though Plato does not say it, the only disease which really suits his argument is that form of lunacy in which the patient is happy and contented under his hallucinations; for then indeed the man who does wicked acts, without knowing they are such, is in a worse condition than he who does them with a consciousness that they are wrong.

The *Gorgias* is the greatest of all pagan protests in favour of absolute morality against the utilitarian theory, that good is pleasure, and evil pain. In this dialogue there is no account whatever taken of present pleasure, and he alone

is thought a true philosopher and a good man who can despise such inducements, and follow his conscience in spite of bodily pain and torture. The first declaration of Stoicism, and of the self-denial of our Gospel, is to be found in the splendid and ennobling argument of Socrates, who knows that he will not be followed by the mob, who feels himself isolated and disliked, but who claims the inalienable right of the honest man to think for himself, and follow those eternal laws of justice which alone can render any human soul, or any human society, permanently happy. Grote complains that in arguing against utility, and even in supporting it (*Protagoras*), Plato only supposes that coarse form which regards the purely private interest of the individual, without considering the utility of those around him. And no doubt by bringing in this latter consideration, late writers in ethics have contrived, as Grote does, to put a fair face on the doctrine of Interest. But is not this the colouring of an ugly theory with the colours borrowed from a foreign source? Can the regard for others be called utility or interest with any common decency of expression? The very assertion *this is my interest* excludes in many cases those of the rest of mankind, and if these interests clash with it, to choose them is to violate the doctrine of utility in its only proper and reasonable sense. Thus the noble protest of the *Gorgias* stands, with the *Phædo*, among those writings of Plato which have not (like the *Symposium* and *Phædrus*) lost their point by a change of social conditions, and there are few of the dialogues more profoundly instructive and interesting to the ethical student of the present day.

§ 430. A remarkable contrast to it, in ethical theory, is the *Protagoras* (on the possibility of teaching virtue). This dialogue is in style and scenery not a whit inferior to the *Gorgias*; nay, it is even a more elaborate and brilliant composition, and not even the theorists who wish to prove it an early and mistaken piece can find in it the supposed crudities of the *Phædrus*. It has all the marks of Plato's ripe scholarship and literary perfection. Yet in it Protagoras is made the honest and persuasive advocate of the best traditional morality, whereas Socrates attacks these views, and holds that virtue is the art of computing our pleasures and pains, and making the most of the balance. To utilitarians

like Grote, this theory, which is very foreign to Plato's general tone, is peculiarly attractive. Nay they even strain points to bring out this side of the Socratic ethics in other dialogues. No doubt there was a certain vulgar homeliness about Socrates, which sometimes taught the pleasant consequences of virtue as if they were its chief recommendation. It was, moreover, an excellent engine in disputation, as it opposes an intellectual computation of results to an often vague æsthetic feeling. But the real value of the *Protagoras*, as compared with the *Gorgias*, is to demonstrate Grote's theory of the mutual independence and frequent conflicts of the dialogues, which were written separately, and which each put their own point of view, often in intentional variance from the rest. Plato evidently was too genuine a pupil of Socrates not to feel the difficulties in all ethical speculations, and though he was quite ready to dogmatise, and set up a system, he was quite ready to discuss and debate its foundations. In fact, as Grote has shown beyond all question, the constructive and the sceptical sides of Plato are separate streams of thought, and he did not seek to bring them into one channel.

On another point these two dialogues are interesting. They prove the general respectability and high character of the leading sophists. Though Plato was the determined enemy of their system, though he ridiculed and censured the pretence of teaching excellence, moral or intellectual, for money, he always makes inferior followers of the great sophists—Polus, Thrasymachus, Euthydemus—the butts of his satire, and treats both Gorgias and Protagoras with respect. They are not debaters, they cannot stand a cross-examination from Socrates, but they teach vulgar morals with elegance and sincerity, and there are few finer passages than the exposition put into Protagoras' mouth of the general diffusion and teaching of virtue by all society in a civilised Greek city.¹

§ 431. We pass to the last class—the purely or mainly constructive dialogues, in which Plato has set forth his views on the construction of the world (*Timæus*) and on the reconstruction of society (*Republic* and *Laws*), with the fragment called *Critias*.

¹ *Protagoras*, pp. 322-3.

These latter are so important from a social and political view, as well as from their great length and explicitness, that they deserve special consideration. The *Republic* is, moreover, the best composed and most perfect composition of Plato, so much so that those German critics, who assume that a man must decay in old age, will not allow it to be placed late in the catalogue. All agree that the *Laws* was one of his last essays, and was intended to give a more practicable scheme than the *Republic*, both of them being, however, harmonious in principle.

But the style and tone of thinking are very different. There is no kind of Platonic excellence which is not represented in the *Republic*. There is the gentle, pertinacious, ironical Socrates in the first two books ; there is the didactic, imaginary Socrates to suit Plato's convenience in the later books. There is the finest character-painting—the resigned and mellow old age of Cephalos, the brutal frankness and impetuosity of Thrasymachus, the delicately shaded differences between Glaucon and Adeimantus, both earnest seekers after truth. There is hard-and-dry metaphysic in the fifth and sixth books ; there is a splendid myth, that of Er the Armenian, at the close of the tenth. Few of the important theories of other dialogues can be cited which are not alluded to or implied in the argument. But when there are oppositions, such as between the *Gorgias* and *Protagoras*, it is the nobler and more ideal side which is adopted. In fact, there are peculiar points of contact with the *Gorgias* and *Phædon*, and perhaps less of the erotic element than we should expect from the author of the *Phædrus* and *Symposium*.

§ 432. The formal subject of the dialogue is the enquiry, *what is justice?* It is the subject approached with such boldness, and with so direct a challenge to Socrates in the *Kleitophon*, that those who accept that fragment as genuine think it was originally intended as the opening of the *Republic*. Others again, from the negative and lively tone of the first two books, imagine that this portion was an early composition, added to and enlarged by Plato in his later and more constructive years. All these are but conjectures. What is more important to note is that the work has taken both its name and importance, not from the official, but from the indirect or accidental investigation which Socrates intro-

duces in a huge parenthesis. The problem to be solved is the nature of justice. It is only by the assumption of a civilised polity being a system analogous to the mental constitution of an individual, and of larger and easier survey, that the conversation passes into the description of the ideal *State*, falsely called by us the *Republic*, as the absence of monarchy is by no means essential to Plato's scheme. We know in fact from the *Politicus* that he was inclined to the rule of a single head, and an absolute head too, provided the ideal character, the king-philosopher, could be found to conduct it. In the *State* or *Republic* before us, he places the control under a small number of guardians, with similar qualifications to his *Politicus*, but the number is immaterial, their relations to one another are not considered, and their authority is regarded rather as an abstract unity than as the wisdom resulting from discussion, and the decision of the majority in a consulting board. The real point, which he considers vital in the constitution, is to exclude the public from consulting on state affairs, and to confine the government to one, or to a few, select experts, who are not to be required to impart their reasons to the subject classes, or to submit to criticism.¹ This is the attitude of all those aristocratic theorists who speculated on the best form of polity in Plato's age. They were all profoundly convinced of the evils of a democracy, and still more of the inexpediency of amateur politics. The hand-to-mouth legislation of mobs, or of the casual advisers of mobs, was to them absurd on so vastly important an issue, and they considered that here if anywhere professional skill was absolutely required. The common sense or collective wisdom of a number of intelligent private men—the best form of government, according to modern notions—was by them

¹ Cf. his argument in the *Politicus* (pp. 292–3) beginning: μὴ οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πλῆθος γε ἐν πόλει ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην δύνατον εἶναι κτήσασθαι; his conclusion is (p. 297 B): ὥς οὐκ ἂν ποτε πλῆθος οὐδ' ὠντινωνοῦν, τὴν τοιαύτην λαβὼν ἐπιστήμην, οἷον τ' ἂν γένοιτο μετὰ νοῦ διοικεῖν πόλιν, and therefore (p. 292): τὴν μὲν ὀρθὴν ἀρχὴν περὶ ἕνα τινά, καὶ δύο, καὶ παντάπασιν ὀλίγους, δεῖν ζητεῖν, ὅταν ὀρθὴ γίγνηται. He goes on to compare the art to that of medical men, who treat patients of all ranks and dignities, without allowing them to interfere or meddle with the treatment, often painful and distressing, which medicine and surgery prescribe.

thoroughly despised. If any of the practical politicians, like Pericles, had really done anything great, it was to be accounted for by their partial acquaintance with deeper philosophy, and their even occasional converse with the philosophers who raised their thoughts to the general laws of the world. Yet even Pericles had fallen vastly short of the Platonic requirements, as we may see in the *Gorgias*.

Assuming then that the public was unfit to govern itself, Plato, and with him the Greek theorists, were furthermore quite averse to allowing it even that liberty of life, which was the mark of the Athenian democracy, and which all actual states allowed their citizens in their own homes. The general notion which governed Greek life was that the state could demand any sacrifice from the citizen, that his personal rights were as nothing in regard of any state claim, but that, provided he submitted to this demand, his private life was to be without control. When the citizen entered the strong door of his house, he was absolute master, and it required some extraordinary violence or scandal to persuade the state to interfere. Thus ordinary Greek politics, while holding the absolute power and claims of the state, were less particular than we are in maintaining private morality.

There was one peculiar exception—the Spartan society under the paternal despotism of the ephors. Here the young men at least were kept under control all through their life. They lived in common, slept in common, hunted in common, and were all the time under organised supervision. Plato applies this idea to the higher classes of his state, and, strangely enough, makes this higher caste or class the military class. The men of his day were beginning to find out that a citizen militia, torn from home and from peaceful duties, was no match for professional warriors, like the Spartans, whose discipline and experience were now being imitated by mercenary troops and paid generals. Hence the theorist set apart a special caste as a military guard for the rest of the state, and he devotes much of his treatise to their education and maintenance. Moreover, like that Homer whom he, though himself so saturated with his genius, ejects from his state, he will not conde-

scend to describe the life and training of the artisan or husbandman class, but spends all his attention upon the noble warriors in the battle of life.

§ 433. But Plato went far beyond this. He saw clearly that while the production of other animals was carefully controlled by men, and hence varieties and improvements in breed were easily obtained, the production of man, the highest and most precious of animals, was left to chance, to random fancy, to stray passion, to pecuniary considerations ; so that congenital defects, moral obliquities, and all other defects are propagated, and deform the human race. This question was then, and has ever since been, so surrounded with a cloud of sentiment, and entwined with the sacred ties of family affection, that the very discussion of it is almost intolerable, and only a few advanced thinkers are even yet to be found who will venture to urge this necessary condition for the physical and therefore intellectual improvement of mankind. Mr. Jowett, no old-fashioned conservative, can see how the abolition of private property, and a community of goods, may yet become the condition of a more advanced culture, and how the assertion of private rights and interests may be a hindrance to the public good. But he recoils even from imagining a society without permanent marriages, without apparently a home or family ties, and where the propagation of the race was directed and controlled by the state.

It is usual to speak of Plato's theory as the *Community of wives*—a gross libel on the philosopher, who guarded the relations of the sexes in the strictest way, as long as they lived together for the state, who made marriage, so to speak, a 'sacrament,' and punished every sin against its sanctity as impious.¹ But though he does not give details on this point, it appears that his marriages were to last only for a season, and when the necessity for a new union of citizens arose, the persons

¹ The only point in this part of the *Republic* which is in any sense *immoral* is the license given to the guards who are past the stated age for marriage. They are not restricted, except in this, that they are not to produce any children, or, if they do, to make away with them. This is the point on which modern ethics may well censure the highest Greek morals.

who had formerly cohabited had no claim to remain together, nor were the parents to know their own children, whom the state took and educated.

It should be observed, that though Plato had no actual model for these temporary marriages, there was at Sparta a greater regard paid to the breeding of the human race, and with good results, than in any other civilised society of either ancient or modern times. This care had certainly advanced to the point of disregarding all the usual sentiment as to the sanctity of married life, for Plutarch tells us facts (in the *life* of Lycurgus) which show how easy the adoption of Plato's scheme might have been at Sparta.¹ The really remarkable point about the matter is this: that in the state where temporary husbands were allowed, and where the production of a healthy and beautiful race was made the paramount consideration, no decay in female honour, no collapse of family ties, or of the influence of home, ever took place. Spartan wives and mothers were, on the contrary, the noblest and purest in Greece. Accordingly, Plato could have pointed to Sparta as the only state which approximated to his ideal polity in freeing the relation of the sexes from the shackles of mischievous sentiment, and nevertheless as the only state in which the physical improvement of the race was notorious, while the chastity and refinement of both sexes were not impaired. In other respects the Spartans had fallen short (not in degree, but) in principle. They had apparently thought about the equality of the sexes, according to certain legends about Lycurgus, but the weaker sex had proved itself the stronger in resisting the lawgiver, and the education and training of women had accordingly suffered. Plato proposes that in his caste of guards both sexes shall receive the same treatment. Again, as to education, the ignorant and vulgar ephors would of course fall far short of Plato's philosophic elders, who seem rather framed on the model of the Pythagorean brotherhood. Hence music, as well as gymnastic, was to be taught on philosophical principles, and with a view to educate

¹ Schömann (*Gk. Antiq.* i. pp. 214, 267, Eng. tr.) thinks that even *polyandry* was sanctioned, but only on late evidence. He cites Polybius, *Excerpt. Vatican.* xii. 6, p. 819 (Ed. Hultsch).

the faculties and feelings of the mind rather than the muscles of the body. On Plato's theory of the tripartite division of the soul, the intellect must be developed by philosophy, the affections by music, while the union of both is to keep in check the lower appetites.

§ 434. But no real reform can take place in education without a complete reform in religion, and hence Plato goes to his extremest length when he proposes to abolish Homer, the Bible of the Greeks, and all other poetry based on the ordinary theology. He thinks a totally new religion is requisite for pure and sound morals. The deity must be one and the author of all good. He must be passionless, without variableness or shadow of turning, without love or jealousy, without pride or interest. All defects in the world are to be attributed, not to his want of benevolence, but to his want of omnipotence in controlling the original necessities of things. New myths must be invented and circulated in place of the amours and wars of the gods, such myths no doubt as those of which he has himself given specimens in many of the dialogues, and not least in the end of this dialogue. The control of the whole polity is placed in the hands of a small number of elders, chosen from the caste of guards, who have been so trained in speculative philosophy, and so steeped in the contemplation of the Ideal Good, and True, and Beautiful, that they will be persuaded with difficulty, and only as a matter of duty, to undertake the regulation of human affairs.

But the great work is so full and suggestive that no adequate analysis can find a place here. I must omit the determination of justice as the proper relation of the various divisions of the soul, like that of the various orders in the state, as well as the curious history of the various aberrations from right polity in the state, and right morals in the individual, with which the later books are occupied. To one feature, however, I will call attention. It is fashionable among Christian theologians to say that the pagan world, and especially the Greeks, had no consciousness of sin, no real feeling for the pollution of moral guilt. If such persons would take the trouble to read the picture of the tyrant (ix. 1), they would find the portrait

of a stricken conscience never equalled, so far as I know, from Plato's day till the days of Macbeth and Richard III. in Shakspeare's drama.

§ 435. Plato's Deuteronomy, the *Laws*, may best find its place as an appendix to the far greater *Republic*. It professes to be the second best constitution, and one surrendering many points to the strong national prejudices which were openly violated or disregarded in his earlier and more complete system. It may also be regarded as a third alternative, if we consider that the absolute control given to the 'kingly artist' in the *Politicus*, and to the select few elders in the *Republic*, is here vested in an established code of laws, which are administered by a sort of timocratic democracy. It abandons expressly the theory of the *Politicus*,¹ that a code of fixed laws is only a make-shift to meet average cases, and the want of special knowledge in the ruler, so that the ideal king will not hesitate to punish the wicked according to his own judgment, and in violation of existing legislation, as he is the highest and best judge of the necessary changes in laws, and the varying requirements of a complex human society—τὴν τῆς τέχνης ῥώμην τῶν νόμων παρεχόμενον κρείττω. But if the philosopher-king, or the council of perfectly educated elders, who know the Forms or Ideas of Things, and act accordingly, cannot be found, we must only establish the best possible code, and invest it with the dignity and sanctity of a Divine Revelation. This had already been foreshadowed in the *Politicus*.²

Upon the fiction of a new foundation in Crete, a nameless Athenian stranger undertakes to describe its proper constitution, and does so in a detail, and with a minuteness exceeding that of Plato's other works. But though Aristotle cites the nameless Athenian as Socrates, nothing can be more contrasted with the real Socrates than the tone and method of this lawgiver. He is with great propriety called an Athenian, for as the *Republic* might fairly have been excogitated by a philosophic Spartan, if such could exist in the fourth century, the *Laws* are distinctly modelled upon the older Attic

¹ pp. 294-7.

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¹ pp. 297, sq.

constitution.¹ As the board of elders represent the ephors, so the Code of Laws represents the venerable work of Solon, protected by an invisible, or nocturnal council, which has no logical place in the scheme. This contrast of ideals—Spartan in the *Republic*, Athenian in the *Laws*—runs all through the works, and it has long been recognised by critics that the chief value of the latter is in pointing out to us details of Attic law, which we only know through the adaptation of Plato. It is interesting to find the philosopher in his old age conceding even so much to the democracy which his soul abhorred, and deigning to make Attic models serve him for even a partially ideal state. But truly the *Laws* are a work of his old age, and if the testimony of Aristotle assures us of their authenticity in the literal sense, we may agree in a higher and spiritual sense with the Germans who will not accept it. For in the *Laws* the real Plato is dead, just as the real Edmund Burke is dead in the *Letters on the French Revolution*. The spirit of Socrates is gone from him, as his figure pales out in the later dialogues, and an evil spirit is troubling him. All his fame, all his piety, all his earnestness, have not been able to stay the spirit of scepticism which his dialectic had worked. The rejection of popular theology was bringing with it the decay of morals. The philosophers were found to be bad citizens, for the questioning of principles had induced laxity of practice. The world is so bad, and evil is so predominant, that he even advances in one isolated passage to the theory of a second world-soul, the author of mischief in creation, and the opponent of the good Demiurge in the *Republic*. So then the dying theorist composes a great palinode, in which he protests that his principles are perfectly consistent with even Athenian principles. He shows that, with some practical modifications, these will suit a Platonic state, and that on one capital point he will even abandon the task of his life. When the laws are once established on philosophical foundations, he will make peace with the orthodox crowd, and forbid all discussion and dialectical practice. Let

¹ The commentators note that many social points are taken from Sparta. This is true ; but the main body of the work is on the details of legislation, which are almost all Attic in principle.

us but agree upon our religion, and I will defend it with all the vigour of the narrowest religionist. I will make mere heresy in opinions, though accompanied by a blameless life, punishable with five years' imprisonment ; I will visit the graver (and more usual) cases with the penalty of death. Verily, if this be so, the sentence on Socrates was just, and may be defended from the *Laws* of his favoured disciple. Accordingly he banishes a strictly philosophical education in the Theory of Ideas even from his magistrates, and substitutes mathematical training, together with the sanctions of religion—in fact, a Pythagorean rather than a Platonic ideal.

We have in Greek literature many instances of intellectual power unimpaired in advanced age, and not a few of our greatest remaining monuments are the latest work of their authors. The *Laws* of Plato are therefore a remarkable and exceptional case of senility, curious and valuable in its way, but no fair evidence of the real greatness of its author. There is no doubt great dignity, and even oracular splendour about it ; like the Deuteronomy ascribed to his Hebrew rival, the *Laws* of the Attic Moses combine solemn homily with precept, burning exhortation with command ; the old man's former grace and subtlety flash out here and there. But there is something pitiable, as well as pathetic, in the rage of this royal thinker, who, like Lear, has brought up ungrateful children, and they have turned against him.

§ 436. The *Epinomis*, an appendix of very doubtful authenticity, goes in detail into the education of the Nocturnal Council, to whom is entrusted in the *Laws* the general care of the constitution. It consists chiefly in a theological study of Astronomy, to which Plato seems really to have inclined in his later or Pythagorean epoch. So likewise the fragmentary *Critias*, and the projected *Hermocrates*, were to give illustrations of the carrying out of the ideal principles of the *Republic* in history. For this purpose the *Critias*, and also the opening chapters of the *Timæus*, give a curious and imaginary account of the condition of Attica thousands of years before, when she entered into conflict with the power of the great continent Atlantis, which lay beyond the Pillars of Heracles—a strange and much

discussed anticipation of the discovery of America, which the Abbé Brasseur de Bourbourg¹ has actually received as a genuine historical tradition. To him the civilisation even of Egypt is originally brought from the older, and once more advanced, western continent. But these splendid dreams, as well as the abstruse physical theories of the *Timæus*, cannot detain us here. I will only call attention to the freedom with which Plato (and other philosophers of his day) treated the facts of history as a vehicle for moral improvement. The genuine historic sense, and thorough conscientiousness as to facts, which we all admire in Thucydides, seem to have made no impression upon Attic society. Plato especially, who preaches the use and morality of fiction for didactic purposes, does not hesitate to invent (in the *Critias*) and distort² previous history—his account of the Dorian migration and its results being contrary to what we can deduce from the evidence. Thus, while the rhetors handled history as a branch of oratory, Plato handled it as an adjunct to ethics, and dressed up the older annals of the Greeks to suit his purposes as a sort of moral fairy tale.

§ 437. The above very inadequate review of Plato's works will afford the reader a better means of judging their author than a mere literary description of his genius. Nevertheless, a few points may be suggested in addition to what appears from the foregoing pages. Few readers of a single dialogue, even of the *Republic*, would imagine or anticipate the extraordinary fascination exercised over European thought by Plato from his own day to the present. It is the fashion to deduce all the later schools of philosophy from the real Socrates; but perhaps the Platonic Socrates may have replaced him more completely than we imagine. The Stoic ideal of the wise man, standing apart from and above the crowd; more precious in himself and to himself than to others, or to the members of a Greek city—this ideal is clearly drawn in the perfect philosopher of the *Gorgias*, the *Politicus*, the *Crito*. The deeper and sounder aspects of Epi-

¹ *Commission Scientifique de Mexique*, vol. iii.—the splendid work promoted by the Emperor Napoleon III.

² *Laws*, pp. 691, sq.

curus' Search for Pleasure appear in the *Protagoras*. The Peripatetic goods of 'mind, body, and estate,' indeed the whole of their system, comes directly from Platonic teaching. Need I add that the sceptical Academics found their forerunner in the Agnostic Socrates of the earlier dialogues, and that the Alexandrian fusion of Judaism, Egyptianism, and Christianity could find no fitter book to form their philosophical Bible than the works of Plato. This exaltation of Plato by the school called the neo-Platonic is perhaps the most curious and the greatest tribute to his genius. No argument can so convince us of the veneration, of the sanctity, of the absolute authority of any book in the minds of men, as the desire of ages which have drifted away from its principles still to claim and to obey its authority, by dint of allegorising, and sublimating, and mysticising its doctrines. The scholars of the Renaissance, the Cambridge Platonists, Berkeley, Malebranche, and a host of later intellectualists, have sustained to the present day the spirit, and to some extent the doctrines of Plato.

But apart from the history of philosophy, apart from these metaphysical theories which only attract the few choice and subtle spirits of an age, what do we not owe to him in literature? The form of the philosophical dialogue, constantly copied by later Greek philosophers, but by all of them without dramatic genius, has fascinated even in English literature some of our greatest masters of style, such as Bishop Berkeley and Walter Savage Landor, nor have *Symposia* been wanting even in the ephemeral literature of the present day. Both the sceptical and the constructive sides have been imitated. The vulgarest atheist will still put his arguments in the form of a Socratic elenchus, and the deepest thinker will strive to use it in laying the foundations of his system. Above all, the construction of an ideal state has been a model imitated, as Mr. Jowett says, 'by a goodly band of followers.' Cicero's *Republic*, Augustine's *City of God*, More's *Utopia*, are among the greatest, and perhaps even Hobbes' *Leviathan*, and Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*, owe some of their celebrity to a far-off and distorted reflex of Platonic genius. Great practical books of statesmanship, such as Aristotle's *Politics*, and Machiavelli's *Principe*, would not disown at

least the suggestions of contrast. Still more fruitful has Plato been in throwing out scattered guesses at truth, and bold inferences from unrealised principles, which ever attract and stimulate those who will think more thoroughly and fearlessly than the vulgar masses. Thus in the *Republic* he has anticipated the Mediæval Church, in which the spiritual control by a few, and a strict subordination of the rest to those specially selected and educated, were realised beyond his most ardent hopes. So too he anticipated a great reform of religion, and from the summit of his Mount looked upon a promised land which his people should inherit. And while he went a long way beyond even the present age in his theories of the improvement of the race by rational and careful selection of parents, and proper attention to the physical antecedents of humanity, he was so far from degrading the female sex in social importance, that he distinctly asserted the equality of the sexes and the rights of women in the strongest nineteenth-century spirit. Again, on the laws of war, he distinctly asserts (though here in agreement with the higher minds of his day) the laws of what we should call Christian warfare, of humanity to Hellenic prisoners, of regarding Hellenic troubles as family quarrels, to be celebrated by no trophies or triumphs. His guesses in physical science are not less curious and interesting.

§ 438. But with all this strange modernness, Plato is a Hellene of the Hellenes. His prospect does not include any non-Hellenic races. Though he acknowledges the culture and the learning of the Egyptians, and borrows, or affects to borrow, splendid myths from other barbarians, the fusion of Jew and Greek, of bond and free—the Hellenism of a later age—is far beyond his vision. He shares with Isocrates the old, I had well-nigh said the vulgar, Greek admiration for the most retrograde and narrow of the Hellenes, the Spartans; nay, he is so exclusive and aristocratic in spirit, that he will hardly condescend to consider the lower classes, and conceives, like every other Greek of that day, even his ideal society to be a select body of equals amid a crowd of unprivileged inferiors and of slaves. This it is which gives to Plato's Communism a cha-

racter so radically distinct from all the modern dreams known by the same name, or from the early Christian society described in the *Acts of the Apostles*. It was essentially an aristocratic Communism, and was based not on the equality of men, but upon their inherent and radical disparity. It was really the Republic of the select few, exercising a strict and even intolerable despotism over the masses. Here again, in spite of the modernness of the Socratic conception of the philosopher as a privileged dissident, of the rights and the dignity of the individual and his conscience—here again Plato falls into the purest fourth-century Hellenedom, when he constructs an ideal state, or a code of Laws, in which this dissident can be allowed no place. To protect such an individual, with all his nobility, and his inestimable good effects on those around him, the actual Athens of Plato's day, as Mr. Grote says, was a far safer, happier, and better abode. There democratic habits and common sense had modified and softened those theories of state interference, which no individual thinker of that age seems able to shake off.

All these profound contradictions were doubtless the cause of that increasing gloom and morbidness which seem to have clouded Plato's later years. He did not believe in the perfectibility of the human race. Even his ideal Polity, if carried into practice, is declared by him to contain the seeds of a necessary decay. The human race was not advancing, but decaying. Dialectic and free thought led to scepticism; acquiescence in received ideas to ignorance and mental apathy. We may almost infer from the silence of contemporary history concerning his later years that, beyond his immediate disciples, he was neglected, and regarded as an idle dreamer. Yet if this was so he but verified his own prophecies on the social position of the true philosopher.

§ 439. In his style he is as modern as in his thinking. He employed that mixture of sober prose argument and of poetical metaphor, which is usual in the ornate prose of modern Europe, but foreign to the character and stricter art of the Greeks. This style, which is freely censured by Greek critics as a hybrid or bastard prose, was admirably suited to a lively conversation,

where a sustained and equable tone would have been a mistake.¹ But when Plato attempts formal rhetoric, as in the reply to Lysias in the *Phædrus*, or in the *Menæxenus*, we find how true was the artistic feeling of the Greek schools, and how this greater genius, with its irregularities, falls below the more chastened and strictly formal essays of professional orators. He is said in his youth to have inclined to dramatic poetry, but his aversion to dramatising passion was so ingrained, and his love of analyzing the play of intellect so intense, that we may imagine him producing very dry and unpopular tragedies. Yet his appreciation of the great poets, though his criticisms of them are always moral, and never æsthetic, was certainly thorough, and told upon his style. Above all, he shows a stronger Homeric flavour than all those who professed to worship the epics which he censured. His language everywhere bears the influence of Homer, just as some of our greatest and purest writers and speakers use unconsciously Biblical phrases and metaphors. It is also very remarkable that he is not *only* the first Greek author who confines the name of Homer to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, but that the text he used was apparently that established afterwards by Aristarchus against the inferior and faulty copies used by Aristotle and later critics.² The effects of the rhetoric of his rival Isocrates are also to be remarked in him, though he seems never to have adopted with any strictness that avoidance of hiatus which is a distinctive mark of Isocratic prose.³ Hence we see in Plato the child of his age and yet its leader, the most Attic of Athenians, and yet a disaffected citizen, a profound sceptic, and yet a lofty preacher, an enemy of the poets, and yet a rhapsodist himself, a thinker that despaired of his own people, and yet, aloft on his Pisgah of speculation, looking out with prophetic eye upon a far future of better laws, purer religion, and nobler life.

¹ Albinus (*Isagoge*, c. 2) well sums up its characteristics: τὸ Ἀττικόν, τὸ εὖχαρι, τὸ ἀπέριτον, τὸ ἀνευδέες. It is remarkable that Aristotle, in his *Politics*, calls the dialogues specially by one of the epithets here denied—τὸ πέριτον; but he is evidently speaking of the matter, not of the technical prose style.

² Cf. Sengebusch, *Diss. Hom.* ii. p. 118.

³ Cf. above, p. 184, on the *Menæxenus*.

§ 440. *Bibliographical.* As regards the external history of the text, there is no doubt that the dialogues were early conveyed, in very good copies, from the Platonic school at Athens to the Alexandrian library, where they were commented on with care, especially by Aristophanes and Eratosthenes. There were even editions brought out with the critical marks devised for the Homeric texts,¹ a fact which shows the great esteem in which they were held ; and the very term *χωρίζοντες* was applied in this controversy. Unfortunately we have little remains of Aristophanes' work except the grouping in trilogies of some dialogues, mentioned by Diogenes, and two references (I think) in the extant scholia. The neo-Platonists and the Roman schools of philosophy studied and criticised the text diligently. The rhetor Libanius composed good arguments, and our scholia quote both Didymus and Aristarchus. But some of them are distinctly composed by Christian writers, as, for example, the note on the Sibyls to the *Phædrus*. These scholia, which are on the whole good, are scanty on many of the dialogues, though very full on others. Thus the first *Alcibiades*, the *Gorgias*, and above all the *Timæus*, have very ample notes, while the *Protagoras*, *Parmenides*, and *Ion* have hardly any whatever. They have been separately published by Bekker (1824) in a convenient form.

Passing to the MSS., which are good and numerous, it is agreed that far the highest authority belongs to the splendid Bodleian codex, written in the year 896 A.D., and therefore one of our oldest classical MSS. There is an equally ancient Paris MS. for the *Republic*, *Laws*, and *Timæus*. The rest have been described and classified by Bekker in his edition, which other editors follow. The printed editions, commentaries, and translations are so numerous, that it would be a great task to enumerate even the principal ones.² Long after the Latin version of Ficinus (1483) came the Aldine folio of 1513, dedicated to Leo X., not even now a rare book. Every great

¹ Cf. Vol. I. p. 37, note.

² Nicolai, *ZG.* i. pp. 508-27, gives a catalogue of the myriad works on Plato, to which I refer the special student. Yet he omits to mention Mr. Jowett's translation.

press, or editor of Greek texts, since that time has produced a *Plato*. I particularly avoid the philosophical side of Plato in this literary history, and therefore pass by his ancient rivals and pupils, who belong strictly to the history of philosophy, but I cannot avoid making an exception to my silence on the great library of Platonic philosophy in favour of Mr. Grote's admirable and not sufficiently esteemed work. In our time the best texts are Bekker's, Stallbaum's (with full commentary, 1835-61), and the Zurich edition (1839). An interesting and rare book is the seven dialogues printed by the Dublin University Press, as its first book, in 1738. The special editions of separate dialogues up to date are given in the prefaces to each dialogue in Stallbaum's edition. But some good English commentaries have since appeared, such as W. H. Thompson's *Gorgias* and *Phædrus* (1868), Badham's *Philebus* (1855), Geddes' *Phædo* (1863), L. Campbell's *Theætetus*, *Sophistes*, and *Politicus*, Wayte's *Protagoras*, &c. Mitchell's *Index Græcitalis* was printed at Oxford 1832. In addition to Manuel Chrysoloras' translation of the *Republic*, about 1397 (printed by Cassarini, Venice, 1624), and Ficinus' early Latin translation, we have an English version of the *Apology* and *Phædo* in 1675; Dacier's French in 1699, reproduced in England 1701; Sydenham's in 1760 (several dialogues); abridgments of the *Phædo* and *Theætetus* by Leibnitz; Davies and Vaughan's *Republic*—an excellent book; V. Cousin's French version in 1822; Schleiermacher's, and the Stuttgart translation by various scholars (1869); and now, finally, Mr. Jowett's five volumes, with admirable introductions which give us the literary side of Plato perfectly. Nevertheless, this great book by no means supersedes the admirable work of Grote on Plato, in which we have the curious phenomenon of a Positivist expounding the great Idealist with sympathy and generally (I think) with fidelity.

CHAPTER VIII.

ISOCRATES.

§ 441. WE turn to another leading representative of Attic prose during the earlier half of the fourth century B.C.—a representative who, with Lysias and Isæus, with Plato and with Xenophon, makes up that wonderful constellation of writers of whom Demosthenes may be considered the greatest star. Our authorities are agreed that Isocrates was born at Athens in 436, the son of Theodorus, a flute manufacturer, and of Heduto. The names of three obscure brothers and a sister are mentioned. He may have been a few years younger than Lysias, eight or nine years older than Plato. His father, being wealthy, was able to give him so good an education that he himself boasts¹ he was better known and stood higher among his school-fellows than ever afterwards—a very credible statement, seeing that his great talent for form must have made him a brilliant and promising pupil. Among his masters are mentioned Prodicus, of whom critics have found traces in his orations, and Socrates, whom he once mentions² in connection with Alcibiades, without sympathy, so that the stories about his public mourning of the philosopher's death seem false; indeed, no natures could be more contrasted than those of the two men, and the praise of Isocrates in Plato's *Phædrus*, which Socrates speaks, is evidently mere Platonic Socratism.

It is fashionable to argue that he was necessarily influenced by Socrates, because he shows a high moral tone, and was superior in philosophic culture to Lysias and the earlier orators. But this opinion³ is based on the vulgar notion that the real sophists were Plato's sophists, and on a false estimate of the

¹ *Antid.* § 161.

² *Busiris*, § 5.

³ Cf. Blass, *AB.* ii. p. 12.

philosophy of the speech-writers, whose art consisted chiefly in concealing itself. It is not fair to say that an epideictic orator is more philosophical than a court speech-writer, except the latter has had official means of affording us a comparison. At all events, the cardinal doctrine of Socrates, that virtue is a teachable science, was not held by Isocrates, though it was eminently in harmony with the profession of education which he adopted. On this point he shares the very noble and popular view expounded by Protagoras in Plato's dialogue.

When the Peloponnesian war ruined the fortunes of his family, Isocrates was obliged to turn his good education to account, and then probably took lessons from Gorgias, whose oratory was the model he adopted and vastly improved. He is also said to have been a friend of Theramenes, a more likely intimate than Socrates, also of Xenophon, and of Archinus—whom the critics restore in Suidas' notice—a well-known patriot and speaker.

§ 442. But it is evident that his first efforts in speech-writing were not in the style of Gorgias; they were the few court speeches which we still possess, and which the orator in after years deemed so unworthy of the far higher profession which he had adopted, that he stoutly denies ever having assisted in any litigation. The consistent external evidence, as well as the internal character, is, however, too clearly against him, and commentators are unanimous in refusing credence to the author as regards the genuineness of these speeches. There is, however, another theory possible, concerning which I will speak presently, which holds all or part of these speeches to be rhetorical exercises, made on the occasion of real lawsuits, but perhaps in rivalry with the speeches really delivered, and to show what ought to have been said. This would justify Isocrates' assertion. Finding himself, however, not likely to surpass his rivals in this profession—both Lysias and Isæus must always have been more in repute—he turned to the profession of education, which had become fashionable under the Sophists and Socrates, but which he endeavoured in his manifesto *against the Sophists* to put on a new basis. In this fragment we can see the programme of all his life. He endeavours to

steer a sort of midway between true philosophy, such as Socrates had taught it, and the pretended science of the Sophists, who held that expertness in speaking and in debate was in reality the only thing to be learned, and in itself the sum of education. He postulates a moral basis which, in opposition both to Socrates and the lower Sophists, he thinks impossible to attain by instruction, but, for the rest, he thinks the ideas required by a cultivated man few and easily comprehended ; whereas to think them in an orderly way, and express them with elegance, is really the object of education. In fact, *le style—c'est l'homme*. In after years, when his position as a rhetorician was secured, he published some moral addresses (to Nicocles), which are on the level of the gnomic poets in thinking, and preach that vulgar and selfish piety which has not yet disappeared from Christian pulpits. But as for any criticism of received dogmas, any speculation about the nature or the destiny of man, such things are far above him. The only immortality he knows is that of fame ;¹ the only sanction, that of material rewards. He is sceptical about the popular faith, but expresses his doubts as an ignorant man of fashion, not as a serious thinker feeling after the truth.

We have, in addition to the speech *against the Sophists*, a very long *résumé*, and defence of his life and teaching, in an imaginary speech entitled (by Aristotle) *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως*, concerning the exchange of property, from which, and from the *Panathenaicus*, we may take the remaining points of interest known to us concerning his life. But when he tells us that, in contrast to the fast youth of Athens, his own life had been pure and blameless, he seems to contradict certain scandalous rumours preserved in Athenæus from an epistle of Lysias, that he was attached to two famous courtesans successively. He certainly did not marry till in advanced life Plathane, widow of the rhetor Hippias, of whose sons he adopted the youngest, Aphareus. When his fame as a rhetorician brought him many

¹ I am aware there is an exception, or an apparent exception, in his striking remark about the Mysteries (*Panegy.* § 28) ; but its repetition in a vague way elsewhere (*De Pace*, § 34) prevents any serious weight attaching to it.

pupils, each of whom stayed with him from three to four years, and paid ten minæ—a sort of university course—he acquired a large fortune, and was enrolled among the richest class of citizens. Hence his state duties were heavy, and more than once he was obliged to resist the attack of sycophants, who desired to thrust upon him an undue share of state expenses. Once (acting through Aphareus as his deputy) he was successful (B.C. 355), but a second time he was obliged to undertake the duty. He protests that though his pupils were many and famous, and his wealth greater than that acquired by Gorgias, the most successful of former sophists, it was exaggerated by report. He also urges, in reply to the suspicions and the aversion of the Athenian public, the number and celebrity of his pupils, whom he gathered about him neither to waste their time with subtle speculations of ancient sophists—probably Pythagoras and Parmenides—studies respectable in themselves, but unfitting for practical life; nor to delude them by boastful promises that, in spite of any natural wants, he could make them orators and politicians. For he exhibited in his own person the defects of a poor organisation, a weak voice, and extreme bashfulness. Hence he never could take part in public affairs, nor did he ever solicit or fill any state office.

§ 443. But he amply compensated for this, in his own estimation, by publishing pamphlets in the forms of harangues, or open letters to eminent persons, on the interests of the Greek nation. His moral essays and those upon culture have already been mentioned. It may be added that he strove to take from the term *philosophy* the high meaning which it had acquired for ever from the writings of physical and metaphysical speculators, and to confine the name to the somewhat shallow compromise between vulgar common sense and real learning which he affected. But the most important of his pamphlets are those on the national politics of Greece. He develops in these—published during a course of forty years, during many changes and chances in the history of the nation—the same leading ideas, to which he holds with narrow and stupid tenacity. He is ever painting the sorrows and miseries of Greece through internal factions, through internecine wars, and, in his

earlier days, through the unjust and tyrannous supremacy of Sparta after the defeat of Athens in 404 B. C. The only remedy for the resulting poverty, discontent, and savagery throughout Hellenic lands is an union either under Sparta and Athens, or under either of them, or under some single head such as Philip ; and this is the alternative which in later years he recognised as the only possible one. But the whole profit he saw in such an union, and the main chance of its benefiting Greece, was by producing at once an invasion of Persia, and plundering its enormous wealth for the benefit of the Greeks. He exhibited a very just estimate of the Persian power, chiefly derived, it would seem, from the experiences of Xenophon in the *Anabasis*, or from Agesilaus' campaigns, and he saw that the conquest was not difficult. But when he ever indulged the hope, which became with him a sort of monomania, that the conquest of Persia would make every poor Greek rich, and every discontented one happy, so that the natural superiority of the race would find due scope for its exercise, he was totally incapable of apprehending the necessary reaction which so vast a conquest must produce upon the conquerors, and how inevitably the very culture which he taught and revered must alter and lower itself to embrace a vaster area. Had these natural consequences been within his vision, he would have recoiled in horror from his pet scheme, for nothing was further from his mind than Hellenism in the later sense.¹ He held indeed that culture more than race was the distinctive feature of real Greeks, but for all that, he would not have hesitated to place the most ignorant Spartan far above the most enlightened Macedonian or Egyptian. Herodotus approached far nearer to the later conception of Hellenism than Isocrates.

§ 444. Preoccupied with these notions, surrounded by distinguished pupils and friends, but treated with indifference, and I imagine with contempt, by the Athenian public, the vain rhetorician lived on to an advanced age, still thinking himself the leading political adviser of Greece, and still wondering,

¹ The same is the case with Xenophon ; cf. his *Agesilaus*, c. 7, sub fin.

with amusing naïveté, that his advice, however beautifully expressed, had so little effect upon the politics of the day.

He wrote most of his Letters, his *Philip* and *Evagoras*, in old age, for though not gifted with physical vigour, his health remained excellent. In his eighty-second year he composed the *Apology* entitled *περὶ ἀντιλόγου*, and began to prepare his *Panathenaicus*, or panegyric on Athens, in his ninety-fourth year, finishing it in his ninety-seventh, though he then suffered from a painful disease, which attacked him three years before. When he was ninety-eight, the battle of Chaeronea supervened, and he at last saw some hope of his life-long desire being accomplished ; for Philip now stood undoubtedly at the head of Greece, and could carry out the policy the orator had recommended to him in an open letter. Isocrates accordingly addressed him another letter (the third), which was the last product of his pen, and which is particularly valuable, as giving a direct contradiction to the fables about his patriotism, his disgust at the battle, and his consequent death by suicide. For he was no political martyr, having, in fact, always postponed the liberties of Greece, about which he discoursed so much, to the realisation of his favourite schemes against Persia : he knew that an autocratic ruler was more likely to carry them out, as the result proved. But he must have died about this time.

§ 445. Thus this remarkable writer lived through three of the most eventful generations in Greek history, and though one of the most prominent writers of his time, may be said to have produced no influence whatever except upon the form of prose writing. For he was in no sense a thorough-going man. He was a curious combination of sophist and patriot, of would-be politician and philosopher, of really private and public man at the same time. The candour and honesty of his nature made him in feeling a patriot, while his want of appreciation for deeper politics prevented him from seeing the evils of despotism, or taking any thorough interest in the forms and varieties of constitutions. His bashfulness compelled him to remain in private life, while his vanity urged him to appear in public ; his profession suggested to him the study of philosophy, while his intellect was incapable of understand-

ing its higher problems. Thus his egregious vanity and self-complacency were perpetually wounded by the consciousness that he had, after all, not made his mark upon the age, and that, though eminent and widely respected, he was neither consulted nor obeyed by the men whom he most desired to influence. He aspired to the position of a Swift or a Junius, with the talents of an Addison or a Pope.

We shall speak of his style when we have reviewed his works. Here we have only considered the man himself, a personage in after days greatly overrated, when the study of Greek history fell into scholastic hands, but in his own day rightly estimated as merely a shallow and conceited, but personally respectable rhetorician. Into the great contemporary struggle between Macedonia and Athens, between Philip and Demosthenes, he was never admitted, nor does either side ever refer to his advices. Among the philosophical schools which then sprang into life he finds no place. Thus he lived among the most profound speculative thinkers and the most ardent politicians the world has ever seen, without either giving or receiving aught in these momentous conflicts of deeper ideas and of nobler men. Had his advices been of the smallest importance, they would doubtless have been cited both by the honest and the dishonest opponents of Demosthenes' patriotic policy, both by Phocion and Æschines, as being strongly in their favour.

He was buried in the Kynosarges, and his family monument is described in the *Life* of 'Plutarch.' The account somewhat resembles what future ages may read concerning the Albert Memorial, except that on the summit was a Siren, the emblem of the sweetness and persuasiveness of his discourse. There were, moreover, a statue of him dedicated by Aphareus at Olympia, and one preserved in the Acropolis at Athens, as a boy on horseback, and yet another made by the sculptor Leochares for Timotheus. From this latter descend the busts which still perpetuate for us the gentle and refined features of the orator.

§ 446. As to his pupils, stated to have been one hundred in number, he himself enumerates several who were honoured

by the state with gold crowns ; but this list by no means specifies the most important, Diophantus and Timotheus, distinguished generals ; Androtion, Laodamas and Lakritus, equally distinguished speakers ; and Ephorus and Theopompus, who were the leaders of the later historiography among the Greeks. These latter will occupy us hereafter. But every contemporary, not only friendly, such as Xenophon, but adverse, such as Plato and Aristotle, shows the influence of his style, which he boasts to have been imitated by all his opponents. Moreover, though his pupils distinguished themselves in every department, so that he even foolishly pretends that Timotheus' strategy was the result of his good education, it is no doubt true that careful training impressed upon them all a certain fixed type or style, which made 'a pupil of Isocrates' mean in those days the same sort of thing that is now meant when we say an 'Eton boy,' or an 'Oxford man.'¹

§ 447. The works of Isocrates have been handed down to us in various order in our MSS., and most of those which are fixed in date come from the period of his maturity, or his later age ; indeed most of the longer orations were written so late in life as to show an increase of garrulity, and of an anxiety to be heard, as he neared the limit of his activity. But the earlier speeches, especially the court speeches and rhetorical exercises, are not dated, so that we can follow our convenience in arranging them. Two of these exercises remain, or rather an actual exercise (the *Helen*), and a letter to the sophist Polycrates concerning an exercise (the *Busiris*), which Isocrates criticises, and suggests topics for a better treatment. Both documents are extremely interesting, as they must have been to some ex-

¹ It is observed by Blass that while Plato's school shows some affinity with western Greeks, the pupils of Isocrates, if not Athenian, come from eastern or Asiatic Greece, and this he rightly ascribes to the decay of Hellenedom through the tyrants and advancing barbarians of Italy and Sicily ; while in the East Hellenic culture was gradually becoming ascendant. Indeed, in another generation, Greek eloquence came to be called *Asian*, where the excess of ornament marred the chastity of the speech of Attic orators. Hence probably the strong interest felt by Isocrates in Asiatic affairs.

tent advertisements of what he could perform, and of the principles on which he considered an encomium should be composed. As, however, he assumes (in the *Busiris*) the tone of an experienced sophist of high repute, in contrast to the recent claims of Polycrates, it is probably reasonable to date these speeches shortly before his great performance—the *Panegyricus*—or about 390 B.C.

The *Helen* is composed in rivalry to another Helen, every topic of which he professes to have avoided, while composing a better encomium. This general indication, together with the friendly tone of Isocrates towards his rival, has made many critics, old and new, regard the other extant *Helen* (p. 80) to be the piece intended. The difficulty of ascribing it to Gorgias arises from the mention of that rhetor¹ in the present speech as a negative philosopher, in a way which at first sight seems to imply that he is not the author of the rival composition. The writer of the Greek argument suggests (after Machaon) that Anaximenes of Lampsacus was the rival intended. Blass decides in favour of its being Gorgias. However this may be, Isocrates' proem is quite foreign to the subject, though very suitable if the speech was intended as an advertisement, for it opens with censure of eristic and ethical philosophers, such as Antisthenes and Euthydemus, and also of the Platonic school, who spend their time in vain subtleties. These disputations (it says) are not even original, for ever since Protagoras, Gorgias, Zeno, and Melissus have done all this, and done it better than their successors. Akin to these vanities was their habit (he says) of advocating paradoxes, or exalting mean topics, in order to show their acuteness. He that wrote the encomium of Helen, on the contrary, at least chose a great subject, in which it is worth while to outdo him. After this proem² he approaches the proper argument. It is remarkable for the realistic treatment of mythical history, which gives the speech an unreal complexion, as well as for the digression on Theseus,³ which, though intended to vindicate Helen by the greatness of her ravisher, is expanded with an evident bid for Athenian popularity. If these seem to us drawbacks, the

¹ § 3.² §§ 1-16.³ §§ 22-37.

praise of beauty is, on the other hand, very noble and poetical, and its power in story and in poetry is set forth with great elegance and profound truth.¹ The style shows all the special points of finish, to which we shall revert when we have concluded our survey of the works.

§ 448. The *Busiris* is not only a sketch of an encomium, but also an Apologia for the hero, necessitated by the admission of Polycrates, that he was a cannibal who sacrificed foreigners when they came to Egypt. The subject therefore, as Isocrates points out, is badly chosen, besides being inartistically treated by the rival sophist. The introduction is a letter to Polycrates, couched in apparently friendly terms, professing as an advanced teacher to help an ignorant beginner, by pointing him out his gross faults of composition. The advice is far too sharp to be received in a kindly spirit, and we hear that Polycrates replied by criticising the *Helen* of Isocrates. He had also published an attack on Socrates, which unfortunately is not here described by Isocrates, except that Alcibiades was declared to be the pupil of Socrates, 'a thing no one ever heard before,' and which redounded to Socrates' credit. This then should not have been mentioned in a rhetorical attack. We wonder at Isocrates' criticism, which directly contradicts both Plato and Xenophon, nor has any reasonable explanation for such a statement been offered. In this speech also there is a long digression on Egypt,² which dilates on the still widespread fame of Pythagoras, who had learned his wisdom there. The conclusion of the essay is almost as offensive as the proem, and asserts broadly the superior wisdom and experience of the writer, though younger in years than his correspondent. The composition is not so elegant as that of the *Helen*, though there is some fine writing in praise of Egypt.

The speech *against the Sophists* is classed by the ancients with the foregoing, *detractio* being considered the opposite of *encomium*, and therefore requiring analogous treatment. Isocrates' refutation or censure of rival rhetoricians, first for their absurd pretensions in education, secondly for the immorality of their technæ, in aiding falsehood against truth, is able and

¹ §§ 54-58.

² §§ 11-30.

clear. His attack on the dialecticians and their subtleties, on the contrary, is the shallow talk of a mere essayist, who cannot see the just value of this philosophic training.

§ 449. Before approaching the proper sphere of the orator—his harangues on political subjects—it is well to say a word concerning the few extant court speeches, which the author disowned in later life, but which are both well attested by competent ancient critics, and have internal evidence too strong to be overcome. Thus, for example, a sentence¹ in the earliest of them, that *against Callimachus*, is copied word for word in the *Antidosis*;² and this Isocrates would never have done had not the original form been his own. The speech was delivered shortly after the amnesty, as the practice of arguing a demurrer (*παραγραφή*) before the plaintiff spoke was then quite new, and was specially introduced to meet violations of the amnesty. The legal plea of the speaker (who is the defendant in an action for 10,000 drachmæ, said to have been abstracted from the plaintiff during the troubles following upon the rule of the Thirty) was to urge the act of amnesty, as a bar to further proceedings; but, as was always the case before Athenian juries, such legal points, however valid, must be supported by showing that the defence was a just one on its own merits. Hence most of the speech is spent in proving that the speaker had nothing to say to the loss of the money; moreover, that his opponent was a villain and a sycophant, while he himself was a patriotic democrat. The details concerning the act of amnesty and its general observance make the speech one of historic interest. It is smoothly and gracefully written, but wants the incisiveness of the greater logographers, as well as their superior ethos or character-drawing. A certain diffuseness is also to be observed, which we should naturally expect from Isocrates.

The short speech composed for a man of the lower classes against Lochites, who had assaulted him, has the same features—too much smoothness and too many generalities, though it is very interesting in its assertion of the modern notion of *insult* as the main thing to be resented by free men, the damage done being a mere accidental consequence of an essentially

¹ § 41.² § 91.

unlawful act. Blass compares this speech with that of Demosthenes *against Conon*, to show how abstract and broad Isocrates' pleading is, in comparison with the force and point of Demosthenes. But the opening of the present speech, in which the facts were treated, seems to be lost.

There seems to be also a mutilation at the end of the next speech on our list, that *against Euthynous*, which has no epilogue. Its authenticity has indeed been denied by Benseler, on the ground of the frequent admission of the hiatus. But in other respects it is sufficiently Isocratic to persuade Blass and Sauppe that it is the speech which we hear the orator to have written on the subject, though the only citation from it is not found in our remaining fragment. It may be held either that it is one of Isocrates' earliest speeches, composed before the principle of avoiding the hiatus had been consistently adopted, or that he did not give it a final and careful revision. The case was one of peculiar interest to rhetoricians, and we know that Lysias composed a speech on the other side, of which only a sentence remains. But we may be sure that it was often discussed in abstract exercises, and this is, according to Benseler, the real character of the present document. The intellectual interest referred to was that of arguing a case in which no direct evidence could be procured (*ἀμάρτυρος*), and which was therefore to be settled on general grounds of probability, which could be urged on either side.

The plaintiff Nicias, during the troublous times of the tyranny, being threatened with persecution, had got rid of all his property by depositing it with friends, among whom Euthynous had received three talents to keep for him. When he claimed back his money, Euthynous would only admit the receipt of two. As soon as the democracy was restored, Nicias, who had been afraid to do more than protest at the time, sued for the remaining talent. There being no evidence or witnesses, the case turns on the respective characters of the litigants, and their respective opportunities for sycophancy, or for oppression, under the Thirty. From this point of view the speech is an interesting exercise. In style it seems to me more concise and brief than is usual with Isocrates.

§ 450. The speech *on the Chariot and Pair* (περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους) is really, as we have it, a mere encomium on Alcibiades, whose son is defendant in an action brought for the recovery of the value of the horses, which were alleged to have been wrongfully taken from a certain Tisias. Here again the earlier part, and the proofs of the honest acquisition of the horses from the Argives, seem lost, and we have merely the epilogue answering an attack on the life and policy of Alcibiades. The similar condition of several of the speeches just described, in which we have part of the argument elaborated with only a brief reference at the opening to the missing part, leads me to suspect that, after all, Isocrates may have told practically the truth when he denied that he ever busied himself in the law courts by writing speeches. It may have been his practice, when a case of public interest occurred, such as the general validity of the act of amnesty as a bar to proceedings, or the importance of punishing even a formal assault, or the panegyric of a public man like Alcibiades, to compose by way of model to his pupils a portion of the harangue which ought to have been delivered. This case of Alcibiades must have been peculiarly attractive to the rhetors, for his life and policy were open to either praise or censure. The attack handed down to us among Lysias' speeches bears close relations to the present harangue, either as its forerunner or its reply. Both orations seem mere displays of what could be said on either side concerning a genius so brilliant, so mischievous, and so various in his fortunes. We have another longer and more genuine *encomium* of the same kind in the *Evagoras*, addressed to Evagoras' son Nicocles, tyrant of Cyprus. This family stood in friendly personal relations to the orator, and the deeds of Evagoras in holding Cyprus for years against the Persians were not only more splendid but more recent, and not alloyed by the treacheries and unstablenesses of Alcibiades' career.

§ 451. The case seems to me different in the two remaining court speeches, the oration against Pasion (τραπεζίτικός) and the *Ægineticus*, both composed for friends or pupils, *not Athenians*, and one not even for delivery at Athens. If then the above sup-

position about the other court speeches¹ be correct, we may still believe the orator that he never mixed in the quarrels of citizens, though he assisted a foreign pupil from Byzantium against the banker Pasion, who was originally a metic of no better reputation than the Jewish money-lenders who settled in the mediæval cities of Europe. The conflict is about *à priori* probabilities, not, as in the *Amartyres*, for want of evidence, but from conflict of evidence, the plaintiff alleging that he had deposited a large sum in the bank with no witness except the slave clerk, and that Pasion had even forged a subsequent document to show that he was under no responsibility; Pasion of course denying all this, and showing that the plaintiff had openly alleged his poverty and his debts at Athens. This the plaintiff confesses to have done when summoned by Satyrus, the tyrant of the Bosphorus, to return and surrender his money. The whole case gives us no pleasant picture of the commercial honesty of Athens, and of the chicanery openly alleged against important men of business. This speech is plainer in style, and more closely reasoned, than most of Isocrates' court exercises, but indeed the hiatus is so frequent that Benseler rejects it altogether. We presume from Pasion's after career that he must have either gained or settled this lawsuit, though such an inference, inevitable in our day, is not conclusive in his case, seeing that he was constantly accused of gross fraud, which he managed to tide over through the influence of powerful friends and through his wealth. Our best evidence for the genuineness of the speech is Dionysius' careful criticism of it as such.

A strong argument for the merely theoretical character of the court speeches is furnished by the last and greatest which Isocrates composed, and this in the defence of himself. It was falsely entitled *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως* by Aristotle, whereas the orator, who was pained at the result of this action, conceives himself attacked as to his whole life and profession, in imitation of Socrates, and delivers this long speech as an *Apologia pro vita sua* on a capital charge. Here, then, we

¹ Havet long ago extended this view to all these court speeches, and so apparently, from another point of view, does Kyprianos. Cf. Blass, *AB.* ii. p. 118.

have a distinctly imaginary case treated in this peculiar form. The most interesting of all the other court speeches in the collection is the *Ægineticus* on a disputed succession; but we have already delayed too long upon this lesser side of the orator's activity.

§ 452. I pass to an intermediate pair of speeches, the *Plataicus* and *Archidamus*, which are in many respects like court speeches, though the subject-matter is political, and therefore approaches the 'public advices' to which he devoted the best part of his life and art. The former is supposed to be spoken before the Athenian assembly by a Platean speaker, when that city had been destroyed a second time by the Thebans, about 373 B.C. He appeals to the Athenians, as the advocates of justice in Greece, and as bound by peculiar ties to Plateæa, to interfere, and to restore them to their city. The speech is thus very similar in subject to those inserted by Thucydides in his history, and invites special comparison with the speech of the Plateæans in his third book. But though there is great pathos in the description of the misery of the exiles by Isocrates,¹ and the style is infinitely smoother and more polished, the exercise of the rhetor is almost contemptible in comparison with the burning force and deep earnestness of the historian.

The *Archidamus* is a strong appeal made by the young Spartan prince to his city not to submit to the liberation of Messene by the Thebans, and to choose the extremities of war in preference to such a national disgrace. Both Dionysius and Philostratus place this speech very high in the collection, on account of its splendid expressions of patriotism, and its postponement of all lower motives to that of honour and devotion.²

§ 453. I will only notice three more compositions, the later two of which are only expansions, with some modifications in detail, of the first and most perfect of the orator's harangues,

¹ §§ 46-50.

² I see that G. Sauppe (ad Xen. *Agæ.*, præf. p. 126) declares it certain that this letter is not by Isocrates, I suppose on account of its historical blunders and contradictions about the acquisition of Messene. Blass does not even suspect it.

on which his fame properly rests. This is the *Panegyricus*, a speech which might have been delivered to the assembled Greeks at Olympia or the Panathenæa, but which was actually a pamphlet, and published in a written form, as the orator was totally incompetent to declaim it like Gorgias or Lysias. The subject is Isocrates' lifelong idea, the union of all Greece under the hegemony of Sparta and Athens, for the purpose of the conquest of Asia. It was published about 380 B.C.,¹ when the disastrous results of the peace of Antalcidas were becoming manifest, and when Isocrates' Asiatic pupils were doubtless constantly bringing him details of the misery of the Ionic cities under the decaying Persian despotism. Indeed his persistent anti-Persian policy may have been stimulated by his close relations with eastern Hellas, and doubtless tended to make him very popular among the better classes through the cities of Asia Minor. The Anabasis and Retreat of the 10,000 mercenaries under Clearchus and Xenophon had lately exposed the weakness of the Persian empire, and Isocrates shows an accurate appreciation of these facts. But, along with this war policy, he justifies the claim of Athens to the hegemony of the sea by an elaborate panegyric (in our sense) of her history and her claims, which should persuade the Spartans to yield this portion of their dominion. Here he enters into competition with the ἐπιτάφιοι, or funeral harangues, which always extolled the city and its greatness, so that we are again brought to compare him with Thucydides, whose Epitaphios in Pericles' mouth goes over similar ground, in describing the national merits of Athens as a centre of culture for all Hellenedom. I do not subscribe to the judgment of Blass,² that there is nothing equal to this passage in Greek literature; but I do think that Isocrates has here successfully emulated Thucydides, whether with originality, or, as his opponents alleged, by plagiarism from others, and that the

¹ There are difficulties as to exact date, owing to a statement of Diodorus about Evagoras' war, which cannot be well reconciled by those of Isocrates. Cf. the discussion of the point in Blass, *AB.* ii. p. 230; and Mr. Jebb, *Attic Orators*, ii. p. 151.

² ii. p. 241.

passage is perhaps the best in his works.¹ Of course the harangue was naught as a piece of practical politics, for a vague

¹ §§ 43-51 : Τῶν τοίνυν τὰς πανηγύρεις καταστησάντων δικαίως ἐπαινουμένων, ὅτι τοιοῦτον ἔθος ἡμῖν παρέδωκαν ὥστε σπείσασθαι καὶ τὰς ἔχθρας τὰς ἐνεστηκυίας διαλυσάμενους συνελθεῖν εἰς ταυτόν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' εὐχὰς καὶ θυσίας κοινὰς ποιησάμενους ἀναμνησθῆναι μὲν τῆς συγγενείας τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπαρχούσης, εὐμενεστέρας δ' εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον διατεθῆναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, καὶ τὰς τε παλαιὰς ξενίας ἀνανεώσασθαι καὶ καινὰς ἐτέρας ποιήσασθαι, καὶ μήτε τοῖς ιδιώταις μήτε τοῖς διενεγκούσι τὴν φύσιν ἀργὸν εἶναι τὴν διατριβήν, ἀλλ' ἀθροισθέντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐγγενέσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἐπιδείξασθαι τὰς αὐτῶν εὐεξίας, τοῖς δὲ θεάσασθαι τούτους πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀγωνιζομένους, καὶ μηδετέρους ἀθύμως διάγειν, ἀλλ' ἐκατέρους ἔχειν, ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ὅταν ἴδωσι τοὺς ἀθλητὰς αὐτῶν ἔνεκα ποιοῦντας, οἱ δ' ὅταν ἐνθυμηθῶσιν, ὅτι πάντες ἐπὶ τὴν σφετέραν θεωρίαν ἦκουσι, — τοσοῦτων τοίνυν ἀγαθῶν διὰ τὰς συνόδους ἡμῖν γιγνομένων οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ἀπελείφθη. καὶ γὰρ θεάματα πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα κέκτῃται, τὰ μὲν ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλοντα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας εὐδοκιμούντα, τὰ δ' ἀμφοτέρους τούτοις διαφέροντα· καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν εἰσαφικνουμένων ὡς ἡμᾶς τοσοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὥστ' εἴ τι ἐν τῷ πλησιάζειν ἀλλήλοις ἀγαθόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦθ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς περιειληφθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ φιλίας εὐρεῖν πιστοτάτας καὶ συνουσίας ἐντυχεῖν παντοδαπωτάταις μάλιστα παρ' ἡμῖν ἔστιν, ἔτι δ' ἀγῶνας ἰδεῖν μὴ μόνον τάχους καὶ βώμης ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγων καὶ γνῶμης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων ἀπάντων, καὶ τούτων ἄθλα μέγιστα. πρὸς γὰρ οἷς αὐτὴ τίθησι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους διδόναι συναναπείθει· τὰ γὰρ ὑφ' ἡμῶν κριθέντα τοσαύτην λαμβάνει δόξαν ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαπᾶσθαι. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πανηγύρεις διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου συλλεγεῖσαι ταχέως διελύθησαν. ἡ δ' ἡμετέρα πόλις ἅπαντα τὸν αἰῶνα τοῖς ἀφικνουμένοις πανήγυρις ἐστιν.

Φιλοσοφίαν τοίνυν, ἣ πάντα ταῦτα συνεξεῦρε καὶ συγκατεσκεύασε, καὶ πρὸς τε τὰς πράξεις ἡμᾶς ἐπαίδευσεν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπράυνεν, καὶ τῶν συμφορῶν τὰς τε δι' ἀμαθίαν καὶ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γιγνομένας διεΐλε, καὶ τὰς μὲν φυλάξασθαι, τὰς δὲ καλῶς ἐνεγκεῖν ἐδίδαξεν, ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν κατέδειξε, καὶ λόγους ἐτίμησεν, ὧν πάντες μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τοῖς δ' ἐπισταμένοις φθονοῦσι, συνειδυῖα μὲν, ὅτι τοῦτο μόνον ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν ζῶων ἴδιον ἔφυνεν ἔχοντες, καὶ διότι τούτῳ πλεονεκτήσαντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αὐτῶν διηνέκαμεν, ἱρῶσα δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις οὕτω ταραχῶδεις οὔσας τὰς τύχας ὥστε πολλάκις ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους κατορθοῦν, τῶν δὲ λόγων τῶν καλῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐχόντων οὐ μετὼν τοῖς φαύλοις, ἀλλὰ ψυχῇς εὐ φρονούσης ἔργον ὕπας, καὶ τοὺς τε σοφοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀμαθεῖς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ταύτῃ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διαφέροντας, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλευθέρως τεθραμμένους ἐκ μὲν ἀνδρίας καὶ πλοῦτου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν οὐ γιγνωσκομένους, ἐκ δὲ τῶν λεγομένων μάλιστα καταφανεῖς γιγνομένους, καὶ τοῦτο σύμβολον τῆς παιδείσεως ἡμῶν ἐκάστου πιστότατον ἀποδειγμένον, καὶ τοὺς λόγῳ καλῶς χρωμένους οὐ μόνον ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν

advice to Sparta and Athens from the study of a sophist to unite against Persia was not likely to sway public councils. The whole importance of the speech is its splendid form, which was in fact not only far superior to any previous piece of prose, but has not been surpassed either in Greek or modern writing. It is accordingly a monumental piece of writing, and, as such, not only deserved the ten years which the author devoted to its composition, but the great attention ever since paid to it by the students of rhetoric. Minute criticism has discovered slight inconsistencies in the political attitude, owing to the long interval between the composition of various parts, and even to enlightened Athenians, not to say to moderns, the citation of mythical friendships as arguments for modern alliances, and the distortion of history for panegyrical purposes, are defects which mar the enjoyment of the perfect form in which these trivialities or falsehoods are disposed. There is, moreover, an extreme equability of flow, a smoothness of diction, a rounding of periods, which a modern orator would have varied with bolder figures of diction, with poetical quotations, or at least with that forcible terseness which was admitted even in the stricter Attic prose writing. But, with all these reservations, the *Panegyricus* is still one of the masterpieces of prose, and has perhaps more constantly influenced careful writers in Greece, in Rome, and in the Renaissance, than any other harangue which could be named.¹

§ 454. In advanced old age, when Isocrates had long seen the fruitlessness of his endeavours to reconcile the leading states by persuasion, he found in the rise of Philip a practical hope of realising his ideas. He therefore addressed him the open letter entitled *Philip*, calling upon him to insist upon peace among

δυναμένους ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐντίμους ὄντας. τοσοῦτον δ' ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ὥσθ' οἱ ταύτης μαθηταὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασιν, καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποιήκε μηκέτι τοῦ γένους ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον Ἑλλήνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδείας τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας.

¹ I will not give an analysis of this speech, as no student who desires to appreciate Isocrates can avoid reading it through in preference to any of the rest.

the Greeks, and to lead them against Persia. Thus the wealth of Asia would be carried back to Greece, and ample territory would be found for all the exiled and wandering mercenaries, who were now a pestilence in the Greek world. The orator had even predicted with singular felicity in his *Panegyricus*, that the difficulty would yet be to keep the Greeks at home, a state of things which really ensued under Alexander's successors, and produced, more than any other cause, the curious and sudden depopulation of the country. Isocrates thinks that the project would have been realised by Agesilaus, had he not spoilt his prospects, and created perpetual seditions and revolutions among the Greeks, by bringing back his own friends to power, whenever they had been exiled, or subdued by the opposite party.¹

The other side of the *Panegyricus*—the encomium of Athens—was taken up again in the prolix and tedious *Panathenaiicus*, already noticed as being composed between the author's ninety-fourth and ninety-eighth years, and which, therefore, should not be criticised too severely. But in form and style even this essay could not easily be surpassed, though Isocrates often apologises for his own decay, and protests that he is now no longer able to polish and adorn his speeches as he had done in former years. From this it appears that style never became a second nature with Isocrates, as it does with most great English authors, but always remained (as perhaps with the modern French) a conscious art. His definition of culture, in opposition to the philosophers and the lower sophists, is so interesting that I will quote it. It will be noticed that he is rather averse to the popular exposition and criticism of the poets, which we often see in Plato's dialogues, and which was certainly one of the usual modes of education.²

¹ §§ 86-88.

² §§ 26-35 : Τῆς μὲν οὖν παιδείας τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων καταλειφθείσης τοσούτου δέω καταφρονεῖν, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ἐφ' ἡμῶν κατασταθεῖσαν ἐπαινῶ, λέγων δὲ τὴν τε γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τοὺς διαλόγους τοὺς ἐριστικούς καλουμένους, οἷς οἱ μὲν νεώτεροι μᾶλλον χαίρουσι τοῦ δέοντος, τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ὅστις ἂν ἀνεκτοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι φήσειεν. Ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐγὼ τοῖς ὠρμημένοις ἐπὶ ταῦτα παρακελεύομαι πονεῖν καὶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν ἅπασι τούτοις, λέγων, ὡς εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ἕλλοι δύναται τὰ

§ 455. A word in conclusion on the nine letters in the collection, which, contrary to the usual rule, are all admitted to be genuine by the critics. Some of these (1, 6, 8) are mere proems to political advices, and evidently published as specimens by the author. The ninth (to Archidamus) is a very elegant summary of most of Isocrates' political views, and written in his best style. Three (4, 7, 8,) are letters of recommendation, of which the fourth (to Antipater) is one of the most perfect models of what such a letter ought to be. It is remarkable that, though we find some references to his *technē*, and to clever apophthegms in his conversation, there is not a single quotation from

μαθήματα ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἀποτρέπει γε τοὺς νεωτέρους πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀμαρτημάτων. τοῖς μὲν οὖν τηλικούτοις οὐδέποτε ἂν εὑρεθῆναι νομίζω διατριβὰς ὡφελιμωτέρας τούτων οὐδὲ μᾶλλον πρεπούσας· τοῖς δὲ πρεσβυτέροις καὶ τοῖς εἰς ἄνδρας δεδοκιμασμένοις οὐκέτι φημὶ τὰς μελέτας ταύτας ἀρμόττειν. ὥρῳ γὰρ ἐνίοις τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς μαθήμασι τούτοις οὕτως ἀπηκριβωμένων ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους διδάσκειν, οὐτ' εὐκαίρως ταῖς ἐπιστήμας αἷς ἔχουσι χρωμένους, ἔν τε ταῖς ἄλλαις πραγματείαις ταῖς περὶ τὸν βίον ἀφρονεστέρους ὄντας τῶν μαθητῶν, ὁκνῶ γὰρ εἰπεῖν τῶν οἰκετῶν. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ γνώμην ἔχω καὶ περὶ τῶν δημηγορεῖν δυναμένων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν γραφὴν τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐδοκιοῦντων, ὅλως δὲ περὶ ἀπάντων τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις διαφερόντων. οἶδα γὰρ καὶ τούτων τοὺς πολλοὺς οὔτε τὰ περὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καλῶς διφκηκότας οὐτ' ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις ἀνεκτοὺς ὄντας, τῆς τε δόξης τῆς τῶν συμπολιτευομένων ὀλιγοῦντας, ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ἀμαρτημάτων γέμοντας· ὥστ' οὐδὲ τούτους ἡγοῦμαι μετέχειν τῆς ἔξεως, περὶ ἧς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω διαλεγόμενος. Τίνας οὖν καλῶ πεπαιδευμένους, ἐπειδὴ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδοκιμάζω; πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς καλῶς χρωμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκάστην προσπίπτουσι, καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐπιτυχῇ τῶν καιρῶν ἔχοντας καὶ δυναμένην ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ συμφέροντος· ἔπειτα τοὺς πρεπόντως καὶ δικαίως ὁμιλοῦντας τοῖς ἀεὶ πλησιάζουσι, καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀηδίας καὶ βαρύτητας εὐκόλως καὶ ῥαδίως φέροντας, σφᾶς δ' αὐτοὺς ὡς δυνατόν ἐλαφροτάτους καὶ μετριωτάτους τοῖς συνοῦσι παρέχοντας· ἔτι δὲ τοὺς τῶν μὲν ἡδονῶν ἀεὶ κρατοῦντας, τῶν δὲ συυφορῶν μὴ λίαν ἡττωμένους, ἀλλ' ἀνδρωδῶς ἐν αὐταῖς διακειμένους καὶ τῆς φύσεως ἀξίως, ἧς μετέχοντες τυγχάνομεν· τέταρτον, ὕπερ μέγιστον, τοὺς μὴ διαφθειρομένους ὑπὸ τῶν εὐπραγιῶν μηδ' ἐξισταμένους αὐτῶν μηδ' ὑπερηφάνους γιγνομένους ἀλλ' ἐμμένοντας τῇ τάξει τῇ τῶν εὐφρονούντων, καὶ μὴ μᾶλλον χαίροντας τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρξασιν ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομένοις. τοὺς δὲ μὴ μόνον πρὸς ἐν τούτων ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα τὴν ἔξιν τῆς ψυχῆς εὐάρμοστον ἔχοντας, τούτους φημὶ καὶ φρονίμους εἶναι καὶ τελείους ἄνδρας καὶ πάσας ἔχειν τὰς ἀρετάς.

any lost oration—a good guarantee that we possess, as in the case of Plato and Demosthenes, all that he published. There is, moreover, a long catalogue of spurious treatises ascribed to him, quoted in the anonymous *Life*. The list is printed at the end of Benseler's (Teubner) edition.

§ 456. We now turn to the closer consideration of his rhetorical theory and his style. The first question which arises is whether Isocrates ever published a formal *techné*, or handbook of the theory of oratory, as was done by almost all the composers of court speeches. The conflicting evidence has been summed up with great care by Blass,¹ who shows that, though there are several references to, and quotations from, an alleged *techné*, there is not sufficient evidence to ascribe it to Isocrates himself, who seems only to have devised special rhetorical artifices called *τέχναι*, collected by his pupils into a book which passed under his name. This conclusion is quite consonant with the character of his mind, which was not capable (I think) of devising a complete and logical system. He rather looked upon rhetoric, which was to him synonymous with philosophy, as a mental gymnastic, requiring, first, good natural abilities, secondly, assiduous practice, and obtaining from theoretical instruction only moderate help. He distinguished, broadly speaking, the kinds of oratory into three: dicastic, or court speeches, which he considered an inferior branch; epideictic, or harangues of display, consisting of encomia or of the reverse, and these either of mythical characters or of historical men—the latter often of use in the epilogues of court speeches; and thirdly, deliberations, or orations of advice, of which the moral exhortations to individuals (Nicocles) were of less importance, and of inferior form, being necessarily disjointed in form, like gnomic poetry. The public advices, or speeches on national affairs, were, on the contrary, the highest and most valuable result of the whole art.

In all these he considered that the elements, or factors which made up the result, the 'ideas,' as he vaguely called them, were neither many nor obscure; the whole art consisted in combining them. On this point he has only left us the most

¹ pp. 97–8.

ordinary practical hints ; he evidently trusted to constant practising, and to the imitation of the models he proposed, as the real method of learning, in opposition to the purely scientific and theoretical instruction in the school of his rival Aristotle. We can only seek his notions from the occasional statements scattered through his speeches, and quoted from his teaching by old critics. He tells us first that we should choose a noble subject, not a trivial or a paradoxical one (like the cannibal Busiris) for an eulogy. This talent in the right choice of a subject depends upon natural taste, and cannot be taught. Then he tells us that the proem is not to be too long or too short, that it must fit closely into the main subject, that the narrative must be natural, and much more of such obvious, almost trivial advice, recommending that the finest and most striking topic should be kept for the last. Again, he cautions against digressions, though his own exercises are not free from this fault. Above all, he seems to have paid great attention to making easy and natural transitions from one topic to another, an art which is perhaps nowhere more remarkably exhibited than in his speeches. He utterly scorned the formal subdivision into heads since so popular in Puritan preaching, and sought to lead the hearer naturally and without conscious effort along well considered and carefully prepared, but carefully concealed lines of argument. A hiatus or gap in passing from one topic to another was to him as inartistic as a hiatus between two adjoining vowels. He recommends greater simplicity in court speeches, where a jury is to be convinced, whereas a harangue should be as splendid as a lyric ode, that is, a Greek lyric ode, such as those of Pindar and Simonides.

As to the particular ideas, the great point is to have them perfectly new, an advice only practicable in harangues, and which Isocrates has himself violated by admitting commonplaces into his court speeches,¹ as well as by repeating himself in later years. But, on the whole, he really adheres to the precept, his *Helen* being a remarkable exhibition of an exercise on a trite subject, in which he boasts that he does not reiterate a single topic used by his predecessors. In the next place, the striking points must

¹ *Antid.* § 18; *Trapez.* § 54.

not only be suitable in length and dignity, but should be distributed equably throughout the speech. It is remarkable that in encomia, and in personal attacks, he distinctly admits and even recommends exaggeration of the truth. This feature, which he applies not only to mythical, but to recent events, was of momentous importance in injuring the historical sense, if not the moral sense, of the historians who were his pupils. I will here add, as belonging rather to the matter than the manner, that though the whole flow of Isocrates' harangues is extremely ornate, he does not admit, or admits only very sparingly, those special ornaments, such as quotations from poets, epigrams, and witticisms, which are the main stock of modern orators. Such diversions, which are almost as foreign to Demosthenes as to Isocrates, are unworthy of the solemnity and dignity assumed by most Greek orators.

§ 457. Passing from the discussion of the proper *thoughts* in a speech, upon which we can find little that is new or original in Isocrates, but rather a careful and methodical use of the rules long since suggested by the experience of his predecessors, we come to the rules for *expression*. These are of course either for words (*ὀνόματα*) or for the combination of words (*σύνθεσις*). On the former of these heads he recommends strongly the use of the ordinary vocabulary, which he calls *πολιτικὰ ὀνόματα*, and censures the use of metaphorical or strange words, not absolutely, for the style is to be polished and above common language, but in any excess, for perfect style consists not in novelties and surprises, but in the perfect use of the speech of other men. This is the more praiseworthy in Isocrates, as the choice of words (*ἐκλογή*) of Gorgias and his school was very ornate and artificial. Hence Dionysius and other critics cite him as, next to Lysias, the highest model of pure Attic diction, using the simplest and best recognised terms, and even too timid in avoiding the bold tropes and metaphors so striking in Demosthenes. However splendid the subject, and however noble the diction, it is everywhere remarkable how the effect is produced essentially by the *composition*, by a careful and artistic arrangement of common terms, seldom by the use of grand and poetical words. This is indeed the secret of a great artist, which he

might teach by constant showing and correcting, never by any definite collection of rules.¹ Occasional departures from this simplicity are caused by the necessities of the case. On the other hand, so many words and combinations of words are rejected by the purism of the author, that it is easy to find in a spurious speech like the *Demonicus* numerous violations of his usage. This Benseler has done, but it ought to make the same critic hesitate in rejecting other speeches merely on the ground of the hiatus, which is a far more fallible test than the accumulation of many phrases and constructions not found in the recognised works of so very consistent and careful a stylist.

§ 458. As to the composition of the words, there are a few rules quoted from the alleged *technē*. First to avoid hiatus in utterance, which must arise if we end a word, and commence the next, with vowels. And this is only a salient instance of the great importance he attached to melodious utterance, and the avoidance of all harsh and difficult combinations of sounds. But in most of these, our ignorance of the real pronunciation makes it impossible to guess his reasons; in the case of hiatus we have a law common in French and other modern languages. This matter was first thoroughly sifted by Benseler, whose book upon it² is a classical work, though he overrates its importance as a test of genuineness. For the law is not absolute in Isocrates, much less in other writers, though all his contemporaries, and all subsequent prose writers, more or less conformed to it. The elision or crasis of Greek and of Latin poetry became a law for the Romance lan-

¹ Some of the instances collected by Benseler are as follows: *σύν* is never used separately, always *μετά*, a peculiarity followed by most of the Attic orators: by Lysurgus, Hypereides, and Dinarchus absolutely, by Lysias, Demosthenes, Plato almost so (cf. Blass, *AB.* ii. 127). Again, *ἀποστέλλεσθαι* and *λέγειν* only of persons, *ἀναλίσκειν* only of time and money, *ἐξαλείφειν*, literally, of writing; *νοῦς* only with *ἔχειν* and *προσέχειν*, and a dozen more such points. This extraordinary purism is somewhat relaxed in his latest compositions. He seems even to repeat the same combinations, *θαυμάζειν καὶ ζηλοῦν, ἐπαινεῖν καὶ τιμᾶν*, &c., as if he felt them peculiarly suitable.

² *De Hiatu in Orat. Att. et Histor. Græcis* (Friburg, 1841).

guages, but no prose has ever been so strict in observing it as developed Greek prose. Blass doubts whether Isocrates was properly the discoverer of the principle, but the indifference of Lysias in some of his best speeches, and of Plato in earlier works, seems to point to him as its first promulgator. Indeed in two speeches, the *Trapeziticus* and that *against Euthynous*, hiatus is not avoided, and hence Benseler rejects them. But these are early speeches, perhaps the only real court speeches, and may have been composed before he adopted the principle, or to conceal his personality. I have already observed that in Isocrates genuineness can be independently tested.

As to the particular kinds of hiatus admissible, of course those which admit of elision or crasis are not in point, though prose does not use these expedients so largely as poetry. Thus where there is a stop, elision is inadmissible, and a hiatus will occur which is by no means so offensive as that in the middle of a clause. Furthermore, as even these latter cannot be evaded, Isocrates admits a certain number, $\tau\acute{\iota}$, $\tau\iota$, $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$, $\ddot{\upsilon}\tau\iota$ and $\pi\rho\acute{o}$, with a vowel following; likewise $\epsilon\ddot{\upsilon}$, as do tragic and comic poets, but I doubt whether this υ was not pronounced a soft consonant, as it is now by the modern Greeks. $\pi\omicron\lambda\upsilon\ \ddot{\alpha}\nu$ is allowed, but no other case with $\ddot{\alpha}\nu$, and in the looser speeches $\epsilon\grave{\iota}$ and $\eta\grave{\iota}$ with a following vowel. In his stricter writing Isocrates carefully avoids hiatus with the cases of the article. Why these selections were made is now obscure, but should be carefully studied by those who seek to recover the old pronunciation. Many other details are given by Benseler. Another prescription was against closing and opening successive words with the same syllable, as $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\alpha\nu\omicron\ddot{\upsilon}\mu\epsilon\nu\ \acute{\mu}\acute{\epsilon}\nu$, which occurs indeed, with one or two more cases, in Isocrates. This law is obvious enough, and, had it been strictly followed, would have saved us endless blundering in the copying of our Greek MSS., and precluded many of Cobet's most brilliant emendations. Other disagreeable combinations were no doubt equally eschewed.

§ 459. When we approach the larger question of rythm, we find ourselves on peculiarly Greek ground. We can easily follow Isocrates when he taught that good prose must be more flowing and musical than conversation, and yet not so formal

as poetry—that it must, in fact, be rythmical, but not metrical. But when his pupils and rivals began to discuss the proper rythms to use, and the master recommended iambi and trochees, while Ephorus objected to spondees and tribrachs, and recommended pæons and dactyls, while Aristotle favoured the first pæon at the opening, and the fourth at the close, of a sentence—when we hear these and other such rules, we feel that there is indeed rythm in prose writing, and that we ourselves feel one kind awkward and another pleasant; but we cannot follow the Greeks into detail. The examples cited by the critics seem to depend completely upon quantity, disregarding accent; and this alone would make their rules unintelligible to a modern Greek, more than to an Englishman. Every good writer among us is led by an obscure feeling of rythm, which he observes, but none study prose writing with sufficient care to think of formulating their practice. It is refreshing to find that even the Greeks could not agree upon any absolute law, and that the later Asian orators, who constantly closed with trochees, like Isocrates' *ὠφελεῖν εὐρασθαι*, were ridiculed for it. Blass' analysis of many passages in Isocrates¹ proves that he used a great variety of rythms, but so combined them as to avoid poetical metre. It is very remarkable that, with all these artificial laws as to the order of words, our author seldom transposes the logical order, and that his sentences are models of clearness and facility. It is indeed one mark of genius, like that of great poets, to say naturally in metre what ordinary men can hardly express in prose; but this no doubt was one of the causes why he spent such vast time and labour on his writing. The result seems simple enough; yet how many times may each sentence have been recast before logical clearness and melodious rythm were equally satisfied. On the other hand, Isocrates' over-strictness in avoiding transposition deprived him of that peculiar force and vividness which Thucydides, for example, attains by the prominence into which he roughly drags his leading idea and its contrasts.

We now come to the combination of rythmical clauses, or *periods*, which are a very distinctive feature in Isocratic prose,

¹ pp. 138, 87.

though unfortunately we have no rules left us by the master himself as to his usage in this respect. Our earliest authority is the suspected third book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, from which we learn that a period in prose is like a strophe in verse, a complete unity, including various members under it, but as a whole easily grasped and satisfying to the mind. By the aid of a suspended grammatical construction, and of adversative or connecting particles, a very long sentence can thus be brought into a well-balanced and harmonious system; but the poetical period is stricter in form; the prose period only varies the length and weight of its members, in order that the thought may also be rounded off and complete. It is evident from the careful survey of sentences by Blass¹ that very great variety was admitted, both as to the number of the clauses and their relative lengths, in Isocrates' periods. In fact, instead of the obvious antithesis of equally balanced clauses (such as those so common in Gorgias and in our Gibbon), he used a larger and more complicated harmony, in which we can now only wonder at the effect, and enumerate the elements, without being able to extract from them the law—if law it was, and not a cultivated instinct—which guided him in his practice.

Certain it is that we often find a thought expanded for the sake of fuller expression, and that this insistence upon formal harmony wearies the reader who desires to hurry onward to a new thought. But if there was one thing wholly strange and odious to Isocrates, it was hurry in thinking or speaking. Let us quote a specimen. In the *Panegyricus* he wishes to say (as a sequel to his undertaking that he will exceed all former speeches), that while our ancestral glories are common property to all, the highest treatment of them is a peculiar gift, and oratory would indeed flourish if admiration was bestowed not on the first inventors of speech, but on those who have brought it to perfection. How does he express this idea?² He ex-

¹ *AB*. ii. pp. 147, sq.

² §§ 9–10 : αἱ μὲν γὰρ πράξεις αἱ προγεγενημέναι κοινὰ πᾶσιν ἡμῶν κατελείφθησαν, τὸ δ' ἐν καιρῷ ταύταις καταχρῆσασθαι καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα περὶ ἐκάστης ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὖ διαθέσθαι τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἴδιόν ἐστιν. ἡγοῦμαι δ' οὕτως ἂν μεγίστην ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας

pands the first clause, and gives weight to its conclusion by adding the superfluous *ἡμῖν κατελείφθησαν*, because he desires to expand the responding idea, the oratorical treatment of ideas, in three parallel clauses, all coming under the *ἰέ*. Then he brings the emphatic *ἰδιον* into a later part of its clause than the corresponding *κοιναί*, thus gaining variety of order without losing his point.

All the rhetorical points in such periods as this are easy to apprehend, when we apply ourselves to the careful study of their structure. But I confess I can hardly follow Blass in the details of the analysis by which he shows that, in putting an argument, Isocrates balanced period against period, and wrote with an almost poetical though various symmetry. The reader will see the specimens he quotes,¹ and will be disposed to agree generally with his result ; but the working out of the details is not easy, as the exact limits of each clause may be variously fixed by different critics. Enough has been said to call attention to the subject, and show how Isocrates combined extraordinary fulness and splendour of style with perfect clearness and simplicity of structure.

§ 460. With regard to the ornament, or what the ancients called figures, he employs the antithesis, sameness of length, and sameness of opening or concluding sound, which Gorgias had already used to excess. It seems that Isocrates was

τέχνας καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς λόγους φιλοσοφίαν, εἴ τις θαυμάζοι καὶ τιμῇ μὴ τοὺς πρώτους τῶν ἔργων ἀρχομένους ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἄρισθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐξεργαζομένους, μηδὲ τοὺς περὶ τούτων ζητοῦντας λέγειν, περὶ ᾧ μηδεὶς πρότερον εἴρηκεν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς οὕτως ἐπισταμένους εἰπεῖν, ὥς οὐδεὶς ἂν ἄλλος δύναιτο. The latter sentence is a very elegant specimen of a rythmical and orderly period. The verbs are put first, because the double objects (other arts and eloquence) would otherwise keep the hearer too long in suspense as to the construction. Then in the expression *θαυμάζοι καὶ τιμῇ* the verb is doubled, merely to increase the weight of a clause which introduces a lengthy pair of oppositions distributed in a double pair of clauses. These clauses are marked both by rymed endings, and by curious and delicate varieties of expression. Thus *λέγειν, εἴρηκεν, εἰπεῖν* are used together to avoid tautology of sound, *μηδεὶς* and *οὐδεὶς* with their corresponding tenses producing the same effect. Moreover, *ζητοῦντας* compares with *ἐπισταμένους*, and the conditional *μηδεὶς* with *δύναιτο*.

¹ pp. 148-53.

averse to other alliteration or plays upon words for this very reason. But Gorgias had brought his rhymes and alliterations close together, whereas in Isocrates they help us to catch the sense of balanced clauses. The maturer speeches seem to employ them less, and we know that later critics despised all such arts as trivial. Isocrates avoids the *ἀναφορά*, or repetition of an emphatic word, common in Lysias, but agrees with him in the use of self-questioning to add liveliness to the argument. Asyndeton with him is rare, and so indeed are those figures of thought, such as irony and apostrophe, which were so effective in his successors. But I have already noticed the careful and smooth junction of his sentences and subjects, which is not consistent with violent emotions.

I must refer the special student to more explicit books for closer analyses of Isocrates' rhetorical excellences. Mr. Jebb¹ has given very full accounts of all his orations; Blass has 100 weighty pages on his style and diction; the Frenchmen Cartelier and Havet have treated him from these and other points of view. Of course he was the delight of later rhetoricians, and, had not Demosthenes arisen, would have been the leading name in Greek oratory.

§ 461. Owing to this competition, Isocrates, who had been in his day praised above all living men, falls in for a good deal of adverse criticism. The early critics Philonicus, Hieronymus, and Cleochares are cited by Dionysius as having made all manner of sound reflections on Isocrates' style, compared with the simple grace of Lysias and the force of Demosthenes. His sameness and smoothness, his agreeable flow, and never-failing dignity pall upon the taste, which desires stronger flavour and greater variety. Dionysius himself, in his tract on Isocrates, and again in his remarks on Demosthenes, is accurate and thoroughly sound in his judgments, for Isocrates claims to be judged as a rhetorician, and in this field Dionysius was a really great authority. Cicero also, whose style is exceedingly like that of Isocrates, appears to have especially used him for a model—as indeed did Demosthenes, and through these two orators he has moulded all the prose of modern Europe. But

¹ *Attic Orators*, vol. ii.

his great followers supplied from their genius, or from other models, the higher qualities in which he was wanting—conciseness, boldness, and, above all, pathos, which is hardly ever to be found in the polished periods of the self-satisfied professor of eloquence. Yet, strangely enough, though his moral exhortations were favourites in education, and his other speeches studied for sophistic displays—though Dionysius and Hermogenes were very full and appreciative concerning him—we have no scholia extant upon him except the few empty wordy notes published by Coraes from a Vatican copy (65 L), and again by W. Dindorf, with those on Æschines (Oxon. 1852). This is the more remarkable, as we possess one MS. of his works, which is better than most Greek MSS., the famous Urbinas, which is now the basis of our critical editions. The others are not to be named in comparison with this splendid codex. The first printed edition is also of the earliest among Greek classics, being, I think, the first prose author issued (Milan, 1493), and in the fine old type, which the influence of the Aldine press unfortunately destroyed. We then have the handsome Aldine edition of 1513, with the lesser orators. Since that time this remarkable author has been less edited than might have been expected. The Stephanus (1593) and the Basle (Hieronymus Wolf, 1570) are the chief texts till we come to Coraes (Paris, 1807) with the scholia, Bekker's text (Oxford, 1823) and the Zurich editors. There is also a good critical revision with the fragments by Benseler in the Teubner series. The *Demonicus* and *Panegyricus* have been lately brought out, with English notes, by J. E. Sandys (Cambridge, 1872), the *Panegyricus* and *Areopagiticus* by Rauchenstein, and a few other single orations by other scholars. Reiske's *Index Græcitalis Isocratæ* was reprinted by T. Mitchell (Oxford, 1828). The careful translation and commentary of the Duc de Clermont-Tonnerre are specially commented on by Egger (Paris, 1865). There are several German translations, and one Italian. I am not aware of any in English.

CHAPTER IX.

THE LESSER CONTEMPORARIES OF ISOCRATES.

§ 462. THE historian of Greek literature must chiefly occupy himself with the greatest and best of each period, as its real fruit both in showing the national genius, and in affecting the literary history of the world. But our full consideration of Plato and of Isocrates—the greatest lights of this generation—must not blind us to the large number of lesser stars around them, who as critics, imitators, and even as independent thinkers, also affected their age, and had perhaps more influence than is now apparent. The very names of these writers are unfamiliar to ordinary students, and do not even appear in some histories of Attic literature; but this makes it the more desirable to give such account of them as is necessary to a right estimate of the age.

We must remember that the earlier sophists started from universality of knowledge as their standpoint; they professed so to teach general culture, that on any given subject a man might be able to speak with elegance and with persuasion. Such was especially the aim of Gorgias, the most striking and suggestive of the older generation, whose negative attitude in philosophy was no doubt intended to arm the man of general culture against the specialist in metaphysic. As has been said above (p. 62), in the chapter on the Sophists, the attempt at teaching universal wisdom, even through the help of scepticism, broke down before the orthodoxy of the public, who resented this *ἐπιτείχισμα τῶν λόγων* (as Alkidamas well called it), and before the attacks of the specialists, who by confining themselves to single subjects attained a depth and authority unattainable by polymaths. Antiphon, Plato, and Isocrates, each in his own line, made an impression on the Greek world,

which the more direct descendants of Gorgias sought in vain to rival. That the latter school still existed, that they carried on bitter controversies with one another, with Plato, and with Isocrates, that they moreover published their views in a voluminous body of literature, is well known to us from the criticisms of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, from the anecdotes of Diogenes Laertius, and from the lists of titles, and literary scraps, in Suidas and in various grammatical and rhetorical remains.

But of all this vast body of literature there only survive, perhaps happily for us, four little speeches, and a rhetorical tract. From these, however, we can form some estimate of the lesser writers of the day, just as the spurious orations in the works of Lysias and Demosthenes inform us, perhaps better than the genuine, of the average practical eloquence at Athens.

§ 463. The first of the four speeches is the *Ajax and Odysseus*, ascribed to ANTISTHENES, the founder of the Cynic, and indirectly the Stoic philosophy—a very remarkable figure in his day, as appears from the extraordinary sketch in Diogenes Laertius. But the main interest in him belongs rather to the history of Greek philosophy, to which I must refer the reader for a full account of his opinions. Being the son of a Thracian mother, and of poor circumstances, he began his studies late in life, and when attracted by Socrates was perhaps the most independent and original of all his pupils. This many-sided man was not only a philosopher but a rhetor, who had learned from Protagoras and Prodicus; he speaks disrespectfully of Gorgias. His character may best be gathered from his conversation in Xenophon's *Symposium* and *Memoirs of Socrates*, in both of which he takes a leading part. As he turned to practical ethics, and to the best rule of life, we find him ridiculing Plato's Ideas, and setting up sceptical paradoxes, which are in their turn ridiculed by Isocrates in his *Helen*. Plato, in his *Sophistes*, and Aristotle in his *Metaphysic*, speak of him with contempt as an unscientific and therefore unsuggestive teacher, who was not properly educated or cultivated.¹ This seems

¹ They seem to have the same sort of feeling about him which well trained university men have for self-educated writers, who often possess greater

strange in the face of his writings, which embraced tracts on Homer, Theognis, and other poets, on various questions of philosophy, and on rhetoric. The long and various list may be seen in the *Life* by Diogenes. Xenophon and Theopompus, among his cotemporaries, speak of him with great respect.

We are here, however, concerned with his rhetorical works, which seem to have contained a number of tracts on style, and also a number of specimens of oratory, in the form of imaginary attacks on or defences of mythical heroes. His dialogues were especially celebrated among later Greeks, and he is even cited as a model of Attic diction. Cicero says¹ that the fourth and fifth books of his *Cyrus* struck him 'like all Antisthenes' writings, as rather the work of a subtle than of a learned man.' The rhetors Dionysius and Hermogenes neglect him completely, and to this cause we perhaps owe the almost total loss of his works.

§ 464. The one document now ascribed to him is the argument of Ajax and Odysseus for the arms of Achilles, before a jury, said, in the legend, to be composed of Trojan captives. But this jury is not distinctly addressed as such in either speech, and is treated with contempt by Ajax, as knowing nothing of the case, and not being present at the previous conflicts. Hence the jury must be supposed a different one, made up of people who stayed at home, else we should certainly have had appeals from both speakers to the experience of the Trojan captives during the war. The argument of Ajax is short and blunt, insolent to the jury, and contemptuous to his adversary. With a good deal of ethos, and even with a few rhetorical points (such as the opposition, § 9 of διαγιγνώσκειν with διαδοξάζειν) there is much slovenliness in the style; thus λόγος or parts of λέγειν are used ten times in ten lines.² The answer of Odysseus is naturally longer and more elaborate, and vindicates the value of astuteness and wakefulness, of stratagems and wiles, against the brute valour and ignorance of Ajax. There

originality and force, but are wanting in the form and grace only attainable in an atmosphere of classical culture. Isocrates' school was doubtless the Oxford, Plato's the Cambridge of the day.

¹ *Ad Att.* xii. 38.

² §§ 7-8.

are constant allusions to the stories, and even to the expressions and metaphors, of Homer's *Iliad*.

The genuineness of this piece has been most needlessly attacked by many critics. Some think that these rhetorical exercises about imaginary cases only came into fashion late in the schools; others observe that there is some avoidance of hiatus, and therefore evidence of the prior existence of this law. Others again call the speeches unreal and vapid. All these difficulties have been disposed of by Blass,¹ who is one of the few German critics ready to defend suspected works. But he has hardly put enough stress on the important precedent set by Euripides in his tragedies, which show us that elaborate arguments on mythical quarrels were not only in fashion long before the later schools, but were much to the taste of the Attic public. Hence it is quite natural that we should hear of almost all the sophists occupying themselves with rhetorical displays in defence of Helen or Paris, or even Polyphemus, and in attacking Palamedes and other heroes of good report. These were in fact the favourite subjects for those sophists who wished to show their cleverness in teaching the art of debate. So far as I know, Socrates was the first *modern* personage who afforded materials for such exercises. As regards the absence of hiatus, there is no reason to think this work was brought out by Antisthenes until Isocrates was an established teacher, and his principles of composition generally recognised. The avowed hostility of Antisthenes and other sophists to Isocrates could not save them from his influence, and there is every evidence that this particular law of euphony found early and universal favour. It is greatly to be regretted that all the dialogues of Antisthenes are lost, for in them old critics recognised the best specimens of his style. The *Ajax and Odysseus* is not wanting in ability, but as a rhetorical specimen is poor and weak when compared with the greater productions of the age.

§ 465. A lesser figure, but one more strictly belonging to our history, is that of ALKIDAMAS, the son of Diokles, born in Æolis, who seems to have been contemporary with Isocrates, for his

¹ *AB.* vol. ii. pp. 310, sq.

extant speech *about the Sophists* came out before the *Panegyricus*, and he is, moreover, mentioned as the master of the orator Æschines, who was born in 390 B.C. This man was not only the pupil, but in the strictest sense the follower of Gorgias. For Antisthenes, though a rhetor and a sophist, was also a Socratic philosopher, and this side of his teaching, as an exaggeration of Socratism, was far more important than his Sophistic. Alkidamas, on the contrary, is the strict rhetor and sophist combined, who professes to teach men how to speak well on any subject, and his theory is put forth in the able tract still extant—a manifesto directed against the school of Isocrates. Suidas, indeed, calls him a philosopher, and the titles of some physical works by him are mentioned, but these seem of slight import. Even in formal knowledge of rhetoric he seems to have done little, nor is any official *techné* of his now known from certain indications. But Tzetzes, who says he read several of his books, mentions that the *Encomium on Death* he could not find (though Cicero refers to it¹). There are, besides a *φυσικὸς λόγος*, the *Messeniakos*, composed on the opposite side of the case from Isocrates' *Archidamos*, the *Eulogies* of the courtesan Thaïs, his *Mouscion*, and the speech *about the Sophists*, which last is not mentioned by the ancients. The *Mouscion* is interesting as having contained an account of the contest of Homer and Hesiod, and of Hesiod's death.²

As a rhetorician Alkidamas seems to have asserted himself to be the rival of Isocrates, and with some success; for though posterity has decided long ago in favour of Isocrates, Aristotle (in his *Rhetoric*) combats Alkidamas' claims with considerable care and asperity. He censures him as being frigid, and illustrates it by many instances of the excessive use of composite terms, the use of poetical words, and the excess of epithets, which were used not as spice but as food in his writing.³ Dionysius

¹ *Tusc. Disp.* i. § 116.

² I have discussed it above (Vol. I. § 87).

³ *Rhet.* iii. 3, § 3 : Διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμαντος ψυχρὰ φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, οὕτω πυκνοῖς καὶ μέζουσι καὶ ἐπιδήλοις· οἶον, οὐχ ἰδρῶτα, ἀλλὰ τὸν ὑγρὸν ἰδρῶτα· καὶ οὐκ, εἰς Ἰσθμια, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰσθμίων πανήγυριν· καὶ οὐχὶ νόμους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν πόλεων βασιλεῖς νόμους· καὶ οὐ δρόμους, ἀλλὰ δρομαῖα τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρωτῇ· καὶ οὐχὶ

follows in the wake of Aristotle. Nevertheless, his extant oration, as Blass remarks, saves him somewhat from these charges, and shows him to have been a rhetor of ability, who advanced with the times.

§ 466. The speech *about those who write set speeches, or about the Sophists*,¹ is a distinct defence of the school of Gorgias against that of Isocrates, which was now bidding fair to outstrip it. It is a *Lehrprogramm*, just like Isocrates' *κατὰ σοφιστῶν*, and is alluded to in Isocrates' *Panegyricus* (§ 11), at least probably, for I do not think the references at all so certain as Reinhardt and Blass do. The orator desires to show that the mere composers of carefully written speeches in the closet in which they spent their lives 'had missed the greater part of both rhetoric and philosophy, and should rather be called poets than sophists.' He supports this thesis by a string of sound but not logically connected arguments, in which the whole case is well and fairly stated. The difficulties of reciting a set speech, the ludicrous effect of sticking in it, the hazards of inserting any sudden inspiration, are all put with clearness and force. There is, in fact, from the history of Greek eloquence no document which represents more thoroughly the modern and common-sense views, as opposed to the artificial finish of ancient rhetoric. Alkidamas by no means despises writing; he fully appreciates the value and even the necessity of such a practice, but he insists that a proper training in extempore speaking is the only safe and thorough instruction in the art of practical oratory. The style of this excellent tract is in accordance with the matter. The author shows that he has benefited by Isocrates' work. He writes in good periods, he avoids unnecessary hiatus and alliterations; he attends to rhythm and balance in his clauses. He is, in fact, a pupil of Gorgias who

μουσεῖον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβὼν μουσεῖον· καὶ σκυθρωπὸν τὴν φροντίδα τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ οὐ χάριτος, ἀλλὰ πονδήμου χάριτος δημιουργός· καὶ οἰκονόμος τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς· καὶ οὐ κλάδοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τῆς ἕλης κλάδοις ἀπέκρυψε· καὶ οὐ, τὸ σῶμα παρήμπισχεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος αἰσχύνην· καὶ ἀντίμιμον τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαν· (τοῦτο δ' ἅμα καὶ διπλοῦν καὶ ἐπίθετον· ὥστε ποίημα γίγνεται) καὶ οὕτως ἐξεδρον τὴν τῆς μοχθηρίας ὑπερβολήν.

¹ περὶ τῶν τοὺς γραπτὸὺς λόγους γραφόντων ἢ περὶ σοφιστῶν.

has distinctly gone beyond his master. These are the results brought out by the careful examination of Spengel, who first made good the genuineness of the speech against earlier doubters, and whose arguments Blass has supplemented.

§ 467. But the critics are unanimous in rejecting the second speech, the *accusation of Palamedes* by Odysseus, as the work of another author. It is, like the defence of Palamedes ascribed to Gorgias, in form a court speech, resting rather upon general grounds (*εἰκόρα*) than upon evidence, for though witnesses are cited to prove that a traitorous missive was shot into the camp on an arrow, neither the missive (though quoted) nor the arrow is produced. The rest of the speech is an artful *λοιδορία*, or attack on Palamedes' former life, showing that treachery might naturally be expected from him. I do not share in the contempt usually expressed for this speech by German critics. The writer has a bad case, and knows it, but he gives us an instructive picture of the sort of arguments permitted, and perhaps even thought effective, before Athenian juries. For though the composition (especially as to hiatus) shows it not to be the work of Alkidamas, Blass has proved that there is no reason to deny its antiquity, and that it may be the work of some contemporaneous rhetor. He suggests the rhetor Polycrates, to whom Isocrates addressed his letter of advice,¹ and who was well known as the advocate of desperate causes, in order to display his acuteness. Such would be the present speech, as well as the attack on Socrates, the defence of Busiris, of Polyphemus, the encomium of Clytemnestra, and others. He, moreover, composed a *λοιδορία* of the Lacedæmonians, and encomia of mice, of pots, and of counters. If the encomium of Paris was written by him, the citations from it show it to have been the best of these *tours de force*. Blass accordingly compares him in his juggling rhetoric with the dialectical acrobats Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, whom we meet in Plato.

§ 468. Of *Zoilus*, mentioned as both a rhetor and a historian, and moreover as the notorious *Scourge of Homer*, we know little beyond what Suidas and the Homeric scholia tell us. From this point of view he has already been noticed.² The sophist

¹ Cf. above, p. 220.

² Vol. I. p. 34.

Lycophron is a very hazy, but yet interesting figure. We know from allusions in Aristotle that (in addition to some logical subtleties) he asserted noble birth to be an idle distinction, and what is far more important, that laws were the mere negative guarantee of justice among citizens. This last principle, taken in connection with *Lycophron's* democratic views, has suggested the probability that he may have followed up the idea of *Hippodamus*, and set up a democratic ideal against the aristocratic ideals of *Plato* and his school. To the latter laws were a system of positive training, intended to watch and direct the whole life of the citizen; to the former our modern notion may have been revealed, that laws are only the protection of a society governing itself in ordinary life without state control. If this be indeed so, we may deeply regret the loss of the works of so advanced and reasonable a thinker. But our evidence is too scanty to be satisfactory.¹

§ 469. Far more important to us is *ANAXIMENES* of *Lampsacus*, son of *Aristocles*, pupil of *Zoilus* and the Cynic *Diogenes*, teacher and companion of *Alexander* in his campaigns. As he is reported to have written *Alexander's* life, and as the treatise extant alludes to nothing after 340 B.C., he may have been a mature and active teacher and writer for the period thus comprised (340–20 B.C.) His grateful fellow-citizens, whom he had saved from *Alexander's* wrath, set up a bronze statue of him in *Olympia*, which *Pausanias* saw. He was the master of the notorious *Archias*, who hunted down *Demosthenes*, and he is said to have been specially hostile to *Theopompus*, whose style he parodied in a libel on *Athens*, *Sparta*, and *Thebes*, called the *Trikaranos*, and published under *Theopompus's* name.²

¹ Cf. *Vahlen's* article on *Lycophron*, *Rhein. Mus.* vol. xxi., and *Susemihl's* interesting notes on the allusions to him in his edition of *Aristotle's Politics* (ii. pp. 67, 143), where further writers on the subject are indicated.

² There is a remarkable extract, giving the substance of it, in the rhetor *Aristides* (i. p. 338), which the reader will find quoted in *Müller's FIIG.* i. p. lxxiv., note, in the *Prolegomena* on *Theopompus*. It argues—in my opinion with great justice—that none of the leading states of Greece ever knew how to carry out an imperial policy. The author appears to

These jealousies and rivalries are important as showing the competition among literary men, and the activity with which authorship was carried on as a profession during the fourth century B.C. Both as sophist and rhetor Anaximenes was in his day celebrated. He was a famous extemporiser, composed court speeches for others, and harangues, of which an *encomium of Helen* is cited. In more serious literature he wrote a tract on Homer, no doubt owing to Zoilus' example, and some philosophical book from which ethical fragments are quoted by Stobæus. But his *history* was the most important. Though called *Hellenica*, it began with the origin of gods and men, and reached down to the battle of Mantinea (in twelve books). Eight more embraced the *Philippica*, and the acts of Alexander. We also hear of a tract 'on the deaths of kings.' All these works are lost, and we can only imagine him to have been a rival of Theopompus and Ephorus, an Isocratic historian, with the capital fault of treating history as a branch of oratory. Dionysius speaks slightly of him, as a 'Jack of all trades, but master of none.'¹

§ 470. The extant *technê* was saved by being foisted in among Aristotle's works, with a spurious preface in the form of an epistle to Alexander. As early as the sixteenth century, Petrus Victorius conjectured from the allusions of Quintilian that it was the work of Anaximenes. Spengel has supported its genuineness in this sense with additional arguments.² This

have shown this in contrast to the policy of Alexander, to whom he was attached.

¹ *Isæus*, § 19.

² It should, however, be noticed that Zeller (*Aristotle*, p. 78, note, third German edition) hesitates, with Rose and Campe, to accept Spengel's theory, on the ground that the dedication to Alexander is not foreign to the rest, though plainly un-Aristotelian, and (what is far more important) that the work shows in several places the influence of Aristotle in its nomenclature and in its method. The careful examination of Mr. Cope (*Introd. to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, pp. 401, sq.) rather goes to disprove this view, and leads us to suspect that the most important points of agreement were produced by a deliberate alteration of this lesser rhetoric to suit the accredited views of Aristotle in his classical work. Mr. Cope seems to incline rather to the work being previous to Aristotle's than a later produc-

techné is therefore possibly the only theoretical treatise of the kind extant from the age of the Greek sophists, when the rhetoric of Aristotle had not yet eclipsed all the rest. It gives us the condition of the theory of eloquence among his predecessors, and is consequently of considerable interest. But as literature it is nought, for it consists wholly of dry logical divisions, with the barest possible examples, and unfortunately original examples, by way of illustration. The most interesting section (30) is perhaps that on the *proem*, intended to conciliate the audience, which must be either favourable, unfavourable, or neutral. If unfavourable, it is so either to the speaker, or the cause, or the speech. If to the speaker, either for past or present causes, because he is too young, or too old, or talks too often, or not often enough. Hints are given in each of these cases. The book ends with a collection of *gnomes*, or ethical commonplaces.¹

While the author is full and sensible on the arrangement of a speech as a whole, he tells us nothing of the mysteries of style, beyond avoiding the hiatus, and studying alliteration; he nowhere defines rhythm, or discusses such ornaments as metaphors; in fact, with all his divisions and subdivisions, he remains on the surface of the subject. It is here that his work contrasts with the philosophical rhetoric of Aristotle, which was probably written a few years later. There are, indeed, points of contact in the two treatises, but while Anaximenes (if it be he) thinks of nothing of practical precepts, which are directly useful to a speaker, Aristotle thinks of little but the psycho-

tion, though he justly hesitates to ascribe it to Anaximenes, and prefers to call it *Anonymi rhetorica*. The resemblances between the two treatises are distinct, and yet so general and apparently so undesigned as to persuade me that there was certainly no borrowing on either side, but that the rhetors of the day had agreed upon some points which appear in both works. But had the anonymous work been really later, as Zeller supposes, the resemblances, if there were any, must have been far more frequent and definite. On the other hand, Cope points out (p. 409) some expressions which have a suspiciously later tone. The whole question is full of difficulty nor do I see the prospect of a definite solution.

¹ For a fuller analysis the reader may consult Blass, *Att. Ber.* ii. pp.

logical conditions, and, as has been often observed, his *Rhetoric* never trained a speaker.

It is, I think, hardly fair of Blass to criticise this tract as a sample of Anaximenes' style, even though Dionysius quotes it when censuring the author. Of course a dry manual like this would not affect the dignity of his *Moralia*, or the grace of his historical narrative. The style is as simple and straightforward as possible, and as such well suited to its subject. I will only repeat that here, as among all early rhetors, there are no definite laws for grace of diction and euphony of composition beyond the obvious points which they all make. It was very well to speak of eloquence as a matter of training, of chaste and ornate prose as a matter of prescription. Whether in Isocrates, or in Plato, or in Demosthenes, the euphony really came from the delicate æsthetic sense of the individual master, and could never be transferred to inferior pupils by any handbook of rules, or prescriptions of arguments.

§ 471. *Bibliographical.* The best separate editions of the *technē* addressed to Alexander, which appears in all the complete texts of Aristotle, are Gaisford's (Oxon, 1820) and Spengel's (Zurich, 1844), who appends illustrations from the extant orators, as the author unfortunately constructs his own examples. Spengel has also included it in his collection of rhetorical tracts. As regards the text of the orations just discussed, they are found, as well as the *Helen* of Gorgias, in the MSS. of Antiphon and Andocides, but not all in each MS. The *Helen* is most frequently found; the oration of Alkidamas in the best MSS. They are printed in the Zurich edition of the orators, and by Blass with his Antiphon. There are not, I think, any special commentaries on them, except some articles in German classical periodicals, and a few special tracts, such as Vahlen's *der Rhetor Alkidamas* (Wien, 1864), Winckelmann's *Antisthenis fragmenta*, Cope's *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, p. 401, sq., on the *technē* addressed to Alexander, and others not worth enumerating here. Blass' history of Attic oratory is quite exhaustive on all these matters, and should be in the hands of every serious student of the subject.

CHAPTER X.

XENOPHON.

§ 472. NEITHER the birth nor the death of this remarkable and characteristic figure in Greek literature can now be fixed with any certainty, but for literary purposes we can approximate to them sufficiently. Most of his biographers have been misled by either of two mistakes : first, the accepting of the false legend that Socrates saved his life at the battle of Delium, a story implicitly contradicted by Alcibiades' evidently historical account of this retreat in Plato's *Symposium*; secondly, the assumption that Xenophon was present, as a youth of fourteen or fifteen, at his own *Symposium*, an assumption in no manner warranted by his solitary opening remark, that he wishes to record the lighter conversations of eminent and refined men : οἷς ἐὲν παραγειρόμενος ταῦτα γινώσκω, ἐηλῶσαι βούλομαι. The scene being laid at Athens in 420 B.C., would require us to assume 435 at latest for his birth, whereas Cobet has clearly shown¹ that he speaks of himself in the *Anabasis* as a very young man, and even specially numbers himself with those under thirty years of age. This, as well as his amateur position, without command in the Grecian army, makes it certain that he was not born before 429 B.C., and not much later, seeing the maturity of his character and conduct in the famous 'Retreat of the Ten Thousand.' We must therefore reject the date of Krüger and Clinton, who think him to have been born about 444 B.C., chiefly I think on the strength of the fable about the battle of Delium. There is, on the contrary, nothing known of Xenophon before 400 B.C. He then introduces himself, not as a tried veteran who had fought through the Peloponnesian war,

¹ *Nov. Lectt.* pp. 535, sq.

but as a young man who was still a disciple or follower of Socrates, and who was looking out for some opening in life. This general impression is, to my mind, so naturally produced by the narrative, that I wonder how experienced critics, like Sauppe, can still maintain the old chronology. What can be more decisive than the conclusion of his first speech? ¹ εἰ δ' ἡμεῖς τάττετέ με ἡγεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν προφασίζομαι τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκμάζειν ἡγοῦμαι ἐρύκειν ἅπ' ἐμαντοῦ τὰ κακά. The man who says this must be either above or below middle age. The former is impossible. We must therefore consider him not over thirty at this time. Cobet has cited much additional evidence. The latest events noticed in his works are the conclusion of the Social war between Athens and her allies (356-5 B.C.), together with the beginning of the Phocian or Sacred war. This is the proper interpretation of the allusion ² to the Phocians abandoning Delphi, and the Thebans endeavouring to seize it—an earlier affair, which cannot mean the final ruin of the Phocians (347-6). This has also been well explained by Cobet.³ We have thus a period of seventy-two or seventy-three years for his life, which is more probable than the ninety years claimed for him by Lucian.

§ 473. During this momentous epoch of Greek history, we have only a few passages in Xenophon's life clearly before us—passages however of great interest, and indeed of national importance. He was the son of Gryllus, an Athenian, of the Eretrian deme, and apparently an aristocrat, to judge from his habits and associates. According to the legend in Diogenes, given in his *Life* among the philosophers, he early attracted the notice of Socrates, who stopped him in the way, and asked him where men of honour were to be sought; and on his replying that he did not know, said, 'Follow me and learn.' His discipleship is, at all events, certain, though we cannot perceive any adequate moral results from such splendid teaching. We may suppose that first his youth, and possibly his connections among the oligarchs of 411 B.C., prevented him from taking any prominent place at Athens, where indeed all the later war was

¹ *Anabasis*, iii. I, 25. ² *Hellen.* v. 8. ³ *Nov. Lectt.* pp. 756, sq.

a naval war, for which he shows but little taste. Certain it is that we find him after the Restoration at Athens, with no fixed course of life, or good prospects, and ready to accept the invitation of his friend Proxenus to come to Asia, and ingratiate himself with that eminent phil-Hellene, the younger Cyrus.

It is, however, not impossible that before his departure he had something to do with bringing out the unfinished work of Thucydides, and that he commenced his *Hellenica*, as its continuation, in which he relates the closing fortunes of the Peloponnesian war, the Tyranny, and the Restoration by the patriotism of Thrasybulus. This valuable piece of contemporary history bears every trace of earlier composition, and of a different temper, from the later books ; and I even incline to the theory of a separate publication, as we can hardly imagine the author not rehandling and modifying his early statements, if he came afterwards to put forth the whole book for the first time in its completeness.

§ 474. His adventures in Asia, where he attended the battle of Cunaxa, as a sort of voluntary field officer, then consulted with the Greek generals, and at last became himself a chief commander and organiser of the Retreat—all this is among the most familiar chapters in Greek history. We will return presently to the question of his credibility in this narrative. He seems to have been then rather a young man to take the lead, but without doubt his good general education, and his ready eloquence, marked him out among an army of desponding mercenaries, none of whom excelled him except in military experience. How he obtained the technical knowledge for manœuvring large bodies of troops seems very strange, and is only to be explained by the strong natural taste he everywhere displays for evolutions, perhaps still more by the rudeness of warfare among the Greeks, who seem to have known little or nothing of strategy till Epaminondas arose.

Whatever share, however, he had in saving the 10,000 mercenaries, there can be no doubt, from his own narrative and his laboured self-justification, that he was a most important agent in their travels and troubles after they had reached the Greek colonies on the Euxine. He evidently

hoped to become the founder of a new city. When this scheme failed, he made himself the agent of the Spartans at Byzantium to scatter or to disarm the very dangerous army of marauders, which well-nigh sacked the city, and which must have been the dread of all the colonies within its reach. In consequence of these services, and of his strengthening the army of Thimbron (in 399 B.C.) with the remnant of his tried soldiers, he became intimate with the Spartan magnates, and especially with Agesilaus, to whom he particularly attached himself.

About the same time, but for reasons which are unknown to us, he was sentenced to banishment from Athens. If this sentence had certainly come after the battle of Coronea, its explanation would be easy ; but it is alleged by old authorities to have been because of his campaign with the mercenaries of Cyrus, which seems inexplicable. At all events, he accompanied Agesilaus on his homeward march, and was present at the momentous battle of Coronea (394 B.C.), of which he gives us a graphic description. He afterwards settled in Skillus, a Lacedæmonian district, some miles south of Olympia, and on the road to Sparta, so that he could see his friends on their way to the festival. In this retreat, which he digresses to describe in the *Anabasis*,¹ he combined religion, sport, and literary work. He erected a shrine to the Ephesian Artemis from the proceeds of his spoils, which he had deposited safely with a certain Megabyzus, her priest at Ephesus, for votive purposes, when he set out on his perilous march with Agesilaus. As the district was full of game, the main materials for the periodic feast were procured by the hunting of Xenophon and his sons, aided by any who chose to join.

§ 475. Most of Xenophon's works were produced in this delightful retreat, which seemed unlikely to be disturbed by further wanderings and troubles. But we hear that of his two sons, whom he sent to fight with Athens and Sparta at Mantinea, one (Gryllus) was killed fighting bravely in the cavalry, so bravely that his death was commemorated in one of the pictures which Pausanias saw long after in the Acropolis of

¹ iii. 5.

Athens. We also hear, on Diogenes' authority, that the Eleans invaded his estate, and drove him out, so that he spent his last days at Corinth. According to others, his sentence of banishment was rescinded on the proposal of Eubulus, and he revisited his native city, after a long lapse of chequered years. His death is placed by Diogenes (after Stesicleides) in 360 B.C. ; though if the tract *on the Revenues* be accepted as genuine, he must have lived till 356 at least, and this is thought the more probable theory. Yet I find it hard to reject so precise a notice as that of Diogenes.¹ We know nothing more of his private affairs, except that his wife Philesia is said to have been brought home from Asia. An earlier wife, Soteira, is also mentioned as accompanying him to Aspasia's house. Among the other Xenophons enumerated by Diogenes, it is curious to find one mentioned as the biographer of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, the very men whom our author has passed over with unjust neglect. His personal beauty was much praised ; I am not aware that there is extant of him any authentic bust.

In character he was a very typical Athenian, and though not pre-eminent when we think of Pericles or Thucydides, a far truer average specimen of his age than they. The very first point which strikes us is his religiousness, which is perpetually cropping up, but which, when closely examined, turns out to be mere prudence with regard to the gods, and not real piety. In his own account of the transactions at the close of the Retreat, and of the general affairs of his time as a historian, he shows far less honesty and singleness of mind than his sceptical predecessor. There are not wanting evidences of both selfishness and vanity in the man, in addition to the unfairness of mind which has robbed us of a contemporary portrait of Epaminondas, by one of the very few capable of estimating his military genius. But Xenophon is so intent on lauding Agesilaus and the Spartans, that he hides from us the real hero of his day. How far this one-sided manner of writing

¹ ii. 6. 56 : κατέστρεψε δέ, καθά φησιν Στησικλείδης ὁ Αθηναῖος ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ Ὀλυμπιονικῶν ἀναγραφῇ, ἔτει πρώτῳ τῆς πέμπτης καὶ ἑκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος, ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Καλλιδημίδου, ἐφ' οὗ καὶ Φίλιππος ὁ Ἀμύντου Μακεδόνων ἥρξε.

history may have been produced by the influence of Isocrates will be discussed in its proper place.

§ 476. Turning to his WORKS, it seems that he is one of those few authors, like Plato, whose literary labours have been handed down to us complete. The dark ages have exacted from him no tribute of oblivion. The ancients counted forty books, which corresponds fairly with the sum of the subdivisions of our collection, nor is any work cited by them not to be found in our catalogue, even when their citations cannot be verified in our texts. As to their chronology, it is tolerably certain that one of them, the tract *on the Athenian Constitution*, is far anterior in date to all the rest. But though the once-received early date for Xenophon's birth might make his authorship of the tract possible, most good critics have agreed in declaring it an anonymous production, which has been incorporated in his works on account of its analogy to the genuine tract on *the Lacedæmonian Constitution*. The condition of Athenian affairs assumed in the work cannot have existed after 425 B.C., so that we have before us (discounting the fragment of Gorgias) *the earliest extant specimen of Attic prose*, the remains of Antiphon being generally supposed to date from the latest period of his career.

But here even the partial agreement of critics about this very interesting tract is exhausted, if we except their perhaps harmonious chorus of complaint as to the miserably corrupt and lacerated condition of the text. Indeed, if we consult the critical preface of Sauppe, we may find, even on the date of its composition, opinions varying from that already given, down to the Macedonian period, the latter extreme being supported by Bernhardt, on account of the statement¹ that the Attic dialect was an idiom containing a mixture of all the rest. There has been an equally great and bootless controversy about the authorship. Few scholars maintain Xenophon's claim, though Cobet seems to admit it. But (in addition to Thucydides!) both Critias and Alcibiades have been named,

¹ ἔπειτα φωνῇν πᾶσαν ἀκούοντες ἐξελέξαντο τοῦτο μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τῆς. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἰδίᾳ μᾶλλον καὶ φωνῇ καὶ διαίτη καὶ σχήματι χρώνται, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κεκραμένη ἐξ ἅπαντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων (ii. 8). This is a wonderful statement.

because the work is professedly that of an Athenian aristocrat hostile to the democracy, and nevertheless defending the expediency of the policy of the demos. Both these suggestions seem to me absurd; for all the evidence we have concerning Critias shows him to have been a rhetor of far greater skill than the author of our tract, and we may be certain he would not have written in defence of the demos from any point of view. As to Alcibiades, there seems to me one sentence in the work directly aimed at him: 'I indeed excuse democracy in the populace, for it is natural that anyone should benefit himself; but whosoever does not belong to the populace, and yet prefers living in a democratic to living in an oligarchical polity, has [evidently] laid himself out for crime, and knows that it is easier for a miscreant to pass muster in a democratic than in an oligarchical state.' This is the reflection of an oligarch upon his fellows who adopt radical or whig politics, and play the part of democratic leaders.

Passing, then, from this resultless enquiry, we come to another cloud of controversy about the original form and scope of the tract, some explaining its direct question-and-answer style as implying a familiar letter; others (Cobet and C. Wachsmuth) maintaining that an older dialogue has been cut down into an argument by an inexperienced writer; others again, such as Kirchhoff, analysing the work sentence by sentence, and declaring it a mere congeries of badly connected fragments. But Kirchhoff has dissolved in his crucible even the *de Corona* of Demosthenes; nor do I think that any ordinary speech, for example, of Andocides, would afford him fewer points of attack than this tract. If it be indeed an early essay in Attic prose, when no model existed for an argumentative treatise except, perhaps, a few dialogues of Zeno, we may fairly expect to find a conversational style with question and answer, as well as rapid transitions without strict logical nexus. And indeed, Rettig, in a careful tract,¹ has shown that, with a few transpositions of paragraphs at the close, the whole tract may be brought into a reasonable shape.

Turning to the matter of the work, the reader will find it one of

¹ *Die Planmässigkeit der 'Αθηναίων πολιτεία* (Wien, 1877).

the most interesting and instructive documents of the age, and very remarkable for its Machiavellian tone, that is to say, its calm ignoring of the right and wrong of the case as irrelevant, and its discussion of the question: Given a democracy, are the provisions of the Athenian democracy expedient for its preservation? Had Machiavelli written his projected tract on the Republic as a sequel to his *Principe*, he must have produced a very similar argument, though with historical illustrations, such as Aristotle uses, which are foreign to the author before us. Thus the whole temper of the writer is that of the school of Antiphon or Thucydides, not that of Plato or Xenophon. I will quote a specimen of the style.¹ In addition to A. Sauppe's text (Tauchnitz), the special editions of Kirchhoff (Berlin, 1874) and C. Wachsmuth (Göttingen Program, 1874) are to be recommended. For a summary of the various controversies, Wachsmuth's and Sauppe's prefaces, Kirchhoff's paper in the *Transact. of the Berlin Academy* (1874), and Rettig's criticism of this and other essays (*Zeitschr. für öst. Gymn.*, 1877), will suffice most readers, and will indicate to the unwearied multitudinous special studies which may be consulted.

§ 477. There is the greatest difficulty in arranging chronologically the remaining works attributed to Xenophon, and the differences of opinion are so great and ably defended, that in a practical survey like the present it seems best to give one's

¹ ii. §§ 14-16: 'Ἐνὸς δὲ ἐνδεεῖς εἰσιν' εἰ γὰρ νῆσον οἰκοῦντες θαλαττοκράτορες ἦσαν Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑπῆρχεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν μὲν κακῶς, εἰ ἡβούλοντο, πᾶσχειν δὲ μηδέν, ἕως τῆς θαλάττης ἤρχον, μηδὲ τμηθῆναι τὴν αὐτῶν γῆν μηδὲ προσδέχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους· νῦν δὲ οἱ γεωργοῦντες καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι Ἀθηναίων ὑπέρχονται τοὺς πολεμίους μᾶλλον, ὁ δὲ δῆμος, ἅτε εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν σφῶν ἐμπήρσουσιν οὐδὲ τεμοῦσιν, ἀδεῶς ζῇ καὶ οὐχ ὑπερχόμενος αὐτοῖς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἑτέρου δέους ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν ἦσαν, εἰ νῆσον ᾤκουν, μηδέποτε προδοθῆναι τὴν πόλιν ὑπ' ὀλίγων μηδὲ πύλας ἀνοιχθῆναι μηδὲ πολεμίους ἐπεισπεσεῖν· πῶς γὰρ νῆσον οἰκούντων ταῦτ' ἂν ἐγίγνετο; μηδ' αὖ στασιάσαι τῷ δήμῳ μηδέν, εἰ νῆσον ᾤκουν· νῦν μὲν γὰρ εἰ στασιάσαιεν, ἐλπίδα ἂν ἔχοντες ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις στασιάσαιεν, ὥς κατὰ γῆν ἐπαξόμενοι· εἰ δὲ νῆσον ᾤκουν, καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν ἀδεῶς εἶχεν αὐτοῖς. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐκ ἔτυχον οἰκήσαντες νῆσον, νῦν τᾶδε ποιοῦσι· τὴν μὲν οὖσαν ταῖς νήσοις παρατίθενται, πιστεύοντες τῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ κατὰ θάλατταν, τὴν δὲ Ἀττικὴν γῆν περιορᾶσι τεμνομένην, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι εἰ αὐτὴν ἐλεήσουσιν, ἑτέρων ἀγαθῶν μεζύων στερῇσονται.

own view, and refer the special student to the critical prefaces in Sauppe's edition, which contain a prospectus of the controversies up to 1866. But it seems to me surprising that those who hold Xenophon to have been forty years of age when he joined the expedition of Cyrus, should also hold that he wrote nothing until after his return. That a mature and educated man should write nothing during years of enforced idleness, or certainly of political and military insignificance at Athens, and suddenly burst into persistent authorship, after serving as a mercenary for a few years, because he was exiled from his home, and settled in a sporting country—this is what I cannot believe. There is no reason for asserting that he ever rested from campaigning or wandering till 393 B.C. at least, so that he would thus begin his literary career at over fifty years of age. Cobet, who holds more reasonable views as to his comparative youth when he served with Cyrus, thinks the ardour of the *Tract on hunting* good evidence that it was a youthful work—a supposition most unlikely, seeing that Attica was so thickly populated that 'not a hare could be found in it,' and that Skillus was the natural scene of such interests. Nor is Cobet perhaps acquainted with sporting society, in which the keenest members are often those who have spent the longest time in such pursuits. To my mind, the continuation of Thucydides, which may have been suggested to him by his being entrusted with the unfinished MS., is his earliest work. We find in it no trace of Laconism, or of that historical unfairness which he developed in later years. In fact, it seems probable that it was written about 400 B.C., just before his departure for Asia;¹ nor do I think its concluding sentence, which says, 'that after the amnesty the Athenians live in political harmony, and even now abide by their pledges,' is any proof that many years had elapsed. The real danger was during the first couple of years. These,

¹ I observe that the many Ionisms and Dorisms, which Cobet has noticed throughout Xenophon, and regards as evidences of residence away from the pure dialect of Attica, are almost all cited from later works, and that the earlier *Hellenica* (especially books I. and II.) offer very few examples. Sauppe's *Lexilogus* seems to afford us the same evidence.

I take it, had just elapsed, and still the demos was firm and kept its promises. The same phrase is no doubt used in the end of his *Life of Socrates*, which must have been written ten or twelve years after the events he describes, when he says that 'even still' people kept regretting his loss. But the cases are not at all parallel. Nor can it be argued that this vague phrase implies any corresponding lapse of time whenever it is used.

But it is better to abandon these unsatisfactory enquiries, and classify Xenophon's works not as to date, which is impracticable, but as to subject-matter. They will easily fall under four heads: the *historical* books, the *Socratic* books, the Essays on *Political Philosophy*, to which perhaps may be appended the Tract on the Attic revenues, and lastly the *technical* tracts on horses, on the management of cavalry, and on hunting. The first class falls naturally into the following order: first the early books of the *Hellenica*, down to the Restoration of the Democracy under Thrasybulus. Then the *Anabasis*, or Expedition of Cyrus, with the Retreat of the Greek auxiliaries, and their fortunes in Asia Minor under the Spartan supremacy. This huge parenthesis in the *Hellenica*, which is specially indicated as such at the opening of the 3rd book, is followed by the remainder (lib. 3-7) of the Greek history, down to the battle of Mantinea and death of Epaminondas. The *Agésilas*, a panegyric on the Spartan king, forms a sort of appendix to these works, justifying the exaggerated estimate of the king which we find in the later *Hellenica*.

§ 478. There can be no doubt that the earlier *Hellenica*, or *Paralipomena* (of Thucydides), as they are sometimes called, are far the most reliable of Xenophon's contributions to history, though all are very valuable, as giving us light where we are deserted by the earlier and greater historians. At this time the author had not developed either that personal vanity, which makes him justify all his own actions in the *Anabasis*, or that servile adulation of Agesilaus, which has infected his later history. In the *Paralipomena* he follows the course of the Peloponnesian war from the year 411 B.C. to the Restoration of Thrasybulus (403-2 B.C.). The affair of Arginusæ, the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, and the final settlement of the great war, are the pro-

minent events which he records. Several remarkable characters—Lysander, Callicratidas, Theramenes—would be almost unknown to us but for this work; and of Callicratidas in particular he has drawn, perhaps unconsciously, a nobler picture than that of any other Spartan. Grote is not satisfied with his account of the affair of the generals after Arginusæ, but whatever difficulties there are in the narrative are rather to be ascribed to the conflict of evidence than to any want of candour on the part of the historian. The whole narrative, and the inserted speeches, though clear and agreeable to read, want both the power and the pathos of Thucydides. The trial and death of Theramenes, with whom he evidently sympathises, is the most striking episode in these books.

§ 479. At the opening of our third book of the *Hellenica*, in which the author resumes his narrative in later years, and with altered tone, he states that the relations of Cyrus with the Lacedæmonians, and subsequently his march against the king, his death, and the retreat of the Greek mercenaries to the sea, have been written by Themistogenes the Syracusan. No such person is elsewhere mentioned, except by Suidas, as an author, and our *Anabasis*,¹ though composed anonymously, has so many internal marks of Xenophon's style, that all antiquity was unanimous in attributing it to him. The question remains, whether Xenophon wished to have his own work attributed to another, or whether there really was an earlier *Anabasis* lost, or completely superseded by the work now extant. There is of course on this, as on every other Xenophontic problem, a perfect library of controversy. Plutarch thinks that the author considered his self-laudation would be more credible if put as the evidence of a disinterested writer. Some have dreamed of modesty on Xenophon's part—a theory which ignores all that we know of his character. Others, again, suppose that he expanded a nucleus or smaller narrative of Themistogenes, but are opposed by minute censors who find traces of gaps and omissions, and think our *Anabasis* only a

¹ We generally speak of the 'Retreat of the Ten Thousand,' whereas Xenophon entitled his work 'The Expedition (or going up the country) of Cyrus' against his brother the King of Persia.

compendium. It is a curious fact, that the writer of the book not only speaks of Xenophon throughout in the third person, but that he often pretends not to have been himself an eye-witness. Thus,¹ in describing a scene at which Xenophon's presence had just been mentioned, the writer proceeds: '*but some say* that they (the Greeks charging at Cunaxa) struck with their shields against their spears, to frighten the horses.' Several such examples are cited by Mure.² On the other hand, there are passages, like the soliloquy of Xenophon, when he starts up from his dream in the eventful night after the treacherous murder of the generals, which can hardly have been composed by anyone else, even admitting the habit among Greek historians of supplying set speeches for prominent speakers in their narrative.

Nevertheless contemporary writers, like Isocrates, while well acquainted with the history of the Retreat, and often quoting it as a great feat of arms, never mention Xenophon among its leaders. This silence of Isocrates is to me so strange that I conjecture him to have read an original and shorter *Anabasis* by Themistogenes, in which the part of Xenophon was by no means so prominent; that Xenophon, in reply to unfavourable criticisms upon his conduct in connection with his relations to Athens and Sparta, took up this obscure and little known work, and re-edited it with larger additions from his own recollections. Hence the combination of second-hand and direct observations, and also those not very consistent excuses and self-justifications in the later part of the narrative which Mure has exposed with much acuteness. According to this theory the opening notice of the third book of the *Hellenica*, which may just as well be regarded as the concluding sentence of the earlier second book, must have been written before Xenophon rehandled the work; for from that moment his authorship could not be doubtful, and his affected disguise would be ridiculous. It would also account for any harshnesses of transition which are really to be found in the work, still more for the 472 words not elsewhere (*aut perraro*) used by Xenophon, which the patience of Sauppe and others has discovered in our text.

¹ i. 8, 18.² v. p. 368.

It is surely unnecessary to say one word in description of the subject-matter of the *Anabasis*, which may be found in any elementary history of Greece, and with great fulness of detail in Grote's monumental work.

§ 480. As to the historical merit of the work, most critics have been unbounded in their admiration of its excellence, and have adopted it as a thoroughly complete and faithful account of a very important episode in Greek history. Even Grote, who is cautious and critical in accepting the statements of the *Hellenica*, here lays aside all reserve, and finds in Xenophon the model of an Athenian gentleman, and a splendid specimen of the results of democratic education. This mixture of scepticism and credulity is a curious feature often recurring in Grote's great work. We do not so much wonder at it in mere philologists. But many even among these, and with them Colonel Mure, in one of the best chapters of his work, have suspected that the *Anabasis* is, after all, as an historical work, not more conscientious than the later *Hellenica*, and that the author, without fear of contradiction, seeing that all the main actors were now dead or scattered, could assume an importance quite beyond that warranted by the real facts. He is the soul of the Retreat : he is never wrong ; he always thinks of the right thing, and says the right word. It seems extraordinary that, were his achievements equal to his description of them, he should not have been recognised as one of the greatest generals of the age ; and yet we never find him either employed or consulted in that capacity.

In truth we have here a striking example of the value of literary excellence. The clear and fascinating narrative of the author's adventures ; his affected modesty and worthiness, his frankness and apparent naïveness and piety—all these seductive qualities have made us forget that he is really pleading his own case, without admitting any reply ; while, even on his own showing, his conduct towards his companions at the close was doubtful and treacherous. At all events, his contemporaries seem to have judged him differently from the mass of modern critics. The book is one familiar to every schoolboy, and there is no figure in Greek history now so prominent in the classical world.

This is a just tribute to his style and to the adventurous life which he led. In his own day, the Retreat of the Ten Thousand was chiefly valuable in showing the inherent weakness of the Persian Empire, and in suggesting to every ambitious Greek the possibility of overthrowing it. But to us the concluding books, which treat of the fortunes of the army after it reached the sea near Trapezus, have perhaps the most interesting and valuable lessons. They are far less read and edited than the earlier books, and schoolboys seldom attain unto them. Nevertheless, it is here we obtain our only clear and detailed account of the doings of a mercenary force, when not engaged in an actual campaign—of the scourge which such a force was to all the surrounding country, and how they were just as likely to plunder a Greek as a barbarian settlement. At the same time we see among them that strong sense of external religion, that dependance on dreams and omens, that fear of the anger of the gods, which strikes us all through Xenophon's writings as a strong contrast to the temper of Thucydides. In all these features we are strongly reminded of the Grand Catalan Company, whose pious words and atrocious deeds form so interesting a chapter in the history of the Byzantine Empire, and of Greece during the Frankish occupation. There are also in this concluding part of the *Anabasis* many curious details about the manners and customs of savage tribes living along the Euxine, as well as of the court of Seuthes, and of the social condition of his kingdom.

§ 481. The digression about his residence with his children at Skillus¹ proves that the work was not brought out till many years after his return, somewhere about 380 B.C. It would have been impossible for him to resuscitate the details with such accuracy, had he not either taken notes at the time or trusted to some earlier history of the Retreat. It seems to me improbable that, had he kept a journal with the intention of publishing it, he should have delayed its completion, when all Greece was deeply interested in so remarkable and significant a campaign. His delay may be accounted for by the earlier work of Themistogenes, which I have above assumed,

¹ v. 3.

and perhaps by his fear of being contradicted or criticised by the surviving leaders, had he put his own prowess so strongly forward while they were at hand to correct him.

Nothing strikes us more strongly, at the close of this history, than the enormous power wielded by the Spartan harmosts and admirals throughout Hellenic lands, and the arbitrary and cruel use they made of it. Xenophon's Laconism was not then so developed as to prevent him from drawing these things with a faithful hand; his own subserviency to the Spartans, and his determination to stand well with them, while it throws a stain upon his loyalty to his comrades, shows us how he thought it hopeless to adopt any other policy. He may have apprehended banishment from Athens, though the digression just referred to is worded as if it had only followed his treason at the battle of Coronea. It is indeed hard to conceive any motive strong enough to induce him to this latter step, except his personal attachment to King Agesilaus. We may be sure that an Athenian would feel as much intoxicated by the favour of a Spartan king as some Americans are by the courtesy of European grandees.¹

§ 482. This intimacy with one of the main actors seems to have suggested to him the continuation of his *Hellenica*, which he accordingly carried down to the year 362 B.C., ending with the battle of Mantinea. It is in this work that we meet with the earliest specimen of that debased historiography which is mainly to be traced to the influence of the rhetoricians, and particularly of Isocrates. As that rhetor confessedly used historical facts for the sake of recommending a policy; as he propagated the old sophistical habit of composing panegyrics of or attacks on mythical and historical persons, in which truth was deliberately sacrificed to oratorical effect; as he began distinctly to lay claim to history as a branch of oratory, the fatal fashion was introduced of writing history with an object, and so the splendid path pointed out and pursued by Herodotus and

¹ There are three special Lexica on the *Anabasis*, by Strack (8th ed. 1874), Vollbrecht (3rd ed. 1876), and Suhle; Rehdantz' 4th and Vollbrecht's 6th eds. (both 1877) are the best commentaries; Arnold Hug's new recension (Teubner, 1878), based on the Parisian MS. C, eclipses all previous texts, even Cobet's, and is regarded by the critics as final.

Thucydides was abandoned. Thus we have a school of historians whose respect and attachment for truth is seriously impaired, while their studied rhetoric is indeed by no means superior to their great models. The later books of the *Hellenica* are an instance of this depraved tendency, and here we happily have some means of exposing it. The earlier books are upon the Asiatic campaigns of the Lacedæmonians, in which Xenophon could panegyrisé them without serious damage, though occasional discussions about acts of tyranny in Elis and Thebes are glossed over without comment, especially when Agesilaus is concerned. But in the later and general history of Greece, which follows the battle of Coronea, when the leaders of Greece were Thebes and Sparta, and when the latter was completely humbled by the genius of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, the disgraceful partiality of the author becomes painfully apparent. He was writing up Agesilaus, a second-rate man, against the strong and sound popular opinion that Epaminondas was the great military genius of his age. Hence the military achievements of both Ismenias at Naryx, and Pelopidas at Tegyra—victories of Thebans over Spartans—are quietly omitted; at Leuctra and elsewhere the Theban generals' names are ignored, and it is only at the close of the book, in describing the campaign which ended with Mantinea, that a tardy tribute to Epaminondas is wrung from him, in terms which show that the popular opinion (which we find in Plutarch) was then prevalent, and that he sought to detract from it by no better arguments than petty carping, unjust insinuations, and unworthy silence. This is all the more regrettable, as we have in Xenophon one of the few men competent, had he been so disposed, to have informed us concerning the remarkable innovations in both tactics and strategy due to the great Theban, of which we have but a glimpse in the account of the battle of Mantinea—a sort of ancient Rossbach in its disposition. But the fuller criticism of such matters does not belong to the history of literature.

§ 483. Turning to the style of the *Hellenica*, the ordinary reader finds it easy and pleasant, yet not without a certain dryness and narrowness, as the author confines himself strictly to

military affairs and political revolutions, without social or literary digressions. But more careful critics find it full of harsh transitions, apparent gaps and breaks, and other traces of its either being left unfinished by its author, or contracted by an incompetent epitomist. They even profess to find in Plutarch traces of his use of a fuller *Hellenica*, which had disappeared, and made place for the present compendium, before the days of Diogenes Laertius. But all such arguments are surely very unsafe in the absence of the other sources, which Plutarch may have used, and in answer to which Xenophon may have composed his *Hellenica*. This latter attitude seems to me so probable, that I fancy the book was composed in the form now before us, by way of answer to some strong and popular panegyric on the Theban leaders.¹ Such an origin would account for gaps, for transitions, and for allusions not supported by the work itself—such, for example, as that to the fame of Epaminondas, in the very last chapter, when hardly an act of his has been recorded throughout the history. But the weight of German enquiry into the sources used by Plutarch, and his way of using them, inclines to the theory that he followed some later historian, such as Ephorus or Ister, as his one main guide in each life, so that he only agrees with the older authorities when these authors have copied them. Plutarch may, therefore, not have used Xenophon directly, any more than he used Thucydides directly in composing his *Lives*.²

In other respects the composition reminds one rather of Herodotus than of Thucydides, not of course in dialect, but in the dramatic way in which speakers are introduced, short speeches and dialogues interspersed, and especially in the constant transition from indirect to direct speaking—from a report of what was said into the actual words of the orator. This practice is, indeed, so constant in the *Hellenica*, as to be apparently a favourite *figure* with the author.

¹ See especially 7, 5, 12, which is manifestly a reply to such a panegyric.

² Cf. Vollbrecht, *De Xen. Hell.* (Hannover, 1874), pp. 19, 20, who states and refutes the arguments of Kyprianos and Grosser, the main advocates of the epitome theory.

There is an occasional moral or religious reflection of no great depth, and always in agreement with the writer's bias. In the scenes which he himself witnessed, such as the battle of Coronea, and the announcement to Agesilaus of the destruction of his battalion by Iphicrates near Corinth, there is much graphic power; and he does not seek to paint his hero a conventional Spartan, but a man touched with the changes of fortune, starting up in wild excitement from his throne or weeping with joy, at sudden announcements of evil or of good.¹

§ 484. The formal panegyric of the Spartan king has come down to us in the tract entitled *Agesilaus*, which gives a sketch of his life and acts, in the form of a written encomium, like Isocrates' *Evagoras*, which that orator afterwards declares to have been the model for many imitators. Most of the facts in this tract are copied from the *Hellenica*, some unsuitable points being omitted, and a notice added of Agesilaus' expedition to Egypt, and death, which occurred in 360 B.C. Hence the tract, if genuine, must rank amongst Xenophon's latest works. But concerning the genuineness there is, as usual, a mass of confident and contradictory criticism, many first-rate critics asserting that the book must be by Xenophon, because of its style and its manifest borrowing from the *Hellenica*, while a large number of learned men reject it for the very same reasons. Under such circumstances, any new decision is not likely to be accepted with much confidence. The rhetorical pomp, which marks this composition beside its genuine fellows, may of course be accounted for by its very object—an epideictic display. The historical suppressions are proper to such a performance,² even were they not strictly Xenophonic. But what does seem to me like the work of a stranger, and not of the Boswell of Agesilaus, is the want of intimate personal knowledge of that king beyond what the *Hellenica* afford. There are, indeed, a few things added, but it seems strange that Xenophon, if he were the author, should not have supplemented his *Hellenica* with

¹ The best recent editions of the *Hellenica* are those of Breitenbach (1876), Büchschütz (1876), and E. Kurz (Munich, 1874).

² On this point, therefore, the censures of Mure (v. pp. 434, 435) are completely beside the point.

many private recollections, when he is illustrating the character of his hero by special anecdotes. I am suspicious, moreover, on account of the gross exaggeration (in chap. ii.) about the Spartan loss at Leuctra, which, he says, amounted to half the citizens, whereas in the *Hellenica* we are told that 400 out of the 700 present were slain. The style is uneven, and the structure of the piece not according to the strict laws of rhetoric. Thus the proem consists only of two short sentences, and there is a full recapitulation at the end, which is unsuitable, and spoils the effect (as Isocrates felt, when he forbade such repetitions in encomia). The following sentence is perhaps the worst possible specimen of Gorgian alliteration¹:—*νομιζων ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τό τε ἀτρεμέας, καὶ ἀνεκπληκτότατον, καὶ ἀθορυβητότατον, καὶ ἀναμαρτητότατον, καὶ δυσεπιβουλευτότατον εἶναι*. Several of these words occur nowhere else in Xenophon, as is the case with many other terms in this tract. But the frequent recurrence of ἅπασι λεγόμενα in each tract or work of Xenophon makes it very difficult to establish their genuineness from internal evidence. In contrast to the former, here is an elegantly finished period: ὁ δὲ καρτερία μὲν πρωτεύων, ἐνθα ποιεῖν καιρός, ἀλκῇ δέ, ὅπου ἀνδρίας ἄγων, γνώμῃ δέ, ὅπου βουλῆς ἔργον, οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ δικάως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς παντελῶς ἂν νομιζέσθαι.² Here I leave the *Agesilaus*, recording my own opinion against its genuineness, but referring the reader to the German critics for arguments on whichever side he pleases to range himself. There is a convenient English text and commentary lately published by Mr. Hailstone.

§ 485. We now proceed to consider the Socratic group of works, consisting of the *Memoirs*, or general sketch of Socrates, with the *Æconomicus*, which describes his views on the practical business of life, and the *Symposium*, on social relaxations. This account of the great philosopher, by an affectionate pupil, differs widely from the panegyric we have just discussed. Instead of rhetorical periods and figures, for which Xenophon had little natural taste, and imperfect training, we have the form of artless narrative and easy dialogue, in which he is a great master, though overshadowed by the quaint Herodotus

¹ c. vi. sub fin.

² Cf. also c. xi. § 13.

and the matchless Plato. Yet the real artlessness and the frequent tameness of his conversations only impress us the more strongly with their faithfulness, and it is now agreed that to him we must look for the unvarnished picture of the great master whom Plato transfigured and Aristophanes traduced. This form of composition was indeed not new, or original to Xenophon, having been already employed by Ion of Chios, in his Recollections of his own Life, and of the remarkable men he had met. But Xenophon applied it to the special purpose of illustrating the Life and Character of Socrates, and the other persons introduced are intended as mere foils to the central figure.

It is remarkable that the author, though here speaking throughout in the first person, introduces himself as a third actor in one scene.¹ The treatise as a whole is too disjointed and too diffuse to be agreeable reading, but may be taken up here and there with great profit. Near the commencement² there is a very interesting defence of Socrates against the charge of having educated Alcibiades and Critias. It is shown that these men went to Socrates to gain power from intercourse with him, not to learn virtue, which they from the beginning despised, though they were for a time kept in check by him. I may indicate as specially interesting in the remainder of the work the *locus classicus* on the choice of Heracles, borrowed from Prodicus' famous apologue,³ the sketch of a *Panegyricus* on Athens,⁴ and the very elegant argument for the existence and benevolence of the gods from final causes,⁵ with the exhortation to piety in gratitude for these favours.

The last chapter⁶ has so much in common with the *Apologia Socratis* handed down to us under the name of Xenophon, that most critics have refused to believe in the genuineness of both, but believe that one at least, perhaps both, must be spurious and that the longer *Apologia* is either the source or the expanded copy of the eighth chapter. If the *Apologia* is (as I believe) genuine, it was probably the original conclusion of the *Memoirs*, with which it agrees strictly in form, being professedly no complete account, but, like the fourth Gospel, a sort of supplement to the incompleteness of other defences. Cobet⁷

¹ i. 3, II.² i. 2, I2, sq.³ ii. I, 2I, sq.⁴ iii. 5, IO, sq.⁵ iv. 3.⁶ iv. 8.⁷ *Nov. Lectt.* 667, sq.

thinks it specially intended as a reply to the accusation of the sophist Polycrates—a rhetorical exercise to which Isocrates alludes in his *Busiris* (above, p. 220). The shorter eighth chapter would then be an excerpt, put together and added to the *Memoirs* when the *Apologia* came to be read and copied out separately. As a defence, though neatly and even elegantly written in the unmistakable vein of Socratic questioning, it is very inferior to Plato's *Apologia*. For it implies a greater assumption of wisdom and piety in Socrates (which specially appears in the far stronger response of the oracle to Chærephon), and also preaches the eudæmonistic view of the profits of death at the limit of a hale old age, with which Socrates consoles himself. He thinks it a positive gain to die before his faculties and friends forsake him. Old age, we must remember, was not honoured at Athens as it is among us.

The marks of time in both *Memoirs* and *Apologia* are few and uncertain. In the former he says¹ that all 'even still' continue to feel Socrates' loss (ἐτι καὶ νῦν λιατελοῦσι πάντων μάλιστα ποθοῦντες αὐτὸν), which seems to imply the lapse of some years after his execution. The apology alludes not only to the death of Anytus, but to the confirmed drunkenness and loss of character of his son, and this again requires a considerable interval. Still I do not believe, in the rapidly changing society of Athens, that these *Memoirs* would have produced any effect, or the *Apologia* have been read, many years after Socrates' death. If so, this sketch of Socrates would date from the time when Xenophon first attained literary leisure at Skillus, about 493 B.C.

The text is purer than most of our MSS. of Xenophon, nor have the critics (except in the last chapter of the *Memoirs*) found fault with the logical nexus of the various subjects, as they are successively discussed. These tracts have not received much attention from English scholars, who seem, indeed, of late years, rather determined by school requirements than by the intrinsic value or interest of the Greek classics. The best special information (besides the histories of philosophy on Socrates) will be found in Breitenbach's (ed. 5, Berlin 1878) and Kühner's editions, and in the preface to Sauppe's text.

¹ *Mem.* iv. 8, 11.

§ 486. The *Æconomicus*, which is in form a mere book of the *Memoirs*, introduced with a connecting particle, is really an independent treatise, and is the only Socratic dialogue of Xenophon which can be compared in value to the Platonic dialogues. For here Xenophon is no longer a mere pupil, but an independent thinker, setting forth views even opposed to those of his master. But, characteristically enough, while Plato does this in speculation, Xenophon does it in practical matters, and in relation to the art of husbandry. The dialogue, which is very varied in its subjects, and, excepting the technical part, exceedingly interesting, begins with Socrates' affected desire to make the fashionable and ambitious Critobulus a good economist, since, though his fortune is large, his expenses, and the public demands upon him, are proportionate. They then enter upon a very sophistical discussion as to the proper meaning of the term *economy*, which is shown by Socrates to apply to practical good sense in all the affairs of life, but specially to the management of one's household ; and first of all of its mistress, then also of landed property with its stock, the chief kind being horses. There follows a panegyric on farming,¹ showing it to be a suitable recreation even for the Persian king, with the garden anecdote about Cyrus and Lysander, and an allusion to Cyrus' death, which is an anachronism in Socrates' mouth, as he could hardly have heard such details until the return of the Cyreians, just before his trial. There is a fine passage² on the tyranny of the passions, which is eminently Socratic, but the panegyric on agriculture, in cap. v., is probably quite foreign to him.

Accordingly, with great dramatic propriety, the leading part is now transferred by Socrates to Ischomachus, a gentleman of position as a landed proprietor, and owner of a large town house, who instructs Socrates, first³ on his method of training his wife and servants, then⁴ on his own rules of life and of recreation, and next⁵ on the training of his steward. There follow⁶ chapters on the details of practical farming.

¹ *Æcon.* cc. 4 and 5.

² c. I, 16, sq.

³ cc. 6-10.

⁴ c. II.

⁵ cc. 12-14.

⁶ cc. 14-19.

The end of the treatise is an eloquent argument against Socrates' leading doctrine, that knowledge is virtue, since all men understand husbandry, but many fail from not carrying out what they know, through sloth, or incapacity of governing their dependants. The conclusion is a reflection upon the divine gift of ruling men without constraint, which seems inborn in a few men, and cannot be acquired. It is likely that Xenophon is here thinking of Epaminondas, in whom he particularly praises this quality at the close of the *Hellenica*. Thus the principal speaker not only lectures Socrates on topics which the latter does not understand, but tells him important truths which he does not contradict, though they are foreign to his teaching. We may, therefore, regard this tract as composed after the *Memoirs*, and that the author began by adhering to the form of dialogue and the character of Socrates, but soon wandered into an independent line of thought. The description given by Ischomachus, a model Attic husband, of his young wife, brought up in total ignorance except of cooking, and adorned with paint and false hair, and high-heeled shoes, though never allowed to leave the house—his account of his gradual education of her, of her ingenuous and noble cooperation, and of the honourable relations of husband and wife, is one of the most striking passages in all Greek literature.¹ The style is careful and pure, though critics find some peculiarities unusual in Xenophon.² The

¹ Cf. my *Social Life in Greece*, pp. 275, sq. It is remarkable that the use of factitious dress and ornament, so justly reprehended by Ischomachus here, is defended in the case of the Persian kings in the *Cyropædia* (viii. I, 40-2) as a means of imposing on (καταγοητεύειν) their subjects.

² Thus the careful variation of the verbs in this sentence (concerning the risks of painting and other artificial aids to female beauty) is remarkable: ἡ γὰρ ἐξ εὐνῆς ἀλίσκονται ἐξανισταμέναι πρὶν παρασκευάσασθαι, ἡ ὑπὸ ἰδρωτός ἐλέγχονται ἡ ὑπὸ δακρύων βασανίζονται ἡ ὑπὸ λουτροῦ ἀληθινῶς καταπτεύθησαν. Here is an elegant passage in praise of husbandry:—xix. 17-19: Οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ καὶ πάλαι σοι ἔλεγον ὅτι ἡ γεωργία οὕτω φιλόανθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πραεῖα τέχνη ὥστε καὶ ὀρῶντας καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐπιστήμονας εὐθὺς ἑαυτῆς ποιεῖν. πολλὰ δ', ἔφη, καὶ αὐτὴ διδάσκει ὡς ἂν κάλλιστά τις αὐτῇ χρῶτο. αὐτίκα ἄμπελος ἀναβαίνουσα μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ δένδρα, ὅταν ἔχη τι πλησίον δένδρον, διδάσκει ἰστάναι αὐτήν· περιπεταννύουσα δὲ τὰ οἴναρα, ὅταν ἔτι αὐτῇ ἀπαλοι οἱ βότρυνες ᾧσι, διδάσκει σκιάζειν τὰ ἡλιούμενα ταύτην τὴν ὥραν· ὅταν δὲ καιρὸς ᾗ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἥδη

reader will find in the *Æconomicus* many hints of the author's special knowledge of horses, which led to the tract *on the Horse*, and also of the technical side of his mind, shown in the details concerning farming. The allusion to Aspasia, as an authority on the duties of husbands and wives, has excited much attention, and has helped ingenious authors, such as M. Becq de Fouquières,¹ to rehabilitate her character. English readers will also be much struck with the description of the big Phœnician ship, which was visited and admired for its order and discipline, as an English man-of-war is visited in foreign parts. These are but a few of the many points suggested by this tract. The latest English version has appeared in vol. i. of Mr. Ruskin's *Bibliotheca Pastorum*. Schenkl's text is the most recent recension.

§ 487. We turn to the *Banquet*, a dialogue intended to show the conversation of educated gentlemen at Athens in society, and especially of Socrates, as the king of all good talkers. The scene is laid at a feast given by the rich Callias in honour of his favourite, the boy Autolycus, who won a victory in the pancratium at Athens in 421 B.C. But when critics infer that Xenophon was present at a banquet in this year, they quite mistake the freedom with which Attic authors composed their dialogues. He was intimate, he tells us, with the speakers, and that is all.

After describing the extraordinary effect of the beauty of Autolycus on the company, and their consequent silence and awkwardness, a professional jester or parasite, perhaps the earliest we know personally, intrudes himself, but is hospitably admitted to the feast. After his jokes have been tried, with little effect, the conversation becomes general, and wanders through many subjects, all of them, however, social or ethical. This is diversified by the feats of a company of what we should call circus performers, introduced by a professional Syracusan, who

γλυκαίνεσθαι τὰς σταφυλάς, φυλλορροοῦσα διδάσκει ἑαυτὴν ψιλοῦν καὶ πεπαίνειν τὴν ὀπώραν, διὰ πολυφορίαν δὲ τοὺς μὲν πέποντας δεικνύουσα βότρυς, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι ὠμοτέρους φέρουσα, διδάσκει τρυγᾶν ἑαυτήν, ὥσπερ τὰ σῦκα σκαΐζουσι, τὸ ὄργων ἀέλ.

¹ *Aspasie de Milet*. (Paris, 1872). The special literature on the *Æconomicus*, both in editions and dissertations, will be found enumerated (up to 1864) in Sauppe's Preface. Schneider's edition (with several other Xenophonic tracts, in 1805) is still the most complete.

is much annoyed at the lead which Socrates takes in the entertainment, and only pacified by the latter recommending him to exhibit something lovely and graceful, instead of feats of danger. The banquet accordingly closes with a wanton scene of the loves of Ariadne and Bacchus, acted by a boy and girl of his troupe.

The conversation, which seldom remains fixed upon one subject, is chiefly intended (unlike the *Memoirs*) to bring out the peculiarities of each of the company. Antisthenes, Critobulus, Callias, and Hermogenes are sketched in this way, each by dilating upon his own strong point. Thus Hermogenes describes his piety, and the practical results of it,¹ in a very homely way, reminding us of Sydney Smith's description of certain people's religion as *otherworldliness*. Poverty and riches are discussed, and so are beauty and love. This latter is the leading topic, and gives Socrates the opportunity for a remarkable discourse on its two species—the spiritual and the carnal²—which is not unworthy of Plato's best writing.

The similarity of subject has of course given rise to much discussion on the relation of this to Plato's *Symposium*, some holding that Plato meant to rival Xenophon, others that Xenophon intended a critique on Plato, while there is really no clear evidence that either intended to censure or sought to excel the other. In splendour of thought and loftiness of diction Plato is of course far pre-eminent, but we may be sure that in excluding all the professional amusements, which he does with marked contempt, and in making his guests speak long orations on the same subject, he has not drawn so faithful or natural a picture as Xenophon's, where the talk is disconnected, often trivial, sometimes coarse. To us it would appear that the people talked too much about themselves, and that questions of personal interest, as opposed to those of larger importance, are too prominent. On the main subject discussed, that of love, our modern ideas are so far removed from those of Socrates and his companions, that it requires long study of Greek life, and deep sympathy with its grace and beauty, to

¹ iv. 47, sq.

² cap. viii.

enable us to tolerate even what is said by way of banter. To the serious statements of Socrates no objection can be made. But it is not to be wondered at that a respectable English Philistine, like Mure,¹ should condemn Xenophon's Socrates and his company very severely, and see nothing but grossness of the lowest kind in their mutual affection. We must not judge them so harshly, for even the divine Plato stooped lower at the close of his *Symposium*, and Epaminondas did not rise above the received customs of his country, though both were men of genius, and I believe also of piety.

The weight of opinion leans towards the priority of Xenophon's *Symposium*, and to its being written early in his literary life, as a supplement to his more elaborate picture of Socrates. As a source of information on Attic morals and manners its value is not easily over-estimated, nor is it by any means so tedious as his longer works.

§ 488. The political philosophy of Xenophon was not, as we may imagine, of a very deep or speculative order. During middle life he was brought in contact with the Spartans, whose constitution was the most lasting and the most aristocratic in Greece. Accordingly he undertook in a special tract, not unlike the tract already described on the Athenian state, to show the causes of the dignity and permanence of the Spartan power. There is, indeed, little said about the constitution, so little that the tract should rather be entitled *on the discipline of the Lacedæmonians* than on their polity. The Lycurgean training of the youth, so like in some respects to that of our public schools, the military training of the citizens, their high state of discipline and their subjection to authority, are set forth in a very striking picture. But we can see plainly that the author gives us old traditions confused with actual facts, and

¹ Vol. v. pp. 453, sq. The reader who desires to consult an opposite authority may turn to G. F. Rettig's long article in the *Philologus* for 1879 (vol. xxxviii. part ii.), where the whole dialogue is analysed with great minuteness, and all manner of hidden delicacies and moral lessons extracted from it. But the learned German is so simple as to imagine that the Syracusan's *παῖς* is his son, and to be completely in the dark as to their relations (p. 296). I need not add any further evidences of his critical judgment.

the fourteenth chapter, if genuine, distinctly admits that a great decadence had set in, and that the ideal condition described in the tract was a thing of the past. The concluding remark, that the curious obsequies of the kings were meant to show they were regarded as heroes, appears to me made in reference to Herodotus' remark,¹ that the customs of the Spartans on these occasions were the same as those of the Asiatic barbarians.

There is the usual controversy about the form of the work, and even Cobet is in this case induced to consider it a mere abstract of a fuller treatise, seeing that Plutarch, who uses it freely as an authority in his life of Lyscurgus, seems to quote things not now to be found in the text. Others have pointed out its antagonism to the *Panathenaicus* of Isocrates, who claims for the Attic culture, against a partisan of the Spartans, the superiority which Xenophon claims for his patrons. When the tract was written, the battle of Leuctra had evidently not been fought, and the fourteenth chapter, which is perhaps to be placed at the end, and may have been mutilated, seems intended to meet the altered *prestige* of the Spartans in Greece. I am disposed to hold it genuine, and nearly in its original form, seeing that all Xenophon's works are found equally disjointed in argument, and that the theory of compendiums by later hands cannot surely apply to the whole of his works.

The permanent interest of the tract is the sketch of a state morality overriding the ordinary laws of chastity and of purity, and yet, though introducing new habits and new morals, preserving the feelings of honour and personal dignity among men and women, who must have been degraded in any ordinary state. There is much in Plato's *Republic* plainly imitated from this remarkable society, particularly his postponing the purity and permanence of the marriage tie to the higher duty of producing healthy children for the state. But Plato's arrangements, whereby the sanctity of the tie was strictly maintained through its temporary duration, seems far more civilised than the coarse indifference of the Spartans, as described by Xenophon.² It may, indeed, be doubted whether his statements are not merely theoretical exaggerations, for the Spartan women, whatever their

¹ vi. 58.² i. 7-10.

other faults, seem to us more like modern mothers of families than any other Greek women.

§ 489. But while Xenophon could not but be struck with the marvellous permanence and power of the Spartan constitution, his inmost character must have led him to favour the monarchical form. He was all his life attached to some one superior mind, which he took as his guide, and which he served with ready obedience—first, and best, Socrates, then the brilliant Cyrus, then the inferior, but still able Agesilaus. Hence we find in his remarkable dialogue entitled *Hiero*, between that tyrant and the poet Simonides, that though the miseries and dangers of tyranny are most eloquently set forth, the author finally turns to the good side of absolute rule, and shows how a despot may live a life of great usefulness to the people whom he sways. A private career is, indeed, vastly happier, but a tyranny may be made not only an endurable, but even an enviable position. The whole form of the tract is peculiar, being a dialogue without Socrates, and being, moreover, more ornately written than is usual with Xenophon. Nevertheless, critics have been almost unanimous in accepting it as genuine, and I do not feel my instinctive dissent can be supported with convincing arguments. The passage which describes the change from the contentment of private life to the anxieties of sovereignty, is perhaps the most striking in all our remains of Xenophon.¹

¹ Cap. vi. §§ 1-8 : Βούλομαι δέ σοι, ἔφη, ᾧ Σιμωνίδῃ, κακείνας τὰς εὐφροσύνας δηλῶσαι ὕσαις ἐγὼ χρώμενος ὅτ' ἦν ἰδιώτης, νῦν ἐπειδὴ τύραννος ἐγενόμην, αἰσθάνομαι στερόμενος αὐτῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ ξυνῆν μὲν ἡλικιώταις ἡδόμενος ἡδομένοις ἐμοί, συνῆν δὲ ἑμαυτῷ, ὅποτε ἡσυχίας ἐπιθυμήσαιμι, διήγον δ' ἐν συμποσίοις πολλάκις μὲν μέχρι τοῦ ἐπιλαθέσθαι πάντων εἴ τι χαλεπὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῃ ἦν, πολλάκις δὲ μέχρι τοῦ ὧδαίς τε καὶ θαλίαις καὶ χοροῖς τὴν ψυχὴν συγκαταμιγνύναι, πολλάκις δὲ μέχρι κοινῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐμῆς τε καὶ τῶν παρόντων. νῦν δὲ ἀπεστέρημαι μὲν τῶν ἡδομένων ἐμολὶ διὰ τὸ δούλους ἀντιφίλων ἔχειν τοὺς ἐταίρους, ἀπεστέρημαι δ' αὐτὸς τοῦ ἡδέως ἐκείνοις ὁμιλεῖν διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐνορᾶν εὐνοίαν ἐμολὶ παρ' αὐτῶν· μέθην δὲ καὶ ὕπνον ὁμοίως ἐνέδρα φυλάττομαι. τὸ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ὕχλον, φοβεῖσθαι δ' ἐρημίαν, φοβεῖσθαι δὲ ἀφυλαξίαν, φοβεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς φυλάττοντας, καὶ μήτ' ἀνόπλους ἔχειν ἐθέλειν περὶ αὐτὸν μήθ' ὠπλισμένους ἡδέως θεᾶσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀργαλέον ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα ; ἔτι δὲ ξένους μὲν μᾶλλον ἢ πολίταις πιστεύειν, βαρβάρους δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ Ἑλλησιν, ἐπιθυμεῖν δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐλευθέρους δούλους ἔχειν, τοὺς δὲ δούλους ἀναγκάζεσθαι ποιεῖν ἐλευθέρους, οὐ πάντα σοι

§ 490. In this tract, the disadvantages of despotism decidedly preponderate, but we find that our author was not content to leave the question so, and many years after (for the *Hiero* seems an early work) we find him developing his ideal state under the form of a paternal and hereditary monarchy in his *Education of Cyrus*; a very diffuse political novel, in which he sets forth his ideal picture as a biography of the older and greater Cyrus, in opposition to the dreams of Plato and other theoretical politicians of the day. This work, which is the longest and most ambitious of all Xenophon's writings, but consequently the most tedious and the least read, seems to be our earliest specimen of a romance in Greek prose literature. The author frequently professes to have written from observation, and from information obtained in the East, and this has induced many critics to seek in the *Cyropædia* for historical materials, wherewith to supply a corrected account of the Eastern histories of Herodotus and Ctesias. Xenophon differs from both as much as they differ from one another on the history of Cyrus; and as there were at least four versions of his origin and his rise into power, it has often been supposed that Xenophon followed one of these traditions, and did not invent his facts. When he agrees with Ctesias against Herodotus, that the name of Cyrus' second son was Tanaoxares, and not Smerdis, he no doubt had some foundation for his assertion. But it is idle to attempt to sift out the particles of history from the mass of fiction with which the author has consciously surrounded his hero.

The work being strictly a panegyric of Cyrus in the form of an historical narrative, the writer felt bound to exclude any flaws or faults which he knew, and to exaggerate all his virtues, and seeing that he pursued this rhetorical course in professed history, he was not likely to depart from it in a treatise really

ταῦτα δοκεῖ ψυχῆς ὑπὸ φόβων καταπεπληγμένης τεκμήρια εἶναι; ὁ γὰρ τοι φόβος οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ἐνὼν ταῖς ψυχαῖς λυπηρὸς ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων τῶν ἡδέων συμπαρακολουθῶν λυμεὼν γίγνεται. εἰ δὲ καὶ σὺ πολεμικῶν ἔμπειρος εἶ, ὦ Σιμωνίδη, καὶ ἥδη ποτὲ πολεμίᾳ φάλαγγι πλησίον ἀντετάξω, ἀναμνήσθητι ποῖον μὲν τινα σίτον ἥρου ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, ποῖον δὲ τινα ὕπνον ἐκοιμῶ. οἷα μέντοι σοὶ τότε ἦν τὰ λυπηρὰ, τοιαῦτά ἐστι τὰ τῶν τυράννων καὶ ἔτι δεινότερα· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἐναντίας μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντοθεν πολέμιους ὁρᾶν νομίζουσιν οἱ τύραννοι.

political, and describing an ideal monarch. Thus from this long and elaborate work we can hardly be said to gain anything new on the life of the greatest and the most interesting figure in Asiatic history. Nevertheless, we wonder how a man born and educated in all the blessings of Hellenic law and liberty can stoop to defend almost all the circumstances of Asiatic despotism—eunuch households, painted faces, pompous and effeminate robes, and slavish ceremonies.¹ Such concessions to the splendour of the Persian court, which had evidently so dazzled Xenophon in his youth that he never recovered his political vision, make his ideal picture anything but a monument of Hellenic superiority. As to style, the book is excessively diffuse, and many conversations are introduced without much point, merely to illustrate the conversational talent on which Xenophon much prided himself, as a Socratic Athenian of good birth, and accustomed to good society. But the specimens he gives hardly justify his good opinion of himself.

It is remarkable that in this political romance we have also (as an episode) our earliest sentimental romance, the loves of Abradatas and Panthea, which are told at intervals through the narrative,² and which end with the death of Abradatas in battle, and the suicide of Panthea and her eunuchs. As was natural to an Athenian of that epoch, such love could hardly be conceived as existing till after marriage, and the story may have been introduced in support of the Socratic theories of the dignity and importance of the female sex and of the married state. To us, who have been satiated with such stories, this early attempt seems rather dull and feeble, but it deserves notice as a phase important in literature, and one which was to bear fruit an hundredfold.

The great king is represented as dying quietly in his bed, and not from his wounds in a battle, as Ktesias says. He ends his life with a very striking address to his children, in which the author inserts his hopes of the immortality of the soul³—a very interesting passage, of which Cicero has made large use.

The last chapter of the book must surely be spurious, as it contradicts the whole purpose of the work. It explains how, as soon as Cyrus was dead, his people degenerated into all

¹ Cf. vii. 5, and viii. 1. ² Books iv. to vii. ³ viii. 7, 17, sq.

manner of vice and disorder, and reversed all the good arrangements inaugurated by him. This chapter is, indeed, curiously analogous to the chapter on the Lacedæmonian decadence in the tract just discussed, and could not but suggest the hand of an editor, who added his own reflections on the historical results to the theories of the author. In the present case some such theory is necessary to sustain Xenophon's character for good sense. The text is perhaps purer than that of any other portion of our author; but though this is so, and though the style is perhaps smoother and more finished than the rest, yet the subject is so needlessly spun out with dialogues and descriptions of semi-imaginary campaigns, that it can never be popular, and there are probably very few who have had the patience to read it through. Here, if anywhere, we should have longed for the 'epitomator' of the German critics to come forward, and treat this tedious novel as he is supposed to have treated the rest of Xenophon's remains. The *Cyropædia* seems a late work, composed, probably about 361 B.C.,¹ in the decline of his powers, and when the garrulity of age was increasing.

§ 491. We pass from the most theoretical and fanciful of Xenophon's works to the most thoroughly practical, the tract entitled *ποροί* (not *περὶ προσόδων*, a later name), and intended to exhibit the financial resources of Athens, and the policy which should consequently be followed by that state. We hear from Diogenes Laertius that Xenophon, having been exiled on the proposal of Eubulus, was ultimately recalled by the influence of the same statesman, then at the head of the Athenian finances, and it is consequently conjectured that Xenophon, in extreme old age, wrote this tract by way of advice to Eubulus—a notion justly ridiculed by Cobet. Nevertheless, it was certainly intended to support the same party, and, if not written for Eubulus, was intended to dispose the public to put confidence in a peace policy.

Commencing with an eulogistic statement of the climate and central situation of Athens, as favourable for a development of wealth, the author recommends four improvements in

¹ Both Breitenbach and Hertlein have given us good commentaries (now both in third editions, 1874).

state policy : (1) the encouragement of alien settlers, by allowing them to buy or build houses in the city, admitting them to the cavalry (not the hoplite service only), and other such compliments ; (2) the encouragement of merchants by material conveniences, such as marts and hotels, and by better laws for saving time and promptly settling disputes, but in general without any further outlay than 'decrees, and civilities, and attentions,' such as inviting important traders to public entertainments—he also recommends a state merchant service ; (3) the development of the silver mines by state subsidy and state control, providing capital in the way of slave workmen, and by the formation of joint-stock companies ; (4) lastly, by earnestly adopting a peace policy, and endeavouring by embassies to establish a sort of international agreement to check the wastefulness of war. He advises a mission to the Delphic oracle and to Dodona to enquire whether such a policy be not the right one, and if so, how it should be carried out in detail.

But the main object of all this care to increase the revenues of the state is to secure a regular state support of three obols per day, payable to all citizens alike, poor and rich, without any corresponding obligations. Thus, says he, the prevailing poverty will be relieved, and even the rich, who pay heavy taxes, will receive back a very high interest on their outlay. It is hard to conceive a more dangerous and mischievous theory of finance. As Grote observes, the returns for the outlay, especially in the mines and the merchant navy, are all uncertain, while the expenditure is heavy and certain. But even granting the possibility of an adequate return, can any condition be conceived more utterly ruinous to all the true greatness and dignity of Athens than that of making all the citizens pensioners of the state, so long as they could manage to remain at peace with their neighbours? Could any proposal pander more effectually to the weaknesses and vices of the Athenian character? Grote justly points in contrast to the oration of Demosthenes *on the Symmories*, delivered about the same time, where the views of a practical and sensible statesman may be found, based on the same facts, and the same condition of public affairs. There is nothing commendable in the policy of

the tract, except the warm affection and zeal for Athens which the author shows in his declining years.

§ 492. Some critics have wondered why Xenophon makes no mention of agriculture, for which in his other works he shows so strong a predilection, and again, how so experienced and enthusiastic a soldier should advocate a peace policy. Of course the agriculture of Attica was not, in his mind, capable of producing state revenue, and no man was more likely to advocate a peace policy than the aged veteran, who in his hospitable retreat had so long learned to value the enjoyments of peace, while narrating the excitements and dangers of war. The peculiar value of the tract lies not in its recommendations, most of which are obvious, and the rest not very practical, but in the very interesting details it gives of the mines of Laurium, and their working. Xenophon seems to express quite too sanguine an opinion as to their inexhaustible value, and he says some absurd things as to the unalterable value of silver, even as compared with gold. But we know from the speeches of Lycurgus and Hypereides, that great profits were being made twenty years later from the mines, and great activity displayed in opening new shafts. Sycophantic prosecutions, with promises of enormous confiscations of wealth among the people, became quite common, and even stopped private enterprise.¹

The date has been very well determined by Boeckh as Ol. 106, 1, just after the conclusion of the Social war, and before the beginning of the Sacred war, though the Phocians had, it seems, already seized the Delphic temple, but had retired from it—a preliminary occupation which Cobet was the first to infer, and which has helped to clear away the difficulties of dating the tract. All the critical questions as to its Xenophontic style, its unity, and its purpose, have been discussed in a very careful pamphlet by H. Zurborg (Berlin, 1874), and since in his edition of the text (1876). The form adopted is no longer that of dialogue, but rather that of a deliberative speech,² so much so that

¹ Hypereides, *pro Euxen.* col. xlv.

² Accordingly, a comparison with Isocrates' speech *on the Peace*, composed under the same circumstances, is very instructive on the differences of the two men : the one broad and vague and sentimental ; the

the tract has been held to be compiled from two such discourses. But all such subtleties are disposed of by the analogy of the remaining tracts, which are wholly, what the *Finances* are chiefly, *technical treatises*, and which, therefore, need only be slightly handled in a work on literature.

§ 493. These technical tracts are three in number : on the care and training of horses ; on the duties of a cavalry officer ; and on hunting, including the care and training of dogs. They are the earliest specimens we have of such books, excepting the Hippocratic treatises, and as such have been much studied by specialists. I confess the *Hipparchicus*, or tract on the duties of a cavalry general, confirms my notion that the Greeks knew little of scientific warfare. The directions for creating and keeping in discipline a cavalry force are what any practical man could suggest. The evolutions described are very simple, and much of the tract is devoted to the political difficulties of raising and maintaining such a force. But the most curious feature of all is its dominant religiousness, so much so that the opening is like that of a business meeting, where the proceedings commence with prayer. All through the practical directions, the reader is constantly reminded that he must act according to the will of the gods ; and at the conclusion Xenophon leaves his reader with a justification of this view : ‘ If any should wonder why the expression D. V. (σὺν θεῷ) has been so frequent in my treatise, let him know well that a man who has gone through many dangers will be less surprised, and that in war, though the adversaries are always making plans, they seldom know how they will turn out.’ I may also notice¹ the non-Socratic doctrine that correct knowledge is of no use in any pursuit or art, if we do not insist on the carrying out of the practical details.

§ 494. The treatise *on the Horse* is a far more valuable work, and really shows an insight into the care and training of horses, which would do credit to a modern book. He refers in his preface to the work of Sinon, which he praises, and of which

other narrow and precise in his thinking, but both one-sided, and wanting in the qualities of real statesmanship.

¹ Cap. 9, 2.

a short fragment has survived.¹ He desires to supply what has been omitted in that work, which its author commemorated by setting up a bronze horse at the Eleusinion, and engraving his works on the pedestal.

The technical character of this treatise does not tempt us to delay upon it; I would only mention the persistent inculcation of kindness and gentleness in the treatment of the horse, so far in advance of the methods of our vulgar and brutal horse-trainers. But though Xenophon constantly alludes to the dangers of being cheated in the buying of horses, Providence, which he elsewhere so frequently invokes, is here never called upon to interfere. The principal object of keeping horses at Athens was for display in processions, and curious importance is laid² on the proper prancing and caracoling of horses at such ceremonies. In fact, we see the author describing such riding as is represented in the famous Parthenon frieze, which may have been before his mind when writing, We also learn that this was no ideal horsemanship, but the fashionable practice at Athens. The absence of any remarks on saddles, or on shoeing, will strike the modern reader; neither of these was in use among the ancients. Hence the hardening of the feet, and the difficulties of mounting without stirrups, occupy much space. This tract has been specially translated and commented on (together with the *Hipparchicus*, by P. L. Courier, a French Artillery officer, 1807) in English by Berenger, in his *History of the Art of Horsemanship*; also by Fr. Jacobs (Gotha, 1825). Neither tract has received much attention among recent English scholars.

§ 495. We now come to the last and most characteristic of Xenophon's technical tracts, that on *Hunting*, which treats very carefully of the points, the breeding, and training of dogs; then of nets, and, lastly, at great length, of hare hunting, in which the author takes the most enthusiastic delight.³ Nor is

¹ Published by Darenberg in his *Notices et Extraits des MSS. médicaux*, p. 169.

² Cap. II.

³ οὕτω δὲ ἐπὶ χαρὶ ἔστιν τὸ θηρίον, ὥστε οὐδεὶς ὕστις οὐκ ἂν ἰδὼν ἰχνεύμενον, εὐρίσκόμενον, μεταθεόμενον, ἀλίσκόμενον ἐπιλάθοιτ' ἂν εἰ τοῦ ἐρῆ (v. 32).

the religious element wanting, for when the nets are ready, the best trained of the dogs is not loosed without a prayer to Apollo and Artemis Agrotera to give the hunter sport. The chase of fawns and stags, or of wild boars, is not detailed with any such care. There is a foolish and mythological preface about Cheiron and his pupils, generally and justly rejected by critics; there is also a very inappropriate attack upon the sophists at the conclusion, beginning with the last (thirteenth) chapter, which is also rejected. I should be disposed to hold the real conclusion to come earlier, ending with 12, 9. But the question is hardly worth discussing. Cobet thinks it (above, p. 265) probably the earliest of Xenophon's works. If we adopt (as I do) Cobet's own arguments on Xenophon's age, he was brought up at Athens during the Peloponnesian war, when hunting in Attica would be seldom possible, and indeed we know that in the following generation one of the comic poets speaks of it as a land where not a hare remained. I am convinced, therefore, that it was not composed till after the author had settled in his 'hunting box' at Skillus. The very form of the genuine proem,¹—ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν περαινῶ τοῖς νέοις, &c.—implies a writer of mature years.

§ 496. On the so-called fragments of Xenophon I need not delay the reader. There are short epistles to Socratic friends, first printed by Allatius, and some quoted by Stobæus, which may be read in the appendix to Sauppe's edition, or in the *Epistolographi Græci*, but which are certainly spurious. There are also a considerable number of words and phrases quoted by old authors and grammarians as Xenophon's, which we do not now find in his works. These are the stronghold of the 'Epitomators,' the chief of whom is the modern Greek Kyprianos. A good many of them are doubtless blunders, where Xenophon is cited instead of Xenophanes, or some similar name. Others are free citations, and can be still identified. A few, especially from the *Anabasis*, are really unexplained, and may possibly come from the lost *Anabasis* of Themistogenes.

§ 497. It remains for us to sum up the general conclusions to be derived from our special survey of Xenophon's works.

¹ i. 18.

We have seen that there is much reasonable suspicion of their having been edited by a later hand. The epilogues of the *Memorabilia*, of the *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, of the *Cyropaedia*, of the tract on *Hunting*, all contain irrelevant matter, in some cases stultifying all that goes before. If these be indeed the author's additions, we must assume them to be the additions of an embittered and querulous old age, and appended to the later copies of his works. Again, the combined prolixities and brevities of his style have tempted scholars to the theory that we possess but blundering epitomes, which feebly convey to us the real grace of the 'Attic bee.' But the fact that these objections have been separately brought against so many of his works, show that the epitome theory is vastly improbable, and that the fault lies in the author himself, whose imperfect literary and rhetorical training—Socrates was no master of form—contrasts with the very polished and strictly professional authors of the same period.

It is, however, hardly true to speak of Xenophon as a mere practical man, and his works as mere recreations. On the contrary, his later life seems to have been wholly devoted to literature, and he attained a rank among Attic writers which very few were ever able to reach. Among the Roman critics especially he earned no small meed of praise. His subjects were congenial to them; his books were easy; his language approached the later common dialect, which they all understood perfectly. He was, moreover, always the gentleman amateur, who cared less about a hiatus in his vowels than in his hunting nets, and admitted stragglers in his vocabulary while he would not tolerate them in his troop. This reputation for simple grace and unaffected ease, which made him so popular among Roman critics, he has maintained among the students of Attic style, and among the educators of our youth in Attic Greek, so that great scholars, like Cobet, Dindorf, Sauppe, Schneider, and Schenkl, have spent endless labour upon the purifying of his text. It is the more remarkable, as he confessedly not only admits Ionic, Doric, and poetical words into his ordinary style, but uses so irregular a vocabulary that each work abounds in ἁπαξ λεγόμενα, not only as regards himself, but as regards the

good Attic authors of his age. As a writer, therefore, of good clear Attic Greek, and upon very attractive subjects, there can be no question that Xenophon ranks very high.

§ 498. But when we come to judge him from a different standpoint, and consider how he appreciated the divine philosophy of Socrates, the momentous facts of the Theban supremacy, the merits of the various polities with which his adventurous life acquainted him—then it is that we feel in him a great want, and are obliged to degrade him to the second rank among the writers of the Attic age. For among his many advantages of ability and of experience he lacked the one which is worth all the rest—he lacked genius. We see this in his practical life, for though a successful and experienced general, he never attained any high reputation as such through Greece. Indeed, he seems all his life dominated by any great man whom he met—Socrates, Cyrus, Agesilaus. Yet even here when he endeavours to draw the portraits of his idols, he is a mere Boswell, a mere photographer, who copies petty details, but, being no true artist, is unable to catch the ideal side of the character, and reproduce it for all time. Thus the portrait of Socrates in Plato's dialogues is probably far less faithful in detail than Xenophon's, and yet in its depths how infinitely truer and more satisfying ! So likewise in his History, in his political philosophy, he is consciously writing up a personal friend, and writing down his foes ; he is consciously recommending the virtues of a personal friend, or, in the *Anabasis*, his own, and thus he omits the larger features of the world-problem as it unrolled before him. Above all, he completely wants that spontaneity, that absence of self-consciousness, which marks the products of real genius. Hence his portrait of Socrates is vulgarised, and that great man's philosophy represented as a mere refined and calm Hedonism, such as Epicurus afterwards taught. His own religion is of the same kind, a cool calculation of the profits to be derived from honouring the gods, and no real exercise of self-denial, purity, or nobleness of soul.

The stirring times in which he lived, and his diligence as an author, make him a valuable and important personage in Attic literature, but he has probably imposed upon the learned

with a great exaggeration of his military deeds in the *Anabasis*. In his own day, this famous Retreat, while it made no little stir through Greece, did not bring him any immediate renown. It is owing to his own bright and well told narrative that he is not only cited as an authority by all the historians of Greece, but that he is a household name in the mouth of every schoolboy who begins the study of classical Greek.

The writings of Xenophon were much read and admired by succeeding generations ; but, imitated by Arrian,¹ quoted by Cicero, criticised by the Latin rhetors, I cannot find that the Alexandrian scholars paid him any critical attention. There are said to be scholia in some of the Oxford texts, but as yet unedited, nor do I know what may be their value.

§ 499. *Bibliographical*. The number of extant MSS. is very great, and scattered through libraries from Jerusalem to Madrid, but few of them are old, and there seems much difference of opinion as to their real date and respective value. The earliest dated (A.D. 1166) is the No. 511 in the Marcian library at Venice ; there is another of some such date in the Escorial ; one at Wolfenbüttel seems the best. Very few of them, if any, contain all the works, but rather selections and excerpts. The earliest printed *Xenophon* is the Latin version of 1476 (Francis. Philelfus, Milan), the first Greek edition the Juntine of 1516. Of recent complete texts the best are Schneider's (3rd edition, Leipzig 1838-40), that in the Didot

¹ The works of Arrian, who called himself, and was called by others, the younger Xenophon, are interesting and valuable from an historical and ethical point of view, but cannot be included within the bounds of Greek classical literature. There are in them so many grave violations of Attic usage, that by common consent they are not studied in an ordinary classical education. The appellation of the younger Xenophon, it may be observed, applies by no means so much to style as to similarities of life and choice of literary subjects. The Socrates of Arrian was Epictetus, whose life and opinions he recorded. Besides this, he wrote history chiefly from a military point of view, such as the *anabasis* of Alexander, the *Indica*, and other lost works, a book on tactics, and a supplement to Xenophon's tract on hunting. The *Indica* were not even composed in Attic Greek, but in the Ionic dialect of Ktesias and Herodotus, the latter of whom he has everywhere imitated in the structure of sentences, and in many peculiar terms.

series, and those of G. Sauppe (Tauchnitz, 8vo., 1864) and L. Dindorf with A. Hug's *Anabasis* (Teubner, 1873). There are many excellent recent editions of the separate works, which have been already mentioned. Schenkl's complete edition (Berlin, 1876), with his studies on the MSS. in the '*Abhandlungen* of the Vienna Academy for 1875-6,' is now far the most complete and valuable. He has also published a very popular Chrestomathy with lexicon (6th edition, Vienna, 1877). The various recent monographs are noticed by Nitsche in Bursian's *Fahrsbericht* for 1877.

CHAPTER XI.

DEMOSTHENES.

§ 500. WE come at last to a great Greek author, concerning whom there are fortunately very ample materials presented to us. We have several copies, evidently authentic, of his statue, so that his very appearance is familiar to us. We have in the next place the details of his early struggles in life in his own speeches against his guardians; of his political acts and career in his great public harangues, especially in the speech *for Ctesiphon on the Crown*, which is a splendid *apologia pro vita sua*. We have, moreover, these public confessions in many cases commented and animadverted on by his adversaries, Æschines and Hyperides, so that they are not uncontrolled self-pangyrics.

In the following generation, when literary history came into fashion, his memory was yet fresh enough to afford good materials to historians and biographers. From these are derived the various and independent *Lives* of the orator, which still amount to ten in number. Fullest and most interesting is the work of Plutarch, then the many details contained in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, though his official *Life* is not preserved. The various sketches in the *Lives of the Orators*, in Suidas, and in the prefaces to his speeches, are less important. The points which remain in doubt are rather obscured by controversy than by oblivion.

§ 501. We know that Demosthenes was born of respectable and well-to-do, though not illustrious, parents—Demosthenes (of the deme Pæania) and Cleobule,¹ and that in childhood he was

¹ Æschines (*against Ctes.* § 171) gives an explicit account of the Scythian origin of Cleobule, which may be true, but he can find nothing to say against her character.

brought up in comfort, and with the advantages of a good station. But the exact year of his birth is uncertain, because he has himself confused it. He says he was thirty-two years old when he prosecuted Meidias, and this speech is fixed at such a date (349 B.C.) as would make his birth-year 381 B.C.¹ On the other hand, the speech against Onetor specifies that he attained his majority (in his eighteenth year) in the archonship of Polyzelus, 366 B.C. This gives us his birth-year as 384-3 (the date given in the *Lives*); and this date is now assumed, with slight variations, by all the best authorities. Thus at the very outset we have a specimen of the sort of difficulty we constantly meet in treating of this orator. The passage in the speech against Meidias being an isolated statement, must be regarded as a deliberate misstatement, and it deceived most of the ancients—Dionysius, Aulus Gellius, and apparently Plutarch. But there are not wanting indications of the truth elsewhere.²

The elder Demosthenes had two establishments, one for the manufacture of swords and knives, another for the wooden frames of couches; in fact, we should call him both a cutler and an upholsterer. But of course he carried on this business rather as a capitalist, for his property in slaves and chattels at his death is valued by his son, probably with some exaggeration, at fourteen talents (about 3,300*l.*)—in those days a large fortune. By his will he left his children—Demosthenes, a boy of seven years old, and an only daughter—to the care of two nephews and a family friend, on the understanding that one nephew, Aphobus, should marry his widow (an ordinary Attic arrangement); the second, Demophon, should marry the daughter, with a good dowry, and to all three he gave the use of certain moneys until his son should come of age. None of these arrangements, except the securing of the money for themselves, was carried out by the dishonest guardians. Thus Demosthenes found himself, when he came of age, possessed of the responsibilities and expenses of a fortune—which ought by

¹ This, viz. Ol. 99, 4, is Dionysius' opinion.

² Cf. the intricate discussions of A. Schäfer (*Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, iii. B. p. 55), and of Blass, *AB.* vol. iii. pp. 7-10.

interest, he says, to have increased to thirty talents—but in fact a pauper.

There is little doubt that in this emergency he had recourse to Isæus, the most skilful practical pleader of the day in such lawsuits, and with his help and advice¹ brought an action against Aphobus, the main delinquent, for ten talents, the third part of the embezzled property. There is no proof that Demosthenes learned from any other of his famous contemporaries, either philosophy from Plato, or rhetoric from Isocrates; but it is certain that, by a diligence so exceptional as to be remarkable, he had attained a sounder general culture than almost any young man of his day. Hence his own knowledge was sufficient to compose in the main the early speeches concerning his property, which, though not brilliant, manifest the force and directness which we admire in his most perfect works. He won his case against Aphobus, but was put off by various pretexts and devices, so that he was obliged to prosecute Onetor, Aphobus' brother-in-law, to whom the property had been professedly transferred.

I need not give the details of these disputes, which can be read in the speeches. The young orator seems to have recovered but a small part of the ten talents claimed from Aphobus, and after many vexatious delays and disputes, while the other two guardians were not prosecuted, so far as we know. However, his legal victory over Aphobus must have brought him into notice, so that he was soon able to improve his impaired fortune by the lucrative profession of composing speeches for litigants in the law courts.

Our authorities agree in representing him as a very hard-

¹ The relations of Demosthenes' to Isæus' speeches have been carefully examined in two programs (Hildesheim, 1872-3) by A. Laudahn, who also adduces the forty-first speech (*against Spudias*) to show how the same ideas were repeated in various forms by Demosthenes. Laudahn thinks that though the borrowing from Isæus is clear, the modifications introduced into the poem of the Or. xxvii., which to some extent mar Isæus' composition, cannot have been made with that orator's advice and consent, and thus Demosthenes' independent use of Isæus' speeches may be proved.

working, water-drinking, unsocial person, who spent all the night either in political studies, or in the preparation of speeches, which smelt of the lamp, and were at first so laboured as to be obscure and even dull—a fact which we can partially verify in his earliest public harangues. In after years there were not wanting allegations of debauchery and extravagance against him, but these seem so inconsistent with his nature that they would require the most convincing evidence to sustain them. It is more likely that he devoted every moment of his early life to intellectual work. Later on he married, but his only child, a daughter, died just before the news came of Philip's death (336 B.C.), and he left no direct descendants to enjoy the hereditary honours voted, though long after his death, by his grateful fellow-citizens.

For ten years after his successful suit against his guardians he worked as a speech writer, and from this period we have remaining the speech (if genuine) *for the trierarch's crown* (359 B.C.), then the speech *against Leptines* (354 B.C.), and possibly others, but many are lost. He is reported at the close of the speech (of Demon) *against Zenothemis* to have said that he abandoned private suits, when once he had undertaken the duty of public politics. But there is no doubt that this rule suffered many exceptions, or only applied to personal appearances as an advocate or supporter of litigants in court. He had the reputation of being a subtle advocate, ready to take every advantage in the intricacies of the law, or in the statement of doubtful facts; he was even openly accused during his lifetime, and ever since, of selling his services to opposite sides in the case of the disputes between Phormion and Apollodorus. Something of the kind he must really have done—perhaps (as Blass thinks) in order to induce Apollodorus to propose the bill for the application of the theoric fund to war purposes. The proceeding now fashionable among the panegyrists of Demosthenes is to evade this serious moral charge by asserting the spuriousness of all the speeches for Apollodorus, a desperate resource in the face of the soundest ancient criticism.

But to return to the earlier speeches. It has been well remarked that those personally delivered show a marked contrast

to those composed for others. The latter are bold, incisive and passionate ; the former very modest and restrained, if we except the pathetic and anxious appeals at the end of the speeches *against Aphobus*, where he pleads for the succour of the jury as an orphan on the brink of ruin and disgrace.

§ 502. The public speeches of Demosthenes belong rather to the political than the literary history of the period, and are so fully discussed in every Greek history, that it is unnecessary to recapitulate here the circumstances familiar to every student of the period, and to which we must again refer in speaking of the several harangues. But without an intimate knowledge of the history, it is impossible to appreciate their greatness and their power. They are essentially occasional, each called forth by the crisis of the time, and applying themselves to its solution. And yet for all that they are the exponents of a great and consistent policy—the policy of maintaining the imperial position and dignity of Athens at the cost of personal sacrifices and personal dangers.¹

His political career begins at the moment when by the Social war Athens had a second time lost her naval greatness, and by the death of Chabrias Timotheus and Iphicrates her best generals. Passing by the speech *against Leptines*, which, though spoken before a jury, is devoted to an exposition of public policy and the maintenance of public obligations, we have the speeches *on the Symmories* (354 B.C.), *on behalf of the Megalopolitans* (353 B.C.), and *for the Liberty of the Rhodians* (351 B.C.), the first of which proposes an important financial reform, so as to equalise the state burdens and render the state forces efficient. The other two are very important and statesmanlike announcements that the policy of Athens is to be influenced not by special likes and dislikes, or by past quarrels and ingritudes, but by present expediency, and above all by the determination to maintain a proper balance of power

¹ By far the best commentary on the political speeches is Grote's *History*, as that author, being himself an experienced politician, as well as an accurate and philosophic critic, has a power of appreciating political situations which is quite foreign to Schäfer, E. Curtius, and the other philologists who study Greek politics.

among the neighbouring states. He also advocates the cause of democracy against despotism, of Hellenedom against barbarian encroachment. The style is very Thucydidean, being grave, at times even harsh, and restrained. But we see from the first the deep earnestness and the large views of the speaker.

§ 503. Then comes the period of Philip's aggression in the north—an aggression begun by small degrees, and not openly attacked by Demosthenes till his first *Philippic* in 351 B.C. His panegyrists, indeed, pretend to discover allusions to Philip in the speech *on the Symmories*; but there is no reason why the king of Macedon, if then at war with Athens, should not have been expressly named by so direct a speaker as Demosthenes, who seems here to have been behindhand in turning his attention towards the real dangers of his country. He claims, indeed, and obtains even from Grote,¹ credit for having foreseen political events from their beginnings, and having forewarned his hearers. In the present case the danger must have been already obvious enough; it was Demosthenes' real merit not only to have brought it forcibly and clearly before the people, but to have at the same time, as was his wont, pointed out the practical remedies for it, and the proper policy to be adopted by the Athenians.

Then followed the three orations *for the Olynthians*, which make up what has been properly called the first series of Demosthenes' *Philippics*. The real adversary in all these famous speeches is not so much the king of Macedon as the sloth and supineness of the Athenians, and the influence of the peace party, whether honest or bribed by Philip. Against these he is ever insisting on financial reforms, personal service, and diminution of mercenary auxiliaries. He advocates the seeking of alliances, and the abandonment of petty disputes. Thus while practically effective, and even minute in the details of their special recommendations, these harangues have large and eternal features about them, and are applicable to all luxurious and peace-loving societies, when brought in their advanced age into conflict with a young and energetic power. Still more do they apply to the conflicts of a democracy, which conducts its

¹ xi. p. 442.

affairs by public discussion, against a despot who keeps his own counsel. It was Demosthenes' greatest difficulty that he was opposed not only by able and unscrupulous orators like Æschines, but by men of integrity and personal weight of character, Eubulus and Phocion, both of whom steadily advocated the peace policy against his more splendid but dangerous exhortations. For he would have the people assume higher responsibilities than personal well-being, and greater risks than those of a mere defensive armament.

On the fall of Olynthus, he was persuaded of the necessity of peace, and for a moment joined his political adversaries (in his oration *on the Peace*, 346 B.C.). To this coalition is attributed his somewhat mean settlement as regards a public and personal insult by Meidias, who, apparently through the influence of Eubulus, after some delays and subterfuges, was enabled to stay the pending action by paying Demosthenes thirty minæ—a result which has been mentioned to the orator's discredit ever since.

Yet it was during these years—the years of peace (346–40) which were being employed by Philip for the consolidation of his power and the extension of his influence—that Demosthenes seems to have gained an important place among the public advisers of his country. He led, with Hypereides and Hegesippus, a great party against the supporters of Philip. His second *Philippic* (344 B.C.) raises the alarm, and declares a new war with Macedon to be impending; and in the following year Philocrates, the main advocate of peace and confidence in Philip, was banished by the prosecution which he promoted. In the same year came on the long delayed prosecution of Æschines (*περὶ παραπρεσβείας*), the debate on which is still extant. But here Eubulus and Phocion were able, though with difficulty, to rescue the accused. In 340 there followed his third and most powerful *Philippic*, which calls the Athenians from their indolence and false security to arms against the increasing and now proximate danger.

During the next three years (340–38 B.C.) the power of Demosthenes was at its zenith : his eloquence had really awakened his countrymen ; vigorous measures were taken ; Eubœa was

regained to their alliance; Byzantium saved from Philip's attack. Even the theoric fund was resigned by the democracy, and applied, as the orator had long since proposed, to the public emergency. But by means of the new Sacred war Philip succeeded in invading Greece, and fortified Elateia, the northern key of Bœotia. Then it was that Demosthenes first persuaded the Athenians to cast aside traditional hate, and bring prompt succour to their old enemy, Thebes. Moreover, he himself went forthwith on an embassy to Thebes, and induced the Thebans, in spite of the opposition of the Macedonian party, to receive the Athenian army with sincere good-will. Without doubt this was the greatest triumph of his life, and it is ever to be lamented that the hurry and urgency of the crisis have deprived us of the harangues by which he effected these wonderful results.

§ 504. The battle of Chæronea (August, 338 B.C.) crushed his hopes, and his policy. He fought in the battle as a common soldier, and fled with the rest when the day was decided. But the Athenians marked their sense of respect for him, and chronicled their refutation of the charge of cowardice, by appointing him (in the following winter) to pronounce the *Epitaphios* over the fallen. He was also appointed Commissioner of Public Works, to repair the fortifications of the town, by which the patriots maintained the dignity of Athens, though she was compelled to abandon her aspirations to the leadership of Greece. Owing to the orator's good conduct in this office, and his munificent donation of eighty minæ towards the works, he was voted the public compliment of a crown, to be presented in the theatre, at the proposal of Ctesiphon (337 B.C.). But the proposal, being impeached as illegal by Æschines, was not then carried out. The death of Philip (336) once more revived Demosthenes' hopes; he appeared in festive array, having cast aside the mourning just assumed at his only child's death, for in him patriotism loosed all domestic ties. While Alexander, content with a formal confirmation of his position as generalissimo of the Greeks, was for a moment hidden among the barbarians of the north, Demosthenes, with the aid of treasure sent from Persia which he dispensed without control, gave the Thebans arms and supplies,

and endeavoured to incite a general revolution against him. But the Athenians were still delaying, and had not actually declared themselves, when the Macedonian swooped down upon Thebes, destroyed it, and demanded the heads of the patriot party at Athens, whom he knew to be the real rebels against his authority. By the mediation of Phocion and Demades the lives of Demosthenes and his friends were saved—an act of remarkable generosity in Alexander, but rather, I fancy, from a policy of contempt than of prudence.

The splendid conquests in the East, the Hellenization of Persia, the foundation of a new and continental Greek empire—all this was lost upon the Greek patriots. They remained at Athens, sorrowing over every fresh Greek victory, offering up secret prayers for their ancient enemy, the Persian; hoping against hope that Alexander might be lost in the remote East, from which the wonderful reports of his doings brought despair to their narrow though noble hearts.

Yet while the East was the theatre of brilliant deeds, Athens witnessed a contest of arguments which has almost produced as much attention among posterity. This was the prosecution by Æschines of the vote of confidence in Demosthenes, which Ctesiphon had carried, and the reply of Demosthenes—in reality a public trial of the life and acts of the orator before his assembled countrymen, after his policy had failed, and his country had been hopelessly subdued in the struggle. The successful defence of Demosthenes (*on the Crown*, 330 B.C.) is the greatest of the speeches handed down to us from antiquity.

§ 505. After this great and worthy triumph, the voice of the orator is to us all but silent, and the closing years of his life were shaded with misery and disgrace. When the ‘unjust steward’ of Alexander, Harpalus, arrived off Sunium with an army of mercenaries and an immense treasure, Demosthenes opposed his admission to Athens; but Harpalus obtained an entry without his troops, and scattered his gold among the politicians, in the hope of raising Athens against Alexander. Demosthenes now separated himself from the patriots, and advocated, with Phocion, submission to Alexander, whose power he understood; and he accordingly proposed the detention of Harpalus

and sequestration of his treasures till Alexander's officers should come to claim them. But Harpalus escaped, and half the money, though formally lodged in the acropolis under the direction of Demosthenes and others, was found to have disappeared. Demosthenes was forthwith charged with having been bribed to connive at the flight of Harpalus. After an enquiry by the Areopagus, he and others were sent for trial. State prosecutors, of whom Hypereides was the most notable, were nominated. Demosthenes, who was the first defendant, was sentenced to a fine of fifty talents, and cast into prison, as if payment were impossible, without allowing him even the legal respite. Two of the speeches against him have survived in the remains of Deinarchus and Hypereides (the latter mutilated). With the help of these documents, and the narrative of the facts, most modern historians have reversed the judgment of the Attic jury, in which the ancients acquiesced, and consider him to have fallen a victim to the coalition of the Macedonian with the ultra-patriotic leaders at Athens.¹ He escaped from prison, and was leading a miserable life of exile on the coast of Argolis² when the news of Alexander's death startled all Greece. The patriot party at Athens rose in rebellion. Demosthenes reconciled himself with them, and joined their embassy to influence the Peloponnesus to war. He was recalled by public decree to Athens, and his glorious return was compared to that of the far different Alcibiades. But after brief successes, the defeat at Crannon again ruined the patriots, and Antipater, no Alexander in generosity, insisted upon the extradition of the orators, who were a perpetual danger to the dominion of Macedon in Greece. Demosthenes was overtaken by his pursuers at the temple of Neptune on

¹ So Grote, A. Schäfer, E. Curtius, F. Blass, and others. I find that the Messrs Simcox, in their introduction to the speeches of Demosthenes and Æschines *on the Crown* (Oxford, 1872), take a more sober and prosaic, but to my mind a truer, estimate of the case. We shall revert to it hereafter in connection with the accusation of Hypereides.

² Perhaps writing plaintive letters to soften the anger of the demos; and if the extant letters, which are on this topic, are genuine, they must be the latest compositions we have from his pen.

Calaureia—an ancient shrine commemorating the earliest confederacy in the nascent Hellenic people. Seeing escape impossible, the orator, under pretence of writing his last wishes to his family, retired to the shrine, where he took poison which he had kept in readiness. His strength did not serve him to free the temple from the pollution of his death—a pathetic scene, which Plutarch has immortalised.

§ 506. If the date of his birth is disputed, that of his death was noted with peculiar and affectionate accuracy—Ol. 114, 3, the 16th of the month Pyanepsion (322 B.C.). He was then sixty-two years old. Fifty years later, the Athenians, at the proposal of his nephew Demochares, erected to him a bronze statue (the original of our extant portraits) in the Agora, and granted honours to his descendants. The following foolish epigram was inscribed on the pedestal :—

εἴπερ Ἰσὴν γνώμη ῥώμην, Δημόσθενες, εἶχες
οὔ ποτ' ἂν Ἑλλήνων ἤρξεν Ἀρης Μακεδών.¹

The statue in the Vatican represents a poor, thin figure, with lean arms, and no muscular development; the face is careworn and furrowed; there is no geniality, no trace of humour or good nature, as in most Greek portraits; the lower lip is contracted, and retreating—a corroboration of the witnesses who tell us of his naturally defective utterance. He looks a disagreeable, painstaking, morose man; nor can we see in his face any clear marks either of the moral greatness which raised him to a foremost place among Greek patriots, or of the intellectual force which made him an orator unsurpassed in the annals of history.

§ 507. The existing collection of the works of Demosthenes seems to be very nearly complete, for we hear from the *Life*

¹ The same point is brought out in the ironical fragment of Timocles, which Athenæus quotes (cf. Meineke, *Fragg. Com.* iii. 598) :

B. καὶ πρῶτα μὲν σοι παύσεται Δημοσθένης
ὀργιζόμενος. A. ὁ ποῖος; B. ὁ ποῖος; ὁ Βριάρεως
ὁ τοὺς καταπέλτας τὰς τε λόγχας ἐσθίων,
μισῶν λόγους ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ πώποτε
ἀντίθετον εἰπὼν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' Ἀρη βλέπων.

(among those of the ten orators) that the number of recognised orations was sixty-five, and we still possess sixty speeches, exclusive of the *Letter of Philip*, the six letters of Demosthenes, and the collection of prefaces and speeches. We have many different arrangements of these speeches in our MSS., nor is that of the oldest and best apparently preferable to the rest. They agree (I think) in one point only, in placing the eleven *Philippics*, or speeches against the policy of Philip, first in order. None of the MSS. observe a chronological, but rather a logical order, and upon the following general lines. The widest division is into *δημόσιοι* and *ἰδιωτικοί*, orations on public and private subjects. The former are again divided into five general *συμβουλευτικοί*, eleven *Φιλιππικοί*, and eight *δικανικοί*, or court speeches on public questions, like that *on the Crown*. The *ἰδιωτικοί*, or orations in the causes of private individuals and on private disputes, are subdivided according to their legal aspects, such as those on the guardianship of his property, then arguments on demurrer, on contracts, on assaults, &c. Beyond these two classes come the *ἐπιδεικτικοί* (spurious) and the *Letters* and *proems*.

The first collection, or *πίναξ*, of Callimachus (for the Alexandrian Library) seems not to have been very critical, and to have contained all that went by the name of Demosthenes; but the rhetors of the Augustan age, Dionysius and Cæcilius, were already full of critical doubts, and the former (the criticisms of the latter are not extant) rejects many speeches on the ground of style, and also of historical inaccuracy. This careful and sensible writer acknowledges only twenty-two public, and about twenty-four private, orations as genuine, thus giving us a total of forty-six. But the path on which he trod has suggested to modern critics similar investigations, and, as is natural to destructive criticism, more and more speeches have been declared spurious, till the list of the greatest of the German critics—A. Schäfer—only reaches twenty-nine in all.

§ 508. Before entering on any special analysis of Demosthenes' works, it is necessary to say something generally on this question, one analogous to that of Homeric and Platonic criticism, but fortunately with some additional elements at hand

to afford us a solution. The moderns observe, reasonably enough, that the first rhetors who opened the way in rejecting previously received works were likely to be timid in their procedure, and to allow much to stand which should logically have been set aside. This is in most cases a sound and fair argument. But when I find that Dionysius was not at all conservative in his views, and that, owing to his extravagant estimate of Demosthenes' perfections, he was disposed to reject anything unworthy of him, I do not think that we are justified in advancing beyond his scepticism. I hold this especially in the case of orations which he has quoted as genuine, but which moderns have rejected on the score of inferior style. This is the one point in which the old rhetor's judgment was doubtless far keener and sounder than ours, and it seems to me accordingly that when he, who had his attention closely fixed on style, allows a work to pass unchallenged, and even quotes illustrations from it, the strongest arguments are required to convince us that moderns have proved it spurious on the score of stylistic defects.

From another side, we may approach the same conclusion. When we are told that, owing to the too frequent admission of the hiatus, or the imperfect rounding of the periods, or the monotonous use of connecting particles, a certain speech is unworthy of Demosthenes, and therefore spurious, there are two assumptions involved, neither of which need be true. The first is that the orator was at all times equal to himself, and that all his efforts were equally grand; whereas we may be sure that not only the subject, but any momentary crisis, the state of his health, or of his popularity, was sure to affect strongly the productions of his genius. But even admitting, as we may, that up to a certain point the assumption is warranted, and that a great orator will not allow a poor and feeble composition to be circulated under his name, we have no right to hold that all Demosthenes' speeches received the same amount of revision, or in many cases any revision at all. For we know that only some were published by himself as political pamphlets—these of course were the most carefully and thoroughly polished. Others, and especially the speeches on private suits, being perhaps not even

the rhetor's property, but sold to the litigants, and in any case of small importance to a man who did not live by speech-writing, may have received very little after-revision ; and, except in a few instances, when the author was interested in his subject, or had accidental leisure for composition and correction, such speeches might fall far short, both in power and in polish, of the greater public speeches. There is yet again a third class, not intended for publication, or left aside for the time being, and never taken up again, till other hands did so after the orator's death, and then brought them out in a condition very different from that of a perfect and revised work. Such is the case with even so remarkable a speech as that *against Meidias*, which, not being spoken, was cast aside, and never perfected by Demosthenes himself.

But it may be argued that all these counter-suppositions assume a greater improbability than those above censured ; for they assume that the first draught of a speech by a great orator such as Demosthenes would not contain all the perfections of his style. Why should not so practised a composer at the very first burst produce a speech unmistakeable in the power of its arguments and the splendour of its diction ? The answer is, that in the case of Demosthenes we know that such extemporising was foreign to him, that all his speeches, when completed, smelt of the lamp, and that their beauty and variety were not the result of a spontaneous gift, like that of Demades, but of careful and conscious elaboration. The varieties, for example, in his acknowledged speeches in the admission of the hiatus point to the fact that he did not in ordinary writing or speaking avoid it as naturally disagreeable, but rather that he revised his compositions and got rid of it in the finished draught. This is, in fact, the method of composition postulated by both Schäfer and Blass in their account of the speech against Timocrates, where there are evidences of two recensions, one of which was not polished, and therefore contains offences against the usual rhythm and hiatus between vowels.¹ Perhaps the same elaboration was applied to his periods, to the studied

¹ Cf. Schäfer, iii. 64, 65 ; Blass, iii. 248.

variety of his connecting particles, nay, even the logical strengthening of his arguments.

As regards form, therefore, I think moderns have been hasty in rejecting much that is genuine, and we can point to the conflicts of opinion in our support. What Schäfer thinks manifestly spurious, Weil and Blass defend with sound arguments, and these are only instances of a large and widely spread controversy.

§ 509. When we approach the matter of the speeches as a criterion, it is confessed by all the sceptics that the majority of the disputed speeches are so thoroughly at home in the details of Athenian history, or Athenian law and social habits in Demosthenic days, that any theory of late forgery is out of the question, and that these works, though spurious, must be the compositions of obscurer contemporaries. A few, such as the *Epitaphios* and *Erotikos*, are ascribed to later rhetors, though even here (in the *Epitaphios*) Blass shows that the secrets of Demosthenic style, soon obscured and lost in the decadence of oratory, are known and observed. But admitting the matter to be of the Demosthenic age, they think that (1) feebleness and vulgarity, (2) dishonesty in the speaker, are sure marks of spuriousness. The former is so completely a matter of taste, and one upon which the critics vary so widely, that I pass it by as of no account. The second is clearly what has urged A. Schäfer to seek for grounds of rejection in the case of those speeches in Apollodorus' suits which argue against a client for whom Demosthenes had already composed one of his best court speeches. The ancients had noticed this grave charge against Demosthenes. Æschines brings it against him, and he nowhere denies it. Subsequent biographers, like Plutarch, repeat it. It is surely safer, with Blass, to find strong political reasons for some laxity in the morals of Demosthenes' advocacy, than to start by assuming his moral perfection and make it the ground for seeking critical objections against well-attested speeches. This tone runs all through A. Schäfer's great work, and in my mind mars its critical value and its good sense in more than one argument. But its thoroughness has made it the standard book, which both historians and critics in this country seem now to follow blindly.

§ 510. With these prefatory remarks I pass on to say something in detail of the principal orations of each class, and upon each it will suffice to cite the opinions of the three best modern critics—A. Schäfer, Blass, and H. Weil (as far as his edition reaches). In general, we shall follow the chronological order, making, however, exceptions where a good logical grouping can be attained. Thus we begin with the juvenile speeches against his guardians, as certainly the earliest, though belonging to the *ιδιωτικοί*, or private orations, and therefore placed late in the MSS.

The first and second speeches *against Aphobus* are very interesting, as the first composed by the orator, and certainly composed with the advice and help of Isæus, upon whose eighth extant oration (on the succession to Kiron's estate) they are modelled, and from which some commonplaces are even transferred to these speeches¹ especially in the proem and recapitulation. Some old critics for these reasons thought them wholly composed by Isæus, and are often refuted with the bad argument, that we find everywhere advances in structure, in fulness, and in pathos beyond the older orator. I call this a bad argument, because I believe these speeches are not now in their original form, but retouched by Demosthenes in maturer years, when he published them as early specimens of his art. Hence, though in many respects they are tame and dry, there are many other parts in which we find the real master. The tame parts are the long and minute proofs of the amount of his property in the first speech; the finer portions are the pathetic conclusions, especially in the second speech, when, after describing the death-bed scene of his father, he bursts into a passionate appeal to the judges, which must have been quite startling to those accustomed to the older and more staid eloquence.² Of the ethos or character-drawing so attractive in Lysias we find no trace. The whole composition is serious and at times even harsh, showing a mind anxious and

¹ Cf. α'. §§ 2, 3, 7, 47, with Isæus, Or. 8, §§ 5, 4, 28, and 20, in the second speech; there are also borrowings from other Isæan speeches in these and the Onetor speech (Blass, p. 202).

² §§ 20-2.

engrossed with the subject, to the exclusion of all conscious rhetoric. But, as I have said, we may be sure that many youthful defects, perhaps many more Isæisms, have disappeared in our revised version of this early specimen of the great orator's work.

The third speech (for Phanos), in reply to (πρὸς) Aphobus, is a good example of the controversies to which I have alluded. According to Westermann, the speech is inconclusive and wordy, full of Asian bombast, and therefore spurious. To this A. Schäfer adds a number of apparent inconsistencies with the other speeches against Aphobus, and that against Onetor. He thinks it not even like Demosthenes' work. H. Weil, an equally competent judge, thinks all these arguments inconclusive, and suspends his judgment. Dareste defends the speech, and so does Blass decidedly, showing that no forger would have argued so independently or even inconsistently with the other speeches, and declaring that to him there is nothing un-Demosthenic in either style or argument. In this state of the controversy the early tradition of the work as Demosthenic must be allowed to maintain its authority. The speech is in other respects not very interesting, and does not call for analysis here. We know that the prosecution of Aphobus was successful, though the law's delays and subterfuges did not permit Demosthenes to obtain his rights either at once or in full measure.

§ 511. The two speeches against Onetor, Aphobus' brother-in-law, were delivered in the sequel of the same suit (362-1 B.C.). Aphobus, when defeated, or expecting to be defeated, had conveyed to Onetor his landed property under the guise of repayment of the dowry of Onetor's sister, from whom he pretended to be judicially separated. By this means Demosthenes was prevented from seizing this property in satisfaction of the award granted him against Aphobus. The present speeches are in a trial ἐξούλησις, which we should call 'contempt of court,' or something like it; and argue that Onetor is defeating by false pretences the previous sentence of the court. The orator's main difficulty was doubtless the good character of the defendant, who had lived hitherto a blameless life; hence *ethos*, or character-drawing, was so far excluded, even had he been able and

desirous to use this device. We are not informed of the result of the case. Demosthenes here again¹ uses a commonplace from Isæus' eighth speech,² which is, however, as is remarked, already to be found in Isocrates,³ but only in substance: it is the stupid commonplace, that while sworn evidence has been often found untrustworthy, evidence by torture has never been proved false, a notion upon which I have remarked in another work.⁴

Thus these speeches are rightly classed with those *against Aphobus*, as showing some dependence on Isæus, and marking the first stage of the orator's style. The rythmical laws which critics have discovered in his later works, and which we shall note presently, are not yet observed with any strictness. On the other hand, the influence of Isocratic prose is manifest in a more strict avoidance of the hiatus than we find afterwards. But the distinctly Demosthenic features of strong pathos, shown by exclamations, and of the absence of ethos, are already prominent. So is also that peculiar subdivision of subjects, by which he does not complete one consideration, and abandon it, but interweaves argument and narrative, and returns to his former ideas in recapitulations—all this, which is the most striking feature in his masterpieces, may here be found in germ. To the same epoch are referred the speeches against Spudias, Callicles, and the speech *About the trierarch's crown*, which latter is hardly a private oration, but one on the condition and duties of the Athenian fleet. This work is so methodically divided into *κῶλα*, or members, and so carefully composed as to rythm, that it has been referred to the Isocratic school.

§ 512. With the opening of the social war (B.C. 357) the critics mark the second epoch in Demosthenes' development, when he begins to speak not only in court cases of public interest, but comes forward as a politician to advise the assembled people. These two kinds of speeches now interchange so constantly, and are so closely allied in subject, that it is better to take them as they occur chronologically than to separate them into their logical classes.

¹ α'. § 37.² § 12.³ 17, § 54.⁴ *Social Life in Greece*, p. 240.

First then come the *Attack on Androtion* (παρὰνόμων) and on *Leptines' law*, which is substantially a pleading of the same kind—both, therefore, arguments against mischievous legislation. The former is not delivered by the orator himself, but composed (355 B.C. according to Dionysius) for a certain Diodorus, who spoke in support of Euctemon in attacking for illegality the bill of Androtion. This politician had proposed the customary vote of thanks to the outgoing council, though they had not provided in their year of office the additional ships, without which the law forbade them 'to ask for any complimentary gift.' The proposal of Androtion is therefore attacked by these speakers as illegal and contrary to the public interest. The elaborate second Greek preface, as well as that of Libanius, gives full information concerning the case. As the speech is a *δευτερολογία*, or subsidiary to the main accusation, it begins, without strict proem, by stating the causes of enmity which the speaker had against Androtion—a strange preface in our eyes, but at Athens an apology for an accusation, which, if gratuitous, might be called *sycophantic*, and hence a frequent preliminary justification in such cases—and goes on to anticipate the arguments by which this clever and experienced debater will probably defend himself. The speaker argues his own case, (1) from the informality of the proposal, (2) from the incompetence of the proposer to bring it before the people. The proposal had not gone through the preliminary stage, and was opposed by the law prohibiting any rewards to a council which had not provided new ships. Androtion is supposed to urge that the preliminary vote, though enjoined by law, was in practice usually omitted, and, again, that though the law prohibited the outgoing officers *asking* any favour, there was no law against their receiving one proposed *ab extra*. Against these he urges first the importance of the letter of the law, and then the importance of its spirit, for those who were not to ask must *à fortiori* (σφόδρα γε) not receive favours. He furthermore insists, with a historical retrospect, on the great importance of the navy to Athens, and shows how its efficiency was always coincident with the power and prosperity of the state. As regards the person of Androtion he argues (without any proper

proof) first that his father was still a debtor to the state, which disqualified the son from proposing measures ; again, that he had lived such an immoral life as to be in any case disqualified. To this the speaker adds many details of the violence and injustice of Androtion in exacting certain debts from public defaulters in taxes. These and other subsidiary topics are urged with great force and acuteness, and with intense bitterness, against Androtion. The whole speech shows us for the first time the orator in his full strength, though it is not free from a great deal of conscious sophistry, and much violent personal abuse, which is directly justified by the speaker's private hostility to his opponent. Thus the letter of the law is urged against the loose precedents brought by Androtion, but the spirit of the law against his argument that the letter has not been violated. There are, moreover, evidently insincere evasions of Androtion's reply that his personal character should have been arraigned directly, and not for the purpose of annulling a vote affecting others. Nevertheless, the speech is a masterpiece in its way, and the first of those we have discussed which is likely to interest the general reader, though its intricacy and close reasoning make it no easy study. We are not, however, surprised to hear that it failed in procuring a verdict.¹

§ 513. We pass to the more celebrated but not abler speech *In reply to* (πρὸς) *Leptines*, who had proposed that the list of exempted persons should be abolished, and that all should be liable to the same state burdens, except the representatives of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the ancient tyrannicides. This was the first speech of the kind delivered (B.C. 354) by Demosthenes in person. The time for direct prosecution (παράρῳρ) having passed, the orator assists a previous speaker (Aphepsion) in attacking the law, not the person of the pro-

¹ There is another much longer and more intricate speech of the same kind written for Diodorus, the *Attack on Timocrates* for illegality; but it would require a volume to analyse all the several speeches, and I therefore pass it by, though it suggests interesting critical questions as to its second recension, owing to a change in the adversary's attitude (cf. Blass, *Demosthenes*, pp. 244, sq.).

poser. I will not attempt an analysis of this intricate speech, which deals in far too many repetitions and recapitulations for a reader, though all practised public speakers know that such insistence is necessary when addressing an audience. But from many points of view the work is peculiarly interesting. In the first place, as the ancients remarked, the enumeration of the acts of several of the benefactors threatened by the law gives the orator an occasion of showing his panegyric style, of which hardly another specimen has survived.¹ He argues that the number of persons affected is small, and therefore the result insignificant in a monetary point of view, compared with the tremendous effect produced by a repudiation of state obligations. For here lies the main interest of the speech, as a manifesto of the orator's character and of his policy. He defends the sacredness of public promises, on the one hand, against the seductions of a false expediency,² which really would defeat itself; on the other,³ against the pressure of alleged religious scruples, which he shows to be inconsistent with common honesty.

There is reason to believe that Demosthenes' efforts to keep the people from committing an impolitic injustice failed, and that Leptines' proposal became law. Demosthenes' speech, however, remains a monument of the lofty views and the large policy which he consistently pursued, and it gives us a high idea of the Athenian assembly that such an argument should have been delivered before them by one of their public advisers—at least in aspiration. The best special edition is that of F.

A. Wolf.

§ 514. Before we proceed to the professedly public harangues, I will notice one more speech, which though in form a charge of illegality, yet approaches nearly to a speech on foreign policy, and is in many respects one of the orator's best efforts—I mean the speech composed (for Euthycles) *against the proposal of Aristocrates* (end of 352 B.C.), that the mercenary general Charidemus, then in the pay of the Thracian king Kersobleptes, should be declared sacrosanct in person, and that any man slaying him should be held guilty of a crime against the whole

¹ §§ 30-86.

² §§ 13, sq.

³ §§ 125-7.

confederacy, no city of which should be allowed to harbour him. This astonishing and disgraceful proposal was eminently suited to bring out the powers of an orator of large and dignified views. Accordingly Demosthenes opens by deprecating any personal hostility against Aristocrates, whose name hardly occurs in the speech. After a general introduction he subdivides his argument into three formal heads—rather an unusual practice with him—first, the formal illegality of the proposal, secondly, its inexpediency as a matter of policy, thirdly, the unworthiness of its object to receive this, or indeed of any honour from the state. But while these heads are severally and fully discussed, there is constant recapitulation and suggestion of them all, and the speech ends by reminding the audience particularly of the first head, which might be obscured during the later details.

This formal illegality is shown by an accurate analysis and interpretation of the Draconian and still valid laws concerning homicide, and is, indeed, the *locus classicus* on the six methods of procedure in the various forms of homicide.¹ With great subtlety the orator shows that the proposal to make the slayer of Charidemus directly punishable violates all these solemn enactments, which former complimentary edicts had respected by the clause 'let the slayer be punished *as if he slew an Athenian*.'² He also cites the general decree that no law should be made which did not affect all Athenian citizens equally—a provision which could, however, hardly be meant to exclude special enactments or compliments. He then passes, after some further technical arguments, to the reply of the opponent that the bill is at all events for the public interest, and therefore excusable, even if formally questionable.³ This is by far the most interesting part of the speech, and is based on the principle which we find the most dominating in Demosthenes' foreign policy—I mean that of maintaining a balance of power among the rivals or enemies of Athens. He shows that by giving so strong a support to Charidemus and his employer Kersobleptes, the rival Thracian kings will be discouraged, and the Thracian Chersonese, an important Athenian possession, will be endangered by his ambition. He shows by the exam-

¹ §§ 22-86.² § 89.³ §§ 100, sq.

ple of the Olynthians and of Philip,¹ that the friendship of these semi-barbarians is untrustworthy, and that no compliments to Kersobleptes will prevent his seizing the Chersonese if he feels strong enough to do so. This untrustworthiness makes all extreme declarations of friendship, such as the present, dangerous; and likely, under altered circumstances, to become ridiculous. Indeed, it lowers Athens to the position of a mercenary body-guard, protecting the life of a despot or an adventurer. Nor will there be wanting many others of equal claims, who will feel offended at such a special selection. This leads him to sketch briefly, as he pretends, the previous history of Charidemus—a valuable sketch, and indeed the *locus classicus* for the life of the condottieri² of the fourth century B.C., but in the present connexion far too diffuse.³ He then meets with a lame excuse⁴ the retort why he had not mentioned all this long ago, when other honours were being paid to Charidemus. He concludes with a splendid eulogy, often to be repeated in his political speeches, of the dignity of the policy and the rewards of the older Athens compared with the decadence and folly of his own day, especially as regards the leading politicians (*ῥήτορες*) and their actions.⁵ With a recapitulation of his legal argument the speech concludes. We may well wonder how any but the orator himself could possibly have delivered so long and intricate a speech, for we do not know what assistance from notes or otherwise the buyer of a speech was allowed to use in court. All the main lines of Demosthenes' policy are here plainly laid down. All the wonderful arts of his oratory are already at work.

§ 515. We are thus naturally led back to his political speeches, the first of which was spoken two years before the present trial, and is termed *On the Symmories*. It is really a recommendation of an important naval reform, but in direct relation to an exposition of the foreign policy of Athens at a given crisis.

¹ § 107.

² The student may further compare Demosthenes' defence of Diopeithes, a similar general, in his speech *On the Chersonese* (§ 24, sq.), delivered some years later.

³ §§ 144–86.

⁴ §§ 187–90.

⁵ § 201.

Hence it properly ranks under the Hellenic harangues of the orator, and Dionysius proposes to entitle it 'on the relations to the king of Persia' (περὶ τῶν βασιλικῶν).¹ But, after the manner of Demosthenes, the two subjects are intertwined, and produced as parts of the same policy. There seems to have been a strange uneasiness, almost a panic, at Athens about the armaments of Darius Ochus against Egypt, which were supposed the prelude of a new invasion of Greece.

Demosthenes shows that these fears are in all probability groundless, in any case premature, and that a declaration of hostile policy against Persia might produce serious complications. 'Military preparations against either Greek or barbarian being the same, why, when we have acknowledged foes, should we seek new ones, and not rather prepare against the former, and so be able to repulse the latter should they arise?'² All the commentators, from Dionysius and the scholiasts down to Schäfer and Blass, have asserted that the orator is here pointing at Philip, and that he here first (354 B.C.) shows his long-sighted prudence as to the real dangers of Athens. I think the context proves this widely accepted view to be quite false, and invented to panegyrisé the wisdom and political insight of Demosthenes. As he speaks in the previous sentence of *Greek as opposed to barbarian* enemies, and then of acknowledged as opposed to problematical enemies, it is quite certain that he did not intend Philip, whom he always carefully separates from proper Greeks, and ranks among barbarians. Moreover, had he really intended or thought of Philip, it would have added point and power to his argument to say 'especially Philip, against whom we cannot contend without an efficient fleet.' It appears, on the contrary, from *Philip's Letter*,³ which is now generally accepted even among the Germans as genuine, that the Athenians at this time intended to invite Philip to join them and the rest of the Greeks against Persia. Such evidence

¹ Nevertheless, as Spengel observes (*Demegorien des Dem., Abhandl. Münch Acad.* for 1863, p. 62), the lesser and merely introductory part of the speech refers to the Persian king, whereas Demosthenes' main object is the internal reform. He therefore justly rejects Dionysius' proposed title.

² §§ 10-11.

³ § 6.

is absolutely conclusive against Demosthenes intending to indicate Philip among the *acknowledged Greek enemies* of Athens. I therefore call attention to this as one of those remarkable specimens of a false and forced interpretation, which, when it has once gained a footing in philology, goes on infecting book after book for centuries. Mr. Grote alone, with that genuine historical sense and appreciation of proper evidence which distinguishes him above all the narrators of the affairs of this epoch, ignores the imaginary reference, and notes how obscure Philip's plans remained, and how little even the wisest people thought of them at this time.¹

I will not here discuss the scheme of naval reform proposed by Demosthenes, which shows a thorough study of the resources and wants of Athens, and proves his thorough competence as a financial statesman. It is the guarded and dignified foreign policy, the insistence upon proper preparation and diligent attention to public affairs, which forms the main interest of this weighty speech. The style is sober and grave, as befitted a young speaker then first coming forward as a politician. The critics justly note in these higher qualities, as well as in a certain harshness and obscurity of diction, the strong influence of Thucydides upon the orator

§ 516. In connexion with this speech, we may take that *on Megalopolis* (353 B.C.), and that *on Rhodes* (351 B.C.), both declarations of foreign policy, and both distinctly written in Demosthenes' *pre-Philippic* attitude. In the former, he supports the petition of the Arcadians, now united in Megalopolis, whom the Spartans (as soon as Thebes was weakened by the Phocians) wished to break up into their old sporadic villages and political unimportance. To support these Arcadians was to reverse the policy pursued at the battle of Mantinea, when Athens had sided with Sparta against the then dangerous power of Thebes. Hence Demosthenes has to refute the charge of inconsistency, which he does by showing that with a change of circumstances Athens must change sides, and that she is really consistent in

¹ xi. 399. Cf. p. 406: 'In this (on Megalopolis), as in the oration *De Symmoriis*, a year before, there is no allusion to Philip, a point to be noticed,' &c.

doing so, the balance of power being the object at stake. As the Spartans were formerly supported with this object only, so now they must expect that, when they attempt unjust aggrandisement, Athens will oppose them with active force. Similar is the speech for the exiled Rhodian democrats, who came to implore the assistance of the Athenians to reinstate them, though they had been active in the social war against Athens, and had been leading agents in the overthrow of her naval and insular dominion. Hence these exiles, far from being able to claim sympathy, were the objects of hatred and aversion to Athens—a feeling which Demosthenes recognises, and which he expresses in his speech in the strongest terms. But he shows that a large policy should not be guided by such personal likes and dislikes; he thanks the gods that the Rhodians have been taught by bitter lessons the errors of their ways; he urges that it is the essential duty of Athens everywhere to support democracies against oligarchies, and he therefore recommends that they should be assisted in their present misfortunes. It is objected that this will bring Athens into collision not only with the Carian queen (widow of Mausollus), but with the power of Persia, whose vassal she is. To this Demosthenes replies, that such hostility need not be feared, that when a proper cause is supported, men should not shrink from danger, and moreover that Persia is only strong with Hellenic aid. Thus the very policy which when vague, and for no special purpose, he opposed in his speech *on the Symmories*, he here advocates when a special purpose and distinct foreign policy require it. These three speeches give a full and clear picture of the pan-Hellenic policy of Demosthenes, ever desirous to make Athens felt as a leading and an imperial state, ever ready and claiming the right of interfering in external politics, nay even insisting upon it as a duty, but always in relation to definite questions and for definite purposes. These purposes were two: first to maintain the balance of power among the rivals and opponents of Athens; secondly, to sustain liberty and democracy against tyranny and oligarchy, whether Hellenic or barbarian.

§ 517. But the rising power of Philip is not yet clear to the orator; he does not mention him as even of equal importance

with Kotys or Kersobleptes. The single allusion in the latest speech of the three¹ makes me believe it to be really his first notice of Philip, and delivered before the first *Philippic*, though Dionysius maintains the reverse. The passage is, moreover, interesting as having suggested to the critics that in contrasting the king of Persia with confessed enemies in the earliest harangue, he intended the king of Macedon. Here are his words: 'I see some of you often speaking with contempt of Philip as of no consequence, but with fear of the King as a powerful enemy when he takes up a quarrel. But if we do not actively resist the one as too cheap, and yield in everything to the other as formidable, against whom, O Athenians, shall we set ourselves in array?' This is not the tone of the first *Philippic*; it is even contradictory to its proem. I hold it, therefore, to have been delivered just before serious advices reached Athens that the power of Macedon was no longer to be trifled with, and that here lay the real danger. But instead of agreeing with Dion and his panegyrists that his chief merit was to foresee coming events and to raise the first note of warning, I marvel that this series of harangues should show such ignorance and carelessness about Philip, and think the orator may fairly be charged, along with his obscurer countrymen, with great want of providence and curious dimness of political vision.

The ancients justly separated the Hellenic harangues from the Philippics, under which title they classed all the speeches relating to the struggle between Athens and the rising power of Macedon. Of these the undoubtedly genuine are (in their chronological order) the first *Philippic* (351 B.C.), and the three Olynthiac orations (349-8 B.C.); these may be called the earlier or first group before the Peace of 346 B.C. Then follow the orations *on the Peace* (346 B.C.), the second *Philippic* (344 B.C.), the oration *on the Chersonese* and the third *Philippic* (341 B.C.)—in all eight orations. The remaining three, of doubtful authenticity, I will postpone for the present.

§ 518. Nothing can be more striking than the new and altered tone of the first *Philippic* as compared with the nearly synchronous *Rhodian* harangue. There Philip is mentioned as an

¹ Or. xv., § 24.

object of contemptuous indifference to at least a section of the people, here the orator assumes at the very outset that all are dispirited at his successes, that many debates have already been held about them, and that he does not hesitate to come forward, because the advice of older speakers has been exhausted and found useless. Such a sudden change of attitude seems to me inexplicable by the natural course of events, and in a politician of ordinary foresight, especially when we find Demosthenes with his attention fixed on the foreign relations of Athens, and already knowing the northern Ægean from personal service as a trierarch. Dionysius, indeed, divides the speech into two parts, of which he brings the latter part¹ down to 347-6 B.C.—a division not sanctioned by later critics, who insist upon the unity of the speech, and its delivery at the earlier date. I confess that but for a stray mention of Olynthus, and of the prompt expedition to Thermopylæ as recent,² I should be disposed to bring the whole speech down to a later date, and to demand a considerable lapse of time or a serious crisis between this and the former public harangues; and this will yet, I believe, be possible with the aid of a few emendations.³

¹ From § 30, onward.

² τὰ τελευταῖα πρῶην, § 17.

³ There is the strongest possible internal evidence against the chronological order of the public speeches delivered 354-50, as laid down by Dionysius, and adopted by A. Schäfer and other moderns. If we compare the allusions to Philip found (or not found) in these speeches, we get the following natural sequence: (1) The speech *on the Symmories*, where he strives to calm the fear of the Persian, and though it lay in his way to mention Philip, he is silent concerning him, and only contrasts certain Greek enemies to the uncertain Persian. (2) The speech *on the Rhodians*, in which he casually mentions Philip as an enemy whom some at Athens despise, while they dread the Persian. (3) The speech *against Aristocrates*, where Philip's acts towards Olynthus and Athens are cited as affording a clue to the probable policy of Kersobleptes, in being ambitious as well as faithless, and preferring risks and dangers to peace and security. (4) Then, after a momentous (though possibly short) interval, comes the first *Philippic*, of which the proem states that many public discussions had already taken place about Philip, and that the public mind is in discouragement, nay, even in despair at his great successes, and his almost impregnable position. I am hardly able to conceive in an earnest man, following

The orator seeks to meet the profound discouragement of the people, and their belief in the invincible and impregnable position of Philip, by showing that this was not the temper by which Philip waxed great, or by which Athens recovered her independence from the dominion of Sparta, and that every really vigorous action of Athens has been crowned with success. He recommends the preparation of a large force at home, of a small flying squadron near the scene of the war, but above all he inveighs against the sloth and dilatoriness of the people, who are ever talking and voting and resolving and doing nothing. The whole tenor of the speech is that of Demosthenes' later oratory, full and vehement, speaking with authority and yet with respect for the people, attacking the national faults and the corrupt politicians with bitterness, yet ever maintaining the dignity and the greatness of the real Athens.

§ 519. It is not necessary to analyse severally all the kindred harangues, which are curiously similar in tone and style, and turn perpetually round the same subjects. Indeed, so general are the recommendations in the *Olynthiac* orations, that their order cannot be determined from internal evidence, and the greatest authorities from Dionysius to our own day have differed upon the question. Had even Thirlwall and Grote been at one we might accept their consensus as historians to outweigh all the mere critics, but even they cannot agree, and Grote, while adopting the order which seems to me most probable, expressly refuses to give a positive opinion. I call special attention to this general character of these speeches, as perhaps the reason why they had less effect upon the audience than might be expected. It arose no doubt from the personal apprehensions of the speaker, who could not make a definite proposal without danger of prosecution for illegality (*παράνομον*). Indeed, we know that he put forward Apollodorus to run this risk by voting the Theoric fund to military purposes; and though his proposal was carried in a moment of panic, he was accused when it had passed over, and was fined a talent, about

an honest and consistent policy, such declarations as these last preceding the casual or contemptuous notices in the other speeches.

which time the proposal he had made was declared by a new law to be a capital offence.

What strikes us next to this generality of exhortation, which is, however, always suitable to the particular facts of the case, or illustrated by past history, is the great seriousness of style, which admits of hardly any ornament in the way of metaphor or simile. Nothing can be simpler and more direct than the red-hot earnestness of these speeches. There are only two of them which have marked differences from the rest, the shorter and poorer speech *on the Peace*, and the larger and more varied speech *on the affairs of the Chersonese*. The latter is professedly in defence of the mercenary general Diopeithes, who had undertaken to act on his own responsibility against Philip, and whom Demosthenes defends against the attacks of Philip's party at Athens. This speech, moreover, contains a very remarkable peroration, declaring the orator's own policy, and his description of the duties and responsibilities of a good citizen, in contrast to the venal and the corrupt. There is no finer passage in all Demosthenes, as has been recognised by Brougham. I therefore quote it as a specimen of his thinking and his style.¹ The speech *on the Peace* is poor and tame,

¹ Or. viii. §§ 66-72 : τοιγάρτοι τούτων μὲν ἐκ πτωχῶν ἐνιοι ταχὺ πλούσιοι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐξ ἀνωνύμων καὶ ἀδόξων ἐνδοξοὶ καὶ γινώριμοι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τούναντίον ἐκ μὲν ἐνδόξων ἀδοξοὶ, ἐκ δ' εὐπόρων ἄποροι· πόλεως γὰρ ἔγωγε πλούτον ἡγοῦμαι συμμάχους πίστιν εὖνοϊαν ὧν πάντων ἔσθ' ὑμεῖς ἄποροι. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τούτων ὀλιγώρως ὑμᾶς ἔχειν καὶ ἐὼν ταῦτα φέρεσθαι ὁ μὲν εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ φοβερὸς πᾶσιν Ἑλλήσι καὶ βαρβάροις, ὑμεῖς δ' ἔρημοι καὶ ταπεινοί, τῇ μὲν τῶν ὀνίων ἀφθονίᾳ λαμπροί, τῇ δ' ὧν προσήκε παρασκευῇ καταγέλαστοι. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον περὶ θ' ὑμῶν καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐνίους τῶν λεγόντων ὁρῶ βουλευομένους· ὑμᾶς μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν φασὶ δεῖν, κἄν τις ὑμᾶς ἀδικῇ, αὐτοὶ δ' οὐ δύνανται παρ' ὑμῖν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐδεὺς αὐτοὺς ἀδικούντος.

Εἴτα φησὶν ὅς ἂν τύχῃ παρελθὼν 'οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις γράφειν, οὐδὲ κινδυνεύειν, ἀλλ' ἄτολμος εἶ καὶ μαλακός.' ἐγὼ δὲ θρασὺς μὲν καὶ βδελυρὸς καὶ ἀναιδής οὗτ' εἰμὶ μήτε γενοίμην, ἀνδρειώτερον μέντοι πολλῶ πάντων τῶν ἰταμῶς πολιτευομένων παρ' ὑμῖν ἔμαυτὸν ἡγοῦμαι. ὅστις μὲν γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παριδὼν ἅ συνίσσει τῇ πόλει, κρίνει, δημεύει, δίδωσι, κατηγορεῖ, οὐδεμιᾷ ταῦτ' ἀνδρεία ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἐνέχυρον τῆς αὐτοῦ σωτηρίας τὸ πρὸς χάριν ὑμῖν λέγειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι ἀσφαλῶς θρασὺς ἐστίν. ὅστις δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ βελτίστου πολλὰ τοῖς ὑμετέροισι ἐναντιοῦται βουλῆμασι, καὶ μηδὲν λέγει πρὸς

for Demosthenes was advocating against his will the policy of his opponents, and recommending a peace with Philip, from apprehension of a general attack by the Amphiktyonic Confederacy. The orator afterwards denies that he advocated this peace (in the *Embassy* speech), which Grote notices as a matter of doubtful honesty, but which the German panegyrists explain away by absurd subtleties of interpretation.

§ 520. In the opinion of most critics, the third *Philippic* is considered not only the finest of Demosthenes' public harangues, but probably the greatest speech ever delivered. I confess that, not to speak of the oration *on the Crown*, which they perhaps do not call a public harangue, the speech about the Chersonese seems to me more varied, more pathetic, and not less powerful. But critically, the third *Philippic* is peculiarly interesting in being handed down to us in two recensions—one (the shorter one) represented by our oldest and best MS. (the Parisian S) alone, the other by all the rest, in which clauses are constantly added, so as to change the symmetry, and at times even the argument. Nevertheless, both recensions seem purely Demosthenic, and point to separate editions. Blass, the

χάριν, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ, καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν προαιρεῖται ἐν ἧ πλειόνων ἢ τύχῃ κυρία γίγνεται ἢ οἱ λογισμοί, τούτων δ' ἀμφοτέρων ἑαυτὸν ὑπεύθυνον ὑμῖν παρέχει, οὗτός ἐστ' ἀνδρεῖος, καὶ χρησίμος γε πολίτης ὁ τοιούτος ἐστίν, οὐχ οἱ τῆς παρ' ἡμέραν χάριτος τὰ μέγιστα τῆς πόλεως ἀπολωλεκότες, οὓς ἐγὼ τοσούτου δέω ζηλοῦν ἢ νομίζειν ἀξίους πολίτας τῆς πόλεως εἶναι, ὥστ' εἴ τις ἔροιστό με 'εἰπέ μοι, σὺ δὲ δὴ τί τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ἀγαθὸν πεποίηκας;' ἔχων, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τριηραρχίας εἰπεῖν καὶ χορηγίας καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφορὰς καὶ λύσεις αἰχμαλώτων καὶ τοιαύτας ἄλλας φιλανθρωπίας, οὐδὲν ἂν τούτων εἴποιμι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων πολιτευμάτων οὐδὲν πολιτεύομαι, ἀλλὰ δυνάμενος ἂν ἴσως, ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροι, κατηγορεῖν καὶ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δημεύειν καὶ τὰλλ' ἃ ποιοῦσιν οὗτοι ποιεῖν, οὐδ' ἐφ' ἐνὶ τούτων πώποτ' ἑμαυτὸν ἔταξα οὐδὲ προήχθην οὐθ' ὑπὸ κέρδους οὐθ' ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας, ἀλλὰ διαμένω λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ μὲν πολλῶν ἐλάττων εἰμι παρ' ὑμῖν, ὑμεῖς δ', εἰ πείθοισθέ μοι, μείζους ἂν εἴητε· οὕτω γὰρ ἴσως ἀνεπίφθονον εἰπεῖν. οὐδὲ γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δικαίον τοῦτ' εἶναι πολίτου, τοιαῦτα πολιτεύεσθαι· εὕρισκειν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ μὲν πρῶτος ὑμῶν ἔσομαι εὐθέως, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὕστατοι· ἀλλὰ συναυξάνεσθαι δεῖ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν πολιτῶν πολιτεύμασι, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ, μὴ τὸ ῥᾶστον ἅπαντας λέγειν. ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ βαδιεῖται, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὲ τῷ λόγῳ δεῖ προάγεσθαι διδάσκοντα τὸν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην.

best of modern critics on such a subject, considers the shorter to be the later version prepared by the orator himself—if so, another proof that he attained his perfect form not by previous meditation and slow composition, but by repeated and conscious correction.¹

There are several other speeches in the series, only one of which, the fourth *Philippic*, has any strong claims to authenticity. But it so abounds in passages borrowed from or used in other Demosthenic orations, that it must be either a cento by a later hand, or an incomplete sketch elsewhere utilised by the orator himself, but afterwards found among his papers, and published. Owing to the excellent composition of an original passage in the oration—the attack on Aristomedes²—Blass thinks the latter to be the case; he even thinks Aristomedes a fictitious character, and that the speech was a mere exercise prepared at home by the orator. This seems hardly so probable as that a pupil put together the speech, using perhaps fuller materials to those now extant.

The speech *περὶ συντάξεως*, which does not profess to be a *Philippic*, is made up of passages from the earlier public speeches of Demosthenes, along with general exhortations of a thoroughly un-Demosthenic character. So, too, the speech *on Philip's Letter* is not even a reply to the very weighty and now acknowledged missive placed beside it in the MSS. The speeches *on Halonnesus* and *on the treaty with Alexander* will be referred to under other authors in their place. Indeed, all these outlying speeches are interesting from the view they give us of the average oratory at Athens as compared with the exceptional splendour of Demosthenes.

§ 521. I pass to the three longest, and perhaps best known, speeches of Demosthenes on his own affairs—those *against Meidias*, *on the corrupt Embassy*, and *on the Crown*. These, though separated in date, are worthy of being considered together, as they form, with the speeches against Aphobus, our materials for an estimate of Demosthenes from autobiographical sources.

¹ Cf. also Spengel in *Abhandl. of Munich Academy* for 1863, at the end of his first article on Demosthenes' public harangues.

² §§ 70-4.

Meidias, who was connected with Demosthenes' guardians, and hence an old personal enemy of the orator, had, after many annoyances and insults, gone so far as to assault him publicly in the theatre, when directing in festive dress the performance of the chorus of his tribe. This expensive public duty Demosthenes had volunteered, when others were unwilling, and his tribe likely to be disgraced beside the rest. He had been fortunate enough to secure by lot the choice of his flute-player, and his chorus would have won (he says) but for the constant and malicious interference of Meidias. But when the latter went so far as to give him publicly a box on the ear, Demosthenes brought the matter at once (*προβολῇ*) before the assembled people, who passed an immediate decree condemning Meidias. The extant speech was written for the subsequent action in court, by which the penalty should be assessed after due argument. But as the case was compromised for thirty minæ, this speech was never delivered, and bears many traces of not having been even revised for publication.

It is, perhaps, one of the greatest triumphs of Demosthenes' art, that he has raised so scurvy a quarrel to eternal fame, for an action 'about a box on the ear' (*περὶ τοῦ κοινῆύλου*) was no grateful subject, especially when the orator submitted to the insult at the time, and reserved all his rage for a rhetorical display. Indeed, he is almost ridiculous when he congratulates himself¹ 'that he was not carried away at the moment to do something irreparable;' with his feeble body and in state dress, any retaliation would doubtless have placed him in a more absurd and contemptible position. The mighty pathos then, which the scholiasts and Germans so admire, when he is describing his own chastisement by Meidias, rather affects us with merriment than with indignation. Even worse are the passages where he boasts that he has rejected repeated attempts at a compromise, which he regards as dishonourable in the case of so grave an insult to a public officer. For we know that after all this was written—we will hope not before—the matter was compromised for a considerable fine (about 115*l.*). This fact is naturally laid hold of by Æschines and by Plutarch as an ugly passage in the

orator's career, nor can he be cleared of meanness except by those who are determined to find in him a perfect hero.

The finer side of the speech is its remarkable insistence on the public side of the offence—how personal violence, as such, cannot be tolerated as being opposed to the very essence of democracy; still more, how violence done to a citizen acting in a public capacity is a far graver offence, and an insult to the state; how in the present case a religious ceremony, moreover, was disturbed, and hence the crime amounted to public impiety (*ἀσέβεια*), at Athens the most heinous of offences. He proves the public feeling in these matters by citing many remarkable precedents.¹

From another point of view we may consider the oration as a good specimen of what the ancients called a *λοιδορία*, or personal attack, the counterpart of the *eulogies* which were part of their epideictical oratory. The life and acts of Meidias, his violences, his luxuries, his cowardices—in fact, his violations of every principle of a democracy—are painted with great variety and liveliness. He is shown to be a sort of feeble ape of Alcibiades, but only to have succeeded in copying his private vices. It is remarkable how the orator² speaks of his own solitary position, in connexion with no other public man, whereas Meidias has great political support. I have already noticed his explicit statement of his age as only thirty-two,³ when he says that Meidias, though now fifty, has not performed equal public service. The reading is certain, but as the speaker wished to urge his youth, he was probably guilty of an understatement of his age, so that it is not too bold of modern critics to reject, as they do very generally, this explicit statement as inconsistent with the birth-year established on other grounds.

I will only call attention to one more passage as particularly splendid in its pathos, the passage⁴ in which he calls up the unfortunate Straton, who had decided in an arbitration against Meidias, and, having been disfranchised by his contrivance, could no longer speak or give evidence in court. As the speech was never thoroughly revised, there are many repetitions and unevennesses in the argument, and many feeble or diluted passages. Nevertheless, they are relieved by others of

¹ §§ 175-82.² §§ 189-90.³ § 154.⁴ §§ 95-8.

such force that, in spite of the shabby subject, and the somewhat sorry figure presented by the speaker, it is generally considered one of the finest of his speeches. Dionysius says the speech was composed 349-8, as it was then that the assault took place. Possibly, however, it may not have been written till 347, after which time Demosthenes, by going on the embassy, shows that he was reconciled with the politicians whom he there speaks of as opponents.¹ The best special edition is that of Buttmann.

§ 522. The speech *on the corrupt Embassy* (B.C. 344), against Æschines, which is, I believe, the longest of all Demosthenes' speeches, may be placed, for many reasons, midway between the *Meidiana* and that *on the Crown*. It is, like the others, to a large extent autobiographical, but devoted to a great public cause, in which the orator vindicates himself, and attacks the policy of Æschines for corrupt subservience to Philip. Strange to say, though dealing with a far higher subject, it affects no pathos as compared with the earlier speech. Indeed, the only prominent passage of the kind—that about the treatment of the Olynthian captive woman at the feast²—was, as we hear from Æschines in his reply, an oratorical failure, for which the actor was hissed by the audience. In ethos, as is confessed, the orator is not remarkable, though he often attempts it in the present work.

The form of the speech has excited great suspicion on account of its irregularity of structure, its constant change of subject, its sudden returns upon itself, in fact, its want of symmetry and its diffusiveness. Moreover, in Æschines' reply there are several points controverted which do not appear in our present text, and which imply that Demosthenes' spoken attack must have differed from it. Ancient critics were accordingly of opinion that it was never really delivered, and that we have (as in the *Meidiana*) a mere preparatory sketch not finally worked up. They even state that in their after disputes no pointed

¹ Blass, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

² There is some reason to think from Æschines' allusions that the story was told with greater and more revolting detail in the actual delivery of the speech than it is in our extant version.

reference is made to the trial; which is true, for though Demosthenes¹ alludes to Æschines being on this occasion let off on the ground of his insignificance, I do not think this passage proves anything more than that Demosthenes laid his accusation, and failed to carry it through, which he might have done by not prosecuting a case he found hopeless. But Plutarch quotes, without being persuaded, the statement of Idomeneus that Æschines escaped by only thirty votes. On the whole, I am disposed to side with the ancients against the moderns, and to regard the close general correspondence of Æschines' extant reply to the undelivered attack as arising from the Athenian habit of discussing in the agora all the probable *pros* and *cons* in every impending lawsuit, so much so, that it was a common formula to say, 'but I hear that the defendant is going to lay stress on the following argument.' Those who hold that the trial took place think that we have the first sketch, which was altered for delivery in some respects; and Schäfer even defends all the transitions and reversions, which bolder critics seek to mend by transpositions and omissions.

After duly weighing these various views, I will state my own opinion, without venturing to dogmatise. In the first place, as regards the great length of the speech, I think it was forced upon Demosthenes. The trial, if it ever came off, was certainly looked forward to as such an oratorical treat, that special arrangements were made, and additional time assigned to both plaintiff and defendant. If then the multitude of citizens came together full of interest and curiosity, it was absolutely necessary to satisfy them as to time, as well as in other respects. But Demosthenes' method of treating a large subject at full length was not that of an orderly succession of heads. We see from his imperfect *Midiana*, from his perfect speeches *against Aristocrates* and *on the Crown*, that his aim was to keep the whole subject all the time before his audience, by means of rapid turns, ingenious retrogressions and anticipations, and constant recapitulations. Hence nothing required more care and revision than the sequence of these interlacing arguments, and the proper methods of transition from one to

¹ *De Corona*, § 142.

another without sameness and without jerkiness. Thus, I conceive him to have first chosen his arguments, then to have turned to the question of diction, and lastly to that of composition, properly so called. I feel convinced that he transposed paragraph after paragraph, omitted some and added others, and only with great labour and perseverance attained that perfection where every point seems to come in naturally, and yet receives no more than its due weight in the whole effect. If then the speeches *against Meidias* and *on the Embassy* were laid aside before actual delivery, and by a political man full of business and with no leisure hours, we can conceive them still requiring that exceedingly minute filing and polishing, which may be perceived in the oration *on the Crown*. We have, indeed, not only the materials, but the worked-up materials of such a speech. Probably, the actual paragraphs are all as he would have spoken them. The joining particles, perhaps the order in some cases, would have been different, so that fair critics could not have stumbled, as they have done, at the logical irregularity of the arguments.

As an historical source, this great speech, controlled by the counter-allegations of Æschines, is one of the most precious documents of the period, but it requires the good sense and candour of Grote to balance the conflicting assertions, and make out the residuum of truth between them. Hence as a commentary on the matter of the speech, there is nothing comparable to Grote's discussion.¹ On the mere text, we must study the critical revisions of Cobet (*Misc. Crit.*) and Weil (*Harangues*), which have brought out all that can be obtained from the study of the best Parisian MS. for the interpretation. Shilleto's foolish hostility to Grote mars his otherwise valuable commentary.

§ 523. The circumstances introducing the oration *on the Crown* are somewhat complex, but well recorded and tolerably certain. When, in consequence of the defeat at Chæronea, the Athenians were compelled to look to their fortifications, they appointed Inspectors of Fortifications (τειχοποιοί), one from each tribe, to superintend the public expenditure in this respect.

¹ xi. pp. 525, sq. See especially his valuable note on that page.

Demosthenes, representing his tribe, not only displayed great zeal, but spent a considerable sum of his own money in this service. For this merit Ctesiphon proposed that he should be publicly crowned in the theatre of Dionysus before the assembled people with a golden crown. But the proposal was indicted (*παράγωγι*) by Æschines, on the legal grounds that Demosthenes was as yet accountable for public money, and that there were special enactments forbidding such public demonstrations elsewhere than in the legal assembly in the Pnyx. This objection stopped the proposal in its first stage, though it had received the approval of the Council (*πρόβουλευμα*), and Demosthenes' friends did not feel strong enough to force on the actual trial at the time. But in 330 B.C., when the revolt of Agis had just been crushed, and the anti-Macedonian sympathisers had no doubt nearly involved Athens in the danger, Æschines felt able to bring his case to a decision. He therefore indicted Ctesiphon formally for an illegal proposal, on the ground that Demosthenes was a traitorous and cowardly politician, and that his public life had been fraught with disaster and not with credit to the state.

This is the account given by Grote of the position of affairs in August, 330 B.C., when the trial came on. It appears to me, however, strange, if it was really done at the instigation of the Macedonian party, that Æschines should have insisted on Demosthenes' secret subservience to the Macedonians, and his dishonesty in pretending to oppose them.

Apart from the formal question, on which Æschines seems to have been right (though Demosthenes is able to quote precedents violating the letter of the law in his favour), he reviewed Demosthenes' life and acts in four periods: that before 346, that from 346 to 341, then the crisis ending with the battle of Chæronea (338), and lastly, the subsequent period. The reply of Demosthenes does not follow him strictly in his track. In the first place, the legal question is treated very briefly, and thrust into the middle of the speech, where its importance disappears, owing to the larger and weightier arguments before and after it. Secondly, as regards the four periods of his life, the last was not only of little political importance, but very incon-

venient to be discussed in the face of Alexander's successes, and the close observation of his agents at Athens. This then the orator completely ignores. Thirdly, it is more remarkable that he is also silent on the period before 346, in which his first *Philippic* and *Olynthiacs* show him to have been an active and able state adviser. I can see no reason why he has not touched upon this period, except that (as I have already suggested) he did not show any peculiar prescience in an early discovery of Philip's plans, and, in any case, though already a political man, his speeches at that time had little effect either for good or evil. We may even suspect that our redactions of these early speeches contain a good deal of *ex post facto* wisdom, which the orator may have added when revising them later in his life for publication.

In addition to the proper matter of his defence, Demosthenes has all along added parallel pictures of Æschines' character and policy, by way of contrast to his own, so that the speech is no mere defence of himself, but also a vehement and even scurrilous attack on his opponent. A very slight sketch of the general line of his argument must here suffice, as its extreme variety and complexity can only be understood by a special and careful study.

§ 524. The proem,¹ which opens with a modest prayer that the gods may grant him a requital from the judges of the same goodwill which he entertains for the city and its citizens, requests that the jury may not be induced to expect in his reply a close adherence to his adversary's attack, for he is under a grave disadvantage; his whole reputation, and not a single action, is at stake, and he will be bound to praise himself. For they will see that the trial does not affect Ctesiphon more than it does himself; he therefore repeats his prayer. He then proposes² to take up the general attacks of Æschines before approaching the case at trial. Then follows the narrower preface (*προκατασκευή*), in which he passes from the private attacks to those on his policy and public life, and shows³ that this is no proper way to bring so grave a charge. Had Æschines been honest, he should have brought an open and

¹ §§ 1-8.² *πρόθεσις*, § 9.³ §§ 12-17.

direct indictment long ago. This complaint of the form of attack chosen by the adversary is a commonplace as old as Antiphon, and recurs (say the old critics) seventy-two times in various forms throughout this speech. Then follows¹ a sketch (supported by documents) of the affairs of 346 B.C., of the peace negotiations with Philip, and the ruin of the Phocians, in which he justifies his own policy, followed² by a parallel exposing of the conduct of Æschines during the same period, with sundry digressions into the present consequences of this policy, and the pretended friendship of Æschines with the Macedonian kings.

He now turns for the first time to the actual charge,³ and directs it to be read out, but fastens again upon the statement that Ctesiphon's praise of his policy was false, and proceeds to refute this charge from a sketch of the history of Greece subsequent to the affairs of 346. This, with recapitulations, and with an account of previous crowns awarded to him, occupies a long argument.⁴ He then turns back to the legal side of the charge, where his case is weakest, and seeks by charges of confusion, and by quoting precedents in which the letter of the law was violated, to dispose of this serious difficulty.⁵ He passes into a violent personal attack on Æschines' origin and personal history, a regular *λοιδορία*, such as would hardly have been tolerated even in the Irish Parliament;⁶ and next to the political acts which he accuses Æschines of having done for the enemies of the city.⁷ Then he repeats⁸ the initial solemn prayer to the gods, since on previous occasions the people were blind and would not see either Philip's ability or the fatal effects of Æschines' guilt.⁹ There follows the famous narrative of the seizure of Elateia by Philip, of the great crisis, and of his own acts, justified against Æschines' attacks.¹⁰ This narrative is concluded by the noble outburst in which he maintains that, even had the result been foreseen, no other policy was honourable or possible for imperial Athens—and here follows the

¹ §§ 18-31.² §§ 31-52.³ §§ 53-9.⁴ §§ 60-109.⁵ §§ 110-20.⁶ §§ 121-31.⁷ §§ 132-140.⁸ § 141.⁹ §§ 142-4.¹⁰ §§ 145-87.

famous adjuration.¹ He then continues the narrative up to the battle of Chæronea, which he naturally does not touch, but shows how that, even as it turned out, his bold policy was of service in obtaining good terms for Athens.²

The whole remainder, though very long, is epilogue. First he replies to Æschines' attack that he was an unlucky politician, who brought evil upon those he advised ; he contrasts the fortunes of his life with Æschines' low life and adventures—a bitter and abusive outburst. Then ³ he announces that he will recapitulate before concluding ; and in the remainder of the speech he touches upon almost all the topics already treated, throwing in new narrative, and digressions upon the duties of an honest politician and the fatal effects of treachery. He ends with an eulogy of the great men of old, whom he had followed in spirit, so far as he was able, and with a prayer (as he had begun) that the gods may destroy the traitors, and save his city from impending dangers.

§ 525. Even this scanty outline will show the curious and variegated pattern in which Demosthenes has woven his great masterpiece. He has despised all the ordinary subdivisions by which inferior speakers preserve order and regularity in their compositions. He passes to and fro, combining apology and invective, argument and narrative, by natural transitions and in marvellous relief. The feeling which results from reading it straight through is (I think) not so much that of conviction, as that of being dazzled by the multitude and variety of the speaker's matter, and by the general effect which he produces. There is no boasting, no vain-glory, and yet never was there such sustained and artful recital of personal merit. So, likewise, the contrasted picture of Æschines, though coarsely drawn, and not without obscene allusions, is so powerful that he has never recovered it in the eyes of posterity. But in marked relief to this lower side of the speech is the lofty moral tone, the almost Stoic disregard of consequences, the assertion that the highest honour, the most enduring success, is the performance of right actions for their own sake. It was, indeed, the only defence possible for a politician whose career had

¹ §§ 188-98.

² §§ 199-250.

³ § 270.

been disastrous, and whose plans had turned out a failure. But, nevertheless, it was the right defence, and as such has stamped upon the speech a dignity rarely attained in political oratory.

The extreme complexity and variety of its plan is obviously the original idea of the orator, but is doubtless slightly increased by the insertion of special replies to special points made by Æschines, these replies generally occupying (as Blass remarks) the place of excrescences or appendices to the main argument. This is in itself sufficient to show that Demosthenes composed his defence on the general lines which he knew *à priori*, and which the gossip of the town informed him would be taken by Æschines, and afterwards added such special paragraphs as seemed required. Whether this was done in the actual delivery is more than doubtful. For Demosthenes certainly did not hold himself bound to publish the speech as it was spoken. In fact, Æschines (as the critics have shown) added replies in *his* speech to points made by Demosthenes, which do not now appear in Demosthenes' harangue. But how far Greek speakers were able to answer *extempore* we do not know, and most assuredly in the carefully constructed orations which we possess, not only the avoidance of hiatus, but the alleged regularity of the *cola* or clauses in each period, must have made all such sudden additions easily marked and ungainly excrescences. Hence I believe them to have been either omitted, or specially worked in, before the oration came to be handed over to the copyists.

But will it be believed that this masterpiece of Greek prose has found its Wolf, who insists on cutting it in two, and declaring it the later combination of two inconsistent plans, one sketched at the first threatening of the trial, the other actually delivered six years after? This is the theory of A. Kirchhoff,¹ whose essay will no doubt be read with delight by those who reject his critical dissection of the Odyssey. For if anything could throw general doubt and suspicion on a man's critical judgment, indeed on his critical sanity, it is this attempt to

¹ *Abhandl. Berlin Acad.*, 1875.

demand from a great and perfect work of art the starved logic of pedantic syllogisms.¹

The special editions of this oration, generally accompanied by the companion speech of Æschines, are very numerous. Weil (*Les plaid. pol. de Demosthène*, vol. i. Paris, 1877) gives us the newest and most careful recension. The edition of the Messrs. Simcox (Oxford, 1872), with Æschines' attack, is a very good and satisfactory book.

We have now concluded our review of the harangues to which Demosthenes owes his great and deserved reputation. The speech *on the Crown* is (with the exception of a couple of *Letters*) the last literary product he has left us, and, as Grote has called it, the Epitaphios of Greek Republican liberty.

§ 526. But we have as yet hardly noticed the large collection of court speeches, written in private suits, which are handed down to us among his orations, and which have given rise to volumes of comment and criticism. To review them in detail would be beyond the scope of this work; nor are they, with one or two exceptions, equal to the public speeches, or calculated to give us a better and clearer view of the orator's art and of his style. Indeed, court speeches upon obscure quarrels can hardly in any age be called literature, nor is it from this point of view that they will ever again be popular. They were in their day important studies of how a legal plaint or defence should be framed; they afford many commonplaces and general appeals useful in other cases, and may have been a sort of handbook for speech writers. But nowadays they are chiefly valuable as a deep fund of materials for reconstructing the details of the Attic juridical system, which they discuss from all sides. They are, moreover, incidentally, rich sources for studying the private life and manners of Athenians in that age; for in the narratives of facts, in the evidence adduced, in the personal attacks on character, we have sketches of life and of habits peculiarly fresh and genuine.²

¹ Cf. Cicero's judgment, *Orator*, c. 38, § 133: 'Ea profecto oratio—ut major eloquentia non requiratur.'

² The later chapters of my *Social Life in Greece* were drawn from this unexhausted source; among other like studies, I may call attention to the

For it is remarkable, that though many of these speeches have been declared spurious as being unworthy of Demosthenes, hardly any of them have been shown the product of a later age, or the work of sophists imitating in rhetorical exercises the real conflicts at the Attic bar. On the contrary, their minute and accurate detail, both in legal and historical allusions, prove them to be genuine court speeches, composed in the age and for the occasion when they profess to have been delivered. Accordingly they have been rejected merely from deficiencies of style, except, indeed, in the case of critics like A. Schäfer, whose objections are based on the moral ground, that he does not believe Demosthenes capable of sophistically advocating certain unsound claims. This latter ground especially applies to the speeches for Apollodorus, whom Demosthenes had vehemently attacked in one of the ablest and bitterest of his court speeches, *on behalf of Phormion*. The charge, however, of having corruptly changed sides as an advocate openly brought by Æschines, was not formally denied by Demosthenes, and was generally believed in ancient times, so that any rejection of such speeches on moral presumptions must be regarded as uncritical, and opposed to common sense.

It is considered a remarkable coincidence of evidence, and a perfect proof of spuriousness among the Germans, that Benseler, starting from the merely external test of the avoidance of hiatus, and A. Schäfer, who quite independently examines the speeches on æsthetical and moral grounds, should come to proximate conclusions in their rejection of particular works. But in the first place they do not always agree, and in the next it seems to me that the same revision which removed the hiatus would also remove faults in rhythm, clumsinesses of transition, and inconclusive arguments. Thus the researches of both scholars would only result in proving that some of Demos-

second volume of Messrs. Paley and Sandys' *private orations* of Demosthenes; and, above all, to the striking and picturesque study of bankers and banking, sketched from the history of the Bank of *Pasion Phormion & Co.*, in these orations, by M. G. Perrot (*Revue des Deux Mondes* for Nov. 15, 1873).

thenes' speeches were more logical, powerful, and carefully composed than others, and to the latter class belong most of the works they have declared spurious. When Dionysius and the ancients felt a speech to be spurious, I cede to their far keener appreciation; ¹ when the moderns object, I do not feel persuaded, except they can show strong internal grounds, such as the avoidance of all historical detail, and the servile imitation of a known model, which we find (for example) in the two speeches *against Aristogeiton*. But here Dionysius, of course, was not at fault.

§ 527. The simplest and best of all the 'private orations' is doubtless that *against Conon*, in an action for an aggravated assault. In this, as in very few of his works, the orator occupies himself with simple narrative, and a sketch of the dissolute life of Conon and his aristocratic set; the subject is one quite fit for Lysias, but though all the critics praise Demosthenes' narrative as superior in strength and even in ethos, I cannot see in it the genuine and unaffected grace of the older master.² Perhaps more celebrated is the speech for *Phormion*, to whom the celebrated banker Pasion had bequeathed his wife (a common Attic practice) and his banking business, with the guardianship of his children. The eldest son, Apollodorus, an extravagant man, quarrelled with Phormion about the inheritance, but presently compromised his differences. When he again, however, attacked Phormion, the accused brought a demurrer (*παραγραφή*), and so spoke first, showing that the former compromise was a legal bar to any action, but for safety's sake going carefully into the rights of the case. The present speech is a *συνηγορία*, or supporting speech by some friend of Phormion. The narrative, the argument, and the replies to Apollodorus are combined in Demosthenes' manner, and, indeed, here if anywhere, he succeeds in the ethos, and draws his client as an honest man of business, opposed to a worthless, vain, and noisy spendthrift.

¹ This appears to be Mr. Jebb's judgment, in his excellent article on *Demosthenes* in the *Encyclop. Britann.*, but he nevertheless defers to A. Schäfer's opinion on the speech *against Macartatus*.

² Cf. the excellent analysis of this speech by M. Perrot, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for June 15, 1873, pp. 946 sq.

The first speech *against Stephanus*, which is certainly genuine, is happily a sort of reply on the side of Apollodorus, who sued Stephanus for having given false evidence in the trial concerning the establishment of Pasion's will. Thus though Demosthenes did an immoral act in pleading on different sides in the same quarrel, we have learned by this means a great deal about an interesting case. The struggles of Demosthenes' panegyrist to get rid of this evidence against their hero are summed up by Blass,¹ whose conclusion I have adopted.

§ 528. Among the other speeches rejected, because there is too much hiatus either between the vowels or the proofs, because the dates are supposed later than the epoch during which Demosthenes wrote court speeches, or because the arguments are, in the opinion of the Germans, not sound enough or acute enough for the great orator, there are several which seemed genuine, and good specimens of his eloquence, to Dionysius, and which liberal critics will hesitate to condemn; for we should now have given up that veneration for destructive criticism which is often rashly felt for a new acquaintance.

Thus the excellent speech against Callippus is rejected by Schäfer and Blass because no long interval can be proved to have elapsed since the death of Pasion (370 B.C.) and the case before us, which was therefore tried before Demosthenes wrote any speeches. These chronological inferences are extremely doubtful; in fact, delays in Attic law were rather the rule than the exception, and to base upon them the spuriousness of a work sustained by its own merits, and by consistent tradition, seems to me regular Teutonism in reasoning. But no sooner is it determined that Apollodorus' affairs were not argued by Demosthenes than the critics at once discover all sorts of feeblenesses and follies in a speech which would be shown full of beauty and of force if they thought it genuine. The same remarks will apply, I think, to two other sets of three speeches rejected even by Blass: first, the speeches *against Macartatus*, *Olympiodorus* and *Lacritus*, two of which are cited by Dionysius as good specimens of Demosthenes' ethos; next, those against

¹ pp. 412-13.

Apaturius, *Phormion* (quite a different person from the client of the speech *in behalf of Phormion*), and *Dionysodorus*. In the case of any of them there is, however, some possibility that a clever pupil or imitator may have written under the advice and with the revision of the master. Such a production would be now quite undistinguishable from a lesser, or careless, or un-revised, work of the orator himself.

There are not more than nine as to which the arguments of the sceptics seem to me of real weight ; but when we reach a certain boundary line, or balance of probabilities, the decision becomes very difficult, if not impossible. It is perhaps best to refer, in conclusion, to the results reached by Blass,¹ to which I do not subscribe, but which will show the reader the most recent state of the controversy in Germany.

§ 529. There remain two epideictic speeches, the *Epitaphios*, or funeral speech, and the *Erotikos*, or tract in praise and exhortation of the fair Epicrates. The latter is so essentially Isocratic in form and composition, that we wonder how it ever came to be attributed to Demosthenes. The Funeral speech is supposed to be that delivered on the slain at Chæroneæ, and is really, in outward form, of the school of Demosthenes ; but is a poor performance,² full of over-dressed conceits, and has never been able to deceive critics as to its spuriousness. The writer shows more acquaintance with Plato's *Menæxenus* than with any of the other extant models.

§ 530. Far more interesting is the collection of *proems*, or introductions to public harangues, fifty-six in number, which have been raised, by separating some of them into parts, to the number of sixty-two. These commonplaces are in several

¹ p. 526. He acknowledges eleven public harangues, and eight court speeches on public affairs ; then seven private orations of an early, and seven from a later period. This gives a total of thirty-three genuine speeches. He furthermore classifies the spurious speeches into those by contemporary authors, by the school of Demosthenes, and by the writer who composed for Apollodorus. Weil, a greater linguistic critic, acknowledges the speech against Olympiodorus, and others which Blass rejects.

² I observe that Spengel (*Trans. Munich Acad.* for 1863) is not indisposed to accept it as genuine, though confessedly below the average of Demosthenes' works.

cases identical with the openings of the earlier speeches of Demosthenes (up to 350 B.C.), but show no traces of any of his later and more famous harangues. Had a rhetor or later collector been here at work, such an avoidance would be inconceivable; and therefore the collection is to be referred (in spite of Schäfer and Dobree) to about the year 349 B.C., and to the great orator himself. In form—in the observance of rhythm and avoidance of hiatus—all these proems agree with those confessedly used by Demosthenes. About one half of them refer to special occasions; the rest are perfectly general introductions, intended to excite the interest of the audience and to obtain a fair hearing for the speaker. But they are strictly commonplaces, and seek to gain attention not by putting things in a new and startling way, or by striking some sudden and exciting chord of sympathy, but by the careful and well-rounded expression of some sound common-sense consideration. As such they are not very well suited for the use of the modern orator, though showing clearly how strict and conservative was the taste of the so-called ochlocracy of Athens.

§ 531. As regards the *Letters* of Demosthenes, which close the long catalogue of his works, it has hitherto been the usual fashion to reject them as spurious in composition, but to use them as historical materials, on account of the important and apparently accurate information they contain about the orator's exile.¹

The genuineness has lately been defended (at least as regards most of them) with great ingenuity by Blass. They had

¹ The genuineness of the documents inserted in the speeches has also of late years been generally impugned, and in many cases they have been proved the ignorant compilations of a later age. Nevertheless, the wholesale scepticism regarding them which was growing up has been considerably checked by the discovery of some of them on marble, especially those cited in the speech against Macartatus, which so many critics think spurious. Hence the conclusion of Weil (in the preface to his edition of the speeches) is the just one—that we can lay down no general law, but must test each alleged document on its own merits. Some are certainly false, some apparently genuine; the majority are very doubtful. But this is not a literary question. Cf. H. Sauppe in the 25th *Philolog. Versammlung*, Leipzig, 1868.

been assumed spurious by Westermann, who was followed, without argument, by Schäfer,¹ and, what is far more important, by Grote, who was no sceptic in such matters, but who will not even² use them as historical sources, which Schäfer does. Blass³ accepts the second and third, holds the first and the sixth to be doubtful (though the former may be in substance genuine), and rejects the fourth. No. 5 is of no consequence. He shows that the writer possessed accurate knowledge of obscure details, and that, moreover, both his politics and his composition correspond with those of Demosthenes. He concludes that the *onus probandi* lies on the sceptics, and makes out a very reasonable case. Without venturing to decide the question, in which, however, I sympathise with Blass, I will only point out how signally German critics have their æsthetical judgments controlled by their critical conclusions, and in consequence how utterly unsafe they are as to questions of style. Westermann, having made up his mind that the letters were spurious, discovers that he is guided by their 'thoroughly un-Demosthenic composition, their senile verbosity, their unworthy complaining of misfortune, their obtrusive boastfulness, their want of argument,' &c. Blass, who decides them to be genuine, finds their self-praise moderate and in good taste, their logic thoroughly convincing, their bitter complaints the natural voice of a sensitive and refined nature, their patriotism noble and affecting!

§ 532. After this long review of special works, we may sum up our estimate by some general remarks. All critics are agreed that, as in the writings of Isocrates, so in those of Demosthenes, the greatest elaboration and conscious finish were apparent; we know that the orators of that age regarded themselves as artists, who competed with poets, painters, and sculptors in the production of permanent masterpieces, of models for the imitation of lesser men. Hence the form of a Greek oration is a matter of widely different importance from

¹ Schäfer has since (*Neue Jahrb.* for 1877, pp. 161, sq.) given his arguments, and strongly supported Westermann's view; Blass has replied (*Ibid.* pp. 541, sq.), but I cannot see that the case has become clearer. I still adhere, though without much confidence, to the side of Blass.

² xii. 406, note.

³ pp. 383, sqq.

that of modern speeches. Even if the ideas were commonplace, or at least, not new, a Greek orator could attain the highest praise by the arrangement of his argument, the choice of words, and of the constructions in which he put them. Hence the frequent use of commonplaces, such as the *proems* of Demosthenes, in which some frequently occurring thought was shaped into a proper expression, in which it might be always produced, without offending the audience by its repetition. Moreover, as speeches seem to have been mostly committed to memory, such commonplaces were of no small assistance to the speaker, like the repetitions in the Homeric poems. As all art, and more especially Greek art, so Greek oratory was subject to rules, which were not lightly transgressed; it was based on precedents, which were altered or extended slowly, and protected with great jealousy. The perfection of such a speaker as Demosthenes consisted, therefore, partly in his adherence to the tradition of his predecessors; partly in the wise and cautious innovations whereby he raised his eloquence to a higher level.

§ 533. First, then, as regards his *choice of words*, while adhering generally to the traditions of Lysias and Isocrates, it was remarked that he increased his vocabulary in strength by the admission of many common words and exclamations, which they would have considered beneath their proper dignity, but which give him both greater variety and greater force. Such are his *ἀνθρώπιον*, *ιαμβειοφάγος*, *ὁ δέϊρα*, *ᾧται*, *νῆ Δία*, and many other terms, especially of abuse, which prevent him from being cited as a master of Attic purity, but which must have added to the force and homeliness of his language. We have reason to believe that his actual speeches contained more of these expressions than we now find in our texts; for some were expunged during revision by the author; others rejected by rhetoricians as improper and undignified. These coarser expressions are to be found rather in his court speeches (even in public cases) than in his public harangues, which are remarkable for their dignity and calmness of expression. Indeed, nothing can give us a higher impression of the assembled Attic population than the eloquence which best succeeded with them. But in his

court speeches he is in every respect freer, using vulgarisms and trite proverbs when he thinks them effective. Far rarer are poetical expressions in any of his speeches. His close study of Thucydides shows itself in his choice of certain abstract forms, such as the crowding together of infinitives with articles, which is very obtrusive in some speeches, and the use of neuter adjectives substantively, such as τὸ τῶν θεῶν ἡμῖν εὐμερές. These *tourneures de phrase* make some of his early speeches, for example, that *on the Symmories*, as obscure as the speeches of Thucydides. On the other hand, the use of the plural of abstract nouns, like *πεπονθίαι*, is on the model of Isocrates. His metaphors are not frequent; they are chosen from familiar objects, and are thus not poetical in our sense, but are very striking, and always tersely put, often in a single word. His similes are accordingly very rare. In the great third *Philippic* there are six to be found; in the equally great speech *on the Chersonese* there are none. Everywhere we wonder at the simplicity and brevity of his diction, no idea ever being repeated which does not give balance to a period; and most of these exceptions are removed by rejecting, with Cobet, the second and otiose expression. Indeed, we must again repeat that Demosthenes in his first draughts, or original compositions, did not approach the perfection and beauty of form which his speeches ultimately attained, and that it was through conscious and painful revision that he introduced their more subtle beauties. This is frequently alluded to by the ancients, not excepting his contemporaries, who said his compositions smelt of the lamp; it is also shown clearly by modern critics, like Blass, who point to speeches of which parts have been elaborated and the rest left in the original form.

§ 534. But this after-polishing applies less to his *words* than to the rules as to *hiatus* and *rythm*, which have been analysed with minute care by Benseler and by Blass. As to hiatus, it appears that Demosthenes began by following pretty strictly the practice of Isocrates, and not permitting final and initial vowels to come together, even when separated by a pause, except in such words as *ἦ* and *καί*. This is the case up to about 357, or

the period which embraces the first speech relating to public affairs (that on the *tricerarch's crown*). But even during this period, some of his speeches show less care than others, probably in the revision; and afterwards we find that he refused to be bound by these fetters, and allowed himself greater liberty. At the close of a colon or clause, he no longer avoided the hiatus, any more than the tragic poets did at the end of a verse. How far elision and crasis prevailed in pronunciation, and diminished the apparent cases which we find, cannot now be determined. But after articles, relatives, and such frequent words as *ἐπεὶ*, *μέντοι*, &c., initial vowels are freely admitted. The exact law which he followed seems nowhere stated. Cicero says he avoided the 'concourse of vowels' *magna ex parte*. Later rhetors seem to understand only the Isocratic law.

Passing to rhythm, Blass has enounced the law that Demosthenes avoids the collocation of more than two short syllables, just as is done by the poets in tragic trimeters—a law of which he asserts that no trace is to be found in any of the previous prose writers. He thinks that the immediate followers of Demosthenes observed it, but that presently it was lost. In Plato especially Blass finds frequent crowds of short syllables, thus proving, as he thinks, that Demosthenes' law was a deliberate removal of his style from that of polished conversation. The reader who desires to go into the minute details of this theory, its apparent exceptions, and the evidence for it, should consult Blass' statement.¹ He says it is used so concurrently with the avoidance of hiatus, that spurious or unrevised passages show a parallel negligence of both, and he applies them throughout to determine the question of genuineness.

§ 535. There follows a long and intricate discussion on the structure of Demosthenes' periods, which were known to be divided into *κῶλα*, or members, and which were, according to critics old and new, arranged symmetrically, so as to produce a harmonious effect like that of the odes of Pindar. But while the best old critics, who speak fully and constantly about Demosthenes—I mean especially Dionysius and Cicero—often indeed praise his rhythm and his periods for their harmony and their

¹ pp. 100-4.

structure, yet never give us any special rules, or any definite analysis of his procedure, modern critics have striven to penetrate into the secrets of his composition, and tell us what laws he adopted to produce his great effects. That these laws produced a certain avoidance of hiatus is certain, proving a rule of oratory expressly discovered and used by Isocrates. That they also resulted in the rythmical rule set up by Blass seems true, after the evidence he has adduced ; but I cannot see it so clearly as to assert that this rule is not the accidental, or at least unconscious result of some more subtle and purely æsthetic canons, which the orator never taught, and probably could not teach, his pupils. This I think is the fair inference to draw from Blass' own admission, that all observance of such rhythm disappears as soon as he comes to speeches distinctly posterior to Demosthenes in date. In other words, the revision of the master pointed out offences against a very delicate subjective taste to which his pupils deferred, but as there was no canon laid down, or perhaps possible, the secret was lost with the artist who alone could apply it.

The case seems to me equally strong as regards the question of larger composition, that of the arrangement of *κῶλα*, or clauses, wherewith Demosthenes is said to have produced a sense of harmony by a symmetrical disposition. For this the reader should consult Blass's arrangement of the beginning of the *Crown* oration, according to his hypothesis.¹

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 560-1, *Proem*, §§ 1-8 :

§§ 1-2	§§ 3-4	§§ 5-6	§§ 7-8
<i>κῶλα</i>	<i>κῶλα</i>	<i>κῶλα</i>	<i>κῶλα</i>
32 23 33	44 35 53	24 4 4 42	2222 2222
στίχοι 16	στίχοι 24	στίχοι 24	στίχοι 16

This looks wonderfully symmetrical; but if the reader will turn back to the text printed by Blass on p. 529, he will see how arbitrary the determining of each *colon* is. In fact, the old rhetors, as Blass tells us, could not agree about it. Some are long, some short, and hardly any are clearly determined by either the sense or the construction. To print the passage would occupy too much space. Cf. the article on *Stichometry* and *Colometry* by Blass in the *Rhein. Mus.* for 1869 (p. 524), followed up in his account of Demosthenes, pp. 105, sq. The question at issue is this :

But when we come to enquire by what laws Blass determines the beginning and end of each member, we find no satisfactory test in his long and intricate discussion¹ except the occurrence of a strong hiatus, which was seldom allowed within a *κῶλον*. As to the rest his arrangements are capricious and often unnatural, nor do I think that another scholar, acting independently, and without a desire to produce a symmetrical result, would bring out the same divisions. I do not even think that a recovery of the analysis by the orator of Rhodes, who divided the speech *against Philip's Letter* into *κῶλα* according to the number given in (then) old MSS., and professedly derived from Demosthenes himself, would help us much. For in the first place this speech, being spurious, would not give us the real practice of Demosthenes, but a mere imitation by what Blass himself determines to be² a poor successor, who did not follow the rythmical rule. The analysis of the proem *on the Crown* by Lachares, which is still extant, dates from the 5th century A.D., and has, I suspect, no authority. Nor do I think with Blass that these indications are at all sufficient to prove that the *στίχοι* noted at the end of our oldest MS. mean metrical or rythmical *κῶλα* and not mere lines found in an older copy. It is confessed that even the best of the older rhetors had no certain traditions, or fixed rules about the matter, for Cicero and Dionysius always confine themselves to generalities; Hermodorus and Aristides even contradict one another.³

In the face of these difficulties, I think we may abandon as hopeless the attempt to measure out the symmetries of Demosthenes with plummet line, and must content ourselves to believe that, like his great predecessors and successors in the art, he worked out his speeches by constant reference either to the taste of his audience—in this case a very critical and competent one—or to that delicate taste which he had produced in his own mind by constant and anxious meditation on older

whether the number of *στίχοι* given at the end of each speech in some old MSS. is the number of mere lines in the speech, as written in even columns, or whether the lines represented originally *cola* of various length, of which the sum is given.

¹ pp. 105, sq.

² p. 347.

³ Blass, p. 105, note.

models, on their perfections, and on their deficiencies in regard to the advanced requirements of his age.

§ 536. It is far more interesting and more practical to examine the features wherein we can still securely judge the orator, and explain how he attained his preeminence. Not that there does not still remain considerable difficulty. For when we consider what not only scholars, but statesmen and modern speakers have noticed, that in Demosthenes we have a man who produced the greatest results ever attained in his art, without great natural gifts, or good voice, or a commanding presence, without being a philosopher, without any broad generalisations which could affect future ages, without ornament in the modern sense, without any pathetic scenes, without any real wit—in fact, without attracting either the thinkers or the sensitive natures whom Plato and Aristophanes can fascinate, we are still disposed to be incredulous, and to require some clear and definite solution of so mysterious a problem.

The old rhetors are very far indeed from giving us any adequate account of these things. But what they tell us is interesting and instructive as to the facts of the case. The theory of Dionysius is that Demosthenes consciously combined all the perfections of his predecessors, choosing the terseness and pathos of Thucydides, the grace and ethos of Lysias, the harmony and skilful disposition of Isocrates, and working them up into a mixed style, which embraced all these perfections. Of course no great genius was ever a mere eclectic, but what is really to be here inferred is the extraordinary *variety* of Demosthenes, in whose work could be found passages emulating all these writers in their peculiar strong points. Nor does this variety apply exclusively either to the form or to the matter of his speeches; it interpenetrates both thoroughly. Thus his choice of words was at one time grand and dignified, at another so homely as to be almost coarse. His periods were at one time splendid constructions of such complexity and intricacy as to astonish the hearer, at another they were mere loosely connected clauses, like the easy narratives of Herodotus. Nay even the arguments are never, so to speak, sustained and methodical, but he passes from point to point, anticipates for a

moment, then recapitulates, recounts facts and then expounds arguments ; in fact, plays all round his subject so as to present every aspect of it in curious and varied succession.

It is accordingly a constant remark of the old critics that he not only used the *figures of thought* of older orators more frequently, but added several of his own, which they never dared to use. He used *anaphora*, *anastrophe*, *systrophe*—they enumerate nearly twenty of them—in the way of repeating words at the opening of his clauses, of imagining questions put by objectors, of questioning himself, and so forth. But what seemed new in him was the frequent use of *aposiopesis*, and the use of exclamations, especially at the end of an indignant sentence. Two of these, which must have had a most stinging effect, are very frequently quoted.¹

This vivacity of making his oration almost a familiar dialogue, and of bursting out into exclamation, was an unheard-of liberty according to the old traditions of Greek eloquence. His action in delivery corresponded to it, and shocked the old school. For while even Æschines, with his fine voice and prepossessing appearance, stood up (as his statue still represents him) keeping his hand hidden in the folds of his cloak, and spoke with dignified calmness, we hear that Demosthenes contorted his figure, laid his hand across his forehead so as to affect the attitude of sudden reflection, often raised his voice to a scream, and even turned round and round on the bema in his excitement. These things carried away the lower public, but were always reprehended by artistic critics. In fact, Demosthenes' action was as new and startling on the bema as Mr. Irving's *Hamlet* has been on our stage, and it was a long time before critics could come to confess that the new and vehement style of the young politician had great and enduring merit.

§ 537. If we examine what modern students have added to the somewhat barren criticism of the classical theorists, we may contrast with the liveliness and variety, which they have

¹ (*And.* 78) : ἄλλ' Ἀνδροτίων ἡμῖν πομπείων ἐπισκευαστής, Ἀνδροτίων ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί. (*Aristocr.* 210) : νῦν ἢ πόλις εἰς ὑπηρέτου σχῆμα καὶ τάξιν προελήλυθε καὶ Χαρίδημον εἰ χρὴ φρουρεῖν βουλευέται, Χαρίδημον οἶμοι.

described as 'figures of thought,' a certain remarkable persistence in urging the main point, which makes him never forget his object amid all the changes and momentary digressions of his eloquence. He was far too subtle a student of human nature to lecture in definite heads, like a Scotch preacher. If he has a scheme with subdivisions, he almost always conceals them by such natural and easy transitions that he leads on his hearer insensibly from point to point. But never does he digress from his real subject, and his affected episode is often his most insidious and telling argument.

All this subtlety and even astuteness of advocacy, which does not shrink at times from distorting facts and wilfully dealing in fallacies, is combined with that peculiar dignity and reticence in emotion which have secured him the sympathy of strange generations of men. For he never strains his pathos ; however seductive or striking a picture may come before him, he never turns aside to paint it in detail, like the orators of the present day. He suggests it with a burning sentence, a brief clause, nay, with a single word, and passes on his way. It is particularly remarked by the moderns how quiet and sedate are his conclusions, as if the Attic audience objected to be released in high excitement, and in a moment of strong emotion. Hence the orator, like the tragic poet, was expected to calm his hearers, and close with an appeal to reason and common sense.¹ He never uses a simile for its beauty, but always for its effect in illustration, and hence borrows it from the affairs of ordinary life. Whatever license he may have allowed himself in his actual delivery, he reduced all pathetic digressions, when he came to revise his speeches, to a very minimum, and so produces on us an impression of serious earnest, to which I can quote no modern parallel. This is perhaps the strongest feature in his 'thoughts that breathe, and words that burn.' And together with this red-hot earnestness, there is, on the whole, a moral splendour about him, which raises him above all his contemporaries. It is of course ridiculous to assert that he was a Stoic in his philosophy, that he was so Quixotic a po-

¹ The extant speech of Lycurgus offers a remarkable exception to this rule.

litician as to advocate from the *bema* the doing of right for its own sake, apart from consequences. He plainly enough, in his Hellenic harangues, lays down self-preservation by the weakening of neighbour states as the real basis of Athenian politics. He was quite ready to call in the Persian king, the hereditary enemy of all Hellenedom, to join with the Greeks against the newer and more dangerous, though semi-Hellenic oppressor. But, nevertheless, he had large views of Athenian greatness and responsibilities; he grasped the idea of great sacrifices for great national ends; he advocated the cause of liberty and of culture against despotism; he soared above the petty quarrels of individual states to an imperial policy. These wider thoughts made him the exponent of more than Attic policy, of other than Athenian conflicts.

His unattractive presence, his unsocial temper, and his early difficulties, while they prevented a ready recognition of his genius, were perhaps strong contributing elements to its growth and peculiar complexion. For genius he developed, though attained by labour, and decked with artifice. Nor will any number of subsidiary causes explain to us his success.

But while he added more perhaps than any other great man in history to his natural powers by labour and energy, there was one gift he received from fortune, without which he could not have risen to his true position. He lived in a great historical crisis; he grew up to take part in a momentous struggle, which brought out all his eloquence in the vital cause of Hellenic freedom. The force and the subtlety of his unarmed words were pitted against the phalanx and the gold of one of the ablest monarchs in history. To have been overcome after a long and glorious struggle for such a cause, to have stood forth to speak the mighty epitaph on the tomb of departed liberty, was indeed a fortune worthy of no ordinary genius. The trials of his later years forced from him the bitter reflection, that were he again offered, with his acquired experience, the way to the *bema* or to the tomb, he would not hesitate to choose the latter. But had he been able to look beyond the present life, and see that the one meant lasting dignity and renown, and the other eternal oblivion, he might have justified his first

choice by his own noble words, and cried out that he had not erred—no, not by the heroes that fought at Marathon and Salamis, and all the brave men whom a grateful posterity has honoured with a public tomb, the monument of their valour and their worth !

§ 538. The external history of his text is clearer than that of most Greek authors. It is plain, from the condition in which we find speeches like that *against Meidias*, that many of them were not edited by Demosthenes himself, but by pupils and admirers, possibly by his nephew Demochares, on whose proposal his name was honoured and his descendants distinguished, but not till forty years after his death. The German critics find, even in some of the speeches they reject, the delicate laws of rhythm and hiatus observed according to the model of the master, and they infer from this that he was practically the head of a school. But I think all we know of the man tells against such a theory, and suggests (as has already been argued) that most of these lesser works were probably unrevised compositions of his own. The collection which we possess, though some nine titles are mentioned which are now lost,¹ is in the main that of the Alexandrian Callimachus, a learned man and a scholar, who was not likely to class a notoriously inferior work in the list. Yet he seems to have been easier of faith than his successors.

Polybius speaks of Demosthenes with great respect, but probably as a politician. Cicero constantly alludes to him, and places him as an orator above all other models. Indeed Cicero's rhetorical writings are often the best commentary on his great predecessor, though he evidently knew nothing definite concerning the subtler laws of his composition. But Quintilian, and Plutarch, and Origen,² though confessing his greatness as a speaker, seem quite convinced by their historical materials that he was not an honest or a worthy man.³ Nevertheless,

¹ It is noticed that the geographer Agatharchides and Rutilius Lupus have many quotations from Demosthenes not found in our texts, and apparently not from any varying recension of extant speeches (Blass, p. 59).

² All quoted by Blass, p. 47.

³ With this judgment very few moderns are agreed. I find an estimate

Stoics like Panætius justly recommended his speeches as a good moral study on account of their lofty tone. It was through the rhetoricians that he was ultimately rehabilitated. Cæcilius and Dionysius both wrote largely upon him, and the first letter to Ammæus of the latter is an elaborate eulogy of the 'wonderful eloquence of Demosthenes.' From this tract, and from Dionysius' incidental allusions in discussing other Greek orators, we discover that the critics of the day had begun to reject many works as spurious, and that the catalogue only included about forty-four of the extant speeches. As to mere copies of the text, we do not hear much from Dionysius. But it appears that the Ἀττικιστὰ, or copies written by a certain Atticus, were thought of peculiar value, as Lucian tells us, who speaks of him as a contemporary.¹ Among the Greek rhetors of the Roman schools, comparisons of Demosthenes and Cicero, of Demosthenes and Æschines, and other such essays became common; and from the many monographs or ὑπομνήματα they composed, were brought together the body of scholia, which have reached us under the name of Ulpian, and in which (together with allusions in *Suidas* and *Photius*) we find at least twenty-five authors of such works quoted. The tract *on the Sublime* is perhaps the only one which gives us the æsthetic criticisms of this age. The author's judgments on Demosthenes are sound and clear. But though Ulpian is said to have been a rhetor of the third century A.D., we find fourth century authors quoted in his scholia, so that his own work may not have extended beyond the public orations,

of the orator in consonance with it in Mr. Simcox's excellent preface to the edition of the speeches *on the Crown*, with all of which I would agree, except that he gives some credence to the attacks on Demosthenes charging him with unchastity. These the whole man's life, and his portrait statue, forbid us to believe. Among the Germans, I find that L. Spengel, in his articles on Demosthenes' harangues, has taken an independent course, and does not fall down and worship the orator's character as well as his eloquence. But Spengel has found many opponents, and only a stray follower in A. Weidner. The question of Demosthenes' incorruptibility will recur in connection with the accusations of Hypereides.

¹ *Adv. indoct.* I.

the rest being the collection of Zosimus, or some such person. They are pretty full on the first twenty-four orations, very poor on the rest, but are, unfortunately, almost all on rhetorical points, and tell us little of the history or politics with which the text is concerned. Our best arguments are ascribed to Libanius, but there are often found more prolix arguments by other rhetors.

§ 539. *Bibliographical.* When we emerge from the Middle Ages we find a rich store of MSS., several Italian ones being as old as the eleventh century (the Marcian F perhaps even from the tenth), and one of them written by the same hand as the famous *Ravennas* of Aristophanes. But they are all completely thrown into the shade by the Parisian Σ, of the tenth century, which is now recognised as the proper basis of the text, and probably taken from an Attican copy, whereas the rest are all the vulgar (ἑμπόρειε), considerably interpolated. But from these latter (especially the Marcian F, sæc. x. or xi.) Aldus printed his *Demosthenes* in 1504. He also printed Ulpian's scholia in 1503. All the later editions up to the present generation followed this recension, merely adding collations of MSS. of the same class. Now at last the Zurich editors, Dindorf, Bekker, and Cobet, have shown the enormous value of the codex Σ, which has been most thoroughly and minutely collated for the edition of H. Weil (two volumes have appeared), but also for the texts prepared by these scholars. The work of commenting on Demosthenes is so varied and extensive, that except Weil's volumes, which already embrace most of the important speeches, and Redantz on the speeches regarding Philip, no general edition can be recommended for exegesis. The best texts are Bekker's (second edition, Leipzig, 1854-5), G. Dindorf's (with the scholia, nine volumes Oxon, 1846-51), and Voemel's (second edition, Paris, 1868); special editions of separate speeches are innumerable, and the best have been mentioned separately in the foregoing chapter. The English translations of Demosthenic orations, especially of that *on the Crown*, are very numerous, the latest being that of Sir R. Collier. Leland's, of the last century, has a deservedly high repute. The myriad newer literature on

Demosthenes (up to 1877) will be found catalogued in the thirty-seventh volume of the *Philologus*, pp. 676, sq. Little can ever be added, save in the way of criticism, to the exhaustive histories of A. Schäfer and F. Blass, from which I have borrowed materials throughout.

CHAPTER XII.

THE ORATORS CONTEMPORARY WITH DEMOSTHENES.

§ 540. DEMOSTHENES was only the greatest among a constellation of great speakers, of whom we have sufficient remains to justify the high praise accorded to them by the Greek historians of rhetoric. If in fact they were not all judged by the severe test of comparison with Demosthenes, we should pronounce most of them as quite first-rate in their department of literature ; in some respects, indeed, their less studied composition is more congenial to modern taste than the thoroughly professional eloquence of their great rival.

We naturally begin with ÆSCHINES, marked out by his life as the special antagonist to Demosthenes. Little would be known of him but for this circumstance, and that little again has been obscured and perverted by the unsparing and reckless vituperation of Demosthenes. But it is almost ridiculous how the extant *Lives* of Æschines gravely repeat the calumnies of the *de Corona*, as if they were historical truth, while the equally well-founded countercharges of Æschines against Demosthenes are generally set down at their proper value. However, this vulgar habit of personal λοιπὸνία compelled orators to make counter-statements showing their own antecedents, and to these, when unrefuted by their adversaries, we are bound to assign most weight, as they probably only err by omission, not by deliberate falsification.

The sketch of Apollonius (prefixed to the texts) is more honest than the rest, in appending to Demosthenes' scurrilities the facts stated by Æschines himself in his own defence.¹ It is

¹ περὶ παραπρεσβ. §§ 78, 147, 168.

father, Atrometus, who was in court, at the age of ninety-four, when this case was pleaded (344-3 B.C.), was a respectable but poor citizen of the deme of the Kothokidæ,¹ who, before he lost his property owing to the Peloponnesian war, was a private citizen and an athlete, then was exiled in the days of the Thirty, and served as a mercenary soldier in Asia. He belonged, says Æschines, to a clan which had the same family worship and altars as the Eteoboutadæ, from whose family the priestess of Athene Polias was chosen. Atrometus returned from Corinth with the exiles under Thrasybulus, and being poor began to make his livelihood as a schoolmaster. He had married Glaucothea, the daughter of Glaucus of the deme Acharnæ, apparently of respectable family. The orator tells us his mother shared in the exile to Corinth, which seems strange, as her second son, Æschines, was not born till 389 B.C., according to his own statement. His elder brother, Philochares, and his younger, Aphobetus,² were both well known and respectable men, the former entrusted with the highest commands.

Our orator is said in early youth to have assisted his father in keeping the school, and also (by Demosthenes) to have helped his mother in some disreputable private religious mysteries, such as were common but in bad odour at Athens. Æschines never denies that she was employed in some such living, but merely accentuates the respectability of her family and connections. Being duly enrolled on attaining the age of puberty, he served his term in the *περίπολοι*, or frontier guards of Athens, and in the later campaigns at Nemea (368), at Mantinea (362), and especially at Tamynæ (349), fought with such credit that he was publicly distinguished by the general Phocion. At what time of

¹ Some demes were local, and called by the name of their towns. But others were not so, and were called after some legendary hero. This deme is always mentioned in the patronymic form, but I can find no trace whatever of the personage from whom it derived its name. Hesychius gives *κοθῶ* and *κορθῶ* as rare forms in the sense of *βλάβη*. Hence Fick (*Griech. Personennamen*) suggests *κοθῶκης* in the sense of *healer of ill* (*κοθω-δης*), as the epithet of the eponymous hero of the deme.

² The *Life* ascribed to Plutarch quotes these names as Aphobus and Demochares, which shows either negligence or a text varying from ours. The former is the more probable.

his life he could have employed himself as a tragic actor we cannot tell. Demosthenes says he played *tritagonist* with bad companies 'in the provinces,' and that he was hissed off the stage as CEnomaus, but apparently only for the accident of falling when he was pursuing Pelops on the stage, and being assisted up by the master of the chorus—a very likely misfortune to happen on the Greek stage, with the awkward and unnatural padding and heightening of the human form. This incident is quoted in the first *Life* on the authority of Demochares, and even the name of the chorus-master, Sannio, is mentioned. But the actors with whom he played, Theodorus and others, were the most eminent of their day, and they played the 'classic drama,' which was the most respectable and honourable branch of the profession, so that AEschines, though taking inferior parts, played in the very best companies.¹ He may have been prematurely aged by all these occupations, for he speaks of himself as quite grey at the age of forty-five.² Being of good appearance, though short in stature, and possessing a fine voice, he was afterwards appointed public clerk under the administrations of Aristophon and Eubulus, and gradually obtained sufficient experience and training in public affairs to come forward as a political man (*ρήτωρ*). He was entrusted with several important public missions, especially an embassy to Megalopolis to oppose Philip's policy. He married the daughter of Philodemus, and had a daughter and two sons, whom he produced in court during his defence, as children, when he was himself about forty-eight years old. Having completely failed in his attack on Demosthenes in 330 B.C., and being condemned to pay a thousand drachmæ for unsuccessful prosecution, he went into exile to Rhodes, where he supported himself, not I fancy by rhetoric, which he never professed, but by teaching letters, like his father. He is said to have died at Samos, at the age of seventy-five (therefore 314 B.C.), but on no better authority than that of Apollonius. One of the spurious *Letters*

¹ Cf. the high praise of this Theodorus in Aristotle, *Rhet.* iii. 2, 4, which says that his voice always seemed to be the voice of his character, but that of other actors not so.

² i. 49.

says his mother went with him into exile, aged seventy-three,¹ which is impossible in the face of the statement that she fled with her husband to Corinth in 403 B.C.² One of the finest extant portrait statues of the ancients is the full-length figure of Æschines, standing in the attitude he assumed when speaking, which is now in the Museum of Naples. The calm and dignified face seems to me, however, wanting in expression, as compared, for example, with the analogous portrait of Sophocles in the Lateran. There is also a noble bust reproduced (from Colonel Leake's collection) in Miilingen's *uned. Mon.*, plate ix., which corroborates the genuineness of the statue.

All these facts are obscure compared to his political acts, reviewed by Demosthenes and by himself in extant speeches. There seems little doubt that Æschines, serving under Eubulus at home and Phocion in the field, naturally adopted their peace policy, and was hence from the beginning opposed to Demosthenes. But though he honestly began to advocate this policy, the weight of evidence tends to show that he was afterwards bribed by Philip to promote his ends, and that his later political acts were tainted by this impure motive. Such is at least the verdict of all the calmest modern historians. Eubulus and Phocion must have thought differently, for they supported him through the trial about his second embassy to Philip, and obtained his acquittal; nor was he ever convicted and disgraced, like Philocrates, though his case was a closely analogous one. Phocion and Eubulus may have been persuaded that, though Æschines took money, he did so while honestly advocating a peace policy, and not as a motive for abandoning his principles. Hence they would protect him against their political opponent, Demosthenes. These important testimonies in his favour make me still doubt his treachery, but there is no likelihood of any additional evidence ever clearing up this difficult point.

§ 541. As to Æschines' rhetorical training, the ancients, who always insisted on the filiation of literary genius, asserted that he had studied under Plato and Isocrates, probably confounding him with the Socratic Æschines. Cæcilius called him

¹ 12, § 12.

² παραπρεσβ. § 147.

a pupil of Leodamas, for no other reason, I suppose, than that Æschines speaks of him¹ as an orator not inferior to Demosthenes, nay, even in his opinion a pleasanter speaker. Suidas, whose article on the orator is exceptionally bad, says he was a pupil of Alkidamas. All the internal evidence shows clearly that Æschines never studied rhetoric as a profession, but that having great natural gifts, and being brought by his official position of clerk into constant contact with the best speakers, he formed himself as an amateur upon these models, adding to their method the dignified and graceful delivery which he had studied for his parts on the stage. He affected, moreover, not to be a court speaker, versed in the wiles and subtleties of *nisi prius* practice, but a state adviser on large public interests, like the respectable politicians of the day, who thought speech-writing in private causes a questionable profession. Hence he asserts, at the opening of his speech against Timarchus, that though now forty-five years old, he had never yet appeared in court to prosecute anyone; nor do we find it stated that he wrote speeches for others. The three extant harangues, (1) *against Timarchus*, B.C. 344, (2) *on the Embassy*, B.C. 343, (3) *against Ctesiphon*, B.C. 330, were his only published works; a speech about the Delian temple was of old rejected as spurious. Æschines, in fact, trusted more than any of the professional orators to extempore inspiration; he had a ready flow of words, and probably seldom wrote down what he had to say. We have hints that of the extant speeches two were written after the real trials, and accordingly published as pamphlets of vindication. Hence we can easily conceive him reciting to the Rhodians Demosthenes' speeches, but not as undertaking to teach formally the art of rhetoric.

§ 542. The speech (1) *against Timarchus* is perhaps the most interesting to modern readers, as it does not deal with complicated and disputed political affairs, and can be understood without a minute study of the history of the time. Timarchus had joined Demosthenes in charging Æschines with malversation during his embassy to Philip, when Æschines bethought himself of disposing of his lesser adversary by a

¹ iii. 138-9.

preliminary action. He indicted Timarchus as disqualified from political status, or from accusing any citizen, on account of his disgraceful private life. It is evident from the pains taken by the orator in setting forth both the general expediency of such a law, and its basis in the nature of a democracy, that it had come to be regarded as a dead letter.

After a proem declaring his own modesty of life, and total inexperience in public prosecutions, to which he is only urged now by the *sycophancy* of Timarchus,¹ he proceeds to show that, of the various kinds of constitutions, democracy is that specially depending on law, and the upholding of its sanctions.² Accordingly he proposes to examine the laws of Solon and Draco for the moral restraint of children, of young men, and lastly of the public generally,³ and then to compare with them the life of Timarchus in each period, which he does⁴ in two parts, first showing his prostitution for pay,⁵ and then his squandering of his father's property. Having thus concluded his prosecution, he turns by way of epilogue more specially to two points—first, a refutation of the reply which he hears will be made, and, secondly, an exhortation of the citizens to virtue. But these two are not kept asunder clearly, and the latter especially seems introduced mainly to give a good opportunity for recitations from the poets.⁶

This very Timarchus (says our argument) was the author of more than a hundred decrees. We know, too, other more celebrated Athenians, such as Alcibiades, who could hardly have escaped from a similar prosecution. The particular charge is, however, not so much against youthful excesses, a charge which Æschines does not repudiate even as regards himself, but rather against the practising of immorality for hire—a distinction all-important in this case, and on which great stress is laid. Æschines expounds the plan of his speech⁷ more like a modern preacher than with the art of Demosthenes, though he afterwards⁸ abandons that part of his parallel which affects the boyhood of Timarchus, professedly from generosity, but more probably from want of evidence. Indeed, all through

¹ §§ 1-3.² §§ 4-8.³ §§ 9-36.⁴ §§ 37-115.⁵ §§ 37-94.⁶ §§ 141-54.⁷ § 8.⁸ §§ 39 and 160.

his proofs are so purely circumstantial, that he is obliged to reply¹ to the natural demand of his adversaries to produce direct testimony of any particular act of immorality on the part of Timarchus ; but such an objection, fatal to a prosecution in our courts, was easily disposed of at Athens by an appeal to the general character of the defendant, on which Athenians, who were great busybodies, laid no small stress. The whole speech is very valuable in showing us the moral life of Athens, but the subject is not easy to discuss in a modern book. On its style I will speak when we have briefly reviewed the other orations.

§ 543. The second oration, *περὶ παραπρεσβείας*, as I have already noticed, was probably not delivered,² but was doubtless published by Æschines with more care than attended the publication of Demosthenes' attack, seeing that it was a vindication of his life and policy. The speech is, indeed, much more agreeable to read than its rival, being full of lively narrative and not less lively vituperation, and is not divided, like that against Timarchus, into heads, being rather a narrative of the circumstances of the two embassies to Philip, varied by sundry excursions in personal matters—accounts of his own family and antecedents, and attacks on Demosthenes. It is quite exceptional for its lively ethos, and its most dramatic painting of the sourness and grand airs of Demosthenes on the embassy, as well as of the courtliness and sagacity of Philip.³

Indeed, the narrative of Demosthenes' break-down before Philip, when he had raised the highest expectations by his boasting, is too graphic to be omitted.⁴ The sketches of

¹ §§ 71, sq.

² Against this theory Thirlwall, Schäfer, and others protest strongly, and think the trial must have been held.

³ Both Bergk and Schäfer think it the best of the extant speeches of Æschines.

⁴ §§ 34-5 : 'Ρηθέντων δὲ τούτων καὶ ἐτέρων λόγων ἤδη καθῆκεν εἰς Δημοσθένην τὸ τῆς πρεσβείας μέρος, καὶ πάντες προσεῖχον ὡς ὑπερβολὰς τινὰς δυνάμειος ἀκουσόμενοι λόγων· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον, ὡς ἦν ὕστερον ἀκούειν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐταίρους αὐτοῦ ἐξηγγέλθη ἡ τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν ὑπερβολή. οὕτω δὲ ἀπάντων διακειμένων πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόασιν φθέγγεται τὸ θηρίον τοῦτο προοίμιον σκοτεινὸν καὶ τεθνηκὸς δειλίζ, καὶ μικρὸν προαγαγὼν ἄνω τῶν

past history and the account of the Amphictyonic Council are very interesting, and the whole narrative of Æschines' extempore burst at Delphi, when looking down upon the sacred plain, is worthy of the highest place in Greek eloquence. But the vehement and ribald countercharges of corruption and of immorality made in open court by men of the eminence of Demosthenes and Æschines produce a most disagreeable impression, and show us how different was the tone of political debate at Athens from that of our House of Commons. It is evident that bribery was frequent, and so little heeded, that every politician charged his opponent with it as a matter of course. I will add what appears stranger, but is not the less true, that I believe the occasional accepting of bribes not to have been inconsistent with genuine patriotism and even general honesty. We feel it almost impossible to conceive this. A man once detected taking money in such a way would be among us absolutely ruined. But this is far from being the case in less solid nations than the English—as, for example, among the Russians, and perhaps nearer home. There it is so universal a rule to take bribes, that to accept them from supporters is not the least censured, and even more flagrant violations of honesty are condoned by the exigencies of political expediency. Unless we hold fast this notion, we are sure to go wrong in estimating both Æschines and Demosthenes. The peroration of the present speech¹ gives a true and striking sketch of the history of Athens, especially since the Restoration. He appeals to Eubulus and Phocion to support him, and it was certainly the influence of these respectable men which saved him from the attack of Demosthenes.

§ 544. The same general remarks apply to the third speech, the *indictment of Ctesiphon* for illegality, as having proposed a

πραγμάτων εξαίφνης ἐσίγησε καὶ διηπορήθη, τελευτῶν δὲ ἐκπίπτει ἐκ τοῦ λόγου. ἰδὼν δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ Φίλιππος ὡς διέκειτο, θαρρεῖν τε παρεκελεύετο καὶ μὴ νομίζειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, διὰ τοῦτο οἶσθαί τι πεπονθέναι, ἀλλ' ἡσυχῇ καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὡς προείλετο. ὁ δ' ὡς ἅπαξ ἐταράχθη καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων διεσφάλη, οὐδ' ἀταλαβεῖν αὐτὸν ἐδυνήθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν λέγειν ἐπιχειρήσας ταῦτ' ἐπαθεν. ὡς δ' ἦν σιωπῇ, μεταστῆναι ἡμᾶς ὁ κῆρυξ ἐκέλευεν.

¹ §§ 172–84.

gold crown to be presented to Demosthenes. The circumstances have been detailed in connection with the reply *de Corona*. It is to be observed that the proem repeats in substance the commonplace about the three forms of polity used in the speech *against Timarchus*.¹ The orator then proceeds to his three general heads of accusation: first, Demosthenes was still under audit when the honour was proposed, which was very properly forbidden by a distinct law under such circumstances. This proof, together with the refutation of the counter-pleas, occupies from §§ 6 to 31. Then comes his second point, that in any case crowning in the theatre before the plays began, was specially forbidden by law, and was ordered to take place, if at all, in the Pnyx. This argument, which seems very sound, is met by Demosthenes with the quotation of certain exceptions, which he accuses Æschines to have suppressed in quoting the law. As I see great authorities, such as Spengel and Halm,² at variance about the real justice of the case, it is not likely that the problem will ever be settled. It is quite certain that both orators were capable of both suppression and exaggeration, nay, even of stating deliberate falsehoods.

But ancient critics were so much impressed by the clearness and force of this technical part of Æschines' speech, that they say he would have convicted Ctesiphon more easily than Timarchus had he confined himself to it. He enters next³ upon a different task—a general review of Demosthenes' life in four periods (above, p. 329), in each of which he was either a traitor or proved a misfortune to the state. The account of the earlier periods differs considerably in both orators from their former account, in the speeches about the embassy. As Spengel observes,⁴ sixteen years having elapsed since the facts, the orators knew that they could distort or accommodate them with less fear of detection. Hence Grote has found it impossible to make out the real truth amid their contradictions and inconsistencies. But as a piece of rhetoric, the close of this portion of Æschines' speech, not of course so splendid as the

¹ §§ 4, sq.

² *Munich Sitzber.* for 1875, p. 1.

³ § 49.

⁴ *Abhandl. Munich Acad.* for 1863, p. 99.

reply, is very impressive.¹ So indeed is the rest of the speech, spent in what were called *προκαταλήψεις*, or anticipations of the adversary's replies. It is of course hard to conceive that such pleading could come from a mere vulgar traitor. I cannot but think him rather a real advocate of the peace policy, and systematic opponent of Demosthenes' imperial views, not perhaps above taking presents from Philip, and doing him a service, when it accorded with the views of Eubulus and Phocion, but not a more serious or systematic delinquent.

§ 545. As regards the general style of the orator, it is first of all to be remarked that he was regarded the father of extemporising among the Greeks. To them careful and even written preparation was so essential to eloquence, that to speak on the spur of the moment, though often necessary in political debate, was not accounted an art till Æschines showed what could be done in this way. For the boast of Gorgias that he could reply fluently and elegantly to any proposed question was of course understood to depend on a carefully prepared and

¹ Here is a fine passage, §§ 132-134: *Τοιγάρτοι τί τῶν ἀνελπίστων καὶ ἀπροσδοκῆτων ἐφ' ἡμῶν οὐ γέγονεν; οὐ γὰρ βίον γε ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπινον βεβιώκαμεν, ἀλλ' εἰς παραδοξολογίαν τοῖς ἐσομένοις μεθ' ἡμᾶς ἔφυμεν. οὐχ ὁ μὲν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεὺς, ὁ τὸν Ἀθῶ διορύξας, ὁ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, ὁ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας αἰτῶν, ὁ τολμῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς γράφειν, ὅτι δεσπότης ἐστὶν ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀφ' ἡλίου ἀνιόντος μέχρι θνομένου, νῦν οὐ περὶ τοῦ κύριος ἐτέρων εἶναι διαγωνίζεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη περὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος σωτηρίας; καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ὀρώμεν τῆς τε δόξης ταύτης καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸν Πέρσην ἡγεμονίας ἡξιωμένους, οἳ καὶ τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱερὸν ἡλευθέρωσαν. Θῆβαι δέ, Θῆβαι, πόλις ἀστυγείτων, μεθ' ἡμέραν μίαν ἐκ μέσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνῆρπασται, εἰ καὶ δικαίως, περὶ τῶν ὅλων οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευσάμενοι, ἀλλὰ τήν γε θεοβλάβειαν καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνως, ἀλλὰ δαιμονίως κτησάμενοι. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ' οἱ ταλαίπωροι, προσαψάμενοι μόνον τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ κατάληψιν, οἳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ποτὲ ἀξιούντες ἡγεμόνες εἶναι, νῦν ὀμηρεύουσιν καὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς ἐπίδειξιν ποιησόμενοι μέλλουσιν ὥς Ἀλέξανδρον ἀναπέμπεσθαι, τοῦτο πεισόμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ὅ τι ἂν ἐκείνῳ δόξῃ, καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ κρατοῦντος καὶ προηδικημένου μετριότητι κριθέσονται. ἡ δ' ἡμετέρα πόλις, ἡ κοινὴ καταφυγὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πρὸς ἣν ἀφικνούντο πρότερον ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος αἱ πρεσβεῖαι, κατὰ πόλεις ἕκαστοι παρ' ἡμῶν τὴν σωτηρίαν εὐρησόμενοι, νῦν οὐκέτι περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας ἀγωνίζεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους. καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ὅτου Δημοσθένης πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν προσελήλυθεν.*

well-adapted stock of commonplaces. Æschines' three written speeches, therefore, give us a poor idea of the power of the man, for which we must rather recur to the great scene outside Delphi, where his wonderful address electrified or rather madened an assembly 'inexperienced in oratory,' as Demosthenes calls them. The ancient critics judge him, however, exactly as we should expect a great extempore speaker to be judged, even allowing for the influence of Demosthenes' ribald abuse upon them. Dionysius calls him delightful at first reading, and, when more closely examined, powerful too, but rather from natural gifts than from art. Cicero and Quintilian are severe upon him, and (especially the latter) speak of him as turgid and verbose. Yet Cicero both translated the third speech and imitated from the first¹ in his speeches *pro Rosc. Amer.* and *in Pisonem*.

When we look more closely into the technical structure of Æschines' speeches, we find him in choice of words tolerably pure, and showing traces of the culture which he often consciously displays. But he is less careful in his composition than Demosthenes. He is not strict about hiatus,² and the rythmical law of avoiding a crowd of short syllables seems quite strange to him, as may be seen at the very opening of the first speech. His periods are often long and clumsily constructed,³ but the sense is always clear. Though he constantly enlivens his argument by the usual figures, apostrophe, self-question, &c., and with very telling irony and sarcasm, his most brilliant side is certainly his narrative. I may quote, in addition to the passages already cited, the description of the grave Autolycus bringing down a message from the Areopagus, and how it was received.⁴ Æschines' ethos seems to me brighter

¹ §§ 190-91, a splendid passage.

² As, for example, in i. §§ 2-3, ii. 136 (which I select at random); examples are frequent.

³ e.g. i. §§ 173-5; ii. §§ 211-2; iii. §§ 149-50.

⁴ In *Timarch.*, §§ 81, sq.: τῆς γὰρ βουλῆς τῆς ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ πρόσδοον ποιουμένης πρὸς τὸν δῆμον κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ τοῦτον, ὃ οὗτος εἰρήκει περὶ τῶν οἰκίσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ Πυκνί, ἣν μὲν ὁ τὸν λόγον λέγων ἐκ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν Αὐτολύκος, καλῶς νῆ τὸν Δία τὸν Ὀλύμπιον καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ σεμνῶς καὶ ἀξίως ἐκείνου τοῦ συνεδρίου βεβιωκῶς· ἐπειδὴ δὲ πού προΐοντος τοῦ λόγου

and more natural than his pathos, though he affects the latter zealously, and occasionally, I think, exceeds the chastity observed by the better trained orators. The twelve Letters attributed to him are certainly both spurious and late compositions.

§ 546. As regards the history of the text, it may be observed that while complete editions, and editions of the *Timarchus*, are rare, many scholars have printed the other two together with the corresponding orations of Demosthenes, especially those for and against Ctesiphon. The older and better scholia were published from Paris MSS. by Bekker and Reiske, and then (with those on Isocrates) by W. Dindorf (Oxford, 1842). The age and value of the various MSS. are not yet well ascertained. These orations seem not to be contained either in the best MSS. of the lesser orators, such as the *Cripsiianus*, or in the best MSS. of Demosthenes, such as the Parisian Σ. But nevertheless the oldest of the Parisian copies (Coislin. F) is described by Montfaucon as a quarto of the tenth century, containing many other rhetorical works; and Bekker seems to lay even more stress on the Parisinus J. There are new recensions by A. Weidner (Berlin, 1877) and F. Franke (Teubner, 1863), but without commentary. Scheibe, Hamaker, and others, but above all Cobet, in his *Novæ Lectiones*, have contributed to the purifying of the text.

εἶπεν, ὅτι τὸ εἰσήγημα τὸ Τιμάρχου ἀποδοκιμάζει ἡ βουλή, 'καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐρημίας ταύτης καὶ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐν τῇ Πυκνῇ μὴ θαυμάσητε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ Τίμαρχος ἐμπειροτέρως ἔχει τῆς βουλῆς τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου,' ἀνεθορυβήσατε ὑμεῖς ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἔφατε τὸν Αὐτόλυκον ἀληθῆ λέγειν· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐμπειρον τούτων. ἀγνοήσας δ' ὑμῶν τὸν θόρυβον ὁ Αὐτόλυκος, μάλα σκυθρωπάσας καὶ διαλιπὼν εἶπεν· 'ἡμεῖς τοι, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ Ἀρεοπαγῖται οὔτε κατηγοροῦμεν Τιμάρχου οὔτε ἀπολογούμεθα, οὐ γὰρ ἡμῖν πάτριόν ἐστιν, ἔχομεν δὲ τοιαύτην τινὰ συγγνώμην Τιμάρχῳ· οὗτος ἴσως' ἔφη· φήθη ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ ταύτῃ μικρὸν ὑμῶν ἐκάστῳ ἀνάλωμα γίγνεσθαι·' καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ τῷ μικρῷ ἀναλώματι μείζων ἀπήντα παρ' ὑμῶν μετὰ γέλωτος θόρυβος. ὥς δ' ἐπεμνήσθη τῶν οἰκοπέδων καὶ τῶν λάκκων, οὐδ' ἀναλαβεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐδύνασθε, ἔνθα δὴ καὶ παρέρχεται Πύρρανδρος ἐπιτιμήσων ὑμῖν, καὶ ἤρετο τὸν δῆμον, εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνοντο γελώντας παρούσης τῆς βουλῆς τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου. ὑμεῖς δ' ἐξεβάλετε αὐτὸν ὑπολαβόντες· 'ἴσμεν, ὦ Πύρρανδρε, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ γελᾶν τούτων ἐναντίον· ἀλλ' οὕτως ἰσχυρόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ὥστε πάντων ἐπικρατεῖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λογισμῶν.'

§ 547. LYCURGUS, son of Lycophron, was a man of a very different type, and sprang from the family of the Eteoboutadæ, who filled an ancient and venerable priesthood of Poseidon, connected with the famous Erechtheion on the Acropolis. He was born about the beginning of the fourth century, and lived till near the time of Alexander's death.¹ When he felt he was dying, he had himself carried into the Council Chamber, to answer any accusations against his administration. For twelve years—probably 342–30 B.C.—he remained what we might call Chancellor of the Exchequer (ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς εἰσκήσεως) to the Athenian state. During this period he signalised himself by the highest probity, as well as by the highest ability in administering and increasing the revenues. He was, next to Pericles, the greatest adorer of the city of Athens, and to these two, together with Herodes Atticus, and Hadrian, may be ascribed almost all the public monuments of that celebrated city. He completed the theatre of Dionysus, and adorned it with statues of the great tragic masters. Moreover, he studied their memory more effectually by establishing state texts of their plays, to which actors were compelled to adhere. His other sumptuary and religious laws do not here concern us.² Though decidedly anti-Macedonian in policy, he cannot have been anxious to reserve all spare funds for war purposes, as he spent so much upon the adorning of the city, and the splendours of religious celebrations. Many additional details concerning him are preserved to us in the valuable and explicit *Life* (among the Ten orators). Its author (or his source) seems well acquainted with Lycurgus' family history, for he traces twelve generations of his descendants,

¹ He is spoken of in the *Life* of Hypereides as being dead before the affair of Harpalus, in which he would doubtless have been preferred to anyone else as public prosecutor.

² Grote is singularly curt about Lycurgus, so that the reader must consult either the very full *Life* or Thirlwall's sympathetic account, vol. vii. cap. 56. If the letter of Demosthenes be genuine, his children were imprisoned after his death, we know not why; and Demosthenes (above, pp. 339, sq.) wrote from exile to plead their cause. Some twenty years after his death (in 307 B.C.), public honours and a bronze statue were decreed to his memory.

who held the hereditary priesthood, apparently down to his own time. This would point to the second century A.D. as the date of the biography, probably to the reign of Hadrian, when the antiquities of Athens, and especially the works of Lycurgus, must have excited special interest.¹ He is said to have studied with both Plato and Isocrates, and to have composed with great difficulty and very slowly. His long but well-rounded periods produce this impression on the reader.

If we abstract from his artistic tastes, Lycurgus must have been a sort of Attic Cato, exceedingly unsparing, and even fierce in the prosecution of crime. Hyperides, however,² characterises him to be not inferior as a speaker to anyone in the city, and considered besides to be a moderate and fair man—a curious judgment in the face of his violent prosecutions. These are noted by most of his biographers, and of the fourteen speeches enumerated by Suidas (the *Life* says there were fifteen, perhaps including the *Letters*, as a single additional title) a considerable number were public accusations, in most of which—the *Life* says in all—he was successful. Concerning three only we are more closely informed. The first is that against Diphilus, whom he accused of having made a fortune by cutting away the supports of the shafts in the Laurian silver mines, which were specially guarded by law.³ In Hyperides' speech *for Euxenippus*, which mentions Olympias as the sole ruler of Dodona (and, therefore, not earlier than 330 B.C.), several recent sycophantic actions about the mines are mentioned as having been decided justly by the dicasts, and the panic about working them as having been thus allayed. This panic may have been the consequence of Ly-

¹ This *Life*, and the decree of Stratocles in honour of Lycurgus, appended to it, have been carefully and aptly commented on by Meier, in an appendix to Kiessling's *Lycurgus*. He shows many corruptions in the text, and some inaccuracies on the part of the author.

² *Pro Euxen.* col. xxvi.

³ This Diphilus' property produced when distributed a bonus to each citizen of 50 drachmæ, and, as it amounted to 160 talents, gives us under 20,000 as the number of recognised citizens at the time. But the date of the action is not known.

curgus' prosecution, which would be fixed at about 330 B.C. Next there is the attack, followed by a condemnation to death of Lysikles, who with Chares had been the Athenian general at Chæronea, and had escaped to Athens after the battle. Diodorus has preserved us a sentence of this speech, as a specimen of the *πικρία* of the orator in accusation.¹ We hear that the Theban general at the battle was also prosecuted; but we are not aware with what reason. Had Lycurgus' speech been preserved, it would doubtless have given us important details concerning the matter.

§ 548. The third and now only extant speech, that *against Leocrates*, is connected with the same crisis, and is an attack made eight years after on this person, who in the panic after Chæronea had escaped into a ship through a little gate in the sea-wall at Munychia, and fled to Rhodes, where he brought so exaggerated an account of the disaster that the merchant ships were afraid to sail for the Peiræus. Leocrates, when he found out that his panic had been premature, was afraid to return in the face of the stern edict denouncing all deserters from the city during the crisis, but came to Megara, from which he managed to dispose of his Athenian property. Six years later, imagining, no doubt, that the affair was forgotten, he returned, and seems to have been unmolested for some time, for Lycurgus speaks of eight years having elapsed since the defeat when his accusation was made (330 B.C.). It is likely that Æschines is alluding to this trial² when he mentions that a man who escaped to Rhodes after Chæronea had just been tried for cowardice, and had only escaped by the votes of the jury being equally divided. The speech is one of great dignity, but also of great bitterness, and treats with extreme severity the mere cowardice of the defendant, for no graver crime is alleged against him.

¹ Ἑσπρᾶτῆγεις, ὦ Λύσικλες, καὶ χιλίων μὲν πολιτῶν τετελευτηκότων, δισχιλίων δὲ αἰχμαλάτων γεγόνότων, τροπαίου δὲ κατὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔστη-κότος. τῆς δ' Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσης δουλευούσης, καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων γεγενημένων σοῦ ἡγουμένου καὶ στρατηγοῦντος. τολμᾶς ζῆν καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ὄραν, καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐμβάλλειν, ὑπόμνημα γεγούως αἰσχύνῃς καὶ οὐνείδους τῇ πατρίδι; (Diod. xvi. 18).

² *In Ctes.* § 252.

The passionate conclusion is exceptional, and foreign to the traditions of Attic eloquence. Lycurgus follows the usual scheme of first establishing his case, and then refuting the expected replies of the defendant. But he varies it by sundry digressions upon older history, and by many long and interesting quotations from the poets, such as Tyrtæus and Euripides (*Erechtheus*), which are not so effective in their place as valuable to modern students. Apart from these quotations, the finest and most impressive passage is the narrative of the panic at Athens after Chæronea, a moment so splendidly painted by Demosthenes, and which Hypereides, we are told, also attempted, with less success.¹ Though this passage admits several cases of hiatus, its general style, and the careful periods of the whole speech, make the report credible that Lycurgus studied with Isocrates. His political career was not, however, commenced till after the death of his master, or at least he was not distinguished at the time that Isocrates boasts of his pupils. That he was in his youth a pupil of Plato is also asserted in his *Life*, but I do not think it probable.

§ 549. We have no special treatment of this orator by the rhetoricians, nor have any scholia survived. Our MSS. of his

¹ §§ 39-41 : *καίτοι κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους, ὧ ἄνδρες, τίς οὐκ ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἠλέησεν, οὐ μόνον πολίτης ἀλλὰ καὶ ξένος ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν χρόνοις ἐπιδεδημηκώς ; τίς δ' ἦν οὕτως ἢ μισόδημος τότε ἢ μισαθῆναιος, ὅστις ἐδυνήθη ἂν ἄτακτον αὐτὸν ὑπομεῖναι ἰδεῖν, ἥνίκα ἢ μὲν ἦττα καὶ τὸ γεγονός πάθος τῷ δήμῳ προσηγγέλλετο, ὀρθὴ δὲ ἦν ἡ πόλις ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, αἱ δ' ἐλπίδες τῆς σωτηρίας τῷ δήμῳ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ πεντήκοντα ἔτη γεγονόσι καθείστηκεσαν, ὁρᾶν δ' ἦν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν θυρῶν γυναῖκας ἐλευθέρας περιφόβους κατεπτηχυίας καὶ πυνθανομένας εἰ ζῶσι, τὰς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἀνδρός, τὰς δ' ὑπὲρ πατρός, τὰς δ' ὑπὲρ ἀδελφῶν, ἀναξίως αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως ὀρωμένας, τῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν τοὺς τοῖς σώμασιν ἀπειρηκότες καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τοῦ στρατεύεσθαι ἀφειμένους ἰδεῖν ἦν καθ' ὅλην τὴν πόλιν τότε ἐπὶ γήρως ὁδῷ περιφθειρομένους, διπλᾷ τὰ ἱμάτια ἐμπεπορημένους ; πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δεινῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν γινομένων, καὶ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ μέγιστα ἡτυχηκότων, μάλιστ' ἂν τις ἤλγησε καὶ ἐδάκρυσεν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῆς πόλεως συμφοραῖς, ἥνιχ' ὁρᾶν ἦν τὸν δῆμον ψηφισάμενον τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐλευθέρους, τοὺς δὲ ξένους Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς δ' ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους· ὅς πρότερον ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτόχθων εἶναι καὶ ἐλεύθερος ἐσεμνύνετο.*

extant speech are the same as those of the other lesser orators, or nearly so, and what has been said on the MSS. of Antiphon will apply here. The same holds good of collected editions of this and the other orators, except that F. Blass has not yet re-edited him in the Teubner series, the present text being that of C. Scheibe (1859). The simple speech was given (with a Latin version) by Melanchthon (1545), and by many others, including Coraes (1826), Blume (1828), Maetzner (1836), Jenicke, with German translation (1856). A. Nicolai has published a good school edition (Berlin, 1875), and there are a few special essays, such as G. Kiessling's *Fragmenta Lycurgæ* (Halle, 1847), Jenicke's *Symb. crit. in Lycurg. Leocratem* (Leipzig, 1848), Heinrich's *Schedæ Lycurgæ* (Bonn, 1850), Halm, in *Munich Abhandl.* iii. p. 123, &c. There are many German translations. The Fragments collected by Kiessling do not give us much in addition to the extant speech. They are generally quotations of curious words used at Athens, especially in sacred rites, and in enumerating the expenses of the state. A few interesting sentences are cited in Latin paraphrase as illustrating rhetorical figures in the work of Rutilius Lupus.¹

§ 550. Perhaps the most brilliant of all Demosthenes' contemporaries was HYPEREIDES, son of Glaukippos, of the deme Kollytus, who was all his life a politician and a consistent leader in the anti-Macedonian party. He is generally assumed in former histories to have been a contemporary of Lycurgus, and thus older than Demosthenes, chiefly because in the *Life* he is said to have come forward and contributed a trireme for himself and one for his son, 'when Philip was preparing to sail against Eubœa.' If this refer to the events of 358 B.C., it will throw back the date of his birth at least as far as that of Demosthenes. But everything else we know of the orator points to his being a much younger contemporary of Demosthenes, especially the passage in his accusation in which he reproaches Demosthenes, at his advanced age, of requiring

¹ Cf. Kiessling, pp. 118, sq.

censure and correction from younger politicians.¹ If the statement of the *Life* be at all trustworthy, I suppose we must apply it to the crisis of the campaign of Tamynæ (349 B.C.), when we may conceive that Hypereides came forward as a young man, and somewhat boastfully offered a trireme for himself and for his infant son (τοῦ παιδός). When Demosthenes in the *Meidianā* enumerates the generous offers of supplying triremes by various citizens, it is strange that this occasion of paying a compliment to a young and brilliant adherent should be lost. Hence I believe that more probably Hypereides' first political act, when a very young man, was the prosecution of Philocrates, and that he may not have been born till about 366 B.C. He would thus be but little over forty when accusing the veteran Demosthenes, as the passage above cited clearly implies. His prosecutions of Aristophon and of Diopeithes need not have been before 345 B.C., though he mentions them before Philocrates' case, apparently because he here only was successful, and he wishes to dwell on it ;² Diopeithes especially was not prominent till after that date. The prosecution of Autocles, if occurring just after that person's known *σπαραγγία*, would bring us up to 360-59, but there is no definite evidence that this was the occasion, and I cannot accept it in the face of the general probabilities for the later age of Hypereides.³ It was through his prosecution that Philocrates was condemned (343 B.C.). During the Byzantine campaign (340 B.C.) he also performed an expensive *Choregia* at home, though himself absent as trierarch. He was moreover employed on an embassy to Rhodes, but at what date is unknown. He appears to have proposed the public crowning of Demosthenes after the Athenian successes in the Hellespont, and to have

¹ Col. xviii. : οὐκ αἰσχύνει νυνὶ τηλικούτος ὢν ὑπὸ μεираκίων κρινόμενος περὶ δωροδοκίας ; καίτοι ἔδει τουναντίον ὑφ' ἡμῶν παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς νεωτέρους τῶν ῥητόρων κ.τ.λ. νῦν δὲ τουναντίον οἱ νέοι τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἐξήκοντα ἔτη σωφρονίζουσιν.

² In *Euxen.* col. xxxviii-ix.

³ In a fragment (58, Ed. Blass) he speaks of Socrates being condemned by our ancestors (οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν). Would he say this in 359 B.C., when all the elderly people remembered Socrates' trial ?

aided him in his celebrated embassy to Thebes before the battle of Chæronea. When the news came in, he was very active in his proposals to enfranchise slaves, restore the disfranchised, and put the city in a state of defence by sending down everything unnecessary to the Peiræus. For these proposals he was prosecuted under the *γραφὴ παρανόμων*, but triumphantly acquitted. His extradition was demanded by Alexander after the conquest of Thebes, but then successfully resisted. He is said, nevertheless, to have proposed honours for the supposed poisoner of the king. As is well known, he was the public accuser of his old colleague, Demosthenes, in the affair of Harpalus, and procured his conviction. Nevertheless, he was again united with him in the war against Antipater, and was chosen to deliver the funeral harangue over Leosthenes and his brave soldiers (322 B.C.). When Antipater won the day at Krannon, his extradition was again demanded, together with that of Demosthenes. He fled to Ægina, from whence, perhaps from the very temple of Poseidon, he was dragged by Archias, and was put to death, after having his tongue cut out, by Antipater, either at Cleonæ or at Corinth.¹ There was a monument to him at Athens, whither, it was said, his body, at first cast out in dishonour, was secretly conveyed by his friends. His son Glaukippus was afterwards known as a rhetor and speech-writer.

In character Hypereides is said to have been much under the influence of women, and fond of luxuries, especially of fish,² but otherwise both respectable and very talented. He is called a pupil of Isocrates, like Lycurgus, but the style of his extant speeches enables us decidedly to contradict it. In-

¹ 9th of Pyanepsion, Ol. 114; 3.

² Cf. the fragment of Timocles' comedy, called *Δήλος* (Athen. viii. p. 341; or Meineke, *Frag. Com.* iii. 591), in which, after charging Demosthenes and others with taking money from Harpalus :

A. *ὁ τ' ἐν λόγοισι δεινὸς Ὑπερίδης ἔχει;*

B. *τοὺς ἰχθυόπῳλας οὗτος ἡμῖν πλουτιεῖ,*

ὀψοφάγος ὥστε τοὺς λάρους εἶναι Σύρους.

sc. such a fish-eater that cormorants (compared with him) are Syrians (who never ate fish). Cf. also the same poet's *Icarians* (Meineke, iii. p. 592).

deed, Dionysius remarks that his simplicity and grace remind us rather of Lysias. As to Plato having taught him, nothing is more improbable. Later writers seem to think, because all ambitious and rising young men, of whatever politics, attended the suggestive conversations of Socrates in the previous century, that Plato's school occupied a similar position. Such an inference is obviously false, and against all our evidence, both internal and external. It is remarkable that, though a rich man, Hypereides was a speech-writer, as we may see from his *Defence of Lycophron*, which is composed in this man's person. But, instead of assuming, as is generally done, that his speech-writing was his earliest work, I imagine him to have come forward quite suddenly as a brilliant and rich young man, and to have taken a leading part in politics from the year 343 onward, when his arraignment of Philocrates brought him into notice. His extravagant habits and dissolute life having probably impaired his fortune, he turned his great talents to making money by speech-writing. Thus all his private speeches would date after Chæroneæ. But the other extant works chance to be personal harangues, two of them, doubtless, the most well known he ever delivered, though probably not the happiest—I mean the indictment of Demosthenes and the funeral oration over Leosthenes. This last must, however, be severed distinctly from the rest as an *epidictic* performance, while the rest are court speeches.

§ 551. The accusation of Demosthenes naturally holds the chief place, though it is not the earliest. When first discovered, it was thought that new light would be thrown on the relation of Demosthenes to Harpalus, but, so far as we can judge, in spite of the mutilations and losses at both ends of the speech, no new evidence was adduced, but the report of the Areopagus taken as sufficient guarantee for the facts. Grote has examined the case, with this evidence, partly at least, before him, and considers that Hypereides' speech tends strongly to prove that the real charge against Demosthenes was not personal corruptness but political unpopularity. The opening speech in the prosecution was made by Stratocles, upon whom the speaker of Deinarchus' extant speech seems to

have followed, and Hypereides did not therefore occupy the leading place, as we should have expected from all our notices. I repeat (as it has not been observed) that Hypereides distinctly classes himself with the younger generation, and upbraids Demosthenes, that when past sixty he should require correction from far younger men. He also notes¹ how universally and publicly the political men of the day made indirect profits by their political power. This, he says, is conceded. The only offence resented was the taking of bribes *against the interests of the state*. Taking bribes was *per se* no crime whatever, and the orator speaks of Demosthenes having amassed great wealth in this way. Such was the political morality of the day.²

The *defence of Lycophron* for immoral conduct, and for publicly tampering with the loyalty of a bride to her husband, when in command at Lemnos, is on a case which we cannot fully understand. The accuser was Lycurgus, or perhaps Ariston, whom Lycurgus supported. Schäfer dates the speech about Ol. 107, 4. In my opinion it cannot be so early. This oration is clear and vigorous, and full of very clever, though evidently stock arguments, against the attacks of the prosecutor.³ It is chiefly based upon *εἰκότα*, such as the defendant's good character and the absurdity of his addressing in such a way a bride at a marriage procession. The style is easy and clear, and reminds one (as Hypereides constantly does) of Lysias.

§ 552. The *defence of Euxenippus* is more interesting, being spoken by the orator himself in support of this person, who was attacked by Polyeuctus for fraud. The accused had been

¹ Col. xxi. : πολλὰ ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ δίδετε ἐκόντες τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ τοῖς ῥήτορσιν ὠφελείσθαι—οὐ τῶν νόμων αὐτοῖς δεδωκότων τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑμετέρας πραότητος καὶ φιλανθρωπίας—ἐν μόνον παραφυλάττοντες, ὅπως δι' ὑμῶν καὶ μὴ καθ' ὑμῶν ἔσται τὸ λαμβανόμενον. This is a most important passage.

² The text of both this and the next oration is so mutilated that we cannot tell whether a vital part of the argument is not lost, and Cobet has even abandoned the task of editing them as idle.

³ Cf. col. ix., which meets such an argument as that of Æschines in *Ctes.*, 292-3.

directed by the Assembly to sleep in the temple of Æsculapius, in order that by his dreams he might discover whether a certain disputed territory near Oropus was the god's property or not. In this latter case it was to be distributed among two tribes, who claimed compensation if they were deprived of it. The accuser, who here again was supported by Lycurgus, charged Euxenippus with making a false report of his dream. The form of action chosen was an *εἰσαγγελία*, to which Hypereides objects *in limine*, as applicable only to politicians or prominent public men, whereas Euxenippus was an elderly and unobtrusive private person. The proper test, he urges, of the dream was to enquire at Delphi. The orator gives us a few details of his public accusations up to the date of the speech, when Olympias was sovereign of Dodona (circ. 330 B.C.), and only mentions three. This points to the late rise of Hypereides as an orator. He gives some interesting details ¹ of the great profits made in the mines, and of the disgraceful attempts of sycophants to plunder the wealth made by individuals and distribute it among the people, as Lycurgus had once done. In this speech also there is great simplicity and directness of argument, with very little ornament and no pathos, but much lively ethos in analysing the motives of the accuser.

§ 553. The *Funeral oration*, delivered in 322 B.C., over Leosthenes and the soldiers who fell in the earlier part of the Lamian war, is a very different kind of work, and was highly admired by the ancients. Hypereides here abandons his short, plain, direct style, and undertakes an epideictic display upon the model long established for such purposes. A Greek orator would no more have ventured to innovate on such an occasion than our preachers would in the general form of their sermons—I mean in attaching them to a text, with opening and concluding prayers, and in many other traditional ways of arguing and exhorting which will occur to any reader. This epitaphios, then, is on the model fixed by Gorgias, and followed by Thucydides and Plato, as well as by the orators whose works have not survived. We have in the remains of Lysias and Demosthenes suspicious examples of the same description.

¹ Col. xliii. sq.

Hypereides so affects the old style here that he even balances his periods, and alliterates with antithesis quite in the manner of Gorgias or Agathon (in Plato's *Symposium*). The picture of Leosthenes' reception by the famous dead when he appears in Hades strikes us as curious and un-Periclean, but is very interesting as a specimen of the style.¹ Stobæus has preserved us a fine fragment from the epilogue missing in the papyrus.

§ 554. We have more than two hundred fragments (collected by Kiessling, and also commented on in Blass' text) and sixty-five titles of his speeches remaining, but little of literary value. His free use of colloquial words was censured by the purists. A good deal of the argument of the *Δηλιακός* is preserved, which evidently treated of the mythical history of the island, and the adventures of Leto before the birth of Apollo, at considerable length. It seems to me that it was probably on this model that Callimachus constructed his hymn to the Delian Apollo (above, Vol. I. p. 137). The speech was delivered about 340 B.C., when the orator was appointed instead of Æschines, but we wonder that the argument does not show more traces of political reasoning. His defence of Phryne, and the anecdotes of his tear-

¹ Col. xiii. 10-xiv. 28 : ἐν ἅδου δὲ λογίσασθαι ἄξιον τίνες οἱ τὸν ἡγεμόνα δεξιωσόμενοι τὸν τούτων. ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν οἰόμεθα φοιτᾶν Λεωσθένη δεξιουμένους καὶ θαυμάζοντας τῶν ἡμιθέων καλουμένων τοὺς ἐπὶ τροίαν στρατεύσαντας, ὧν οὗτος ἀδελφὰς πράξεις ἐνστησάμενος τοσοῦτον διήνεγκεν, ὥστε οἱ μὲν μετὰ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος μίαν πόλιν εἶλον, ὃ δὲ μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος μόνης πᾶσαν τὴν τῆς Εὐρώπης καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας ἄρχουσαν δύναμιν ἐταπείνωσεν. κακῆνοι μὲν ἔνεκα μιᾶς γυναικὸς ὑβρισθείσης ἤμυναν, ὃ δὲ πασῶν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων τὰς ἐπιφερομένας ὕβρεις ἐκώλυσεν μετὰ τῶν συνθαπτομένων νῦν αὐτῷ ἀνδρῶν, τῶν μετ' ἐκείνους μὲν γεγεννημένων, ἄξια δὲ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀρετῆς διαπεπραγμένων. λέγω δὴ τοὺς περὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἱ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθερώσαντες ἔντιμον μὲν τὴν πατρίδα κατέστησαν, ἔνδοξον δὲ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἐποίησαν, ὧν οὗτος τοσοῦτον ὑπέρεσχεν ἀνδρεία καὶ φρονήσει, ὥσαν οἱ μὲν ἐπελθοῦσαν τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων δύναμιν ἡμύναντο—ὃ δὲ μὴδ' ἐπελθεῖν ἐποίησεν. κακῆνοι μὲν ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐπίδον ἀγωνιζόμενους, οὗτος δὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περιεγένετο τῶν ἀντιπάλων. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίαν τῷ δήμῳ βεβαιότατα ἐνδείξαμένους, λέγω δὲ Ἀρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα, οὐδένas οὕτως αὐτοῖς οἰκείους οὐδὲ πιστοτέρους ὑμῖν εἶναι νομίζειν ὥς Λεωσθένη καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνῳ συναγωνισαμένους, οὐδ' ἐτέροις ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τούτοις πλησιάζειαν ἐν Αἴδου.

ing open her dress to show her beauty to the judges, are well known. The speech was genuine, but the embellishments apocryphal, and probably falsely inferred from some appeal or suggestion.

The style of Hypereides is that of a newer school than Demosthenes'—of the school of Menander and the new comedy, to whom long periods and elaborate structure seemed tedious, and who affected short and terse statement, clear and epigrammatic points, smart raillery, and an easy and careless tone even in serious debate. Hence the critics, such as Quintilian, think him more suited to slight subjects; and we feel how artificial to him are the periods of his state sermon on the dead—a mere rhetorical *tour de force*. But of his immediate successors some thought him better than Demosthenes—no doubt he was pleasanter reading—a Lysias with all the accumulated art and experience of the completed Attic eloquence. With all this aristocratic gaiety and lightness of style, the man was no trifle. His life and acts prove him an energetic, earnest, patriotic citizen, and he escaped the dark shadows which hang about the later years of Demosthenes. The judgments of Dionysius, Longinus, Hermogenes, and others can now be read in Blass' preface to the Teubner text. The writer on *the Sublime* is particularly full and appreciative in bringing out the contrast between the sour, sombre, mighty Demosthenes and the peaceful, easy, but seldom impressive Hypereides.

§ 555. *Bibliographical.* The history of his MSS. is peculiarly interesting. A splendid codex, covered with scholia, existed in the library of Matthias Corvinus, king of Hungary, after the invention of printing, but was unfortunately destroyed or lost in the capture of Buda-Pesth by the Turks. Since then the orator was but a name in the scholia or lexica, such as Harporation's,¹ till the discovery of the four orations piecemeal in papyri bought by Mr. Harris Warden and Mr. Stobart at Thebes, in Egypt, about the year 1850. The papyrus containing the *epitaphios* is later and inferior to that which con-

¹ It is very curious to read Kiessling's careful monograph (appended to his *Lycurgus*, Halle, 1847), before the recovery of our text.

tains the rest, and all were much mutilated by the Arabs, who cut them in pieces to sell them by separate bargains. The documents have been facsimiled in Babington's editions, and to this scholar we owe more than to anyone else in the restoration of the text. The discovery of course excited great interest, and we now have many good texts by Cobet, Blass (Teubner), &c., as well as Babington's. The papyri seem to date somewhere between the second century B.C. and the second century A.D., and are therefore the oldest Greek MSS. we possess. Unfortunately the writing is careless, and the phonetic spelling of an Egyptian with a provincial and debased pronunciation has introduced many absurd forms. Thus Cobet has found a fine field for his splendid powers of emendation, especially in the Epitaphios.

§ 556. DEINARCHUS, the last of the ten orators, not in point of age, but rather in the date of his activity, was a Corinthian, the son of Sostratus, who settled at Athens, and was intimate with Theophrastus and Demetrius Phalereus. Dionysius computes him to have been born in 361 B.C., for the vague reason that he must have been seventy when he calls himself 'an old man' in 292 B.C. He does not seem to have produced political speeches earlier than the date of the affair of Harpalus, but in this trial, and for a series of years later, he composed orations, chiefly political, for citizens, being himself merely a resident alien, and therefore excluded from public debates. Dionysius thinks he may have begun speech-writing in the law courts as early as 336 B.C., when he was twenty-six years old. After the death and exile of the greater orators, he occupied the first place for about fifteen years, when he was implicated in the disturbances between Antigonus, Demetrius, and Cassander, and retired to Chalcis (307 B.C.), where he remained till the year 292 B.C., in which his friends obtained his return. He then, in old age, pleaded a personal action for the first time against his Athenian host Proxenus—perhaps merely his *πρόξερος*, or patron among the citizens—for refusing, with treacherous intent, to help him in recovering his property. From this speech even the ancients had learned all they knew of his personal history. Suidas says he was killed at the instigation of Polysperchon.

There is fortunately a special tract extant by Dionysius, which examines the speeches attributed to him by the test of chronology, and rejects many, enumerating sixty as genuine, most of them by their opening words. This is the case with the three extant orations, that against Demosthenes, against Aristogeiton, and against Philokles, all written for accusers in the prosecutions about the affair of Harpalus.¹

§ 557. The long and elaborate *attack on Demosthenes* gives us pretty fully the case made against the orator. It agrees perfectly with the fragments of Hypereides' indictment in avoiding all statement of details. But this is here fully justified by appealing to the challenge of the accused to refer the matter to the Arcopagus, by whose decision as to the facts

¹ This tract of Dionysius is an excellent specimen of his literary criticism, and makes me very slow to question his judgments in such matters. He begins by saying how little accurate information could be had about this orator, whom he had passed over when treating of the pioneers and perfecters of eloquence. Neither Callimachus nor the Pergamene grammarians knew anything clearly about him, or his genuine work. He quotes Demetrius Magnes in illustration of this inaccuracy. He then sketches the orator's life, chiefly from his own words in the speech against Proxenus, compared with the Histories of Philochorus on the contemporary events, and quotes the title of this personal speech, with extracts from Philochorus. From these materials he determines his age approximately, and thus establishes a canon for rejecting all speeches bearing internal evidence of being composed before the orator was twenty-five (viz. 336 B.C.), or during his exile (307-292 B.C.). There follow (caps. 5-6) excellent remarks on his style, which is shown to have been eclectic and imitative, without uniformity. But the imitations, which were evidently very good, must (he says) be tested by close comparison with his models, just as copies were compared with the originals of Pheidias, Apelles, or Polycleitus. They would then be found laboured and artificial in comparison with the older masters. Similar were the attempts to imitate Plato, Thucydides, Hypereides (by the Rhodian school), and Demosthenes. He proceeds to give (c. 9) an invaluable list of all the archons from the orator's birth to his last speech, and then classifies the extant speeches into genuine public, spurious public, genuine private, and spurious private. The spurious are separated into three classes: those too early for the orator, those evidently composed during his exile, and lastly those too watery and frigid in style. Then he vindicates for Demosthenes, and adjudicates from Deinarchus, the speech in reply to Εὐετος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀνόματος. Dionysius' tract is unfortunately mutilated towards the close.

he was willing to abide. The Areopagus had spent months in the investigation, and ultimately sent down not only the names of the culprits, but the exact amounts they had received. According to the ordinary procedure of that court, the details of the evidence were not given. I suppose a re-statement of them was forbidden in the final trial before a dicastery of five hundred, which had really only to assess the punishment. This assessment was made according to the amount of public injury supposed to be done by the accused, and according to his general character. Hence both Hypereides and Deinarchus insist upon this side of the case only, especially as Demosthenes had openly declared that he would acquiesce in the finding of the Areopagus. Deinarchus insists, like Hypereides, on the enormous wealth gained from politics by Demosthenes, which he sets down at 150 talents; and all this was not invested in real property, but kept out of the reach of direct taxation.

The imperfect oration *against Aristogeiton* is about an abandoned and worthless citizen, who had only obtained twenty minæ of the plunder, but the evidence against him is the same as that against Demosthenes; and if there were any proof that Demosthenes was associated with such a person in politics, it would be a grave corroboration of the charges now disbelieved on the ground of his general respectability.

§ 558. The third speech is *against Philokles*, a man of position and importance, who was in charge of the Peiræus, and, though he had undertaken not to admit Harpalus, had done so, but only in a single ship. This attack is accordingly different in tone from that on Aristogeiton, and does not seek to prove the case from the general bad character of the accused, but rather to throw suspicion on all his former respectability, owing to the present transaction. None of the three speeches are very interesting, and clearly show us the decay of Greek eloquence. As Dionysius says in his careful critique, he was neither the discoverer of a new style, like Lysias or Isocrates, nor the perfecter of one already known, like Demosthenes and Hypereides.¹ In fact,

¹ The received reading that he had no feature either common to the rest (*κοινόν*), or peculiar to himself (*ἴδιον*), appears to me nonsense, and should be rejected for *καινόν*—there was nothing in him either new or peculiar (cf.

his style was really made up in the way vulgarly supposed to be Demosthenes'—the eclectic method of bringing together the features of all the previous orators. He specially imitated Demosthenes, so that he was called the *rustic* as well as the *gingerbread* (*κρίθιρος*) Demosthenes. Nevertheless, the Roman rhetors, who were able to compare him with still later Greek orators, found him full of good qualities which they lacked. He was, in fact, brought up among the great traditions of the Attic courts and free assembly, and the reflection of this greatness threw its glory over the orator who outlived its decadence. The extant speeches are not faulty, but not striking; they are wanting in fire, in originality, in vivacity, in power, though the writer knows all the figures of thought and diction used by the great masters, and even overdoes the application of them. The MSS. are the same as those of Antiphon. The best special editions are Maetznér's and Blass'.

§ 559. A few words must be said in conclusion on the contemporary orators of repute, whose works have only reached us through uncertain or fragmentary tradition. Thus the defence attributed to Demades, which formed one of a collection of fourteen orations under his name, is certainly spurious, as this very remarkable speaker, whose striking extemporaneous aphorisms were long remembered and quoted, did not compose written speeches. The same was the case with Phokion, whose sententious addresses to the people were thought so effective by Demosthenes. Both Demades and Phokion were more thoroughly than Æschines representatives of the extempore school, which can only exist when supported by extraordinary natural gifts or great weight of character. But of Hegesippus, a contemporary and supporter of Demosthenes, we seem to have an oration—that *on Halonnesus*, which Dionysius notices as *Lysian* in style, and unlike

Dionys. *in Deinarch.* c. 5). I do not think it permissible to translate, 'for he has no *general complexion*, or *uniformity of style*,' though Dionysius says this in the immediate sequel—that he is often like Lysias, again like Hypereides, and again like Demosthenes, and he then refers to special speeches to illustrate this. But to uniformity of style Dionysius applies the term *ὁμοειδής* or *ὅμοιος*.

the other works of Demosthenes. Nevertheless, he did not doubt its genuineness. There is also the speech *about the treaty with Alexander*, and there are no doubt, among the collection in our MSS. of Lysias and Demosthenes, a good many court speeches by obscurer contemporaries, which give us a valuable insight into the average standard of Attic eloquence as compared with that of the acknowledged masters. As regards the speech *on Halonnesus*, it was first shown by Vömel in the last generation to be the work of Hegesippus, a partisan of Demosthenes, who had been sent to Macedonia to demand back, with other territory, the island of Halonnesus. On his return (342 B.C.) he gave an account of his negotiations, and of the plans of Philip, which he had carefully studied. The style of the speech is clear and careful, archaic in its simplicity, and yet strong enough to persuade Dionysius of its genuineness. There are still critics disposed to agree with him, but the majority follow Vömel's decision.

§ 560. DEMETRIUS of Phaleron hardly belongs to the classical period, being both in life and doctrine the representative of the passage of letters from Athens to Alexandria. The favourable judgments on his writings arose chiefly, I fancy, from the personal popularity of the man. He was a leading figure in the history of decaying Athens, brought up in contact with Demosthenes, Hypereides and Aristotle; the pupil of Theophrastus, and friend of Menander. He was practically ruler of Athens for ten years (317-307 B.C.), and he gave an account of his stewardship in a special memoir. But he seems to have written memoirs about everything. After being honoured with 360 statues by the grateful Athenians, they condemned him to death when a stronger Demetrius (Poliorketes) invaded Athens. But he found a pleasant refuge with the first Ptolemy, whom he helped and advised in the founding of the university system (if I may so call it) of Alexandria. The second Ptolemy banished him to Upper Egypt, where he died of the bite of a serpent (283 B.C.). The immense and various catalogue of his works shows that polymath tendency which the Alexandrian grammarians seem to have adopted from the Peri-

patetic school. Having suffered in his life the change from honour to contempt with commonalties and with kings, he has met the same destiny—that usual with second-rate respectability—at the hands of changing centuries. Admired and praised in his day for fruitfulness, for subtlety, and for elegance, he was presently and permanently forgotten.

CHAPTER XIII.

ARISTOTLE.

§ 561. THE last great name, with which the classical literature of Greece may be said to close, is that of Aristotle, and he—great in so many directions—is least of all a literary man. To us he is such only as a literary critic, but even to the ancients, who possessed his dialogues, and who praise the elegance of their form, Aristotle's literary performances were as nothing in comparison to his scientific works. And with him, too, we find, perhaps first among the Greeks, perhaps second to Heracleitus only, the feeling that literature and science are distinct, and that the seeker after accurate knowledge need not adorn his researches with the graces of eloquence or of poetry. Nay he even regarded literature, as such, from a purely scientific point of view, and the works which take their place in this history are his investigation of the nature and conditions of epic and tragic poetry, and of the psychological groundwork of eloquence. Even his *Politics*, though he does not enter upon a criticism of historiography, seem (together with his lost *πολιτεῖαι*) a distinct protest against the Isocratic principle of confusing the narrative of events with rhetorical display, and a reassertion of the style of the bald chronicle with a philosophical rearrangement of facts under logical classes. Thus the numerous and monumental scientific treatises of Aristotle have not the same claim which the dialogues of Plato have to be treated in this book, and we will refer the student who desires to know the deeper side of the man to the library of works on his philosophy, of which Zeller's volume,¹ being the newest

¹ *Philosophie der Griechen*, II Th. 2te Abth., 3rd edition, Leipzig, 1879. This volume is being translated, as the others have been, but as yet is not accessible in English.

as well as the ablest, may be regarded as giving an excellent summary.

The various lives still extant of Aristotle are very disappointing, when we consider the number of details they record. The fullest is that of Diogenes Laertius, which gives us also the text of his will, and the catalogue of his works ; then there is the epistle to Ammæus of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which is mainly devoted to proving that the rhetoric of Demosthenes was developed anterior to Aristotle's teaching, and therefore independent of it. There are also several versions of a life attributed to Philoponus, first printed in the *Aristotle* of Aldus. These materials are well worked up for English readers by Sir A. Grant and by Grote, in their respective works on Aristotle.

The life of the philosopher coincides very curiously with that of his great contemporary, Demosthenes : they were born in the same year, and died in the same year. But in all else the circumstances of their career were widely different. Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. at Stageira in the Chalkidike—a region then thickly settled with flourishing Hellenic towns. His father, Nikomachus, was personal physician and friend of the Macedonian king Amyntas. His mother, Phæstis, may have been of Eubœan origin, for we hear of the family owning a house at Chalkis, to which the philosopher retired towards the close of his life. It is probable that Nikomachus lived with his royal friend, and that Aristotle was brought up about the Macedonian court ; but we know nothing of his education beyond the fact that his parents died early, and that a family friend, Proxenus of Atarneus, took charge of him ; a kindness which Aristotle repaid by adopting Nikanor, Proxenus' son, and afterwards also giving him his daughter in marriage. We hear that Aristotle had brothers and sisters, but they are as obscure as the brothers and sisters of Kant or Des Cartes.

In his eighteenth year, being apparently a young man of good fortune, and, as some said, even of luxurious and dissolute habits, he came to Athens, and joined the school of Plato (367–6 B.C.). Of this early period at Athens we hear nothing but occasional bits of scandal circulated by Epicurus, Timæus, and

other of his opponents in the school of Isocrates.¹ These stories have found little credence in the face of the enormous extent and seriousness of his scientific labours. It is not even likely that he ever increased his means by practising as a physician. There can be no doubt that his independent mind gradually led him to question his master's theories, and thus to estrange him from the Platonic school ; but the anecdotes of his self-assertion and rudeness to the aged Plato are contradicted by the unfeigned respect with which he speaks of him in the first book of the *Nicom. Ethics*,² and in the extant fragment of his elegy on Eudemus. He is said also to have edited and imitated several Platonic dialogues. Indeed, for twenty years, up to Plato's death, he seems never to have abandoned the Platonic school, though he openly questioned the doctrine of Ideas. Of course the influence of Plato, during these twenty years, on the best part of his life can hardly be overrated, and yet in two essential features he made little impress on his pupil—first in the matter of style ; secondly, in the deductive character of his reasoning. Perhaps the influence of Plato on the former appears less than it really was, because we have lost all the early works written by Aristotle during his Platonic years³—the dialogues which were praised for their style, and certain lectures on rhetoric, chiefly directed against Isocrates, whose shallowness seems to have been very distasteful to Aristotle. Indeed, both Cicero and Quintilian quote his adaptation of a line *αἰσχρὸν σωπαῖν, Ἰσokraτηρ ἔ' ἔαν λέγειν*. Nevertheless, in his later and more philosophical rhetoric he quotes no one oftener, as affording good examples, than Isocrates.

§ 562. On the death of Plato, he went (in his thirty-seventh year) with Xenocrates to Hermias, tyrant of Atarneus and

¹ Cf. Müller's *FHG.* i. pp. 209–11 (*Timai Fragg.* 70–6).

² iv. § 1.

³ I cannot agree with Susemihl (note 533 to his translation of the *Politics*, vol. ii. p. 140) that these dialogues were not composed till after 335 B.C., when Aristotle returned to Athens. In the face of the enormous catalogue of his works, such a theory seems to me untenable, not to speak of the marked contrast of style between the early and the later compositions.

Assos, who was himself a pupil of Plato. When, after three years, this Hermeias was treacherously put to death by the Persians, Aristotle settled at Mitylene, and took Pythias, a sister or niece of Hermias, to wife. To this Hermias he dedicated a statue at Delphi, and also addressed him in a still extant lyric poem. In 343-2 B.C. he undertook, at Philip's request, the education of Alexander the Great, now a boy thirteen years old. But unfortunately we know nothing of this interesting relation, except that two tracts of the philosopher, *περὶ βασιλείας* and *ὑπὲρ ἀποίκων* (or *ἀποικίων*), were addressed to Alexander; but I do not fancy that Alexander's large ideas were based upon them. Indeed, we know certainly that Aristotle's Hellenism, which is so manifest in the *Politics*, was distinctly opposed to the Hellenicism of the great king. During this period Aristotle and his pupil resided at Mieza, south-west of Pella. He is said to have obtained from Philip (or Alexander) the restoration of his native town, destroyed along with Olynthus in 347 B.C.; but his good offices were thwarted by the jealousies and counterplots of the exiles themselves.¹ Numerous authorities assert that he went with Alexander to Asia, and there collected the materials of his 255 politics. But this is certainly false.

In 335 B.C. he again settled at Athens, and formally opened a school of his own, called Peripatetic, from his habit of walking up and down while teaching in the gymnasium of the Lyceum. In the succeeding twelve years, he produced the majority of those works, and trained the followers, that have brought him undying fame. We hear of private lectures in the morning, of public receptions in the afternoon, also of common meals, and a sort of discipline in his school.

The follies of Callisthenes, whom Aristotle had recommended to Alexander, and who was suspected of being disloyal to him, owing to his outspoken censure, may have estranged the great king from his old tutor, but no overt act can be cited to prove it; nay rather the materials for his natural history may in part have been supplied by the interest of Alexander in his researches.² Nevertheless, a few years after the king's death,

¹ Cf. frag. 610, from Dio Chrysostom.

² Thus the moot question about the cause of the Nile's rising in sum-

people began to talk scandal about Aristotle having been privy to his assassination by poison. This idle and libellous rumour is sufficiently contradicted by the public feeling which broke out at Athens, at the opening of the Lamian war, against Aristotle as a steady partisan of the Macedonian party. He was attacked under the allegation of impiety by Demophilus (probably the son of the historian Ephorus) for having honoured Hermeias as a hero; people had also charged him with offering devotions to one of his wives, Herpyllis (after the manner of Auguste Comte); and he retired before the storm to his country house in Chalcis, where he presently died (322 B.C., summer) of a chronic disease, which was no doubt aggravated by his intense application to study. His will, preserved like those of his successors in the school of Ariston, is still extant, at least in substance, in Diogenes' *Life*, and shows us his loving and thoughtful care for the welfare of his daughter, his immediate friends, and even the slaves attached to his house.

We know little of his personality. He was evidently thought ugly in his day—thin-legged and with small features. Many smart things are repeated from his conversation by Diogenes, and he was evidently no very agreeable person, or deficient in the power of making enemies.¹ There are several portraits extant of him, especially the splendid sitting statue in the Palazzo Spada at Rome; they represent a refined and careworn, but somewhat hard face, in which thought and perhaps bodily suffering have drawn deep furrows. His policy was Macedonian and anti-Demosthenic, and for this reason he was assailed by many sham patriots. Of course he saw, with Phocion, the impracticability of any other policy in the decay-

mer was said to have been settled by the observations of the great summer rains near its source, which Alexander obtained for Aristotle (fragg. 325-6).

¹ Cf. Themistius, *Orat.* 23, p. 235 (quoted as frag. 57 of Timæus by C. Müller): *Κηφισοδώρους δὲ καὶ Εὐβουλίδας καὶ Τιμαίους, Δικαιάρχους καὶ στρατὸν ὅλον τῶν ἐπιθεμένων Ἀριστοτέλει τῷ Σταγειρίτῃ πότε ἂν καταλέξαιμι εὐπετῶς, ὧν καὶ λόγοι ἐξικνούνται εἰς τόνδε τὸν χρόνον, διατηροῦντες τὴν ἀπέχθειαν καὶ φιλονεικίαν.* Many of these were posthumous enemies. We know that the school of Isocrates and other sophists afforded him plenty of contemporary opponents besides.

ing state of Greece, and he was not bound by the spirit of patriotism, like Demosthenes, to fight to the last for a dying cause, being only a metic, or resident alien at Athens.

§ 563. The catalogue of Aristotle's works, which were said to amount to more than 400, and which embraced every kind of science and every sort of literary criticism, need not occupy us here. The list given by Diogenes in his *Life* was probably prepared by Andronicus, or perhaps Hermippus, from the works found under his name in the Alexandrian library, and does not contain some of those now extant. There is also a list drawn up by Arabic writers of the thirteenth century. The critical questions about these long and complicated lists are discussed by many German writers, who are referred to in Zeller's account. A careful catalogue is to be found in the opening of the fifth volume of the Berlin *Aristotle*, prepared by Val. Rose, and to this splendid volume I also refer in considering the fragments of lost works.

These fragments have, in the case of Aristotle, so peculiar an interest for us, that I propose here to consider them before I enter upon an account of the extant works which belong to the plan of the present book. For it is to the fragments of Aristotle that we must look for all our knowledge of his youthful work, and still more of the work which placed him among the ancients in the rank of a *literary* man. When we read the scientific treatises he has left us, we wonder at the complete neglect of form, the utter abnegation of style in the pupil of Plato, and ask ourselves how it was that so great a critic of poetry and eloquence should not have given some evidence of his theories in his own writing. But the fact is that we only inherit from him those treatises which he wrote as head of a school, and possibly as mere jottings to be filled up by oral explanations. The enormous number and variety of his writings—most of them composed within a few years—seem to preclude anything like careful composition, and in more than one of them modern critics have suspected that we possess the mere hasty notebook of a pupil, taken down from the master's conversation during his morning walks in the Lyceum.¹

¹ Zeller shows (pp. 135–8) with much acuteness that this view goes too

§ 564. Another account of the bad condition of our texts is given in the famous story for which Strabo is our authority. He says ¹ that after the death of Aristotle and Theophrastus, their books were inherited by Neleus of Skepsis, nephew of the latter. Owing to the danger of their being seized by royal book collectors, they were hidden by his heirs in a cellar, where they lay for nearly two centuries, till discovered at the beginning of the first century B.C. by Apellikon of Teos, and by him brought to Athens. Then they were carried by Sylla as booty to Rome, and first edited by Tyrannio and Andronicus (circ. 60 50 B.C.). Hence, Strabo tells us, the early pupils of the Peripatetic school knew little of the real doctrine of Aristotle, and mostly talked barren subtleties (*θέσεις λεκυθίζειν*). This theory is adopted by Heitz, Grote, Grant, and others, but has been of late combated with success by Stahr and Zeller. There is plainly great exaggeration in it, for we find Aristotle's works distinctly quoted ² in the interval, and a catalogue of them as preserved in the Alexandrian library; and as he published most of them during his life, it is not credible that among his pupils and critics, especially the Stoics, no other copy but that in the cellar at Skepsis should exist. There is, however, truth in the story as to these particular copies, and it is more than probable that there may have been some unfinished MS., like the *Politics*, which really lay concealed till this date, and which is therefore unknown to ancient critics before the time of Cicero. But the damp of the cellar could only produce lacunæ in the text, it could not mildew the texture of the style.

The ancients had a very different picture of Aristotle from his works. Their best critics speak of him as a master of style. Cicero tells us that he comes pouring forth a golden flood of eloquence to prove the Divine Providence which has ordered far, and that in these treatises, written in a rough and slovenly, but peculiar and very scientific style, we have the very words of the master, in most cases written down by himself, though often two collateral forms of an argument have crept in either from a new treatment, or an inaccurate copy at the moment. It is at least very likely that his pupils helped him largely both in transcription and in collections of facts.

¹ xiii. i, 54.

² Cf. the evidence collected in Zeller, pp. 145, sq.

the world, and translates a splendid passage to prove it.¹ Dionysius (Halic.) and Quintilian speak in similar words of praise. Simplicius and Photius declare that his letters (collected by Artemon in eight books) were unsurpassed as models of that kind of composition, and though Demetrius quotes a sentence from these letters as far too pompous in style, he cites another² to show how thoroughly the author confined himself to proper subjects, in which he says: 'This I do not write to you, for it is not epistolary' (ἐπιστολικόν). Unfortunately the ancients have seldom supported their praise of the philosopher's eloquence by adequate citations, and we must therefore search the scanty fragments carefully to find any clear proofs of their assertions. In the case of Cicero and later critics, we suspect, moreover, that Aristotle's great and established reputation as a thinker may have led them to exaggerate the perfection of his style.

It is, however, to be remarked that Aristotle's Roman critics cite none of our extant scientific treatises except the *Topic* and *Rhetoric*. Either, therefore, they did not know the scientific Aristotle, or, what is more likely, they were repelled by his *acroatic* (esoteric) books, and confined themselves to those *ἐξωτερικά*, which were written for the public, and were within their comprehension. Thus the Aristotle praised by the Roman philosophers and rhetors is not our Aristotle, he is the author of dialogues and exhortations to philosophy and virtue. But among the Greeks the loss of his dialogues and elaborated essays rather comes from the contempt in which these early semi-Platonic writings were held by his school. In his later and scientific works, they tell us, he put down his real opinions, in the dialogues only what was false or held by others. Hence it is to Stobæus, to Plutarch, and to Cicero that we owe the preservation of a few passages from these dialogues, in which we find not only a Platonic vein of thought, but even a far-off ray of Platonic sunlight in diction.³ In fact, the influence of

¹ *De Nat. Deorum*, ii. 37.

² *Fragg.* 615, 620.

³ We hear that he did not attempt dramatic prologues, like Plato, and that he sustained the principal part himself, unlike his master, but in the manner adopted by Cicero, whose dialogues are probably not unlike those of Aristotle in form.

Plato had been as great on Aristotle as the influence of Socrates on Plato; but we can trace the gradual weaning of Plato from the *Apologia* to the *Laws*; with Aristotle the early stages have left but faint vestiges.

§ 565. There were certainly three dialogues modelled closely upon Plato.¹ From the first Sextus Empiricus and Cicero quote arguments for the existence of the gods and their government of a popular and rhetorical kind,² also for the eternity of the universe, from its beauty and order.³ From the third, a close imitation of the *Phædon*, we have so many interesting and suggestive notes about the nature of the soul, its unlikeness to a harmony, its future happiness, together with strange narratives of a spiritualistic character, that we can feel how thoroughly it was a literary work.⁴ From the *προτρεπτικός*, or *Exhortation to Philosophy*, we have also an interesting anticipation of Des Cartes' refutation of the doubter, for Aristotle tells us that men must either accept or reject philosophy. But if the latter, it must be done by argument, and hence by philosophy. Whether, therefore, men choose it or not, they must philosophise. From the treatises *on Nobility* and *on Wealth* we have also some good extracts by Stobæus.⁵

Among his critical works of this period I may mention an account of the older poets and rhetoricians—a favourite amusement in those days when original literary genius had become exhausted. Cicero tells us that his summary and exposition of the older rhetors (in his *συναγωγή τεχνῶν*) was so clear and good that people gave up reading these authorities themselves. And, no doubt, if the rhetoric now ascribed to Anaximenes were genuine, it must date from this period, and long before the far

¹ That *περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, that *περὶ τὰγαθοῦ*, and the *Εὐδημος*.

² Frags. 12-15.

³ Frags. 17-18.

⁴ Frags. 32-43.

⁵ Frags. 82-5, sq. Bernays (*Dialoge des Arist.* p. 69) thinks that the opening chapters of the fourth book (new order) of the *Politics* are in substance an extract from an ethical dialogue, on account of the greater ease and flow of the style as compared with the rest of the book. The hypothesis, though rejected by Vahlen and others, is probable enough, but the resulting specimen of Aristotle's easier style is not a favourable one, there being little peculiar in it, except some overdrawn expressions.

different psychological study which we find in the real rhetoric of Aristotle. His views about the poets we cannot estimate except from the excerpts in the scholia on Homer, which constantly refer to his *problems and solutions*. I confess that both the difficulties and the answers seem to me so prosaic and often silly, that they do not raise the author in my mind above the critic of the *Poetic*, a work of little æsthetic taste. He raised such questions as these : How could Helen, in her view from the walls, express uncertainty about her brothers, the Dioscuri, seeing that the war had lasted ten years, and many prisoners had been made and ransomed? Of course the obvious solution to us is that this scene was taken from a poem describing the first landing or marshalling of the Greeks at the opening of the war.¹ Aristotle says : ' Perhaps Paris prevented her from meeting the captives.'² Many similar pieces of criticism will be found in the adjoining fragments, mingled with occasional common sense. The most interesting is doubtless the curious anticipation of the Comparative Mythologers, in which he tells us that the 360 oxen of the sun were the days of the year. Thus Aristotle's *ἀπορήματα* on Homer seem not very much better than his edition,³ if indeed it be true that he prepared an edition for Alexander, which that monarch carried in a precious casket.

§ 566. This criticism of the poets suggests to us the philosopher's own poetry, of which three very noteworthy fragments have survived. They are a skolion to Hermias, an epigram for a statue of the same, and part of an elegy on Eudemus. I will cite them below.⁴ The epigram on the statue is like those of

¹ Cf. Vol. I. p. 73.² Frag. 142.³ Cf. Vol. I. p. 31.⁴ (1) On Plato (fr. 623) :

ἐλθὼν δ' ἐς κλεινὸν Κεκροπίης δάπεδον
 εὐσεβέως σεμνῆς φιλῆς ἰδρύσατο βωμὸν
 ἀνδρός, ὃν οὐδ' αἰνεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις·
 ὅς μόνος ἢ πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἐναργῶς
 οἰκίῳ τε βίῳ καὶ μεθόδοισι λόγων,
 ὥς ἀγαθός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίνεται ἀνὴρ·
 οὐ νῦν δ' ἔστι λαβεῖν οὐδενὶ ταῦτα ποτέ.

(2) On Hermias (fr. 624) :

τόνδε ποτ' οὐχ ὁσίως παραβὰς μακάρων θέμιν ἀγνήν
 ἔκτεινεν Περσῶν τοξοφόρων βασιλεὺς,

the best period, very simple and condensed. We do not possess enough of the elegy to understand its plan, but we can judge from the fragments of the dialogue on Eudemus, and the story there told of the curious vision of his subsequent fortunes and death, that the poem was not wanting in imagination. One famous phrase on Plato has made the fragment celebrated. The hymn, which Athenæus says is not a pæan, as was alleged in the accusation of impiety brought against him, but rather a skolion, is a very elegant little poem, and deserves far higher praise than is accorded to it by most of the Germans. It is, I suppose, silently assumed that the author of the dry Ethics, and Politics, and Categories cannot have been a true poet ; but I venture to say, had the poem been handed down under the name of Pindar, some of those who now look upon it coldly would have been loud in their admiration. Apart from the felicity of its expression, there is a moral fervour about it which breathed through the dialogues, and which must have made Aristotle, in his earlier years, more a preacher of righteousness than a votary of abstract science. Of his remaining elegies and his ἔπη we know nothing.

οὐ φανερώς λόγῃ φονίοις ἐν ἀγῶσι κρατήσας,
ἀλλ' ἀνδρὸς πίστει χρησάμενος δολίου.

(3) The Hymn to Virtue :

Ἄρετά, πολύμοχθε γένει βροτείῳ
θήραμα κάλλιστον βίῃ,
σᾶς πέρι, παρθένε, μορφᾶς
καὶ θανεῖν ζηλωτὸς ἐν Ἑλλάδι πότμος
καὶ πόνους τλῆναι μαλεροῦς ἀκάμαντας·
τοῖον ἐπὶ φρένα βάλλεις
καρπὸν τ' ἀθάνατον χρυσοῦ τε κρείσσω
καὶ γονέων μαλακαυγήτοιό θ' ὕπνου·
σεῦ δ' ἔνεχ' οὐκ Διὸς Ἡρακλέης Λήδας τε κοῦροι
πόλλ' ἀνέτλασαν ἔργοις
σὺν ἀγρεύοντες δύναιμι.
σᾶς δ' ἔνεκεν φίλιον μορφᾶς καὶ Ἀταρνέως ἔντροφος
Ἄελίου χήρῳσεν αὐγὰς.
τοιγὰρ ἀοιδίμος ἔργοις, ἀθάνατον τέ μιν αὐξήσουσι
Μοῦσαι
Μυαμοσύνας θυγάτρες, Διὸς ξενίου σέβας αὔξουσιν
φιλίας τε γέρας βεβαίον.

§ 567. From the time that Aristotle went to Macedon, and during the leisure of his retirement with Alexander, we may suppose him to have gradually abandoned popular writing, and to have turned to that purely scientific form¹ which he adopted as a scholarch at Athens. From this latter date come all those dry and abstruse works which belong to the history, not of Greek literature, but of Greek philosophy. Aristotle's view embraced all departments of human knowledge. Like Solomon, he discoursed on plants, from the cedar that is on Lebanon to the hyssop which groweth on the wall; upon animals; on the heavenly bodies and their eternal author; on the mind of man and its faculties—in fact, on all things human and divine.

In this wide survey he also embraced the philosophy of history and the philosophy of art, and here comes in contact with literature in discussing the nature of rhetoric and poetry. Thus we may confine ourselves to a fuller consideration of the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetic*, though we may say something generally about the *Ethics* and *Politics*; not that these are literary works, but because most readers know Aristotle through them, and would therefore miss their absence in this Look. Indeed, they seem to have been the transition stage between the early dialogues and the later pure philosophy, and to have come in this order: first, the *Ethics*, and next, in close connection, the *Politics*; then the *Poetic*, and last of the exoteric treatises, the *Rhetoric*, which may have been composed about 330 B.C. The latter works are in style and method intermediate between his two classes of writings, so that many have asserted them to belong to the latter. Indeed, the boundary line can hardly have been very clearly marked. All these treatises have been

¹ This distinction is not imported by critics, but recognised by Aristotle himself, who constantly refers to the fuller treatment on well-known statements *ἐν τοῖς ἐκδιδομένοις*, or *ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις*. This seems plainly to refer to the popular treatises which were written and circulated among the public, while his deeper works, though by no means secret or withheld, were only known to his pupils. The German critics have written a library of controversy on this matter, without advancing our knowledge or understanding of it. The reader will find a summary in Zeller, *Op. cit.* pp. 112, sq., with the voluminous notes.

so amply discussed and illustrated, that a student of Aristotle is not likely to delay over a general sketch, but will turn to the full and minute commentaries to aid him in the understanding of them. For none of them are attractive from their style, and all of them are difficult, both from ellipse and compression of thought, as well as from dislocations or gaps in our texts.

§ 568. It is remarkable that Aristotle, in this mature *Rhetoric*, regards the science not as a branch of the fine arts, or analogous to poetry, but as a sister science to Dialectic, and closely allied to Politics. As Dialectic, or logical disputation, seeks to establish the truth by argument, so Rhetoric seeks to persuade, or to establish the probable by such arguments as will convince an audience. Hence the whole science is a popular or exoteric science, but nevertheless depends, or ought to depend, mainly on proofs, not on indirect means of influencing men's minds. In fact, he lays down the irrefragable position, that rhetoric is a natural gift of civilised men, all of whom in some way defend their own opinions, or attack those of others, by argument. It is the systematic treatment of this natural faculty of persuasion which forms the subject of the art of rhetoric. Thus Aristotle opposes on the one hand Plato, who is perpetually arguing that, because rhetoric cannot prove itself good to teach any one thing, it is good for nothing; on the other, he opposes the Sophists, who pretended that it was the mysterious key to all sorts of knowledge. There is something very severe and noble in the restriction of the true province of rhetoric to that of *reasoning* with an audience. But there can be no doubt that this has been the true secret of all really great speaking. Demosthenes, and the Greeks generally, seldom depart from argument. But even with Cicero, Chrysostom, Bossuet, Burke, and with all our greatest legal and political orators, it is primarily because they were brilliant and persuasive reasoners that they were great orators. Hence the strict justice of Aristotle's simple definition: 'the power of discovering in each case the possible means of persuading.'¹

¹ ἔστω δ' ἡ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. Cf. the comments of other rhetors upon it quoted in Cope's *Introd.* p. 149.

The main body of the first book is devoted to the analysis of rhetorical materials in relation to the three kinds (εἶδη) of oratory, which Aristotle was perhaps the first formally to distinguish—the deliberative, the judicial, and the epideictic.¹ He says nothing of the exhortations of generals to their soldiers, which figure so largely in earlier historians. No doubt the fashion went out with the rise of mercenary and professional armies, but in any case such speeches must fall into the first class. This division he regards as by far the most important, though he says it was neglected by the rhetoricians for the sake of the court speeches, as in them sophistical arts were of more value. The fact is that political speaking was always thoroughly honoured among the Greeks, but for this very reason was considered a higher art than could be taught by mere sophistical professors. Aristotle's further distinction, that of these three branches the first is about the future, and its main topic the expedient; the second about the past, and its main topic the just; and the third (praise and blame) chiefly about the present, and its main topic the honourable (καλόν)—this seems to me a piece of idle or false subtlety.

The first nine chapters are on the requisites for proofs in deliberative speeches—political education, and a general knowledge of ethical principles. Then he turns to judicial or dicastic speeches; and on these, again, he enumerates the general subjects—justice and injustice, written law and unwritten precedent, and the like, from which the orator should draw his logical proofs. He adds in an appendix the proofs from fact, such as testimony, oaths, documents, torture, by which the speaker may fortify the proofs constructed by argument. So far, then, Rhetoric is little more than applied Logic, in which certain special forms of proof, such as the enthymeme and the example, are substituted for the full syllogism and induction which the philosopher or dialectician uses. But each εἶδος, or special branch, affords special propositions (προτάσεις) from which the orator must argue. Except, therefore, in indicating to him the proper materials, which are de-

¹ The passage which asserts the same division in the *Rhet. ad Alex.* seems to be spurious, as other passages cite only two.

terminated by moral and physical philosophy, there is nothing whatever which would give a speaker any practical help in constructing a speech.

§ 569. The second book approaches the psychological conditions which the speaker should either affect in himself, or stimulate in his hearers, so as to produce persuasion. Here there is much that is suggestive and interesting, though the whole subject is treated in a very confused way. The reader must not imagine that Aristotle has deserted his first principle, of laying the whole stress of oratory on proofs. For all the psychological aids which he here discusses—*ethos* in the speaker, *pathos* excited in the audience—are all direct helps to persuasion, and, as such, direct means of carrying the orator's point. To excite the hearer, without any further object, by a mere splendour of display, would have been thought by Aristotle meretricious even in an epideictical speech. Thus *Ethos* is at first represented as the character which the speaker should assume, and manifest by his speaking: it is composed of three elements, viz. *εὐροησις*, sound common sense; *ἀρετή*, moral weight of character; and *ἐνδοία*, a strong interest in his audience. Aristotle might have gone so far as to say that these, if established by the previous life of the speaker, and not merely assumed for the occasion, will outbalance the strongest logical arguments against him. But presently (as Cope and others have pointed out) we find *ethos* in a new meaning, that of studying the general character of the audience, and addressing them differently if they be old men, or middle-aged, or young. The general features of these ages are then described.¹ As almost all audiences are mixed, such advices seem of little use.

They are, however, preceded by a treatment of *pathos* in rhetoric, which is wider in application than our meaning of it, and signifies the exciting of suitable affections—anger, pity, sorrow—in the minds of the hearers; and there are minute descriptions of the causes of these affections in mankind. *Ethos*, in the first sense, when it is actually produced by the speech, is merely arousing the *πάθος* of confidence and goodwill towards the speaker in the audience, and thus falls under

¹ caps. 13-15.

the class from which Aristotle has distinguished it. But I need not specify these logical defects. The book closes¹ with general directions, or *τόποι*, for using examples, for using apophthegms (*γνώμαι*, which are merely single propositions implying an argument), and enthymemes, or arguments in that short form suited for rhetoric. He even gives a chapter on simulated enthymemes, or sophisms of this kind, which troubles such critics as Cope, who think they must defend the morality of all that Aristotle has said. In these chapters² many examples are given from retorts of Iphicrates, from tragedies, especially those of Theodectes, as well as from his speeches, but, strangely enough (though Demades against Demosthenes is quoted), none are quoted from Demosthenes, his greatest contemporary.

§ 570. The third book, which at last comes to what we should call the proper treatment of oratory or rhetoric, is divided into two parts: the first twelve chapters being on expression (*λέξις*), the remainder on the arrangement (*τάξις*) to be observed in speaking. The latter division seems to me singularly bald and incomplete, and can hardly have come in its present form from Aristotle's own hand. The remarks on the *proem*, or prologue, are the fullest, but the examples are as frequently taken from poetry as from oratory. On the *narrative* he omits all mention of the *προκατασκευή*, or first sketch of the story, a point frequent in our extant speeches, and of great effect in tuning the minds of the audience. He criticises Isocrates' direction that the narrative should be compressed (*ταχέια*), and cites several examples of good and bad narratives from tragedies now lost. Perhaps his best remark is that the narrative should be ethical, and not intellectual. It should not strike the audience as clever, but honest, as is eminently the case with Lysias. On the 'figures of thought' he says nothing, except about the sudden questioning (*ἐρώτησις*) and

¹ As Spengel observes, this subject was announced to come before the psychological part, and is certainly out of its natural order. Hence some dislocation of the text is to be inferred, even though there are at present references from the discussion on the *τόποι* to the chapters on *πάθος* and *ῥήθος*, which show that the work early assumed its present form.

² caps. 22-4.

witty repartees, which are indeed hardly figures of thought. As to the *epilogue*¹ he puts the reminding of the hearer on the same level as the exciting him—a peculiarly Greek view, already noticed when considering Demosthenes' speeches, which generally end with a very calm summary, and a quiet demand for justice.

The chapters on expression are more suggestive, though nothing is more disappointing than that on correctness of diction (*ὅτι χρηρῆ Ἑλληνίζειν*), in which the reader expects valuable hints on style, and is merely told to mind his particles,² his concords, and the clearness of his sentences. Similarly on the difficult and subtle question of rhythm, he only says a few words about iambic and trochaic rhythms, and then recommends (after Thrasy machus) the first pæon for opening, and the last for closing, a sentence. On the deeper laws of the harmony of periods he is silent, or hopelessly general.

But on the qualities of style apart from grammatical accuracy, there are several good chapters against over-ornament and pomp, against stale phrases (*ψυχρὰς λέξεως*), such as those often used by Gorgias and Alkidamas, on metaphors and similes, and other kindred topics. His remarks on the differences of poetical and prose style, and also on the difference of style suited to oral delivery and to written matter, are very sensible and sound, but not, I think, very suggestive.³ To the real beauties of noble poetry he seems comparatively a stranger. After discussing separate words and clauses in eight chapters, he goes on to their connection, either natural or artificial—the well-known *λέξεις εἰρομένη* of Herodotus as opposed to the *λέξεις κατεστραμμένη* of Thucydides, and still more of Isocrates. He adds a chapter on saying 'good things,' and

¹ c. 19.

² It is to be wished that Aristotle had followed his own advice. For his use of *ὥστε*, *οὖν*, *δέ*, and of prepositions, has caused special difficulty to commentators, and called forth special enquiries, such as Bonitz' (*Hien. Sitzber.* 1863) and Eucken's books.

³ Voltaire profited by them, as may be seen from his frequent criticisms of the poetical prose of his rivals, and his praise of the principle laid down by Aristotle. On this Havet (*Étude*, pp. 95, sq.) has some excellent remarks.

on vividness of style. But in neither of these is he happy or original.

§ 571. The impression produced by the *Rhetoric* is not very favourable to Aristotle's genius.¹ We feel, indeed, that the whole book is on a large and sound basis, but is mainly an expansion of the hints thrown out with such brilliancy by Plato in his *Phædrus*; and that, in following them up, Aristotle has stated a good many isolated truths of value, and shown great acuteness, but has added little to the *τέχραι* of his predecessors except the psychological basis, which must have been practically felt by all previous orators. The real secrets of his great contemporary Demosthenes, which he, if anyone, could have discovered, or at least discussed, are either deliberately ignored, or neglected all through his book; and this capital blot in a Greek rhetoric of that age is not to be overlooked or excused. We may add that the style of this work, which expressly treats of style, contains frequent examples of vices which it reprehends. It is constantly too compressed; it is obscure; it is confused; and though some of these blots are undoubtedly to be ascribed to the condition of the text, many are due to the author.

The Latin rhetoricians, Cicero and Quintilian, as well as Dionysius, derive many valuable hints from it, and often follow it closely, but they seem to me to improve upon it very much in the clearness and elegance of their expression. Cicero²

¹ If the reader desires to see the opposite case ably argued, I can recommend to him E. Havet's excellent *Étude sur la Rhétorique d'Aristote* (Paris, 1846), from which I have borrowed many points all through my sketch, though I think the author has often transfused his own ideas into Aristotle. I must, however, note the curious blunder (p. 71) of attributing to R. Estienne the passage on torture, which that intelligent translator found in the best MS. (A^c), but which he printed in italics, as of doubtful authenticity. This is not the only error in Havet's suggestive and charming essay.

² His judgment on the book is worth quoting (*de Or.* ii. 38): Sed, ut eo revocetur, unde huc declinavit oratio, ex tribus istis clarissimis philosophis, quos Romam venisse dixisti, videsne Diogenem fuisse, qui diceret, artem se tradere bene disserendi et vera ac falsa diiudicandi, quam verbo Græco *διαλεκτικήν* appellaret? In hac arte, si modo est hæc ars, nullum est præceptum, quo modo verum inveniat, sed tantum est, quo modo

especially, as Cope's notes will amply show, has put almost all Aristotle's points with great force, and in admirable and terse language. The Epistle of Dionysius to Ammæus, in which he refutes elaborately by dates the notion that Demosthenes borrowed his rhetorical principles from Aristotle, is valuable in quoting six passages verbatim (as he says) from the *Rhetoric*. Though there are some differences from our text, they are not such as to warrant the belief that the work was originally fuller and more explicit. It is more probable that later rhetors added commentaries or expansions, of which a few fragments appear in Spengel's *Collection*. But, unfortunately, all these

iudicetur. Nam [et] omne, quod eloquimur sic, ut id aut esse dicamus aut non esse, et si simpliciter dictum sit, suscipiunt Dialectici, ut iudicent, verumne sit an falsum; et si coniuncte sit elatum et adiuncta sint alia, iudicent, rectene adiuncta sint et verane summa sit unius cuiusque rationis et ad extremum ipsi se compungunt suis acuminibus et multa quærendo reperiunt non modo ea, quæ iam non possint ipsi dissolvere, sed etiam, quibus ante exorsa et potius detexta prope retexantur. Hic nos igitur Stoicus iste nihil adiuvat, quoniam, quemadmodum inveniam quid dicam, non docet; atque idem etiam impedit, quod et multa reperit, quæ negat ullo modo posse dissolvi, et genus sermonis affert non liquidum, non fusum ac profluens, sed exile, aridum, concisum ac minutum. Quod si qui probabit, ita probabit, ut oratori tamen aptum non esse fateatur. Hæc enim nostra oratio multitudinis est auribus accommodanda ad oblectandos animos, ad impellendos, ad ea probanda, quæ non aurificis statera, sed quadam populari trutina examinantur. Quare istam artem totam dimittamus, quæ in excogitandis argumentis muta nimium est, in iudicandis nimium loquax. Critolaum istum, quem simul cum Diogene venisse commemoras, puto plus huic studio nostro prodesse potuisse. Erat enim ab isto Aristotele, a cuius inventis tibi ego videor non longe aberrare. Atque inter hunc Aristotelem, cuius et illum legi librum, in quo exposuit dicendi artes omnium superiorum, et illos, in quibus ipse sua quedam de eadem arte dixit, et hos germanos huius artis magistros hoc mihi visum est interesse, quod ille eadem acie mentis, qua rerum omnium vim naturamque viderat, hæc quoque aspexit, quæ ad dicendi artem, quam ille despiciebat, pertinebant: illi autem, qui hoc solum colendum ducebant, habitarunt in hac una ratione tractanda, non eadem prudentia, qua ille, sed usu, in hoc uno genere, studioque maiore. Carneadi vero vis incredibilis illa dicendi et varietas perquam esset optanda nobis; qui nullam unquam in illis suis disputationibus rem defendit, quem non probavit; nullam oppugnavit, quam non everterit. Sed hoc maius est quiddam, quam ab iis, qui hæc tradunt et docent, postulandum sit.

works are lost, and the remaining scholia are declared quite worthless by those who have studied them.

§ 572. *Bibliographical*. Our best MS. is one of the eleventh century, now in Paris (A^c), which was known to Petrus Victorius, and collated in his valuable edition, but more carefully by Gaisford (1820), and still better by Bekker for his edition. The next best authority is the old Latin translation, undoubtedly by William de Moerbeke, in 1281, which followed word for word a text similar to the A^c text, but with marginal interpolations or commentaries which the translator generally adopts. All the later and more interpolated MSS. seem derived from the same archetype as these older and better copies, and all of them bear traces of the amalgamation of two recensions, in which two renderings of the same idea are given one after the other. Separate editions of the Rhetoric are scarce. First printed by Aldus, not in his *Aristotle*, but in the *Rhetores Græci* (1508), it since holds a place in all the editions of the collected works. However, Gaisford's special edition (Oxford, 1833) is the tenth since the editio princeps. The essays of Brandis (*Philologus*, vol. iv.), Vahlen, and of Spengel, who has given special attention to it, in his collection of rhetorical tracts, in his series of papers on Aristotle in the Munich Academy's *Abhandlungen*, and lastly in a separate edition (Leipzig, 1867), also the hints of Thurot in his *Essays on Aristotle*, may be read with advantage. Bekker's text is reprinted in a separate form, and we have an elaborate Introduction (1867) and a Commentary in three volumes by E. M. Cope of Cambridge (edited by J. E. Sandys, 1874).

§ 573. The *Rhetoric* points back in more than one place to the *Poetic*, which seems to have been composed before it, probably next before it, and to which, as a kindred subject, we may naturally turn. To us oratory is a sister art to poetry, and we may admire the rhetoric of Shakespere and Byron, as we admire the poetry of Jeremy Taylor or Ruskin. We should have accordingly expected to find them treated by Aristotle as sister arts, teaching the most perfect expression in words, under divers conditions of human thought and of human passion. But we find, to our surprise, that he brings them into contact

only in the detail of expression, or λέξις, whereas their sources are to him perfectly distinct. Rhetoric, as we have seen, he regards as merely the art of persuasion, and hence an offshoot of the science of reasoning, applied to a popular audience. It is the science of probable arguments, methodically expressed. Poetry he bases on the instinct of imitation, especially of the imitation of human action, and classes it with the arts of dancing and of music, which have the same object, and which were commonly used in combination with it; also with the art of painting, which uses colours, as poetry uses rhythm and metre, or as music uses melody.

This view is evidently the result of the predominance of the drama in Attic life. All other forms of poetry are regarded in relation to it. In Homer it is far more the dramatic side than the merely descriptive or picturesque, which occupies Aristotle. The old descriptive *Margites* is regarded as a kind of comedy, and, what is still more singular, lyric poetry is hardly mentioned at all, except on its dramatic side, and in those later developments when the music and the dancing were plainly mimetic, and represented a sort of lyrical drama. This may possibly be the result of a great gap in the text, but I rather agree with those who hold that while a discussion on comedy has been lost, there was no place for a separate treatment of lyric poetry in our sense, and this for the special reason I have assigned. The complete ignoring of the whole Æolic school, of Sappho, Alcæus, Anacreon—nay, of Pindar and most of the great masters of Greek melic, is a blot in the *Poetic*, like the ignoring of Demosthenes in the *Rhetoric*. But, as has been well observed, dramatic poetry and legal rhetoric, being surrounded by fixed conditions, lend themselves to scientific analysis far more than the other branches of oratory and poetry. Hence the tendency to write special *τέχναι* for these departments of each of the arts.

§ 574. Aristotle's analyses in the first three chapters of the various kinds of imitation in dramatic and epic, and in tragic and comic poetry, are not very suggestive or fruitful, though undoubtedly correct; but in the fourth he gives an ingenious psychological analysis of the instinct of imitation in man, and its

results. It is owing to this that accurate imitations even of repulsive objects give pleasure by our recognition of their faithfulness. Thus the *Margites*, which he ascribes to Homer, and the Attic comedy are branches of poetry, though they profess to paint men 'worse than they usually are.' But the fuller exposition of the nature of comedy is lost; we still have in the fourth and fifth chapters valuable isolated facts about the history of both tragedy and comedy, which have been utilised in their proper place above.¹ It is, however, plain from several allusions (especially 9, § 3) that the brilliant exuberance of Aristophanes did not fit into Aristotle's system, and that he even excluded it from his very definition of comic drama, which was essentially general, and employed in sketches of character applicable to classes of men. He also objected to the producing of laughter by obscenity, and notes that the new comedy replaced this by indirect hints (*ὑπόνοια*). In fact, the parabases of Aristophanes are to Aristotle the work of an *ιαμβοποιός*, not of a dramatic poet. Thus we have lost by the corruption of our text a theory of Greek comedy excluding Aristophanes!² In the opening of chap. vi. Aristotle explicitly promises to discuss epic poetry and comedy after he has explained the nature and perfections of tragedy. This latter he does very thoroughly from his point of view. We have but scanty notes on epic poetry near the end, in direct comparison with tragedy, and a curious chapter of criticism, or of commonplaces for replying to criticisms on tragedy.³ There is also an analysis of diction⁴ which is to a great extent on the first elements of grammar, and is totally out of place in this work,⁵ as well as some remarks on ornamental diction, which are analogous to, but not so good as, the parallel chapter of the *Rhetoric*.

Apart from all the confusion of the text, apart from the pedantic subdivisions of the school, apart from the flagrantly

¹ Vol. I. chaps. xiv., xix.

² Cf. on these points Meineke, *Fragg. Com.* i. 272.

³ c. 25.

⁴ cc. 19-22.

⁵ Egger qualifies this censure by pointing to the infancy of grammar at this time, and the consequent novelty and importance of what is now trivial and elementary (*Hist. de la Critique*, pp. 227, 456)

inconsistent judgments which are contained in the *Poetic*,¹ and which make it thoroughly unsafe as an authority, without the constant test of plain common sense, there are two permanent merits in the work which will ever interest educated men. The first is the scientific attempt to explain the nature and vindicate the uses of tragedy; the other consists in the preservation throughout the work of many stray fragments of Aristotle's acute insight and his various and profound learning. For however corrupted and interpolated our text may be, there can be no doubt that the main outlines are those of the master's mind. This scattered wisdom, whether on the history of Greek poetry, or on the nature of man, has been gathered and applauded by admiring critics from the days of Corneille's enemies² to those of Lessing, who declared the mutilated and tentative essay in criticism to be as infallible as the *elements of Euclid*; and thus it is now commonplace in histories of Greek literature, or of art criticism.

§ 575. The theory of tragedy, on the other hand, has within the last twenty years been discussed in Germany, as if it had never been known before, and with this result, that what was once tolerably clear has become so confused as to be almost unintelligible. In proof of this I will appeal to the discussion

¹ Some of these are explained away by the ingenious reservations and qualifications of critics, as the reader may see by consulting Susenmihl's notes to his edition. Other points may be the result of our misconception. Thus Welcker first saw the meaning of the sentence quoted from Sophocles in comparing himself with Euripides. What he really said was not that he himself had painted characters as they ought to be, but as they ought to be painted *by a tragic poet*, whereas Euripides had painted them from real or ordinary life. Again, when Aristotle is made to say that the chorus should be an actor and constituent part of the play, καὶ συναγωνίζεσθαι μὴ ὥσπερ [παρ'] Εὐριπίδῃ ἀλλ' ὥσπερ [παρὰ] Σοφοκλεῖ, and to add that the rest of the tragic poets made their choral odes quite irrelevant, he does not mean, as he is often translated, that the chorus was not an actor in Euripides, but that it was not an actor of the right kind, being often an accomplice. I should suggest μὴ δ' ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδῃ - *and yet not like Euripides*, as probably what Aristotle wrote. But there are other judgments which cannot be defended with any common sense, or independence, in criticism.

² Cf. the Preface to his *Don Sanche*, or M. Paul Albert's *la littérature française au xviii^{me} Siècle*, pp. 84, sq.

of the *tragic purification* in the introduction to Sussehl's second edition (1874). It is not too much to say that a more obscure and confused piece of writing could hardly be found even in German literature. This, the most recent result of speculation on the question, is only to be compared to the wonderful hodge-podge made of the same matter in the old Latin version retranslated from the Arabic, and cited by Egger as a curiosity.¹

Here is the famous definition, in its complete form: ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένη λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, ἱρῶι τῶν καὶ οὐδὲ ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.² The first clause is meant to contrast it with comedy, the third with epic poetry, and these require no further explanation. 'Adorned speech' he himself explains as having rhythm and music in it. By the next words—the readings are all through uncertain—he tells us he means that different kinds of adorned speech are to be used in different parts, as iambic metre, and lyric measures with music. But it is about the last clause that the storm of controversy is still raging. I will only note a few of the most interesting points.

In the first place it seems likely that this theory of Aristotle's is intended as a vindication of tragedy against the attacks of Plato, who (in his *Phædrus*, 268 c, *Philebus*, 48 A, and *Republic*, x. 604) touches on the subject, and censures tragedy as a mimic representation of passion, and therefore as morally injurious to well regulated minds. For the luxury of pity is in his view relaxing and effeminating. The same objection, for the same reasons, he applies to epic poetry in its dramatic aspect. To this criticism Aristotle replies, not by directly asserting a moral use in tragedy, as has been argued by Lessing and others, not by considering the trials of the *actors* and their purification as intended for a moral training of the spectators, but by asserting (as Goethe insisted) an

¹ *Hist. de la critique*, p. 427, in his commentary on the passage in his edition appended to that work.

² c. 6, § 2.

æsthetical purpose. He considers that human pleasures and human griefs, apart from their moral side, though not in conflict with it, require to be raised and purified ; and just as we train the taste of the eye by ideal pictures, and by the study of exceptionally beautiful scenery, so the compassion and the fear of the ordinary citizen may be purified by showing him higher and nobler objects for its exercise. That this *æsthetical* training will have good moral results is certain, but these are not included in Aristotle's theory. Hence he speaks of the purification *τῶν τοιοῦτων παθημάτων*, that is to say, not the same affections precisely, nor yet different, but of the lower forms of terror and pity, and perhaps other such affections, by the higher.¹

But the wearisome question, what may have been the exact amount of meaning in the term *purifying* present to Aristotle's mind, whether he intended it as a medical term, implying that tragedy was a purging medicine, and thus homeopathic in principle, or whether he used it in a religious sense, as suggesting the analogy of those treatments of madness and over-excitement by calm and rythmical music then practised in Greece, or whether he meant it in both, or in neither—all this I will leave to the Germans, and to those who have time and patience to wade through their eighty works on the subject. It is the merit of E. Müller and of Bernays first to have brought to bear on the theory a parallel passage from the *Politics*,² in which the *æsthetical* use of *κάθαρσις* is clear, and in which we find it compared to the musical cures attempted by playing very exciting flute music as a palliative for morbid excitement of the mind. It is also certain from the researches of Bonitz that *πάθος* and *πάθημα* are not distinct in sense.³

¹ The comic poet Timocles, in a remarkable fragment of his *Dionysiasuse* (Meineke, iii. p. 592), seems rather to adopt the moral uses of tragedy as the chief good produced. The passage contains an excellent statement of the ordinary theory, to which Aristotle's more subtle view is not opposed, but from which it should be carefully distinguished.

² viii. p. 1341.

³ *Index Aristotel.* sub vocc. The genitive plural of the former is rare in Aristotle, nor is apparently the singular of the latter used at all by him, so that the variation is merely one of usage.

The whole question must be regarded in relation to Aristotle's theory of intellectual and refined leisure (*διαγωγή*) as the chief end of man. This is the happiness of the gods, whose contemplations are no labour, but the enjoyment of perfect knowledge and perfect leisure. This is the happiness, too, of the cultivated man, whose leisure hours should not be employed in the contemplation of vulgar cares, or wasted in vulgar sympathies, but engaged in that of ideal human actions—not always ideally good, but ideal in their greatness, their dignity, and their far-reaching importance, as illustrations of the laws which govern the world.

§ 576. After thus defining tragedy, Aristotle proceeds to analyse the various features or elements which make it up, and determines six, the plot, the character drawing, the *διάνοια*; ¹ then the diction, the musical composition, and, lastly, the *mise en scène*, or theatrical production. Of these various elements he justly considers the plot as by far the most important, observing that recent tragedians had succeeded, by attending to this element, without any character drawing. He gives a full and exceedingly valuable analysis of plots, both simple and complex, of their various devices, such as *catastrophe* and *recognition*, and of their proper limits as compared with epic plots. He even gives ² practical advices to a tragic poet as to the construction of a plot. Of these I need hardly say that the first and most important is to imagine his characters clearly and vividly, so that they may live before him; thus alone, says the acute critic, can inconsistencies and blunders be avoided. The character-drawing is discussed in chapter xv., and is not so suggestive. The fuller treatment of the *διάνοια* seems to be lost, for his reference ³ to the rhetoric is far too general to be satisfactory. The section on expression is in its earlier part an elementary chapter in grammar. The 21st,

¹ By which he seems to mean the thoughts or intellectual aspects of the piece. Thus the later school, and even at times Euripides, were not careful to draw *ἥθη*, but were very particular about brilliancy of dialogue and rhetorical point, which I take to be the *διάνοια* of the piece, according to the concise statement in chap. xix. §§ 1-4.

² cc. 17-8.

³ 19, 1.

on elevated diction, is indeed properly within the scope of the work, but whether from corruptions of the text, or spuriousness, or possibly, though one is almost afraid to whisper it, from the coldness and pedantry of the great author, does not touch the real beauties, or unlock the real secrets, of poetical language. This is throughout the crying fault of both *Rhetoric* and *Poetic*, and is not atoned for by any number of acute and reasonable observations. One almost suspects that the author was beginning to disbelieve in genius, and attribute artistic success to mere soundness and accuracy of method. How far truer and more appreciative is the tract of Longinus *on the Sublime*!

The remainder of the work, with the exception of the curious, and perhaps spurious, 25th chapter, on the refutation of dramatic criticisms by authors, is devoted to epic poetry, and chiefly to its dramatic side. This part of the work is vitiated by an excessive reverence for the Homer of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and a tendency to consider him as a perfect model in every respect, so much so that the problem, in case of any apparent defect (as with our Bible), was merely to vindicate and explain the reasons why the inspired master had chosen to put it thus. This over-reverence for Homer, together with a complete neglect of the tragedy of Æschylus, and of the great lyric poets, are indeed grave defects.¹ We have, moreover, reason to suspect, from the general tenor of the book, and from the few fragments on comedy still extant, that Aristophanes, and the splendid outburst of political comedy in the Periclean age, were set aside by him in favour of the character comedy of Crates and the newer school. If indeed his definition of comedy corresponded with that of tragedy, and if poetry, especially dramatic, was in his view more philosophical than history in drawing general pictures of human nature, such must have been his proceeding.

His ideal poet seems to have been Sophocles, and his ideal play the *Ædipus Rex*; and yet he strangely omits all discussion of the agency of Fate in the Greek tragedies, of which this play

¹ Other defects and omissions, in addition to these, have been noticed in Egger's sensible review of the book (*Hist. de la Critique*, pp. 200, sq.).

affords so obtrusive an example. In fact, *the* point of interest to us in Greek tragedy, especially as we have it in Æschylus—the conflict of human liberty and dignity with the curse of a hereditary fate—is a feature in tragedy apparently unknown to Aristotle. He often cites Euripides with praise, but also with blame, that is to say if we can trust the text. Of this author's plays the *Tauric Iphigenia* is that most frequently commended; but when he reproaches the *Aulid Iphigenia* for inconsistency, we are bound, with all good judges since Schiller, either to accuse him of critical incompetence, or to reject the sentence as foisted in by a later hand. Thus he tells us in one place that Empedocles is only a poet as to metre, and yet in another cites him specially for poetical diction. But every chapter of this tract offers so many points for expansion or for criticism, that I must not venture to enter upon this field.

§ 577. The student who desires to apply the theory of Aristotle to modern poetic art will find it necessary to make allowance for several important changes in the drama, which I will here indicate in a few words. Greek tragedy, being essentially religious, became in the hands of its greatest masters so serious a thing, that the relief of humorous or low scenes was hardly permitted. Aristotle indeed gives us to understand in his sketch of its history that this was not so originally, that it arose from a satyric representation, of which the grotesque side was preserved in the satyric afterpiece, when banished from serious tragedy. This severance was exaggerated by the French school of the seventeenth century, who are far more particular than the less artificial Greek masters in avoiding the lower side of human nature. And such, too, was the opinion of Milton, but happily for us Shakespere gave the law for a wider conception, and since his day, even in theory, the comic or humorous element is admitted and even admired as a merit of contrast in our tragedies. With this exception, the elementary rules and directions of Aristotle are such as should guide every dramatist of every time.

Nay more, in our own reading age, when the drama has given way to the novel, or prose tragedy and comedy of ordinary life, without scenery or illusion, it were well if authors

would study the laws which the Greek critic has laid down on the construction of a dramatic story. Now, as then, the plot is vastly the most important element, and no amount of character painting or clever writing will atone for its deficiency. The consistency of the actors, now as then, can only be preserved by a vivid imagination which transports the writer into the situation of his characters. There are as yet few more devices than those described by him as ἀναγνώρισις and περιπέτεια—an unexpected recognition and a catastrophe, together with pathetic misfortunes. All these and other of his laws may perhaps be better verified in George Eliot's great novels than in modern tragedies. But of course, as I before said, our novel replaces not only tragedy, but the newer comedy of the Greeks; and thus, in addition to the humour allowed in modern tragedy, we have sketches of ordinary life, home scenes, and other such matter, suited rather to Menander than to Sophocles. There are many cases too, as Aristotle tells us, when the mere accuracy of drawing, even of unworthy objects, pleases us by its very faithfulness.

The history of the varying influence of the *Poetic* on literature is itself a wide and interesting subject, which would easily fill a volume larger than the present. I will refer the reader to Susemihl's Introduction to his edition, which gives the necessary references, excepting the important French adoption of the work in the seventeenth century, with its momentous consequences; for this the reader must consult the histories of the French classic drama, or M. Patin's *Tragiques grecs*. I will here append a mere sketch.

§ 578. *Bibliographical*. There are few early allusions to this work, for some supposed ones are doubtless to the separate treatise *on poets*, which seems to have been in three books. But there are also clear indications that the extant work is referred to, and in the plural number, though we have no divisions marked. Some critics are disposed to think that here too there were three books, our corrupt and disordered text containing the substance of the first two, while the stray fragments of the author *περὶ κωμῳδίας* and elsewhere point to the third book as occupied with comedy. But if our catalogues of Aris-

totle's works really come from the *Lives* of Hermippus, pupil of Callimachus, the work was then complete and in *two* books, and there seems good reason to believe that the authors of the best scholia on the tragedies (probably Aristophanes Byz.) knew and applied the canons of the *Poetic*.

In later days we hear little of the work, and after the sixth century it seems forgotten. The Arabs indeed preserved some tradition of it, and made some attempts to understand it, the only knowledge of the book before it was printed being derived from Latin translations of Arabic or Hebrew versions. It seems that there was a translation from the Greek into Syriac, and from this with much care by Abou-Maschar Matthias, a Nestorian Christian, into Arabic, about 935 A.D. This MS. is still preserved in Paris, and shows that the text was then as imperfect as we now have it. Two centuries later Averroes wrote an abridgment of the work, which we possess in the Latin version of Hermann the German at the beginning of the thirteenth century, printed at Venice in 1481. This Hermann tells us he had a complete Arab version before him, but preferred the abridgment of Averroes—a somewhat grotesque work, seeing that this celebrated man had not the least idea what a tragedy meant, and accordingly confounded it with the Arabic panegyrics in honour of princes. He also replaces Aristotle's illustrations from Greek literature by examples from Arabic poetry. There was a translation of Averroes' work into rabbinical Hebrew, and from this into Latin in the fourteenth century.

The Latin version of L. Valla (Venice, 1498) was made directly from a Greek MS., but the text itself was not included in the great Aldine *Aristotle*. It first appeared among the *Rhetores Græci* with the *Rhetoric*, in 1568; then come Pacci (1535), P. Victorius (Junta, 1560), and a host of others. The MS. followed in these prints was one of the many fifteenth century copies, and this was the case with all later editions till the present century, when editors since Bekker (Burgess is a qualified exception) have reverted to the only older MS., an eleventh century copy in Paris, known as A^c. Passing by other early Latin versions, there are Italian translations by Castelvetro and

Piccolomini in 1570-2, the latter of which is highly praised. In the next century Corneille's enemies brought it out in a French version (by the Abbé Hedelin) and framed upon it their *theory of the three unities*, which they foisted on Aristotle, and which they drove to such a pitch as ultimately to discredit the Greeks by the light of their false Aristotle.¹ This 'conflict of the ancients and moderns' is an important chapter in French dramatic literature, and reached down to the days of Voltaire.

It is, however, now agreed even by the Germans that Twining's English translation (1789), and Tyrwhitt's text and commentary, a magnificent specimen of the Clarendon Press (Oxon. 1794), are the real foundation of a scientific knowledge of the work. Excellent German editions now abound: Bekker's text (reprinted 1873); Ritter's and Vahlen's (1867); the translations of Stahr, Ueberweg (1870), Susemihl; the dissertations of Bernays, Vahlen, Bonitz, Susemihl, and a host of others. There are also excellent recent French versions: Egger's (*Hist. de la Critique*, &c., 1849), and several others since that date. I am not aware that there is any work of importance on the subject in English, in our own day, except some notes of Mr. Bywater in the *Journal of Philology*, No. v.; for this reason I have given these details with disproportionate fullness. The reader will find a summary of works, not nearly complete, but very large, in Susemihl's *Preface*, pp. xix-xxiii, and references to fuller catalogues in various German reviews.

§ 579. We turn to a far greater work, somewhat earlier in date, but not so clearly belonging to a history of literature. The *Politics* are confessed on all hands to be the ripest and fullest outcome of Greek political experience. They were based on the researches in Aristotle's *Constitutions*, or Catalogue of some 250 polities, of which many precious fragments tell us enough to desire that it were preserved even at the expense of the extant book on the theory of politics. For as such the present work is essentially conceived in Aristotle's peculiar method, being based on actual experience, and the criticism of

¹ Of course Aristotle insists everywhere on unity of action; he once casually mentions unity of time (v. § 4) in contrast to the freedom of epic poetry; on unity of place he is absolutely silent.

previous theorists. To the historian, to the student of Greek politics and Greek society, this book, though imperfect and corrupt, is nevertheless inestimable. It can hardly be called a literary performance. All the defects of careless composition, or perhaps dictation, of double explanations, of hopeless conciseness, which we find elsewhere in his works, are here also the exercising ground of endless criticism. I will indicate the chief points of interest to the general reader.

The first book, after an introduction showing how the *state* is the natural and necessary outcome of man's social nature, and a more complex union than that within the household, goes on to discuss slavery, and the acquisition of wealth, as parts of the household, and therefore as entering into the state. The other bonds of union are those of husband and wife, of father and son (daughters are ignored) and of brothers, of which the second only is treated in the subsequent book on education. These various bonds find their respective analogies in despotic, aristocratical, monarchical, and timocratic governments, as appears from comparing other passages¹ with what is here said. Aristotle conceives the relation of sex differently from Plato, for he thinks that women differ intellectually not in degree but in kind from men, and he does not contemplate their ever attaining more than the place of free but inferior and subject personages in the household. The *locus classicus* is not here but at the opening of the ninth book of the *Natural History*, a graphic passage, containing a curious mixture of true and false generalisation. I quote it as a favourable specimen of his style.²

¹ Especially *Nic. Ethics*, viii. 10, 11.

² Book ix. ch. i. p. 608. After describing the distinction of male and female as the cause of differences of temper in all animals, he goes on to illustrate it by the case of hounds, and adds that in the case of the bear and panther only is the female more courageous than the male. *τούτων δ' ἵχνη μὲν τῶν ἡθῶν ἐστὶν ἐν πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ φανερώτερα ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσιν μᾶλλον ἥθος καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν ἀποτετελεσμένην, ὥστε καὶ ταύτας τὰς ἑξεις εἶναι φανερωτέρας ἐν αὐτοῖς, διόπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς ἐλεημονέστερον καὶ ἀρίδακρυ μᾶλλον, ἔτι δὲ φθονερώτερόν τε καὶ μεμψιμοιρότερον, καὶ φιλολοιδόρον μᾶλλον καὶ πληκτικώτερον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ δύσθυμον μᾶλλον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἀρρενος καὶ δύσελπι, καὶ ἀναιδέστερον καὶ*

His reflections on slavery are much more interesting, as showing that there were already *Abolitionists* in the world, who declared that slavery was *against nature*—a doctrine which Aristotle earnestly combats, though making several important concessions very damaging to his cause. He rightly denies the absurd doctrine (so fashionable in the last century) of the equality of men, and asserts the radical inferiority of certain races. But it is surprising that he does not recognise among some barbarians, as he calls them, the same right to rule as that of the Greeks. The Aryan barons who fought against the Greeks from the days of Cyrus to those of the last Darius were a nobility of splendid traditions, and educated, as Herodotus tells us, ‘to ride on horseback, to use their bows, and to speak the truth.’ The Carthaginians had framed so excellent a constitution that Aristotle presently selects it among the best of those known, for careful description and comment. Yet he admits only individual exceptions, and is blinded by the national vanity of the Hellenes. His case would have been much stronger had he known such races as the Negroes; but if we admit his premises, that the refined leisure of a small minority of the inhabitants of a Greek city is the highest possible state, he is perfectly justified in his argument.

The remainder of the book is about trade, about the nature of wealth, and how the acquisition of money has come to replace that of the goods which are represented by it. Here again Aristotle shows the old Greek gentleman's prejudice against retail trade, and brands the taking of interest on money as an unnatural crime. This blunder lasted far into the Middle Ages, while the right of plundering wrecks was recognised, just as Aristotle maintains that war or piracy for the acquisition of slaves among people who ought to be slaves (though they do not recognise it) is perfectly just.

§ 580. The second book is a review of famous politics, both

ψευδέστερον, εὐαπατητότερον δὲ καὶ μνημονικώτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἀγρυπνότερον καὶ ὀκνηρότερον, καὶ ὕλως ἀκίνητότερον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος, καὶ τροφῆς ἐλάττωτος ἐστίν. βοηθητικώτερον δέ, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, καὶ ἀνδρείότερον τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαλακίᾳ, ὅταν τῷ τριόδοντι πληγῇ ἡ σηπία, ὁ μὲν ἄρρην βοηθεῖ τῇ θηλείᾳ, ἡ δὲ θήλεια φεύγει τοῦ ἄρρενος πληγέντος.

actually existing and devised by theorists, and does not, I think, increase our respect for the great critic. The theoretical sketches are put on a level with actually existing and successful politics, which is absurd, and, moreover, the faults and failures of these latter, which occurred in the lapse of centuries, are charged to want of foresight in their authors, as if any legislator could foresee such far distant consequences. The ideal states of Plato (or of Socrates, as Aristotle calls it throughout), of Hippodamos, and of Phaleas are criticised, the first at great length, but with much sophistry, and little attempt to understand or appreciate the immortal *Republic*. It is, indeed, maintained by Susemihl,¹ that while the refutation of the extreme socialism in family relations in the *Republic* is very complete and successful, the critique of the *Laws*, which sets forth a state not unlike in kind to Aristotle's own ideal, is petty and sophistical. He complains that critics have not attended sufficiently to this contrast. But I cannot concede that an account of Plato's *Republic*, which asserts his marriage laws to be a *community* (κοινωνία) of women, destroying self-command and chastity, is anything short of a gross libel, and unworthy to be called a refutation.

Then follow very valuable sketches of the Lacedæmonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions. The last chapter seems a spurious addition, reviewing Solon and other legislators by way of supplement. There may have been a real review of Solon given by Aristotle, but surely not the brief and bald statement now in the text. Possibly the gap was early felt in this place, and the lost account of Solon replaced by the present chapter.

The third book enters upon the dogmatic or positive part of the scheme, and seeks to analyse what a state or polity means, before discussing its perfect conditions. A state is determined by its citizens, those who vote and judge in it. Aristotle proceeds to determine more closely the idea of a citizen, and whether his ἀρετή is the same as that of the man. Are the good man and the good citizen identical? This he shows to

¹ *Introd.* p. 27.

be not always the case, but so much so in the best or ideal constitution that his good citizen must be a Greek gentleman of leisure, and secure from all menial trade or employment. He then determines ¹ the various species of constitution according to the sovereign power in each—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—with their various subdivisions and debased forms. With the ninth chapter he enters upon the discussion of individual forms, and, in the remainder of this book, of the forms of monarchy and its justification in nature. It is probably with his eye upon the astounding personality of Alexander ² that he declares there are exceptional cases, where the merit of one man in the state is so indisputably pre-eminent that all are willing, and bound, to obey him. But ordinarily there is more wisdom in a selected plurality, or constitutional aristocracy, which is accordingly the best or ideal form.

§ 581. This he discusses at great length, and with special detail, in the following two books, which stand at the close in our MSS., but which have long since been recognised as out of place there, and are now printed as fourth and fifth in all good

¹ cc. 4-5.

² The reference has been vehemently denied by Susemihl (*Introd.* pp. 42-3) and others, on the ground that Aristotle never considers such an empire as the Macedonian, but exclusively the small Hellenic polity, with its narrow limits and purely Hellenic citizens. This criticism forgets that Aristotle might be so struck by Alexander as a commanding nature, as to infer the justice of making such an one a king even in a Hellenic and ideal state, though he actually lived in a foreign system. I cannot doubt that this amount of reference is intended, but I do not go so far as Oncken in finding philo-Macedonian allusions throughout the work. But if this point be doubtful, what shall we say to the strange statement he makes (p. 1296, 38) in connection with the moderate democracy managed by the middle classes, that 'of those who had formerly attained power, one man only was persuaded to restore this form of government (εἰς γὰρ ἀνὴρ συνεπίεσθη μόνος τῶν πρότερον ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων ταύτην ἀποδοῦναι τὴν τάξιν), while all the rest had made oligarchies or democracies for their own interest?' Who was this remarkable person? The text seems unassailable. Pericles, Epaminondas, Solon, and Pittacus have been suggested. I will add Mardonius, suspecting that Μήδων has dropped out (after γενομένων), and that Aristotle may possibly refer to the statement of Herodotus (vi. 43) that he established popular rule in the Asiatic cities, a thing incredible in his own day. But Pittacus is the most probable.

editions. The first three chapters are no doubt an Aristotelian, but hardly relevant, inquiry into the most desirable existence for a state, which is determined on the questionable analogy of the individual. Whether the philosopher, who stood aloof from public affairs, or the politician, who controlled them, be the more perfect man, leading the more perfect life, was a dispute common since Plato's day. Aristotle elsewhere declares expressly for the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*, the life of intellectual activity, which approaches nearest to that of the gods. He here contents himself with showing that, as happiness—which consists of three parts, the goods of mind, body, and estate—depends chiefly on the first, most men who praise the politician's life from ambition and grasping motives miss the mark altogether. The true and righteous politician's life is not one of unjust aggrandisement, and, on the other hand, not devoid of speculation. So also the philosophic life is not without the noblest kind of action. The two kinds are therefore not mutually exclusive, and a state need not exist for foreign conquest, or for imperial purposes, but may devote itself with equal dignity and perfection to the well-being of its own citizens.

It would carry us too far to pursue even this very brief analysis. The external and internal conditions of Aristotle's state are unfortunately not completely preserved. Nevertheless, the fragmentary fifth book, on the education of the citizens, is so interesting, that I hope to consider it elsewhere fully in connection with the subject of Greek education. The philosopher then turns to the actual forms of polity, and discusses their relation to his ideal state, the conditions of their welfare, and lastly the causes of their decay, with the various means of avoiding it. This analysis of the pathology of polities, which occupies the last book (v. in the old order), is that of most practical value, and has accordingly been most studied by statesmen and political writers. Had Machiavelli completed his *Republic*, designed on the plan of his *Principe*, we should have had a close modern analogy to these books.

§ 582. Most editors, not content with changing the place of the last books in the MSS., as I have mentioned, also transpose the immediately foregoing ones, so that the MS. order is

thus reformed—i. ii. iii. vii. viii. iv. vi. v. The placing of vii. and viii. immediately after iii. was first suggested by Nicolas d'Oresme (1370), then by several of the earliest commentators, such as P. Victorius, Segni, and Scaino da Salo, in the sixteenth century; by Conring in the seventeenth; but was not again urged till the problem was taken up in the last generation by St. Hilaire and Spengel.¹ It is Hildenbrand's suggestion that the closer description of the ideal state was postponed by Aristotle till after he had composed his historical survey, was accordingly left unfinished, and found at the end of the MS. when his books were rediscovered at Skepsis. Hence the place and condition of these books in our MSS. would be explained. The transposition of v. and vi. was not proposed till this century by St. Hilaire, who is supported by Spengel. But this last change is not so imperatively demanded as the former. It is, however, now so generally adopted that the old numbering of the books should be abandoned, as producing useless perplexity.

§ 583. A sober review of the whole work impresses us with sincere admiration on the one hand, and on the other with disappointment. To take the latter first. I will not insist upon the various confusions introduced by Aristotle's over-fondness for logical divisions, especially the vague position assigned to the moderate democracy (πολιτεία) and aristocracy in relation to one another, and to his ideal state. Neither will I repeat myself on the defects of his style, or on the many difficulties introduced by corruptions or dislocations of the text. What we rather wonder at is the narrow Hellenedom of Aristotle, who has learned nothing from contemporary history, nothing from his own studies in foreign politics, nothing from his varied foreign residences, nothing from the Macedonian court, and hence nothing of course from the vague but splendid talk of Isocrates and his school about the spreading of Hellenic culture beyond the limits of the race. With Aristotle Greeks alone are worthy to be free and dominant, and all foreigners are more or less adapted for slavery. The researches made for his 260 πολιτεία

¹ Cf. the interesting account of Oncken, *Staatslehre des A.* i. pp. 85, sq.

must have brought him within sight of the rising power of Rome, and yet we can have little doubt that the Romans were, or would have been, included by him under the head of slavish barbarians. The Carthaginians occupy him very fully with their constitution, and yet he will not allow that even here there was another dominant race adapted for empire.

With this assumption of slavery as natural and necessary to most of the world, comes a contempt for labour, a glorification of leisure, and a dislike for money making, which was the main defect of all Greek political thinkers. And yet there were in Aristotle's day not only logical thinkers who asserted the unnatural and immoral character of slavery in its essence, but democratic theorists, like Hippodamus and the sophist Lycophron, who had approached the modern conception of a state as a mere power of protecting its citizens by law from mutual oppression and injury, while it left them to follow their individual pursuits, without persecuting them with a lifelong education, or an inquisitive intermeddling in their private affairs. But here Plato's influence was too strong. His pupil differs indeed in many details. He will not approach the splendid conception that all the earthly life even of the highest rulers in the ideal state is but a preparation for a purer and higher existence beyond; he regards the state here as the end in itself. But still he is forced to admit that the life of abstract contemplation, apart from all practical affairs, is the best and nearest to the gods. He objects to Plato's extreme supervision of marriage, as set forth in the *Republic*; yet his own notions differ little from those in the *Laws*, and he admits by far the most offensive point in Plato—the sanction of producing abortion—in his own state. And thus in many other cases. He really opposes Plato on a very few details, and those rather matters of degree than of principle.

On the other hand, the influence of the Athenian democracy on this aristocratic theorist is far clearer than on Plato, owing, I suppose, to a more unbiassed historical study. He fully appreciates, in all actual constitutions, the paramount value of a strong middle class; and he upholds with great force the superiority of a fixed code of established law over the chang-

ing decrees and decisions of courts and assemblies. The strongest, and doubtless the most immortal part of his book, is his review not only of the varying forms of existing polities, but of the causes of their conservation and decay—an account corroborated throughout with historical examples unfortunately too minute to be now verified. But there can be no doubt that here he has built upon so sound a philosophic basis, and upon the evidence of so large and varied a political experience, that his lessons on the rise and fall of governments will never grow old, and will be perpetually receiving fresh corroboration, so long as human nature remains the same.

§ 584. The *Politics* of Aristotle seem to have excited no attention in antiquity. The silence of our authorities gives new countenance to the story of the philosopher's works being hidden in a cellar in Skepsis, and only found and published by Apellikon of Teos in the days of Sylla. Of course this story can be disproved as regards his purely philosophical books, but it is not improbable that this unfinished, and therefore unpublished, fragment of a colossal work may have been hidden by an appropriate fate from the generation who had lost the power of profiting by it. It is distinctly cited by Cicero,¹ but all the other ancients who occupy themselves with Plato's *Republic* are silent concerning Aristotle's criticism, and his alternative state. Thus this work did not pass through the Nestorian Christians to the Arabs.

Bibliographical. Our earliest authority for the text is the barbarous but exceedingly literal translation of William de Moerbeke (a Dominican monk of Brabant), made about 1270 A.D. from an older MS. than any we possess. On this Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus wrote commentaries, but with the political darkness of their age. We have no Greek MSS. older than the fourteenth century, and most of them are only of the fifteenth. They are all corrupt, nor can any one of them be regarded as of pre-eminent value. Perhaps the Milan codex (in the Ambrosian Library) is the best. It was done into French with far more critical insight by Nicolas d'Oresme, about 1373 (printed in Paris 1489). After another Latin version by

¹ *De Fin.* v. 4, 11, and elsewhere.

Lionardo Aretino (1398), it appeared in print in the great Aldine *Aristotle* of 1495-8. In the following century, the days of republics and tyrannies, and revolutions, and factions in Italy, a large number of editions and translations—Oncken says twenty-five—appeared. We see in Machiavelli's *Principe* a close study, and often an imitation of the last two books ; and no doubt the Italians of that age were the nearest approach the world has yet seen in politics as well as in art to the old Greeks. In the present century the principal older edition is Schneider's ; the more recent and best was Bekker's (in the great Berlin edition), till the appearance of Susemihl's elaborate text and apparatus, which has sorted and discussed fully all the MSS. and other helps. Susemihl has since published a text with German translation and very valuable notes (Leipzig, 1879), quite the most serviceable edition at present, though the translation is very inferior to that of three books by Bernays, and the constant transpositions of short passages (though carefully noted) are disturbing to references. In England we have Eaton's and Congreve's editions, both very inferior to those just named ; and there are partial commentaries by Heitland, Broughton, and Postgate. There is, indeed, an edition long promised by Mr. Newman of Oxford. But it is much to be regretted that we have as yet no standard English edition produced by some scholar who has an English sense of politics, like Grote. Unfortunately, his posthumous *Aristotle* does not touch the *Politics*. Susemihl's notes (in his German edition) refer the reader to a great mass of special studies in the German periodicals, of which I may recommend those of Vahlen and Bernays. The best general discussion of the *Politics* is Oncken's *Staatslehre des Aristoteles* (Leipzig, 1870), a very eloquent and attractive book, in fact quite an exceptional German work, and well worth translating, though here and there too enthusiastic, and sometimes hasty ; Thurot's and Havet's *Études* are also suggestive. But the modern literature on the subject is almost endless, and may be appreciated from Susemihl's German preface,¹ or from his account in Bursian's *Jahresbericht* for 1874 and 1877.

¹ pp. xviii-xxii.

§ 585. We come, lastly, to the *Nicomachean Ethic*, which was earlier in composition than the *Politics*, but is here treated in reverse order, because it is more strictly a philosophical treatise, with which we are not strictly concerned. I will pass by all critical questions, and all ethical discussion, and will merely call attention to the literary aspects of some portions of the work, which are, indeed, excrescences to the argument, and beyond its proper scope. I refer to the sketching of particular characters in the fourth book (which are illustrations of his doctrine of ethical excellence being a mean), and to his discussion of friendship in the eighth and ninth books. The most peculiar of his characters is that of the *μεγαλόδουλος*, which, with all its grandeur and dignity, is not an agreeable picture of Aristotle's ideal in practical life. The Germans are full of theories as to who is intended to be thus drawn. Zeller says he may have been thinking of Alexander. Oncken believes the philosopher was describing himself! As the portrait is exceedingly unlike what we know either of Alexander or of Aristotle, we may pass by these conjectures with a mere notice. We do not know enough of Pericles personally to assert that he was intended, nor perhaps did Aristotle think of him; but he seems less unlikely than the other two.

The latter dissertation is not without the usual defects of style in our Aristotelian writings—repetitions, parentheses, and omissions of points in the argument, but nevertheless it may lay some claim to style, and has been greatly eulogised by most of the philosophic critics. To us the most interesting question about these books is to determine whether Greek *friendship* was, indeed, no more than is here described, or whether the fault is Aristotle's, who, through his love of definition and explanation, has overlooked the real nature of the thing. He distinguishes three kinds: that from the love of goodness, that for the sake of mutual pleasure, and that for the sake of profit. On all these he makes many acute and many true remarks. But when he tells us that the good man loves himself and his own worth, and *therefore* the same qualities in another; when he denies the possibility of true friendship, except in the case of such mature and self-conscious

persons who are equal or nearly equal in position, he seems to me to have altogether missed the mark, and to have been misled by a spirit of narrow formalism. This is not the place for ethical discussion, but I suppose there are no observers of human nature who will not admit that friendship, though suggested and stimulated by mutual goodness, and frequent intercourse, does not essentially depend upon either. For within the same house and the same society there are often people of excellence, who respect one another, and yet who are not friends. Again, there are very inferior natures, nay actually bad natures, which are capable of forming loyal attachments that stand firm and unsullied even in the midst of crime, of injustice and of contempt for the rights of society. The fact is that what we call friendship in the strictest sense, apart from any conscious mutual advantage, depends upon a subtle and inexplicable sympathy, which draws people together in spite of all manner of obstacles, and often forms bonds among the unequal, while it refuses to join those whom every other promoting cause would almost force into the relation. While Aristotle is perfectly silent on this intangible cause, which is far the most important, he gives us all manner of useful hints on those lesser and spurious forms of friendship, among which I am almost tempted to rank mutual esteem for the sake of goodness. But there runs all through his remarks an unpleasant prominence of selfish considerations, the reflex of the nation and the age in which he lived.

The discussion of editions and commentaries on the *Ethics* must be sought in the histories of philosophy.

§ 586. Before leaving Aristotle, it may be well to consider generally the oft-repeated charges of dryness and of disorder in that philosopher's writing. As to the apparent disorder, it may arise from confusion of thought, as well as from imperfect transmission of our texts; in the former case it is a grave defect. But we should remind ourselves carefully, in justice to Aristotle, that no discoverer is likely to put his first draught into anything like logical shape, and that if we desire to watch the profoundly interesting phenomenon of the thinking out of new truths, or of a new system, we must be content to take it

with those digressions, those repetitions, those perpetual excursions beyond the strict matter in hand, which characterise the speculations of every fruitful thinker.¹ Moreover, with such a thinker as Aristotle, we may even rejoice that he did not condescend to waste his few years of mature work in polishing his style, instead of quarrying out great mines of untouched knowledge. These considerations are an ample apology for all those negligences which arise from carelessness of form, or the over-crowding of thoughts in the teeming mind of the great thinker. The case is somewhat different when we approach those barren subtleties, those minute subdivisions and distinctions, which waste our time and exhaust our patience, while they do not advance our knowledge. We must confess that here Aristotle was the child of his race and age, and did not escape that defect of over-subtlety, which is the leading fault in the Hellenic mind. Not only their philosophers, but their poets and orators give way to this weakness; no sooner do they come in sight of any logical distinction, than they forthwith abandon themselves to the luxury of divisions and subdivisions, of definitions and qualifications. Which of us has not been wearied with them throughout the divine dialogues of Plato? Which of us has not been in turn offended and amused with them in Aristotle? 'Ce sont des articles de dictionnaire que le philosophe s'amuse à rédiger chemin faisant.' One almost imagines that the Greeks of his day still found the newly discovered mechanism of reasoning so delightful, that they could not help exhibiting it, as a child keeps working a new mechanical toy. We see the same turn in Thucydides; we see it in Euripides, who affects his audience as much by conflicts of argument as by pictures of passion or of woe. But in the great classical writers this dominant passion for logical subtlety alternates with those higher literary qualities, which command the sympathy of all civilised men, and thus we condone the *Parmenides* and the *Sophistes* for

¹ I cannot recal any great discoverer who has put his thinking into a scrupulously neat and perfect form except Champollion, whose inductive reasoning in the *Précis du système hiéroglyphique* has this extraordinary merit.

the pathos of the *Phædon*, for the imagination and humour of the *Symposium*, though here too there are not wanting tedious analyses. In Aristotle, as we have him, there is not this relief; we have nothing but depth of thought, and suggestiveness of expression, to atone for the arid scholasticism of his discourse.

§ 587. Thus the classical literature of Greece may be said to close with Aristotle. He himself, as a literary man, stands between the living and the dead; and if in early life he attended to style, in mature age we find him neglecting it for the sake of the matter of knowledge. With him and his generation—the brilliant generation which produced the greatest eloquence in Demosthenes and Hypereides, the most perfect social comedy in Menander and Philemon—the power of original production seems suddenly to collapse, and the age of criticism to commence. Grammar, rhetoric, eclectic philosophy are the branches of literature which flourish, and which, together with second-rate poetry and oratory, fill up the silver or Alexandrine epoch in Greek literature. We have as yet to say something of the historians contemporary with Aristotle, who, though they were inferior to the great masters whom they imitated, transmitted the taste for historical enquiry to those later men, who have left us what is best and most enduring in the decadence of the nation. Poetry, as we have seen in the former volume, had its flashes of revival in Apollonius and Theocritus, but we may thank the kind Fate which has saved us the study of more productions like the *Hymns* of Callimachus and the *Alexandra* of Lycophron.

In the Renaissance among the Romans, and afterwards in mediæval Italy, the contrast of classical and post-classical was not strongly felt. Men imitated and admired Philetas and Callimachus along with Alcæus and Sappho, and loved Polybius and Plutarch as much as Herodotus and Xenophon. No doubt we have gone into an opposite extreme, and neglect too completely the real worth of the later literature, such as it remains to us in Theocritus and Plutarch. But still, in this hurried and weary age, when it is impossible to study the whole of Greek literature in its vast extent, the proper principle of

selection is certainly to confine ourselves to the age and to the men who, in the judgment of all sound critics, have been pre-eminent as well in form as in matter. Plutarch is a pure and elevating writer, full of precious information, and breathing a lofty moral tone. But we lose little by reading Plutarch in English or in French, for as a stylist he is no Herodotus or Thucydides ; he is read for his matter, and his matter only. This too is strictly the case with Aristotle as we know him, and he therefore, as a stylist, is beyond the limit of classical Greek literature. As a critic, however, especially as a critic of classical literature, he has occupied us, I trust, in no undue detail.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE LOST HISTORIANS OF THE FOURTH CENTURY, B.C.

§ 588. WE must not conclude this account of classical Greek prose without saying something of those numerous historians, especially of the school of Isocrates, who were much praised and quoted, and formed the principal materials from which Plutarch, Diodorus, and other writers of the Roman period drew their facts. The enquiry into what were the sources of Plutarch's biographies, or of the later histories, forms a favourite exercising ground for the Germans, and tracts *de fontibus* Plutarchi, or Diodori, or of the rest, inundate the learned periodicals. Unfortunately, though we have many criticisms upon these authors, especially by Polybius, and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who reviews the most important of them, I do not know that we have a single specimen of their style sufficient to afford us an independent judgment. They are cited for facts; they are criticised by one another, at times savagely; they are praised and blamed, but never quoted verbatim at any length. Hence the splendid collection of Carl Müller¹ in the early volumes gives us hundreds of their fragments, and yet conveys no definite idea of their style. Nevertheless, we may be quite certain that none of these writers were in anyone's judgment (except their own) equal to the three great masters, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, who have fortunately survived. All sound ancient critics note this inferiority, not only in judgment and critical knowledge of political and military affairs, but, what would have pained the authors far more, in style. For they were trained rhetoricians, who cultivated manner with conscious care, and sought to outdo the great models placed before them.

¹ *Fragg. Hist. Græc.* 5 vols., Didot, 1853-70.

One imitated Herodotus, another Thucydides, another Xenophon, but, like almost all copies, they were wanting in the vividness, the grace, and the power of the originals. There was apparently a self-conscious and controversial tone about them; they were exercised not only in the jealousies of rival schools, but in the party politics of the day; they wrote history as rhetoricians, and as partisans, if not of men, at least of political theories. Hence later days neglected them, and amid the wreck of the dark ages no one exerted himself to save them. One alone, from a later age, survives. Polybius was doubtless the soberest and most valuable of these Epigoni. His work is of the highest value to the historian, as a long series of approving critics has amply shown;¹ but as a stylist he never has been, and never will be, read. He is a valuable monument in the historical development of the Greeks; he forms no part of their classical literature.

From this preamble it will appear that these writers may here be disposed of very briefly, but a list of their names and works should not be wanting even in this handbook. It is, however, not easy to separate those of a later period from those who flourished before the death of Alexander; for we have a continuous stream of names reaching down to the Roman times, as the student of Müller's *Fragmenta* will see at a glance. I am only here concerned with the earliest of them, and of these some reach higher than the opening of the fourth century B.C.

§ 589. I have already mentioned Ion and Stesimbrotus² as authors of historical memoirs from which Plutarch borrowed. Another early historian, who treated of no events subsequent to 420 B.C., was ANTIOCHUS OF SYRACUSE, son of Xenophanes. He wrote on the early history of Italy, in which he, first among Greek writers, mentioned Rome. He also composed the history of Sicily from the earliest times to the first year of Darius

¹ For the English reader the best sources to estimate the value of Polybius are Thirlwall's *Hist. of Greece* (last volume) and Freeman's very remarkable *Hist. of Federal Government*, vol. i. Unfortunately, neither Grote nor E. Curtius have carried down their Histories to the period of which Polybius treats.

² Above, p. 42.

Nothus, Ol. 89, 1. Being the oldest authority on Sicily and Italy, it is certain that he was much used by Aristotle, Dionysius and Diodorus, as well as by the many succeeding writers on the same subject. But what is to us most interesting is that the account of Sicily at the opening of Thucydides' sixth book is probably borrowed from him, perhaps even verbally, to judge from some peculiar forms not elsewhere found in Thucydides. Thus the whole of this early chronology would depend upon a single writer from an uncritical age. It is not improbable that, as all the early dates are reckoned from the founding of Syracuse, and that this is determined by Archias, the founder, being the eleventh in direct line from Heracles, our Sicilian chronology, which is implicitly received because it is sanctioned by Thucydides, is a mere theoretical scheme. Antiochus, in an extant fragment,¹ speaks of the Achæans who were founding Croton being helped by Archias when on his way to found Syracuse—a much more likely account than that which makes Syracuse an older settlement. In fact, the natural course of things points to the settlement of Corcyra first, then the south² coast of Italy, then Sicily. But I cannot here enter upon this obscure question.

§ 590. The history of Sicily was again taken up by a remarkable man, who lived somewhat later than Antiochus, and was himself a prominent actor in the events of the day, PHILISTUS of Syracuse, son of Archimenidas. Our main information concerning him comes from Plutarch's life of Dion, and from Diodorus, when relating the fortunes of Dionysius and his son as tyrants of Syracuse. For in Suidas' article the historian is evidently confounded with a rhetor Philiscus of Miletus, who was the pupil of Isocrates and master of Timæus, as well as with Philinus of Agrigentum, who wrote on the first Punic war. Philistus was born about Ol. 86-7, and therefore witnessed the great siege of Syracuse by the Athenians. He supported Dionysius with his private means and encouraged him with his advice, and was doubtless one of the staunchest adherents and best friends of the tyrant. Nevertheless they quarrelled, and

¹ Frag. 11, from Strabo.

² As the east coast up to Brundisium is very barren and poor in soil.

Philistus was exiled (386-5 B.C.) to the Adriatic, where he composed most of his histories. After many bitter complaints of his exile, and owing to much flattering persuasion, he was recalled by the younger Dionysius, when he set himself in opposition, apparently with success, to Dion and Plato, who were attempting the philosophical conversion of the tyrant. When Dion invaded Sicily, Philistus was appointed by Dionysius to command his fleet, but being defeated by the Syracusans near Leontini after a brave defence, he either killed himself or was put to death by his enemies, when an old man, in Ol. 106, 1 (356 B.C.).

He wrote the history of Sicily from the earliest date down to the capture of Agrigentum (407 B.C.), in seven books; then, in connection with it, the immediately succeeding reign of Dionysius the elder, in four books, down to his death (Ol. 103, 2). He also wrote two books on the reign of the younger Dionysius, down to Ol. 104, 2, and this work was completed by Athanas of Syracuse.¹ Two points are frequently insisted upon by his critics: first, his strong adulation of the tyrants, which made him very unpopular; secondly, his imitation of Thucydides. Cicero² calls him 'Siculus ille capitalis, vafer, acutus, brevis, pæne pusillus Thucydides.' Quintilian thinks him weaker but clearer. Dionysius, in a fuller criticism, gives him praise and blame combined, and exhibits him, on the whole, as a very second-rate copy of the great master. From Cicero's *Brutus* (cap. 17) we may infer that he despised rhetorical finish in his writing, and was hence degraded in the estimation of an over-cultivated age as being deficient in these minor qualities of a historian. But this would, no doubt, have made his works not less valuable to us. The later historian Timæus, called Ἐπιτιμαῖος from his censorious temper, attacked Philistus, as well as other early historians of Sicily, in his great work, but was himself attacked in turn by Strabo and Polybius. It seems that subsequent historians, who used general histories as their main authority, turned to Philistus as a specialist when they

¹ The title Σικελικά is sometimes given to the whole series, though the author so named only the first part, the second being περὶ Διονυσίου.

² *Ep. ad Q. frat. ii. 13.*

came to treat of Sicilian affairs. This is believed to be the case with Diodorus in particular. Hence comes most of our knowledge of Philistus' works.

§ 591. Far more regrettable is the loss of the histories of Ephorus and Theopompus, the two greatest pupils of Isocrates, whom he trained carefully in what he considered historical style, and whose tempers were so diverse that he said the former required a whip and the other a curb. Hence EPHORUS (of Cumæ, son of Demophilus, born Ol. 98-100) with his calmer temperament turned to earlier history, and composed a celebrated work, reaching from the Return of the Heracleidæ,¹ which he seems first to have made his starting-point, to the siege of Perinthus by Philip (340 B.C.). It was afterwards brought down by Dyillus to the death of Philip. This history was in thirty books (the last completed by his son Demophilus), each with a separate introduction and forming a separate whole. It is praised by Polybius as the first and only attempt at an *universal history*. The other works, *on Inventions* and *on Geography*, seem rather to be excerpts from the digressions in this history.² The general contents of most of the books have been inferred from the fragments by Müller.³

He was considered an honest and painstaking writer, as indeed we may infer from his own statement,⁴ but we do not know what sources he used, or how he used them, for we find through Diodorus and Strabo, who constantly follow him as an authority, that he differed frequently from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon in relating the periods treated by them. In the case of the last, indeed, it is fortunate that he was so independent, for it is to him (through Diodorus) that we owe the possibility of correcting Xenophon's scandalously unfair account of Epaminondas and the Theban supremacy. His fourth and fifth books, called Εὐρώπη and Ἀσία καὶ Λιβύη, on

¹ This was fixed at 1104 B.C. by Eratosthenes.

² This is, however, more than doubtful, though suggested by Müller, in the case of an essay περὶ λέξεως, on expression, mentioned by Theon and by Cicero, in which he recommended dactylic and pæonic, in preference to spondaic and trochaic rhythms, in prose composition.

³ i. pp. lx-i.

⁴ Frag. 2.

the geography of the then known world, were largely used by Strabo and by the scholiasts. Ephorus' account of the causes of the Peloponnesian war is restated at length by Diodorus,¹ and is not calculated to increase our respect for him. On the other hand, his geographical researches afforded valuable material to Strabo, as appears all through the *Geography*. He quoted old poets and inscriptions, but not very critically. Polybius says he is quite ignorant of the operations of war, except those on sea, and that his details of land battles, when they are at all complicated, as at Mantinea, are absurd; but this vice is not peculiar to him. In his account of the Athenian hegemony, we can infer from Diodorus' second-hand history that he was partial to the Athenians, and differed from Thucydides' account of many transactions in giving a more favourable interpretation of Athenian conduct. Nevertheless, he seems to have been as sparing as Thucydides in mentioning the inner, or the constitutional, history of Athens. As to style he is alternately praised and blamed (the former by Polybius, the latter by Dionysius), and he no doubt had the faults and perfections of Isocratic teaching. He was elegant and flowing, but not spontaneous, and decidedly wanting in power.²

§ 592. It is remarkable that while Suidas calls Ephorus *ιστορικός*, he calls his brother historian, THEOPOMPUS, a *ῥήτωρ*, and very justly. For not only did this man compose epideictical displays, as for example at the funeral of Mausollus, but all his

¹ xii. 38-41, frag 119.

² The value of Ephorus as a source of history, and the extent to which he was used by later writers, such as Plutarch, Diodorus, Trogus, and Nepos, form the subject of constant monographs in German philological journals—monographs which show more erudition and acuteness in their conjectures than solid results. I cite a few, in which the remainder will be found discussed: Volquardsen, *Untersuch. über die Quellen des Diodor.* xi xvi (Kiel, 1868); Collmann, *de Diodori Sic. fontibus* (Marburg, 1869); Albracht, *de Them. Plut. fontibus* (Göttingen, 1873); Sauppe, *die Quellen Plut. für das Leben Perikles* (*Abhandl. Gött. Akad.* vol. xiii. 1867); Wolffgarten, *de Ephori hist., &c. a Trogo expressis* (Bonn, 1868); Holzapfel, *Untersuch. über Griech. Gesch., &c.* (Leipzig, 1879). The Sicilian part of Ephorus' history is specially discussed by Holm, *Geschichte Siciliens*, ii. 340, sqq.

writing was intensely rhetorical, and breathed the vehement and angry spirit of the author. He was the son of Damasistratus, and brother of the rhetor Caucalus, born about the 100th Olympiad at Chios.¹ He was exiled when an infant with his father from Chios for *Laconism*, perhaps, as Müller suggests, by the Theban party when Epaminondas attempted the hegemony of the sea. He became the pupil of Isocrates, and returned to his home in his forty-fifth year, owing to the interference of Alexander in favour of exiles during the early part of his expedition. Being a man of private means he never composed court speeches, but wandered through all the Greek cities making epideictic displays of his rhetoric, of which the most successful seems to have been his *panegyric on Mausollus*, prince of Caria, at the famous literary contest instituted in his honour by his widow Artemisia (Ol. 107, 1).

After his return, his free tongue and quarrelsome manner appear to have made him fresh enemies, for after the death of Alexander he was again exiled, and sought a refuge in Egypt, where, however, Ptolemy I. was as unwilling as the Greek cities to receive him, so that he escaped from this country also, through the warning of his friends. This is the last fact recorded of his life. As to his work, we find cited by Suidas an *Epitome of Herodotus* in two books, then a continuation of Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian war (like Xenophon's *Hellenica*), and subsequent events in twelve books reaching down to the battle of Knidus. But his greatest work was a history of Philip, embracing in digressions all the contemporary history down to the king's death, in fifty-eight books. This very voluminous work was abridged into seventeen books, retaining nothing but the Macedonian history, by the orders, perhaps even by the hand, of Philip III., the opponent of the Romans. In this form at least the work was extant in the days of Photius. The reader will find an epitome of what

¹ This is the date preferred by Müller (i. lxxv-vii). Others prefer the date given by Suidas, the 93rd Olympiad, and think he was trained by Isocrates in his first school at Chios. But this does not agree with the statement that he was only forty-five years old after Alexander came to the throne.

is known of the several books in Müller's *Fragg.*, i. pp. lxx-lxxii. His many panegyrical and deliberative speeches, as well as his letters, doubtless in the style of his master Isocrates, are rarely cited. Athenæus refers four times to his letters to Alexander for attacks on the Chians, and on Harpalus concerning his immoral life.¹ There are also mentioned a *Diatribē against Plato*, and a tract on *Piety*.

§ 593. We have many and explicit judgments on his merits as a historian and as a stylist, which are sufficiently supported by his fragments to give us a clearer idea of him than of any of his rivals. We have an abstract of his vain and self asserting personal preface to the *Philippica*.² He here boasted of his independence from writing for pay, of the number of his works, and their celebrity through the world, as well as of his travels, quite after the manner of one of the older sophists. He proceeded to assert the superiority of the literary men of his own day over their predecessors, owing to the advances and improvements made in the study of letters. This offensive self-praise was no doubt common in the school of Isocrates, and marks a turning point in the history of Greek literature. It is plain from the exceedingly voluminous character of Theopompus' compositions, from the extraordinary variety of the subjects quoted in our fragments, and from other indications, that he aimed at excelling Herodotus rather than Thucydides. But not only were his digressions excessive and tedious, but the stories of marvels and miracles, and of barbarian manners and customs, which sound appropriate in Herodotus, were out of place and even offensive in this more conscious and sceptical age, and were justly ridiculed by his critics. We may also be certain that he treated his subject in an intensely rhetorical spirit, seeking everywhere for effect rather than strict truth. He was, moreover, a strong political partisan, and allowed himself constantly to attack violently Greek democracies and their failings. Indeed, in every case he sought out hidden motives, and stated them with force, but often with libellous rancour. His taste for repeating private scandal, and for drawing pictures of luxury and of immorality among both

¹ *Fragg.* 276-8.

² *Fragg.* 26.

Greeks and barbarians,¹ shows a very different order of mind from that of Herodotus. He is in fact a self-conscious, rhetorical, Isocratic ape of the great historian. Nor do his invectives against the increasing luxury of the age sound like the outcome of sincere indignation, but rather of a sour and fault-finding temper.

But withal, he must have been a man of considerable force, and far the greatest of Isocrates' pupils. The very persecutions he endured show that his furious invectives, and his angry advices on public affairs, had far more effect than the despised pamphlets of his master. He is quoted particularly often by Athenæus on various manners and customs, which he had minutely described, and these are unfortunately not the most edifying or instructive portions of his works. In spite of his strong self-assertion, and his unwearied diligence, no subsequent critic admitted him to the pinnacle he claimed above his great predecessors in historiography.²

§ 594. I do not think that any of the numerous succeeding historians,³ or the group of antiquarian writers who

¹ Cf. in Müller frags. 33, 54, 65, 95, 129, 149, 178, 222, 243, 249, 260.

² The utilisation of Theopompus by later historians—Nepos, Plutarch, Diodorus, &c.—forms a parallel enquiry to those above cited as regards Ephorus. The episode *περὶ δημαγωγῶν* seems to have been often thus transcribed. In addition to the tracts above given, which touch on Theopompus as well as Ephorus, we have Bünger, *Theopompus* (Würzburg, 1874); Natorp, *quos auctores—secuti sint Diodorus, &c.* (Würzburg, 1876); Rühl, *die Quellen Plut. in Leben des Kimon* (Marburg, 1867); and Schmidt's *Perikleisches Zeitalter*. These critics set up and overthrow all manner of hypotheses on the indirect use of sources by late authors. But as they are chiefly based on the unproved assumption that later transcribers adhered with uniformity to the authority they had once selected, none of them is likely to add much to our knowledge of lost authors.

³ Thus *Timæus* of Tauromenium, who was born in classical days (about 350 B.C.), did not begin his literary work till late in life, after his exile by Agathocles, and his settlement at Athens. The whole style of his Sicilian history, his perpetual censure of his forerunners, his want of that chastity and reticence which marked good Greek prose, unite in degrading him in our estimation to a writer of the silver age. Our chief knowledge of him is from Polybius, who 'hoists him on his own petard' by frequent censuring of his angry criticisms.

composed *Atthides* on the legendary and historical lore of Athens, can be included in classical Greek literature. In no case have we sufficient knowledge of them to judge of their style, and there is no reason to think that any one of them reached such excellence as to entitle him to any attention beyond that claimed by the matter of his book. The age of originating in literature was passing away. People who studied form had unapproachable models in the older masters. People who desired new knowledge sought it in a great and wide-spreading literature which was scientific in its aim, and sought merely to impart knowledge in the plainest way. These critical and scientific tendencies found a suitable atmosphere for their growth beyond the limits of Greece, and in the new kingdom which first mediated between purely Hellenic and non-Hellenic culture. To enter upon the history of this period, and in this foreign soil, must be reserved for a different work.

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
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
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
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